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THE BRITISH AIR CAMPAIGN DURING THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 
APRIL-NOVEMBER, 1916: A PYRRHIC VICTORY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Battle of the Somme was Britain’s first major offensive of the First World War. 
Just about every facet of the campaign has been analyzed and reexamined. However, one area 
of the battle that has been little explored is the second battle which took place simultaneously 
to the one on the ground. This second battle occurred in the skies above the Somme, where for 
the first time in the history of warfare a deliberate air campaign was planned and executed to 
support ground operations. The British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was tasked with achieving 
air superiority over the Somme sector before the British Fourth Army attacked to start the 
ground offensive.  
 
This study focuses on the Royal Flying Corps, its organization and leaders, as well as 
the strategy and doctrine it employed in its attempt to regain air superiority from the German 
Army Air Service (GAAS) in the spring of 1916. Prior to the start of the ground battle, the 
commander of the RFC, General Hugh Trenchard, directed his squadrons accomplish six 
tactical tasks in order for the RFC to achieve aerial superiority over the Somme. These tasks 
were: 1) aerial reconnaissance, 2) aerial photography, 3) observation and direction of artillery, 
4) tactical bombing, 5) ‘contact’ patrols in support of the infantry and 6) air combat against the 
GAAS to enable achievement of the other five tasks. Critical to answering the question of 
whether or not the RFC accomplished its assigned tasks this study also examines the 
development of air power strategy by the RFC before and during the battle. Five factors are 
used to frame the analysis: strategy, organization, leadership, selection and training of aircrew. 
 
Although the RFC suffered high losses because it rigidly adhered to an offensive 
strategy throughout the air campaign, when the battle ended, the RFC still controlled the skies 
above the Somme. While the ground campaign failed to accomplish most of its stated 
objectives, historians have argued that the air campaign was a victory for the RFC. This paper 
contends that because of the heavy aircrew casualties it in fact proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. 
The consequences of maintaining a continuous air offensive over the Somme led to nearly 
disastrous results for the RFC in its subsequent air campaign over Arras in April, 1917. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
To Command the Sky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
On the first morning of the Battle of the Somme, 1 July, 1916, an air engagement took 
place before the first British troops ever left their trenches to begin the attack.  Just after 0600 
hours, two single-seat de Havilland DH 2 pusher biplanes, the first true single-seat British 
fighter aircraft of the war, became engaged with ten German two-seater aircraft crossing the 
lines at Festubert on a bombing mission.1 Flying the lead DH 2 was the squadron commander, 
Major Lionel W. B. Rees. A career soldier, Rees had transferred to the Royal Flying Corps 
(RFC) at the outbreak of the war in August, 1914 and was serving his second tour at the front 
with an operational squadron.  He had won the Military Cross as a flight commander in 1915 
flying an FB5 Gunbus with Number 11 Squadron.2 The second aircraft in the flight was 
piloted by a Canadian, Lieutenant J. C. Simpson. While Simpson patrolled the lines from La 
Bassee, Loos, and Souchez, Rees patrolled the front line awaiting the return of a flight of DH 
2s, he had sent out several hours earlier to escort aircraft from two other squadrons whose 
mission was to bomb the railway station at Don and disrupt German troop movements in the 
area.3 
 Now separated from his squadron commander by several miles of sky and though the 
odds were heavily against him, Lieutenant Simpson dove to attack the German formation.  
Within seconds, Simpson found himself attacked in turn. After a fierce exchange of machine-
gun fire, Simpson’s DH 2 was seen by observers on the ground to descend more than 5,000 
feet, apparently under control.  In fact Simpson had been killed instantly having been hit eight 
                                                            
1 Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, (London: William Kimber and Co., Limited, 
1969), 170-173. 
2 Alex Revell, Victoria Cross: WWI Airmen and Their Aircraft, (Stratford, CT: Flying Machine Press, 
1997), 77. 
3Ibid., 78.  
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times in the head by the accurate fire from the German gunners. His aircraft crashed in no-
man’s land where the wreckage was almost immediately shelled by German artillery.4 
 Rees was too far away from the fight to have witnessed Simpson’s demise but he did 
spot the cluster of aircraft crossing the British lines and assumed they were the returning 
British bombers he was to link up with. Flying to intercept them, it was not until he spotted the 
small crosses on their fuselages that he realized they were enemy machines. He was more than 
a little surprised that a flight of German aircraft was actually attempting to cross over the lines 
into British airspace, something they had not done in any strength for several weeks.  Rees, 
replicating Simpson, attacked without hesitation. Holding his fire until he was less than one 
hundred yards from the leading aircraft, Rees fired thirty rounds from his Lewis machine-gun, 
causing damage to the fuselage between the pilot and the observer. Rees then attacked the 
second aircraft and fired fifteen rounds into it. In the span of a few seconds he had badly 
damaged two enemy aircraft. Both were seen to be trailing smoke and descending back 
towards the safety of the German lines. At least one of the bombers dropped its bombs on top 
of German positions.5 
At 9,000 feet, Rees then proceeded to attack five more of the enemy aircraft and in the 
process broke up the integrity of their formation and effectively ended the Germans bombing 
mission. He was however, hit in the upper leg by a bullet from one of the bomber’s observer-
gunners but continued to attack as he came within range of another enemy aircraft. “I finished 
firing about ten yards away, and saw the observer sitting back firing straight up in the air. . . 
                                                            
4 Alex Revell, Victoria Cross: WWI Airmen and Their Aircraft , 78. See also H. A. Jones, The War in 
the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Vol. 2, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1928), 332. Hereafter referred to as WITA followed by volume number. 
5 W. Alister Williams, Against the Odds: The Life of Group Captain Lionel Rees, VC, (Clwyd, Wales: 
Bridge Books, 1989), 90-91, 
4 
He was firing an immense amount of ammunition. Just before he reached the lines I gave him 
one more drum. Having finished my ammunition I came home.” 6 
One British pilot had single-handedly prevented ten German bombers from crossing 
the British lines and accomplishing their mission. It was later confirmed that Rees had in fact 
shot down the first two aircraft he had attacked. Thousands of soldiers from both sides had 
been witnesses to this act of incredible bravery. As it turned out, Rees had killed the 
commander of the German flight of aircraft, Leutnant Erich Zimmermann, the Staffelfuhrer of 
Kaghol 3 and wounded his pilot with the aircraft crashing near a small village near La 
Bassee.7  
 The results of the air action between Rees and the German bombers would have no 
small impact on the German Army Air Service’s (GAAS) bombing raids during the opening 
phase of the Battle of the Somme.  The Official Historian of the Royal Air Force (RAF) later 
recorded that “The efficacy of his [Rees’s] attack impressed the enemy whose attempts at 
daylight raiding afterwards were few.”8 Lieutenant Gwilym Lewis, a pilot who served with 
Rees in Number 32 Squadron, wrote a letter to his parents describing his commanding 
officer’s actions that morning. 
The Major [Rees] happened to be up at the same time on a DH. I told you he 
was the bravest man in the world. He came across them a little later, and the 
Archie [Anti-Aircraft] batteries say they have never seen anything so gallant 
or comic in their lives. The Huns were in a tight little bunch when he came 
along-after he had finished they were scattered in twos and ones all over the 
sky, not knowing which way to go. He sent the first one down out of control; 
the second one probably had a bullet through the engine. He turned to attack 
the third, whose observer was sitting with his head back and his gun aimed 
vertically upwards fairly blazing off bullets. I suppose he must have forgotten 
                                                            
6 W. Alister Williams, Against the Odds: The Life of Group Captain Lionel Rees, VC, 90-91. See also 
Ralph Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in France: From Mons to the Somme. (London: Constable and 
Company Limited, 1994), 164-165. 
7 Alex Revell, Victoria Cross: WWI Airmen and Their Aircraft, 76-79.  See also Royal Flying Corps, 
1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, (London: William Kimber and Co., Limited, 1969), 172. 
8 H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, Vol. II. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1928), 332. Hereafter referred to 
as WITA. 
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to take his hand off the trigger before he ”pipped out.”  Just as the Major was 
going to get this machine as a trophy another fellow came and shot him in the 
leg from below. He was still going on but discovered he couldn’t steer his 
machine so he came home.9 
 
Rees was wounded worse than it first appeared. Upon landing he was taken to a Casualty 
Clearing Station and then spent six months in the hospital recovering from his wound. He was 
never able to fly on active operations again.10 His actions in leading his fighter squadron in 
June culminated with his one and only mission of the first day of the Somme offensive. For 
his courage and resolution in the face of overwhelming odds, Rees would later receive the 
Victoria Cross, Britain’s most distinguished medal for valor.11 Although the air battle over the 
Somme lasted nearly eight months, Rees was the only RFC pilot to receive the Victoria Cross 
during the arduous campaign.  
 
Since the Battle of the Somme’s eightieth anniversary in July, 1996, there has been 
much renewed interest by historians and laymen alike regarding Britain’s first major offensive 
of the First World War. Just about every facet of the campaign has been analyzed and 
reexamined. Many of the works have focused on the senior commanders, the strategy and 
tactics that were used, the units involved and of course the soldiers that fought the campaign. 
There has also been much attention given to the social, cultural, and political aspects of the 
nations and armies that conducted the battle. An ever-increasing group of military historians 
have argued that the Somme campaign was a turning point in both the war and in military 
history because during this battle the tank was introduced to the battlefield and aerial warfare 
                                                            
9 Gwilym H. Lewis, Wings Over the Somme, 1916-1918. (Clwd, Wales: Bridge Books, 1976), 47-48. 
10 Christopher Shores, Norman Franks & Russel Guest, Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the 
Fighter Aces and Units of the British Aces and Units of the British Empire Air Forces, 1914-1920, 
(London: Grub Street, 1990), 316. 
11 Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield: Air Fighting and the Complete List of Allied Air 
Casualties From Enemy Action in the First War, (London, Grub Street, 1995), 90.  
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emerged as a factor to be considered in all future operations. In the last ten years alone more 
than three dozen books have been written about the events that took place in northern France 
between July and mid-November, 1916.12 For almost five months, British, French, and 
German armies fought one of the costliest battles of the twentieth century and arguably, in all 
of recorded history. The result was well over a million casualties suffered by the three 
combatants and yet only a few miles of ground had been captured by the Allies when the 
titanic struggle concluded. Historians on both sides of the Atlantic continue to argue and 
debate whether or not the British actually achieved their stated purpose and whether the results 
justified the human cost.13  
However, one area of the battle has been little explored and that is a second battle 
which occurred simultaneously to the one on the ground. This second battle took place in the 
skies above the Somme, where for the first time in the history of warfare a deliberate air 
campaign was planned and executed to support ground operations. The RFC was directed to 
achieve air superiority by its commander before General Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) launched Britain’s first major ground offensive of the war.  
The few historians who have written about the air campaign in the last three decades 
have argued that the RFC not only achieved air superiority during the Battle of the Somme but 
by doing so achieved a significant victory in the process.14 Prior to the start of the battle 
                                                            
12 These books are listed in the bibliography. 
13 Revisionist historians such as Gary Sheffield, Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson, Martin Gilbert, and 
Michael Chappell among a litany of others have provided strong arguments that the Somme was not the 
catastrophe that the ‘traditionalist’ historians made it out to be. They contend that not only did the 
British offensive relieve pressure from the French at Verdun but more importantly by inflicting 
enormous casualties on the German army the battle was a necessary pre-condition for the Allied victory 
in 1918.  
14 The most recent works on the subject are Peter Hart’s Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and 
the Battle of the Somme, 1916, (London: Pen & Sword Books, Limited, 2001); Nigel Steele and Peter 
Hart’s Tumult in the Clouds: The British Experience of the War in the Air 1914-1918, (London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1997) and Ralph Barker’s The Royal Flying Corps in France: From Mons to the Somme, 
(London: Constable and Company, Limited, 1994).  
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General Trenchard directed the RFC to accomplish six tactical tasks in order to achieve air 
superiority over the battlefield. These tasks were: 1) aerial reconnaissance, 2) aerial 
photography, 3) observation and directing artillery, 4) tactical bombing, 5) ‘contact’ patrols in 
support of the infantry, and 6) air combat against the German Army Air Service (GAAS). By 
accomplishing the six tactical tasks the RFC achieved air superiority before and during the 
battle but the relentless pursuit of a strategy of offensive operations at all cost by the RFC 
leadership jeopardized the organization’s ability to conduct future operations. The air 
campaign over the Somme resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the RFC which led to its defeat by 
the Luftstreitkrafte during the subsequent air campaign at Arras in April, 1917.15  
To support the contention that by gaining air superiority over the Somme the RFC 
earned a Pyrrhic victory which resulted in nearly disastrous air campaign that followed this 
study will focus on the British efforts to achieve air superiority in the spring of 1916 above the 
battlefield before and during the First Battle of the Somme. How did the RFC wrest control of 
the skies from the German Army Air Service (GAAS) which had gained and then maintained 
air superiority for nearly eight months before the battle began? If the RFC did accomplish its 
tactical tasks was it able to maintain control of the air throughout the duration of the battle? 
What impact, if any, did the RFC have on the ground campaign during the battle?  By 
conducting a deliberate and well-planned air campaign, the RFC did in fact develope the 
operational framework that would be used by air forces in each of the conflicts that followed 
the First World War. Critical to answering the question of whether or not the RFC 
accomplished its assigned mission before the start of the battle is assessing the development 
                                                            
15 A Pyrrhic victory is defined as a victory won at staggering cost to the victor. The phrase is named 
after King Pyrrhus of Epirrus, whose army was victorious against a Roman army at Asculum in 279 BC 
during the Pyrrhic War. Pyrrhus’ army sustained enormous casualties and he was reputed to have said 
after the battle “If we are victorious in one more battle against the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.” 
See Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary, (New York: Riverside Publishing Company, 
1988), 960.   
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and formulation of an air power strategy by the RFC prior to and during the battle itself. Just 
as important, the organization of the RFC and its leadership must also be examined to 
determine how these two critical elements shaped the planning and execution of the air 
campaign.  
To answer the above stated questions, five factors will be used to frame the analysis. It 
will be argued that each of these five factors played a role, some more critical than the others, 
in the planning and execution of the air campaign, as well as the results achieved and the 
consequences of those results which occurred after the battle was over.  The first factor is 
strategy, most especially the strategy that was formulated and used by the RFC prior to and 
during the battle as well as development of doctrine to support that strategy. Of particular 
interest will be the examination of whether or not the strategy was modified or changed during 
the eight month air campaign. Tied to strategy is the element of morale and its impact on the 
aircrew during the battle, especially when the RFC casualty rate exceeded acceptable 
standards during the last two months of the offensive. The end result of the aircrew’s 
herculean efforts and sacrifice would call into question the chosen strategy used to conduct the 
air campaign. The second factor is the organization of the RFC. Analysis include how the 
RFC was created, developed and expanded to accomplish the missions assigned to it by the 
BEF’s leadership. The third factor is leadership, in particular an analysis of the three most 
influential leaders within the RFC who shaped and led the force before and during the battle, 
and the decisions they made and the consequences of those decisions. The fourth factor is the 
selection process used to identify potential aircrew for entry into the RFC and the fifth and last 
factor is training, more specifically the training programs that were used to prepare the aircrew 
for their role in the air war over the Somme.16 To take each of these factors in turn: 
                                                            
16 For the purposes of this study the term aircrew will encompass pilots as well as observers and aerial 
gunners. 
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First, strategy, which has been interpreted and defined to differing degrees of 
understanding throughout history by the great military theorists from Sun Tzu to Liddell Hart. 
Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow defined strategy as “all military movements out of the enemy’s 
cannon range or range of vision,” and tactics as “all movements within this range.”17 Carl von 
Clausewitz, renowned today as the father of modern strategic study, argued that von Bulow’s 
definitions were far too simplistic because they did not take into account the advancements to 
technology on the battlefield. Clausewitz presented a definition for military strategy that he 
believed would apply to all wars whether they had been fought in the past, those then being 
fought during his lifetime and those that would be fought in the future. “Tactics constitute the 
theory of the use of armed forces in battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for the 
purposes of the war.”18  
In his book, Strategy, Liddell Hart concluded that Clausewitz’ definition of strategy as 
"the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war" was seriously 
flawed because this view of strategy intruded upon policy and made battle the only means of 
achieving the strategic objectives that had been identified by the national or state 
government.19 Later in the same work, Liddell Hart acknowledged that Clausewitz recognized 
these shortcomings in his definition and had he not died at the relatively early age of fifty-one 
he would have clarified his statement. Liddell Hart defined strategy to be: "the art of 
distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy."20  
                                                            
17 Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 190. 
18 Ibid. 
19 B. H. Liddell Hart. Strategy. (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 319. 
20 Ibid., 321. 
10 
For the purposes of this study strategy is defined as a set of ideas for employing 
military forces in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national or multinational 
objectives. Strategy is also distinct from tactics. The latter’s focus is concerned with the 
conduct of a battle or an engagement while strategy focuses on how the different battles and 
engagements are linked. Thus how a battle is fought deals with tactics and whether or not the 
battle should be fought at all is a matter of strategy. Furthermore, doctrine is not strategy but is 
in fact a sub-element of strategy and incorporates how technology, the capabilities of the 
adversary, and the capability of one’s own organization will ensure mission accomplishment.21 
In this study morale is tied inextricably to strategy. Morale is defined as the human 
dimension’s most important intangible element, especially in combat.  It is a measure of how 
people feel about themselves, their organization and their leaders. “High morale comes from 
good leadership, shared effort and mutual respect. .  . High morale results in a cohesive team 
striving to achieve common goals. Competent leaders know that morale . . . holds the 
organization together and keeps it going in the face of terrifying and dispirited events that 
occur in war,” the U.S. Army’s most recent disquisition on the subject has avowed.22  
The second factor is organization. A simple definition of an organization, in this case 
a military organization is an entity that consists of a group of military personnel who belong to 
the armed forces of a state so as to provide a military capability that is required by the aims 
established by those setting a national security policy. All organizations, military or civilian, 
share three key characteristics. First, it must have a purpose; second it must contain people, 
and thirdly, it must have plans. Edwin Gerloff has written: “Organizations are goal-oriented 
associations of people which have identifiable plans, systems and structures that are designed 
                                                            
21 Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-
1960. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989), 7-9. 
22 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22: Army Leadership, October, 2006, 7-8. 
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to accomplish their intended purposes.”23 Goals and objectives are the center of gravity for a 
military organization and faced with complex situations such as combat operations, the 
leadership must make adjustments to achieve those goals and objectives. A military 
organization contains a leadership structure that is hierarchical in nature with a formalized 
rank structure. The leadership determines the relationships between functions and positions, 
delegate’s roles, responsibilities and authority to carry out identified tasks that will lead to 
attaining the organizations established objectives.  
The third factor is leadership, which for our purposes is defined as “the process of 
influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to 
accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”24 Key elements of this definition of 
leadership include purpose and vision. “Purpose gives subordinates the reason to act in order 
to achieve a desired outcome” while vision is just another way leaders can provide an 
organizational purpose. Both in peacetime and in war, organizational-level leaders usually 
provide a statement to their units encompassing far-reaching objectives and goals as well as 
mission accomplishment.25 Specifically, the focus will be on the three senior leaders of the 
RFC who were responsible for the planning, resourcing, and execution of the air campaign 
over the Somme.  
The fourth factor is the selection of aircrew and specifically focuses on the human 
dimension of the air campaign: the pilots and observers who manned the RFC squadrons and 
were responsible for accomplishing the missions assigned them throughout the battle. 
Analysis will focus on the selection criteria for aircrew and whether or not the RFC had 
                                                            
23 Edwin A. Gerloff, Organizational Theory and Design: A Strategic Approach to Management, (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1985), 6.  
24 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22: Army Leadership, 1-2. 
25 Ibid. 
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developed an effective system for selecting potential aircrew and the strengths and weaknesses 
of that system prior to the air campaign over the Somme. 
The fifth and last factor is the training of aircrew. Training, for our purposes, is 
defined as a process to make personnel proficient in accomplishing specific tasks with 
specialized instruction and practice and refers to the methodology and programs that the RFC 
used to train their aircrew to accomplish the assigned tasks required once they joined an 
operational squadron and then deployed to France to participate in the air battle.  
To illustrate the five factors chosen for analysis and to also put a face on the RFC 
during the air campaign, the experiences of ten airmen will be incorporated into the narrative. 
They were selected for several reasons. First, they represent a cross-section of British society 
with various backgrounds, professions and classes, but of the RFC as well. Second, they 
represented the different nations that belonged to the British Empire at the time of the First 
World War. Four were from England, two from Wales, one each from Scotland, Ireland, 
Canada, as well as an American who was serving with a Canadian unit before volunteering for 
duty with the RFC. Thirdly and most importantly, each left either an autobiography, 
unpublished memoir or a detailed collection of letters that chronicles his experiences in the 
RFC during the air campaign on the Somme. 
Each of these ten airmen had one thing in common-a fascination of being part of 
something new that offered both excitement and opportunity. How the men were selected, 
trained and what they witnessed as aircrew during the Battle of the Somme should illuminate 
what thousands of British and Dominion airmen experienced while executing the air 
campaign. Somewhat surprisingly, with the exceptionally high casualty rate that the RFC 
suffered during the battle, nine of the ten men highlighted survived not only the air campaign 
but the war as well.  
13 
Prior to any analysis of the air campaign itself it is necessary to briefly examine the 
development of air power theory in Britain prior to the outbreak of hostilities and, more 
importantly, the development of an aerial strategy for the RFC in France during the first two 
years of the war, including the Somme offensive. How was it that the RFC came to the 
conclusion that by conducting a continuous offensive strategy in the air they would be able to 
attain air superiority over the battlefield and by doing so ensure that the British forces on the 
ground would have a much greater chance of accomplishing their objectives? Achieving aerial 
superiority was only a means to an end for Haig and the commander of the RFC, General Sir 
Hugh Trenchard. Though there was always the argument within political and military channels 
before the war of making the RFC a separate service, the RFC was not a separate service but 
an auxiliary branch of the army and would remain so if Haig and Trenchard had anything to 
say about it.26  
The real benefit of attaining air superiority was to allow freedom of movement for 
those aircraft assigned to observe and direct artillery fire; conduct photographic  
reconnaissance of enemy positions, troop movements and logistics routes and centers; 
maintain observation of friendly troops in the attack and through the use of fighter aircraft, 
prevent the enemy from doing the same.27 By accomplishing these missions the RFC should 
have been able to provide significant support to Haig’s armies.  At the same time, even if 
aerial superiority was achieved, the effort would be largely wasted if the ground forces could 
not capitalize on what the RFC provided it in the way of intelligence, artillery direction, and 
close support to the infantry. 
 
                                                            
26 Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, (London: Allen & Unwin Publishers, Ltd., 
1986),72-73. See also Robert F. Grattan, The Origins of Air War: The Development of Military Air 
Strategy in World War I, (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2009), 186-187.  
27 Hilary St. George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power, 1911-1939, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1944), 88-90.  
14 
 The actions of Simpson and Rees described previously epitomized the aerial strategy 
that the RFC had come to embrace since Trenchard took command of the RFC on 19 August, 
1915. Even before the advent of fighter aircraft to the air war, Trenchard had begun to 
advocate for a doctrine of offensive operations against the GAAS. 28As the commander of First 
Wing, RFC during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (March, 1915) and the Battle of Loos 
(September, 1915), he worked diligently to identify the strengths and deficiencies of his 
organization and that of the RFC as a whole in its attempts to provide support to the British 
Army in France and Flanders.29 The results of his analysis and assessments became the 
foundations for what would become his proscribed aerial strategy.    
During the build-up to the Somme offensive as the BEF was expanding and 
incorporating hundreds of thousands of untrained men into newly formed divisions, the RFC 
was also expanding to provide support to each of the armies and corps on the Western Front. 
As more squadrons and the first aircraft designed to be fighters began to arrive in France in the 
winter and spring of 1916, the RFC’s foremost priority was to end the GAAS’s dominance of 
the skies over the battlefield.30 To do this they had to defeat the ‘Fokker Scrouge’ so called 
because of the Fokker Eindecker monoplane that carried a synchronized machine-gun that 
fired through the rotating propeller. This revolutionary capability changed the face of all 
future air operations.31 From late summer 1915 to early spring 1916, the Fokker Eindecker 
dominated the skies over the French and British trenches. As noted aviation historian Norman 
Franks wrote, the Eindecker’s became like “sharks flying amidst the allied minnows.” 32 Both 
                                                            
28 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, (London: Collins, 1962),154, 
29 Dan Divine, The Broken Wing: A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power, (London: Hutchinson & 
Co, Ltd., 1966), 80. 
30 Sir Robert Thompson, The Royal Flying Corps, (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1968), 58. 
31 Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918, (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation 
Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1984), 16. 
32 Norman Franks, Sharks Among Minnows: Germanys’ First Fighter Pilots and the Fokker Eindecker 
Period, July 1915 to September 1916. London: Grub Street, 2001), x. Franks presents a solid argument 
15 
the British and French had failed to approve or institute a synchronization gear for their 
aircraft in the first eighteen months of the war and thus the British concentrated on developing 
‘pusher’ aircraft where the engine was behind the pilot in single-seater aircraft and the pilot 
and his observer/gunner in two-seater aircraft and thus pushed the aircraft through the sky. A 
major advantage of this type of aircraft was the fact that it allowed for unimpeded observation 
and more importantly a clear field of fire.33 
With the introduction of two ‘pusher’ fighters, the Farman Experimental 2B (FE 2b) 
and the de Havilland DH 2 (DH 2) aircraft, Trenchard was finally able unleash his aircraft to 
take the air war deep behind enemy lines and carry out his offensive strategy unhindered for 
the most part by the enemy or so it seemed at first.34 However, when casualties began to rise 
alarmingly in the first month of the Somme offensive there was both concern and debate not 
only within military channels but within Parliament as well. Questions were raised as to 
whether or not the strategy being used by the RFC was in fact the correct strategy to be 
followed. The debate had begun several months before the start of the air campaign when the 
Prime Minister, Herbert H. Asquith, expressed concern to Haig about Trenchard’s abilities to 
command the RFC as well as the increasing number of aircrew casualties caused by the 
offensive strategy he was employing.35  
With the firm support of Haig, Trenchard was able to keep his inquisitors at bay and 
continued to advocate the critical importance of his offensive strategy against the Germans in 
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France. Eventually, though it wasn’t published until nearly three months after the start of the 
ground offensive, Trenchard provided his strategy for the use of air power on the Western 
Front to the government for clarification. Though it was entitled ‘Future Policy in the Air’ it 
laid out the strategy the RFC had followed since Trenchard had taken command of the RFC.36 
Furthermore, it laid out the argument why Trenchard was convinced that an offensive strategy 
was the only strategy to follow.  His argument and recommendations would prove to be one of 
the most powerful and critical documents in aviation history and would serve as the 
foundation for what would define the tenets of subsequent air power theory in the twentieth 
century and its use in all air campaigns that followed.37   
The strategy espoused by Trenchard was firmly in line with Haig’s strategy for the 
conduct of the war on the Western Front and just like Haig’s it was based largely on a doctrine 
of attrition. 
The sound policy, then, which should guide all warfare in the air, would seem 
to be this: to exploit this moral effect of the aeroplane on the enemy, but not 
to let him exploit it on ourselves. Now this can only be done by attacking and 
continuing the attack.38  
 
 
In the same document Trenchard added “British aviation has been guided by a policy of 
relentless and incessant offensive” which referred to the strategy that he had advocated, even 
demanded be followed since taking command of the RFC.39 He had convinced Haig and his 
aviation superior, Sir David Henderson, the Director General of Military Aeronautics 
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(DGMA) that this was a valid strategy and they agreed, supporting him wholeheartedly.40 This 
strategy had far-reaching effects on Britain’s ability to carry out other air operations, not only 
on the Western Front but in the other theaters of operation as well because of the continuous 
demand to make good the heavy losses of aircraft and more importantly, trained aircrew.41 
 Trenchard’s strategy for air warfare was built upon three basic principles: the first was 
that the RFC was a branch of the British Army along the lines of the Infantry, Artillery, and 
Cavalry.42 Because of the role the RFC had played in providing important operational 
intelligence during the battles of 1914 and 1915, one early British airpower theorist argued 
that the RFC had thus earned the right to be identified as the fourth critical arm of the British 
Army.43 Secondly, The RFC’s sole purpose was to provide whatever support the army 
required to enable it to accomplish its objectives on the ground.44 Trenchard believed that 
without adequate air support the GAAS would be free to cause havoc to British ground 
operations through the use of unhindered artillery direction and observation, reconnaissance 
and photography operations and eventually the ability to provide close air support against 
                                                            
40 Letter from Henderson to Trenchard, 1 February, 1916, Trenchard Papers, RAFM and The Private 
Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919,  ed. Robert Blake, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), 126. 
See also David Jordan and Gary Sheffield, “Douglas Haig and Airpower”, Airpower Leadership Theory 
and Practice, ed. Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox, (London; The Stationary Office, 2002 ), 272-273. 
41 Malcolm Cooper. The Birth of Independent Air Power. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 71-72. 
Cooper argues that because Trenchard was allowed to dictate Britain’s overall air strategy and his focus 
was singularly on winning the air war on the Western Front that when German bombers began to raid 
England, most especially London, in 1917, there were few operational squadrons in England that could 
deal with the threat and thus the ability for the RFC to provide any semblance of home air defense and 
or “retaliatory strikes against enemy cities” was totally inadequate. 
42 F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth. (London: Constable & Co., 1916), 1-
2. 
43 Ibid., 1-8. Lanchester played a major role in the development of British air power theory before the 
First World War and his work Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm put many of his ideas 
and theories into one volume. Robin Higham, in his The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939, 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966) credits Lanchester with establishing the “basic 
theory of air warfare” in England before the First World War. 
44 Malcolm Cooper. The Birth of Independent Air Power, 72. 
18 
British units.45 To prevent this from occurring he proposed that the RFC follow an offensive 
strategy to interdict enemy air assets at all times and the further behind the enemy lines the 
better.  Thus the third principle, air superiority, had to be achieved, regardless of the cost.46 
 Critical to the development of Trenchard’s strategy was his relationship with the BEF 
commander, General Sir Douglas Haig. Trenchard had first come into contact with Haig 
during the September, 1912 army maneuvers in which Trenchard had participated as an aerial 
observer for the “northern force” against Haig’s “southern force.”47 Trenchard and the other 
RFC pilots he worked with were able to locate and identify Haig’s forces and thus secured the 
initiative for the “northern force.” Though still convinced that the cavalry would be 
responsible for battlefield reconnaissance, it was after this exercise that Haig began to develop 
an appreciation for the capabilities of aircraft.48  
Trenchard had then served as Haig’s principal air advisor when he commanded the 
First Wing, RFC when Haig commanded First Army in 1915. It was during this time that the 
two were able to develop a close, working relationship.49 The two were similar in many ways. 
Both lacked good verbal communication skills and disliked speaking freely among those they 
did not know well or trust. Both were seen as silent and aloof to their staffs but could be very 
direct when they observed a problem that needed addressing. Both had been considered strong 
athletes with Haig playing golf, polo, and tennis and Trenchard hunting, polo, and tennis. 
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Mutual strengths included indomitable leadership skills which included a fierce drive to 
accomplish any mission assigned to them. These similarities and the trust they developed with 
working with one another during the Battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos enabled them to 
build a respectful and professional relationship that in turn became friendship.50 Trenchard 
was promoted to command the RFC just four months before Haig was promoted to command 
the entire BEF.51 Haig came to rely totally on Trenchard’s technical expertise on the use of air 
power to the point where almost all of the official documents concerning the RFC and its air 
strategy issued by Haig’s headquarters were in fact written by Trenchard and his staff.52  
 Just as Haig’s strategy of the offense almost guaranteed an enormous casualty rate 
when massed formations of men were pitted against the modern technology of long-range 
artillery and machine-guns, the results were similar but even more drastic for the RFC because 
of its small numbers. Whereas the BEF could and did absorb the enormous losses of thousands 
of casualties per week during the Somme offensive, the RFC, totaling less than six hundred 
aircrew when the Battle of the Somme began, had difficulty replacing with adequately trained 
personnel the growing number of casualties it suffered.53 Thus, Trenchard’s pursuit of a 
strategy “of relentless and incessant offensive” garnered not only controversy but criticism as 
well. Several senior RFC leader’s who disagreed with the offensive strategy would wait until 
after the war to criticize Trenchard.54 Not all waited till after the war however to voice their 
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issues. During the second month of the battle, one of Trenchard’s subordinate commander’s 
recommended one of his squadrons be removed from operations to rest and train replacement 
pilots after sustaining nearly fifty percent casualties over a four week period. Trenchard 
approved the request but for indirectly questioning the offensive strategy that Trenchard 
advocated, the subordinate commander was removed from command and sent back to 
England, banished from all combat theaters for the remainder of the war.55 
 From April through June, 1916, the RFC strongly pursued the directed strategy of the 
air offensive and suffered an increasingly high number of aircrew casualties in the process. 
That said, the ground commanders whose forces were supported by the RFC, praised their 
efforts to both the BEF commander and governmental leaders. Six weeks before the start of 
the Somme offensive the commander of the Fourth Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, 
asserted: 
[It] clearly shows that for the moment at any rate we have command of the air 
by day on the Fourth Army front. I cannot speak too highly of the work of 
these young pilots, most of whom have recently come out from England, and 
the de Havilland machine has unquestionably proved itself superior to the 
Fokker in speed, maneuver, climbing, and general fighting efficiency.56  
  
By directing that his fighter aircraft operate deep behind enemy lines to interdict their German 
counterparts before they could interfere with the RFC aircraft assigned to artillery direction, 
photography and reconnaissance, Trenchard was convinced that the RFC would attain air 
superiority and thus be able to provide any support requested by the army.57 It was this 
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concept that would serve as the cornerstone for Trenchard’s strategy throughout the Somme 
air campaign and for the remainder of the war.58 
 
In the years before the First World War much of the discussion on the development of 
air power theory in Britain (and for that matter in France and Germany as well), revolved 
around the concept of achieving ‘Command of the Air.’ It was thus logical that the air power 
theorists would start with the terms and definitions used by naval strategists to describe 
gaining command of the seas. Two of the more prominent naval strategists before the war 
were the American naval officer and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Britain’s own, Sir 
Julian S. Corbett. Mahan’s doctrine for naval warfare can be summarized into two pre-
requisites for gaining command of the sea. The first was that one must use the navy to destroy 
the enemy’s main battle fleet and second, if the enemy navy refuses battle then blockade his 
fleets in their harbors.59 Corbett on the other hand, though he agreed that command of the sea 
was the main objective of the war at sea he also believed it was not the only objective. He 
argued that opportunities to engage in a battle with the enemy fleet were never an assured 
thing nor was it always required. He emphasized the advantages of defense and proposed that 
the strategic offensive combined with tactical defense was the most effective form of warfare. 
Unlike Mahan, Corbett believed the use of a lengthy blockade was detrimental to the morale 
of the forcing conducting it as it reduced its “effective aggression.”60 It is evident that the 
writings of Mahan and Corbett provided the framework for both the civilian and military 
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theorists to identify what the concept of the command of the air really meant. Attempting to 
define ‘command of the air’ for the government, British army officer, Captain Bertram 
Dickson, presented a memorandum to the 1911 Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (CID).  
In the case of a European war between two countries, both sides would be 
equipped with large corps of aeroplanes, each trying to obtain information on 
the other, and to hide its own movements. The efforts which each side would 
exert in order to hinder or prevent the enemy from obtaining information . . . 
would lead to the inevitable result of a war in the air, for the supremacy of the 
air, by armed aeroplanes against each other. This fight for the supremacy of 
the air in future wars will be of the first and greatest importance (italics from 
original).”61 
 
Three years later on the eve of war, Sir George Ashton wrote a more subdued description of 
command of the air by arguing that only when aircraft were more capable of conducting aerial 
warfare would there be a fight for ‘local command of the air.’62 He was one of many in both 
government and military channels that believed that the primary purpose of aircraft was to 
conduct reconnaissance operations in support of the army or the navy and should avoid aerial 
combat to ensure accomplishment of the mission.63 Lanchester agreed that aerial 
reconnaissance would be an important mission for the flying service but more importantly, he 
believed that once war began “capturing the enemy’s air will be the prime task of the 
aeronautical service.”64  
 By 1913, J. E. B. Seely, the Secretary of State for War, concurred with both Ashton 
and Lanchester when he stated “We should concentrate on obtaining mastery of the air in any 
theatre of war by means of a fighting aeroplane and secure monopoly of reconnaissance by 
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advantage.”65 It was one thing to make this pronouncement, which pleased many within 
Britain’s small military aviation community, but it would have meant much more had he 
advocated the funding to ensure his comments became a reality. When the war started the 
RFC did not have the aircraft, the manpower, or the doctrine to achieve command of the air. 
The Royal Navy’s air wing, The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) on the other hand had been 
conducting experiments with armed aircraft and was intent on developing a more offensive 
style of air warfare before the war began.66 
 One of the few military aviators who believed that command of the air was not 
possible was the Military Wing’s first commander, Major Frederick H. Sykes. He argued that 
though the function of reconnaissance would be an important task for the air service, air power 
was in fact a strategic weapon and thus should be used for strategic purposes.67 He believed 
that the true value of the aircraft was its ability to strike deep behind the enemy’s lines, at 
critical targets such as logistics’ bases, communication centers and the industry that provided 
the weapons for the soldiers at the front.68  Sykes influence of the development of air power 
theory in Britain before the war has been largely ignored by many aviation historians.69 He 
would play a major role in translating theory into the strategy that the RFC would adopt after 
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the First World War began as well as the development of the roles and missions for the air 
service as well.70 
In the years between the Wright Brothers first successful flight and the start of the 
First World War, British air power theorists led by Lanchester and Sykes identified five 
fundamental concepts of air power that had been proposed for further study and had been 
presented to and discussed by the senior political and military leaders at the time for 
consideration and action. The first principle was that by conducting reconnaissance missions, 
air power could make significant contributions to both land and naval operations; the second 
was that command of the air was as essential to Britain as was command of the sea; the third, 
to achieve command of the air an independent service needed to be established; the fourth, air 
power could reach out far beyond the front lines of the battlefield and could strike targets deep 
into the enemy’s homeland; and the fifth, by such offensive action the enemy would be forced 
to divert essential resources to his own air defense. Though these concepts might have been 
known by Britain’s senior military and civilian leaders it in no way meant that they were 
agreed upon by either the air power advocates or the decision-makers.71 
In early 1912, a technical subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) 
met to review the five fundamentals of British air power that had been submitted by 
Lanchester and the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for a policy decision.  The CID 
declared that it was their learned opinion that the major contribution of both military and naval 
aircraft in future wars would primarily be in the role of reconnaissance. They made no 
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recommendations on the other four fundamentals and did not address the likely needs of home 
defense or offensive operations.72 That same year however, the RFC was established on 13 
May, 1912 with a Naval Wing, Military Wing, and a Central Flying School to train both army 
and naval pilots. An air committee was formed to coordinate with the Army and the Navy, but 
almost immediately the two wings began to develop “more in isolation than in harmony” until 
eventually the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) was formed on 1 July, 1914 out of the Naval 
Wing. When war broke out there were in fact two British air forces: the RFC was sent to 
France to provide long-range reconnaissance for the army; and the RNAS was split between 
Britain and Belgium and given the ill-defined mission of providing air defense for the fleet 
and for the United Kingdom.73 
Fortunately for the British some of those who formulated the early ideas on air power 
also became some of the first to put those ideas into practice. Brigadier-General David 
Henderson and Major Frederick Sykes were just two of the first members of the RFC who 
would apply their beliefs on air power upon the newest branch of the British army. The major 
problem that these advocates for air power encountered was that they did not have the rank or 
the influence required to convince either the military or political leadership to begin the 
implementation of more than one of the five fundamental ideas of air power that had been 
identified.  To make matters worse, they encountered senior British military leaders who had 
not been convinced of the need or value that aircraft would provide them on the battlefield. 
Two notable examples are provided by Sykes:  
The opposition by senior officers to air experiments amounted almost to a 
mania. General Nicolson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was of the 
opinion that aviation was a useless and expensive fad advocated by a few 
cranks whose ideas were unworthy of attention.74 
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And in July, 1914, a month before hostilities broke out, General Douglas Haig was purported 
to say: 
I hope none of you gentlemen is so foolish as to think that aeroplanes will be 
able to be usefully employed for reconnaissance purposes in war. There is 
only one way for a commander to get information by reconnaissance, and that 
is by the use of cavalry.75 
 
Haig’s perspective would change drastically in the first major campaign of the war. 
Regardless of the support attained or lack thereof, by the outbreak of war in August, 1914 
there was in fact a set of fundamental tenets of air power theory established in Britain. Not all 
were accepted by the decision-makers at the strategic level and of course none of these tenets 
had yet been tested in conflict. 
 It should be noted that there were more than a handful of retired and senior active duty 
officers who strongly supported the potential of air power before the war. The most senior 
retired officer who favored both experimentation and application of air power was Field 
Marshal the Earl Roberts, VC, commander-in-chief of the British Army before the position 
was abolished in 1904. Those on active duty such as General’s Sir Henry Wilson and Horace 
Smith-Dorrien as well as Field Marshal Earl Kitchener and General Sir John French, Secretary 
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of State for War and commander of the BEF in 1914 had also championed the aircraft but until 
war broke out their voices were for the most part ignored. Lieutenant General Sir James 
Grierson, commander of the BEF’s Second Corps, became a convert of air power after his 
experience with aircraft during the Army maneuvers convinced him that the senior 
commander in future wars would not be able to deploy his forces until he had gained mastery 
of the air.76   
Still facing opposition, the advocates persisted and several of them rose to prominence 
once the RFC was formed and served even more influential roles during the First World War. 
Captain Burke was first a pilot in the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers before joining the 
RFC where he commanded Number 2 Squadron at the beginning of the war and later 
commanded the Second Wing. Major Sykes as has been previously identified was the first 
commander of the Military Wing when it was formed. As a respected aviation theorist and 
flyer, Sykes ideas on air power brought him to the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Winston Churchill. The two spent several weekends together discussing the potential of 
aircraft and the future roles of air power.77 Sykes was also the key planner and organizer for 
the RFC’s role in the Army Maneuvers of 1912 and 1913, which in both years performed 
admirably in providing intelligence to the two divisions involved. It was prior to the 1912 
maneuvers that he served as the main author of the RFC Training Manual (which the War 
Office approved). In it he identified the three primary roles for the RFC: strategic 
reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, and the service of intercommunication.78 In effect the 
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RFC was to serve as the ‘eyes of the Army.’ He also authored the aviation section of the 
British Army’s Field Service Regulations. A year later Sykes authored the RFC Training 
Manual Part II.  In it he provided detailed guidance on the standardization of training for all 
squadrons. As Sykes lone biographer noted “It was a typical Sykes product-massive in size, 
detailed and focused entirely on the goal of achieving organizational efficiency.”79 Of critical 
note, by addressing both the strategic and tactical concepts that the RFC would use in war, the 
Training Manual, Parts I and II became the RFC’s first doctrinal manuals. They would be 
revised based on the lessons learned from the ‘Netheravon Concentration Camp’ that Sykes 
conducted two months before the war began. More importantly, RFC commanders and 
aircrew went to war with ‘established guidance’ on the missions and roles they were to 
conduct to support the army.  
In late June, 1914 Sykes, having convinced the War Office that it was prudent to 
conduct a practice mobilization of the RFC, directed that all units within the Military Wing 
deploy to Netheravon on Salisbury Plain for a four-week training exercise in which 
“experimental night flying across country, observation, signalling, air fighting, bomb-
dropping, photography, wireless and the rapid packing up and moving of transport by night” 
were practiced. For most of these tasks there was no guidance or doctrine. In his memoirs 
Sykes is quick to point out that “our only guide was the knowledge gained by our own 
experience and past mistakes. There were no rules except those we made as we went on.”80  
All four operational squadrons, along with all of their aircraft, personnel and equipment, 
gathered together to train on the many varied tasks they expected to conduct to support the 
army if and when hostilities took place. More importantly the exercise allowed both aircrew 
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and ground personnel to share ideas, techniques, and procedures so that when the RFC was 
alerted they were better prepared to deploy to war. The benefits of the June-July exercise were 
most valuable and the lessons learned were quickly put into practice when the RFC was 
deployed to France less than six weeks later. 
 Having been promoted to lieutenant-colonel in January 1913, Sykes was serving as 
chief of staff to the RFC’s commander, Brigadier-General David Henderson when the war 
began. It was Sykes who was largely responsible for designing the organizational structure of 
the RFC before it came into being but once war was declared he planned the RFC’s 
mobilization and deployment.81 In was shortly before his departure for France that Sykes had 
his first of several disagreements with the man who would eventually command the RFC 
during the Battle of the Somme, Hugh Trenchard. 
Major Hugh Trenchard had become enamored with aviation late in his career after 
having been encouraged by a junior officer who had served with him in Nigeria to take up 
flying. With his career at a standstill Trenchard decided to earn his pilot’s certificate and faced 
several hurdles in doing so but in August 1912, at the age of 39, he soloed after having only 
one hour and four minutes flying time.82 By doing so he became one of the first twenty pilots 
in the RFC since it had become an official organization within the British Army. Due to his 
age and late start at flight training, he only met the entrance requirements by less than ten 
days. Upon earning his wings he was assigned to be the Adjutant of the Central Flying School 
(CFS) where he quickly developed standing orders and procedures that combined both army 
and navy regulations since both services were represented at the CFS. His experience as an 
aerial observer in the 1912 Army maneuvers convinced him of the potential for aircraft in war 
but even more so he was convinced that it was the human dimension and not the numerous 
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theories of air power that were being argued that was the critical factor in making the aircraft a 
valuable tool for the ground commander. The Army maneuvers:  
brought home to Trenchard as no amount of theorizing could have done the 
value of the Central Flying School and the importance of his own place in it. 
Arguments between specialists about the superior merits of the monoplane 
over the slower, stabler biplane seemed of small significance compared with 
the elaborate human problem of producing first-class pilots and technicians 
for a Military Wing which hardly existed yet except on paper.83 
 
 
Trenchard also became involved in the development of the CFS curriculum and created 
written examinations on the subjects of map-reading, signaling, and the theory of aerial 
reconnaissance among others. When the war began he was not happy to learn that he would 
replace Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Sykes as the commander of the Military Wing and 
remain in England while Henderson assumed command of the RFC with Sykes as his Chief of 
Staff.  
 The initial confrontation between Sykes and Trenchard is supposed to have taken 
place the day before Sykes deployed to France. Sykes met with Trenchard to brief the latter on 
his duties and responsibilities as commander of the Military Wing. All went well until Sykes 
informed Trenchard that the Military Wing’s new purpose would be to provide replacement 
aircrew and aircraft for the RFC in France and that he did not foresee any requirement for new 
squadrons to be organized. Trenchard is reported to have said “Don’t talk damned rubbish. My 
job here, as you should know, is to produce squadrons. You’ll get reinforcements but not at 
their expense.” 84  The argument was heated and would result in a rift between the two officers 
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that would only intensify as the war and their careers progressed. Trenchard argued that he 
had been given verbal orders by Henderson that his first priority was to build new squadrons. 
If this were true why did Henderson not inform his chief of staff of this? Perhaps this 
important topic was overlooked or forgotten in the confusion to mobilize and deploy the RFC 
to France. The closest reference to this argument from Sykes is contained within his 
autobiography in which he states that Trenchard had “differed fundamentally with me on the 
policy of taking the maximum number of machines fit for active service [to France].”85 If 
Trenchard’s statement is accurate then why did Sykes believe that the RFC would not require 
more squadrons in the short term? The answer can be found in the fact that the War Office, 
believing the war would be of short duration and would be over in a manner of a few months, 
had approved the mobilization plan that directed all operational squadrons with their assigned 
aircraft and their crews be sent to France within six days after completing mobilization.86 The 
four operational squadrons within the RFC did deploy to France on 13 August with 44 aircraft 
flying across the English Channel without loss. Another nineteen aircraft arrived several days 
later by air or by ship. In the previous years leading up to the war, the CID had approved a 
plan that called for seven RFC squadrons (a total of 91 aircraft) with its attached Aircraft Park, 
that contained both a reserve of aircraft and personnel, be sent to France to support the BEF 
but the war began before the plan could be properly resourced.87 Meanwhile, Trenchard was 
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left in England with forty-one officers and 116 aircraft, of which only twenty were fit for use 
by the CFS for instructional purposes.88  
 With the majority of RFC personnel and equipment deployed to France, Trenchard 
immediately went to work on carrying out the directive he received from Henderson: 
Expanding the RFC.89 It was during these first few hectic days after the RFC’s deployment 
that Trenchard developed a strong working relationship with the man who did much to build 
the new foundations for the rapid expansion of the RFC that followed: Major William Sefton 
Brancker, Assistant Director General of Military Aeronautics at the War Office.90 Brancker 
was an experienced artilleryman who had earned his pilot’s certificate in 1913 and had served 
under General Henderson when he was the DGMA. With Henderson assuming command of 
the RFC, Brancker became the Deputy Director. Diligent, hard working, and with much 
foresight, Brancker worked behind the scenes dealing with the numerous administrative and 
logistical problems the RFC encountered in the first year of the war.91 He would become a 
staunch supporter of Trenchard and his development of the aerial strategy that the RFC would 
follow before and during the Battle of the Somme. 
In coordination with Trenchard, Brancker identified three major requirements that he 
believed were necessary for the expansion of the RFC. The first was the design and 
development of aircraft and aircraft engines. The second was the recruitment and training of 
pilots, mechanics and administrative personnel to support the air and grounds crew. The third 
was the establishment of more airfields and the expansion of the training programs and 
facilities.92 All three requirements had to be addressed simultaneously. When war was 
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declared the decision had been made for the Royal Aircraft Factory to manufacture the BE 2c 
in large quantities but in reality it was only able to produce a small number of aircraft per 
month.93 Therefore Brancker began to purchase aircraft from private manufacturers, the most 
notable being Sopwith and Avro.94 French aircraft under license for construction in Britain 
included Maurice Farmans, Henri Farmans and Bleriots.95 At least five new types of aircraft 
were still being tested and were months away from production. These included the FE 2 
pusher biplane, the RE 5 tractor two-seat bomber and the SE 2 single-seat tractor scout. Both 
Vickers and Bristol were developing an aircraft whose primary mission was to serve as a 
fighter but they too were many months away from fielding a serviceable machine as well.96  
In the period before the war the British had spent little time and capitol on the 
development of an aircraft engine. Instead they had relied on the French for supplying the 
small number of engines the RFC required.97 Just the week before the war started the British 
had ordered a large number of 70 horse-power Renault and 80 horse-power Gnome engines 
but Britain’s failure to develop a reliable aircraft engine, and more importantly the 
manufacturing capacity to provide its air service with reliable engines, would cause even 
greater problems for the RFC in the first two years of the war.98 
To address the requirement for personnel, Brancker established a recruiting office in 
the West End of London. Using his own initiative and without authority he advertised that 
trained civilian mechanics would be paid at the rates authorized for the Army Service Corps 
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which was substantially higher than most of the other branches within the army.99 In less than 
thirty days 1100 men had signed up and it was these men who would serve as the mechanics, 
fitters, and riggers for the new squadrons that Trenchard was directed to build.100 
The procurement of trained pilots posed quite different issues. The RFC and the 
RNAS were in competition for the few civilian pilots then available. The RFC planned on 
making the civilian pilots non-commissioned officers but when the RNAS made the decision 
to award them commissions, the RFC was forced to follow suit.101 The RFC shelved the idea 
of non-commissioned officers as pilots but only temporarily.102 The civilian pilots would be 
augmented in September when General Henderson directed a group of pilots from the RFC in 
France to return to England to serve as the cadre for the new squadrons.103   
The enlargement of the facilities and the capabilities of the Central Flying School 
seemed to be a Herculean task but under Trenchard’s leadership and with the support of 
Brancker and more importantly the support of Lord Horatio H. Kitchener, Secretary of State 
for War, the task was found to be not insurmountable.104 Netheravon was selected to serve as 
an annex to Farnborough where the CFS was located and Brooklands, a civilian airfield, was 
purchased complete with hangars, aircraft, and civilian flying instructors. Five new airfields 
were identified at Norwich, Castle Bromwich, Beaulieu, Catterick, and Northolt where reserve 
squadrons would be organized and trained.105 Ultimately these reserve squadrons would 
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augment or replace the squadrons then in France. Trenchard also directed that a reserve 
squadron be established at Farnborough.106  
With guidance from Henderson, Trenchard was planning on building twelve new 
squadrons only to be chastised by Brancker for thinking so small.107 Brancker had the 
advantage of meeting with Lord Kitchener daily and learned in one of their first meetings that 
the Secretary of State for War believed that Britain needed to be prepared to conduct a long 
war.108 Brancker therefore recommended that Trenchard think on a grander scale. Trenchard 
recorded that Brancker told him he “should try to raise thirty squadrons.”109 Both soon 
realized that this would be no easy task, especially since all of the serviceable machines, pilots 
and mechanics had been sent to France and it would be many months before the new 
squadrons received their full complement of aircraft and trained personnel. In fact, it was not 
until August, 1916 that the RFC attained Brancker’s suggested total of thirty operational 
squadrons.110 The difficulties of building and acquiring engines and airframes and, as well, the 
training of aircrew would remain a problem for the RFC until 1918, the last year of the war. 
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Royal Flying Corps BE 2c conducts a contact patrol during the Battle of Aubers 
Ridge on 9 May, 1915. (Authors Collection) 
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RFC aircraft from Number 3 and Number 4 Squadrons had the distinction of 
conducting the first reconnaissance missions of the war over Belgium territory on 19 
August.111 Three days later twelve reconnaissance flights were flown and were able to provide 
the BEF commander, General Sir John French, information that a large German force was 
moving westwards towards the British sector of the front.112 This proved to be Von Kluck’s 
Second Corps and the reports gave every indication that the Germans were attempting to 
conduct an envelopment of the Allied forces.113 The RFC also suffered its first combat 
casualties that day with an observer being wounded by rifle fire and a pilot and observer killed 
when their aircraft was shot down by ground fire.114 
It was during the BEF’s subsequent retreat from Mons that the RFC truly received its 
baptism of fire. First and foremost, it needed to earn the trust of the commanders and staffs 
that the squadrons supported. Mistakes seemed plentiful during the first week of operations. 
Not only were the ground commanders confused as to what the Germans were doing but to 
add to this confusion were some of the reports they received from RFC aircrews.115 Accurate 
reporting of the size and composition of enemy units was difficult as many of the RFC’s pilots 
and observers had little or no experience in observing and identifying objects on the ground 
from several thousand feet in the air.116 One reconnaissance crew mistook long patches of 
macadam road for a column of troops on the move while another reported a German unit 
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encamped in a shaded field when in reality they had flown over a cemetery and the shadows 
were cast by gravestones.117 
The RFC made its share of mistakes during the opening weeks of the conflict but it 
was during the retreat from Mons that the army’s air service did provide or confirm critical 
information to allow the BEF commander to make several key decisions which in turn led to 
the Allied offensive on the Marne in early September.118 Aerial reconnaissance reports had 
warned General French of Von Kluck’s attempted envelopment and throughout the retreat 
kept the British commander informed of the direction and locations of the German units 
pursuing the BEF.119 It was also during this opening phase of the war that the RFC began 
experimenting with what would eventually become tactical bombing. Done on a very small 
scale and with no effective bomb-release or sighting mechanisms, individual RFC crews 
dropped hand-held bombs or grenades onto German columns.120  
During the First Battle of the Marne the RFC provided valuable service to both the 
British and French forces. Daily reconnaissance reports kept the BEF commander informed of 
both German and French movements. What role they played in assisting with the BEF 
commander’s decision to eventually counter-attack at the Marne is still debated today.121 
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During the battle General French sent a message to the British War Council that stressed the 
work of the RFC squadrons: 
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship’s notice the admirable work done by the 
RFC .  . . . Their skill, energy and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They 
have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information which has been 
of incalculable value in the conduct of operations. Fired at constantly both by friend 
and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained 
undaunted throughout. Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in 
destroying five of the enemy’s machines.122  
As General French’s last sentence states, the first air combats between British and German 
aircraft also took place during this period. Though armed only with rifles, pistols and hand 
grenades, RFC crews were able to force down several enemy aircraft. In fact the first two 
confirmed RFC victories were caused by British pilots whose ‘bold maneuvers’ panicked the 
German pilots into making forced landings to avoid collision.123 
It was also during the Battle of the Marne that the RFC squadrons began to provide 
tactical reconnaissance support directly to the two British corps of the BEF.124 Number 5 
Squadron was tasked to provide three aircraft to the First Corps commanded by General Haig 
and Number 3 Squadron was tasked to provide three aircraft to Second Corps commanded by 
General Smith-Dorrien who had replaced General Grierson after he had suffered a heart attack 
and died while enroute to France.125 Each flight of aircraft was also provided with a wireless-
equipped aircraft from Number 4 Squadron to maintain contact with RFC headquarters.126 
These flights operated solely within the assigned zone of the ground force and had three 
primary tasks. First, the aircrews were tasked with identifying the location of enemy troop 
movements and dispositions to a depth of twenty miles behind the German front lines. Second, 
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they were to identify which bridges remained intact and which had been destroyed and third, 
locate the positions of the forward British infantry units.127 With this information the pilot 
would land his aircraft near the corps headquarters where he and his observer would brief the 
commander and his staff on what they had seen. During the first four days of the battle (5-9 
September) the RFC was in the air continuously and it was only after the German forces began 
their withdrawal to the River Aisne that poor weather set in forcing most of the British aircraft 
to remain on the ground.128 The following account by a British artillery officer highlights the 
impact the RFC seemed to be having on the ground forces they supported. 
I saw the bravest thing I ever saw yesterday. One of our airmen flew down the 
length of the German position. He was fired at all the way by anti-aircraft 
guns, of which they have apparently any number. They wreathed him in 
haloes of smoke. Still he held on and disappeared from our sight. Five or ten 
minutes later he reappeared, returning down their line, and was again greeted 
by the same fusillade. We held our breath and thought every moment to see 
him brought down, but he held on quite unconcerned and finally wheeled and 
flew over us.129   
 
 After the battle, the French commander-in-chief, General Joseph Joffre also paid tribute to the 
contributions made by the RFC.  
Please express most particularly to Marshal French my thanks for the services 
rendered to us every day by the English Flying Corps. The precision, 
exactitude, and regularity of the news brought in by them are evidence of their 
perfect organization and also of the perfect training of pilots and observers.130 
Though Joffre’s praise grossly over-exaggerated the skills and ability of the RFC, it is evident 
by his tone that the RFC did in fact provide some valuable support to the senior leaders of 
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both armies and assisted them in their decision-making during the battle which ended with an 
allied victory on the Marne.131 
 As encounters between British and German aircraft grew in number Henderson came 
to the conclusion that the RFC would soon have to fight to gain information just as several of 
the air power theorists had predicted.132 When Colonel J. E. B. Seely, Secretary of State for 
War from 1912-1914 and eventually the Under-Secretary for Air by the end of the war, 
witnessed one of these first air combats Henderson informed him that he believed that “This is 
the beginning of a fight which will ultimately end in great battles in the air, in which hundreds, 
and possibly thousands, of men may be engaged at heights varying from 10,000 to 20,000 
feet.” 133 During the Battle of the Marne, Henderson notified Brancker at the War Office: 
There are no airplanes with the Royal Flying Corps really suitable for 
carrying machine guns; grenades or bombs are, therefore, at present more 
suitable. If suitable aeroplanes are available, machine guns are better 
undoubtedly. Request you endeavor to supply sufficient fighting machines as 
soon as possible.134  
Henderson was well aware that his request was totally unrealistic. Though the War Office had 
approved the purchase of fifty Vickers FB 5 ‘Gun Bus’ aircraft, it would be many months 
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before they were built and delivered to Trenchard’s reserve squadrons for the crews to train 
with them before they were sent to France.135  
Though more experimentation took place with mounting machine guns on aircraft 
Trenchard and Brancker’s main focus was on the continued expansion of the RFC.136 The two 
formulated that one artillery reconnaissance squadron should support each new division 
raised, and two or three fighting and reconnaissance squadrons should be established to 
support each corps.137 Trenchard also focused on the training program for the new pilots and 
developed a staggered schedule to train two course-loads of student pilots using the same few 
machines available for both classes. When the first squadron completed its training, Trenchard 
split it into three distinct flights and made each flight the nucleus to form three more 
squadrons.138 He proved to be a hard task-master to instructors and students alike. His 
incentive to them was simple: “The harder you work, the sooner you’ll be in action.”139   
 As the opening campaign in France and Belgium progressed and the RFC began to 
suffer casualties, Henderson requested replacements for both aircraft and their crews. On 18 
August he requested two replacement pilots and four days later directed Trenchard to send out 
five pilots with five aircraft.140 It would not be the first time that Trenchard objected to his 
commander, reminding him that at this rate it would be impossible to build new squadrons per 
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both the RFC commander’s own orders as well as those of Lord Kitchener.141  Brancker 
supported Trenchard. “Lord Kitchener wishes to give you all the replacements possible” he 
wired Henderson.142 “At the same time he wishes to continue organising new squadrons at 
home for use with the divisions of the New Army. Please say if you want flights of R. E. 5’s 
and Maurice Farman’s, but if they go other pilots must be sent home to keep things going 
here.”143 The call for reinforcements continued unabated until the end of the Battle of the 
Marne and Trenchard and Brancker juggled the dual tasks of providing replacements to 
Henderson and organizing new squadrons. It was thus quite an accomplishment that by the 
end of October five reserve squadrons had been formed and by mid-November that number 
had doubled.144 
 At the end of October, General Henderson returned to England and visited Trenchard 
at Farnborough. Henderson was in the process of informing his subordinate how the RFC had 
so far performed in France and Belgium when Trenchard interrupted his commander and 
stated that “the battle for command of the air had still to be fought for” and he requested to be 
posted to France.145 Henderson ignored his subordinate’s impudence and went on to explain 
that he had proposed to decentralize the squadrons to provide the best support possible for the 
expansion of Kitchener’s New Army formations.146 His plan called for three operational 
wings, one for each Army Corps and he wanted Trenchard to command the First Wing. 
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Trenchard was most eager to accept the offer but before doing so he inquired about what role 
his rival and antagonist, Sykes would have in the expansion.147 His greatest fear was that if 
and when Henderson left command that Sykes would be his replacement. Trenchard knew he 
could work with Sykes as long as Sykes was on the RFC staff but because of their past 
differences he would not work for him if Sykes became the RFC commander. Henderson 
assured him that Sykes would remain his chief of staff and would have no operational control 
over the flying elements within the organization. With this assurance Trenchard accepted the 
offer and deployed to France on 18 November.148  
 Trenchard’s worst fears almost came to pass as soon as he arrived in France. During 
the final phase of the First Battle of Ypres, the 1st Division commander was wounded by 
artillery fire.149 The BEF commander identified General Henderson to be the new division 
commander and Sykes would then assume command of the RFC in France. This was totally 
unacceptable to Trenchard who sent a telegram to the War Office requesting he be returned to 
his regiment and explained his rationale before leaving for Merville where the First Wing 
Headquarters was located.150 It is assumed that Kitchener saw the telegram for he immediately 
countermanded General French’s orders informing him that he “would not sanction Syke’s 
being in command” of the RFC as he was too inexperienced.151 More than a month passed 
before the matter was settled with Henderson and Sykes remaining in their previous 
assignments. Several weeks later, Trenchard was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel, a 
tribute to his efforts at expanding the RFC and the fact that he had been promoted to command 
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the First Wing.152 Trenchard’s lack of professional decorum in dealing with Sykes as well as 
Henderson seemed to have been overlooked by all of those in a position of influence over him. 
By the time Trenchard assumed command of First Wing, the war of movement was 
over and trench warfare had set in along the entire Western Front.153 Although the RFC had 
experimented with tactical bombing and its airmen had been involved in several air combats 
with German aircraft, its principal mission was still tactical reconnaissance in support of the 
BEF’s corps and divisions.154   
During the First Battles of the Marne and Aisne, the RFC had experimented with 
aerial photography and the use of wireless equipped aircraft to observe and direct artillery 
fire.155 Initially, some aircraft were equipped with Klaxon horns and after observing artillery 
fire would turn in the direction of the artillery battery and provide corrections in Morse code 
with the signal greatly amplified by the horn. This was quickly proven to be both inefficient 
and sometimes inaccurate as the noise of the battlefield often covered up the sound of the 
horn.156 Colored flags, electric signal lamps, and Very lights were also used with some success 
but during the fighting on the Aisne River in September, 1914 the RFC began to seriously 
experiment with using aircraft equipped with a wireless set to direct artillery fire.157  
Lieutenants Donald S. Lewis and Baron T. James had transferred from the Royal 
Engineers to the RFC in 1913 and had done much work before the war on adapting a wireless 
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set to operate in an aircraft.158 The pair was assigned to Number 4 Squadron under the 
command of Major H. Musgrave whose squadron provided wireless support to each of the 
British corps.159To improve the coordination between the flying corps and the artillery, the 
RFC also used artillery officers as observers on loan from their parent unit.160 Because of this 
arrangement a close and professional partnership was formed between the two branches that 
lasted for the remainder of the war.161 It was also during a conference between artillery 
officers and airmen in January, 1915 where the newly promoted Captain James presented his 
idea for a more efficient and accurate means of directing artillery fire from the air. His 
recommendation became known as the ‘Clock-Code’ and was first used at the battle of Neuve 
Chapelle two months later. It was so successful that it became official doctrine and was used 
for the remainder of the war on all fronts.162 Because of the innovative minds of men like 
Lieutenants Lewis and James, it was evident to both army and RFC leadership by the end of 
the Battle of Aisne that the observation and directing of artillery via wireless was now a viable 
mission for the RFC.163 By the summer of 1915 every squadron in France and Flanders had at 
least a flight of two wireless equipped aircraft.164 
A lull in ground activity during the winter of 1914-1915 allowed the RFC to develop 
and improve the techniques and procedures for the directing of artillery fire and aerial 
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photography. These techniques and procedures were put to the test during the battle for the 
French village of Neuve Chapelle in March, 1915.165 
The BEF staff began the planning for the battle in January and one of the first 
requirements that arose was the need for accurate maps of the area in and around the village. 
To solve this problem the RFC was tasked to photograph the area of operations around Neuve 
Chapelle.166 It was largely due to Sykes foresight in the fall of 1914 that the RFC was able to 
accept this request. Sykes had previously directed Major W. G. H. Salmond to liaison with the 
French Air Service and analyze their aerial photography section which had provided excellent 
results to the French ground commanders during the Battle of the Marne.167 After reading 
Salmond’s report Henderson directed that the RFC develop a photographic section of its own. 
The four man section led by Major J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon and using newly developed 
cameras and French aerial photography techniques, ensured that the RFC was able to 
accomplish this mission.168 The aircraft conducting the photography missions experienced 
heavy anti-aircraft fire during each operation but at no time did the GAAS make any attempt to 
prevent the RFC from carrying out its photographic missions.  The photographs provided 
detailed information on the location of many of the German fortified positions and also 
confirmed the location of many enemy artillery batteries in the area to be attacked.169 
By the end of February, Sir John French and his staff had been provided aerial 
photographs of the entire German trench system in front of the British First Army to a depth 
of 700 to 1,500 yards.170 The trenches were clearly identified on the photographs, were then 
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traced onto map overlays to a scale of one to eight thousand. Some 1500 copies of the map 
were issued to each army corps in preparation for the attack.171 As the Official History notes, it 
was the first time the British army went to battle with a complete picture of the enemy’s 
defensive positions.172 
French had selected General Sir Douglas Haig’s First Army to be the main effort for 
the attack and it was during this battle that Haig, with Trenchard’s First Wing providing aerial 
support, formed a professional bond with the man who would command the RFC during the 
Battle of the Somme.173  Trenchard split his squadrons into flights so that they could work 
directly with the two artillery groups, the attacking corps and First Army headquarters. On the 
opening day of the battle, 10 March, 1915, Trenchard visited with the squadrons within the 
First Wing.174 In what would become his trademark for de-briefing crews immediately upon 
return from missions, Trenchard spent hours questioning the pilots and observers to enable 
him to form a picture of what was taking place on the battlefield.175 From the interviews he 
learned that many of the artillery batteries were either deliberately ignoring or had misread the 
wireless messages sent by the RFC observers who were attempting to observe and direct the 
British artillery fire.176 Trenchard was furious. If this was accurate then weeks of coordination, 
discussion and rehearsal prior to the start of the attack had been wasted. He then paid visits to 
the senior artillery commanders within First Army and in several short discussions he was 
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convinced that his aircrews had not been exaggerating the level of non-cooperation on the part 
of most of the artillery units. “I could not get these gentlemen to take any interest. In fact, one 
of them said to me: “Don’t you see Colonel Trenchard, that I am far too busy fighting to have 
time for playing with your toys in the air?”177 But at least one artillery formation did seem to 
obtain satisfactory results by working with their assigned squadron. The war diary of Number 
1 Group Artillery recorded that 
In fulfilling their mission as counter batteries, the Group artillery received the 
utmost assistance from the section of wireless aeroplanes under the command 
of Captain Lewis, DSO. These aeroplanes were invaluable in sending 
information as to the positions of hostile batteries which were active. As 
regards the observation and correction of fire by the wireless aeroplanes the 
observers stated that very little correction was necessary on any targets, and 
that the shooting of the Group appeared to be very effective.178  
 
There was more good news for the RFC in the fact that the commander and staff of the First 
Army’s Royal Artillery did recognize that the observation and direction of artillery fire as well 
as communications from the airmen enabled the artillery commanders to “direct the fire of 
their batteries on to hostile active batteries and other targets that were at the time important 
tactical objectives.”179 
When the weather got worse and hampered the RFC’s ability to fly continuously more 
bad news followed. Trenchard had hoped that the tactical bombing missions, planned against 
several key command and control and logistics centers, would provide valuable support to 
Haig’s army and although the building a German brigade headquarters occupied was 
destroyed and several trains carrying reinforcements were hit, the majority of the bombing 
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raids were ineffective.180 On one mission conducted after dusk, all three aircraft that attempted 
to attack a rail junction at Lille were shot down or crashed before reaching the target.181  
Trenchard realized that without resources the RFC’s attempt to pursue tactical bombing would 
be limited at best and have no bearing or influence on the ground battle.182 
There was one task that the RFC had conducted on a limited basis that the ground 
commanders had found particular useful and that was the ‘contact patrol.’ Designed to keep 
the infantry and artillery commanders informed of the location of friendly units during an 
attack, the intent of the ‘contact patrols’ was for aircraft to fly low enough over the battlefield, 
usually under 1,000 feet,  to be able to spot the locations of the most forward advancing troops 
and then inform the ground commander.183 The ground commander could then assess the 
progress, or lack thereof, and make an informed decision.184 At the same time British artillery 
fire could be called for and directed to support any units that had been stopped by an enemy 
fortified position that had escaped the preliminary bombardment. Two months later at the 
Battle of Aubers Ridge, British troops were issued with cloth panels and directed to lay them 
out in front of their forward positions. Aircraft flying overhead as high as 5,000 feet were able 
to report the positions back to corps headquarters via wireless.185 Once again, the British made 
little territorial gains during the offensive operation, but both the ground and air commanders 
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believed the use of contact patrols had provided some valuable information as to what was 
taking place during the initial, first chaotic hours of the attack.186  
Though the winter and spring operations at Neuve Chapelle (10-12 March, 1915), 
Aubers Ridge (9-10 May, 1915), and Festubert (15-25 May, 1915) failed to successfully 
penetrate the German defensive positions and Haig’s First Army suffered more than 39,000 
casualties during these attacks, both the BEF and the RFC were learning and developing new 
techniques and procedures to advance air-ground cooperation during the crucible of combat.187 
The experience the squadrons gained in carrying out tactical reconnaissance, aerial 
photography, direction and observation of artillery, contact patrols as well as working with the 
division and corps staffs, demonstrated to Haig that the newest branch of the army was in fact 
able to provide assistance to the ground forces.188 The planning and coordination that took 
place between the RFC and First Army at Neuve Chapelle would prove significant to the 
future developments of British ground operations on the Western Front.189 Not only was it the 
first time that air power was fully integrated with ground forces in combat but many of the 
lessons learned would become doctrine within the RFC.190 But it was a single event which 
occurred in the skies above Ypres during the fighting at Aubers Ridge that would serve as the 
catalyst for the strategy the RFC would develop and use for its air campaign during the Battle 
of the Somme in 1916. 
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On 10 May, 1915, A Vickers FB 5 ‘Gunbus’ from Number 5 Squadron, Britain’s first 
true fighter aircraft, attacked a German aircraft and shot it down near Lille.191 Though one 
aerial victory would seem to be small and inconsequential as compared to what was taking 
place along the Western Front at the time, this incident was in fact a harbinger that air warfare 
was about to intensify in a way few military commanders could have predicted.  
Two critical events occurred during the summer of 1915 that would have a major 
impact on the future of the RFC. The first occurred in late July when the GAAS introduced the 
Fokker Eindecker monoplane to the Western Front.192 The Eindecker was equipped with a 
synchronization mechanism that enabled a fixed machine gun to fire through the propeller. 
The synchronization mechanism was deemed so secret that the German pilots were given 
specific orders not to fly across the Allied lines in fear that if they were forced down the 
British or French would learn the secrets of the synchronization gear.193 Though it had 
several major shortcomings as a fighter aircraft, what made the Fokker Eindecker a deadly 
weapon of war was its synchronized machine gun and the few, well-trained pilots that flew 
them.194 It did not take long before the German pilots demonstrated that the slow, poorly 
armed RFC aircraft were no match for the agile monoplanes.195 
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On 29 July, an RFC BE 2c was conducting a photographic reconnaissance sortie and 
had the first encounter with an armed Fokker Eindecker. Though the air fight that ensued was 
inconclusive for both sides what was significant was that the RFC crew reported that the 
enemy aircraft had a machine gun that fired through the propeller.196 In August what would 
become known as the Fokker ‘Scrouge’ began. The GAAS was quick to realize that two of its 
young pilots, Leutnants Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann, of Flieger-Abteilung Nr. 62 
(Flying Section or FA62) were becoming most proficient in the art of air fighting and during 
the months of August and September the pair began to shoot down British aircraft almost at 
will.197 RFC Headquarters soon realized that the increase in the number of air combats 
signaled a change many of its leaders had expected but few could predict the impact on the 
RFC and its development of an air strategy. Lieutenant Colonel H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, 
having previously commanded the Third Wing recorded in late July that “The German 
aeroplanes are becoming far more active, and are making a regular habit of attacking our 
machines when on reconnaissance, and we are having to fight for all our information.”198 
The second critical event occurred when Trenchard replaced Henderson as 
commander of the RFC on 19 August, 1915.199 Kitchener, having already directed a massive 
expansion in order that the RFC would be ready to provide support to the dozens of divisions 
then being formed in the United Kingdom, was quick to realize that a more senior officer was 
required within the War Office to oversee both the expansion of the army’s air arm and deal 
with the plethora of administrative and logistical issues that had to be dealt with on a daily 
basis.200 Brancker had done a commendable job as Deputy Director of Military Aeronautics 
(DDMA) but through no fault of his own he held little influence within the War Office and 
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was outranked by his naval counterpart, Captain Murray Sueter, who also had the support of 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill, and the vast resources of the Royal 
Navy behind him.201 Henderson had been the DGMA until war was declared but had turned 
over his duties to Major Brancker when he took command of the RFC and then deployed to 
France. It is more than understandable that he would want to command the organization he 
helped to create when it was sent into combat. The question must be asked why Kitchener, 
Henderson, or the War Office had not realized or demanded earlier that a more senior 
aviation-minded officer oversee and coordinate the resources and requirements required by the 
RFC? The answer can only be that with war declared these leaders were focused on getting the 
army to France as quickly as possible and as had happened so often in the years leading up to 
the war, aviation matters were not as critical or urgent as the many other defense issues that 
they were dealing with.202   
As chief of staff of the RFC in early 1914, Sykes had written in a memorandum that 
did broach the subject and he argued that the DGMA was more critical to the overall welfare 
and development of the flying corps than was the commander of the RFC. Sykes argument 
was logical, especially when the war of movement ended on the Western Front in November, 
1914 and trench warfare set in but it had not been acted on.203 Brancker himself had sent 
several letters to Henderson that pointed out the critical importance of the DGMA and why it 
needed to be held by a senior officer with aviation experience. 
The Director General of Military Aeronautics must be a Major-General at 
least, have a loud voice in the War Office, and if possible, be on terms of 
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equality with the Army Council. It is obviously the appointment for you, and 
if you hold it, it would also imply the command of the whole Flying Corps.204 
 
After commanding the RFC in combat for twelve months, Henderson had to agree that the 
flying service would be better served if he were back in the War Office in London where 
strategic policy and decisions were made.205 His technical expertise, combined with his 
seniority and operational command experience in the field would provide the RFC the 
wherewithal to deal with both the nation’s political leadership and the Admiralty on the 
critical issues of personnel, training and most especially aircraft production.206 Before leaving 
for England, Henderson had to recommend a replacement to take command of the RFC. The 
obvious choice was the commander of First Wing, Hugh Trenchard. 207 
Though Frederick Sykes had been the commander of the Military Wing and had 
served as his chief of staff the entire time he was in command, Henderson realized that he was 
not a viable option. Kitchener had already disapproved Sykes taking command of the RFC the 
previous December when Henderson had been ordered to take command of the 1st Division. 
Furthermore, while Henderson was on sick leave earlier in the year there had been some 
discussion among the BEF and RFC staff that a younger man should command the RFC and 
upon his return Henderson seemed convinced that the topic had originated with Sykes.208In 
                                                            
204 Letter from Brancker to Henderson, 28 July and August, 1915, Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman 
Macmillan, 106-109.  
205 Letter from Henderson to Trenchard, 25 February, 1916, Henderson Papers, RAFM. See also David 
Devine, The Broken Wing, 76-77. 
206 David Devine, The Broken Wing, 77. 
207 Letter from Henderson to Trenchard, 25 February, 1916, Henderson Papers, RAFM. 
208 Andrew Boyle, in his biography of Trenchard, states that according to Trenchard, Henderson visited 
Trenchard at First Wing headquarters at Merville on 17 May 1915, and in private conversation 
informed him that he was going to replace Sykes. Henderson purportedly stated that Sykes ‘had been 
actively scheming to replace him [Henderson] in his absence. Damaging insinuations had come back 
from the highest quarters. It was said for instance, that the Flying Corps would be better off under a 
commander with youth as well as robust health on his side.’ Henderson had confronted Sykes who did 
not deny that he was the source. Henderson then offered Trenchard the position which Trenchard 
refused wishing to remain in command of First Wing. He did recommend that Brooke-Popham would 
be make an excellent chief of staff as he was more than capable and would serve Henderson and the 
56 
addition Henderson knew that two of his most trusted subordinates, Brancker and Trenchard 
had issues with Sykes, and though his chief of staff was hard-working, intelligent, and 
innovative, he could also be abrasive and hard to work with. Henderson had replaced Sykes in 
May with Brooke Popham and had sent Sykes back to the Directorate of Military Aeronautics 
but within days Sykes appointment was changed and instead he was sent to the Dardanelles to 
assist the Royal Navy in the use of aircraft for the upcoming Gallipoli campaign.209 Thus when 
Henderson prepared to return to London in August it was not a hard decision in 
recommending Trenchard be his replacement. Based on his overall performance since joining 
the RFC, Henderson realized it was both a sound and logical decision. Trenchard had proven 
himself in the field as Haig’s air advisor and the two had formed a mutual respectful 
relationship. It also helped that Trenchard had impressed Kitchener during his few months as 
the commander of the RFC’s Military Wing and his efforts to expand the RFC during the first 
quarter of the war. In little over a year Trenchard had gone from being an army major and 
serving as the adjutant of the Central Flying School to being selected to be the commander of 
the RFC in France. On 19 August, 1915, Trenchard’s appointment as General Officer 
Commanding (GOC), RFC was published in the London Gazette and a week later he was 
promoted to brigadier general.210 Besides Trenchard assuming command of the RFC there was 
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another notable addition to the leadership of the RFC in France. With Henderson resuming his 
role as DGMA, Brancker was selected to take command of the recently created Third Wing.211  
When Trenchard assumed command of the RFC there were twelve squadrons 
operating in France and Belgium.212 Just weeks before on 25 July, the first homogenous 
fighter squadron, Number 11, equipped with Vickers FB 5 aircraft, arrived in France.213 
Though its primary duty was to seek out and attack German aircraft it would also conduct 
long-range reconnaissance, photography and artillery observation as required.214  This 
squadron and its subsequent performance against the GAAS would set the stage for the final 
development of the RFC’s strategy on air power in the months before the opening of the 
Somme campaign.215 
Within just weeks of taking command Trenchard was hard at work planning the 
RFC’s role in the upcoming attack at Loos. Though Lieutenant Colonel Eric B. Ashmore, an 
artillery expert, had succeeded Trenchard in command of First Wing, the new RFC 
commander continued to work closely with Haig and the First Army.216 Haig’s army was once 
again designated to be the main effort for the attack.217  The British effort was to be a 
supporting attack for the French autumn offensive which was to occur simultaneously further 
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south in the Champagne area.218 The First Army, like the rest of the BEF was still 
experiencing a shortage of artillery ammunition and thus it was critical that the RFC be as 
accurate as possible when providing adjustments and corrections to the artillery to save on the 
limited ammunition then available.219 First Wing divided up the area to be attacked into four 
zones and then proceeded to work from before dawn to after dusk communicating the results 
of their observations to at least forty wireless stations that were co-located with the artillery 
batteries within First Army.220   
Trenchard and Ashmore’s coordination and planning with the First Army staff and 
their assigned and attached artillery units was both elaborate and meticulous.221 Coordination 
between the RFC and the artillery had progressed much since the clumsy attempts that took 
place before and during the spring offensives at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, and Festubert. 
A second coordination conference between the RFC and the artillery had taken place in June 
to reinforce the lessons learned from the spring fighting.222  The RFC staff had produced a 
pamphlet that laid out the procedures recommended for artillery coordination between aircraft 
and artillery batteries. The pamphlet was approved by BEF headquarters and issued to all units 
within the army in July. It was the first of several documents on the use of aviation that 
became doctrine within the army before the Somme campaign in 1916.223 The Battle of Loos 
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would demonstrate that there was still much work to be done in the areas of cooperation and 
coordination between the two branches to ensure that optimal results were gained on the 
battlefield. 
Several days before the British troops attacked on the morning of 25 September, all 
targets had been identified, photographed, and coordinated with the artillery.224 Trenchard also 
placed much emphasis on the tactical bombing raids that he directed take place and for three 
days the squadrons within the Second and Third Wings attacked the German’s main supply 
route and the logistic infrastructure in the area around Douai, Valenciennes and Lille.225 More 
than forty aircraft bombed numerous ammunition trains, motor vehicle columns carrying 
reinforcements and ammunition, railway marshalling yards, wireless centers, and several 
bridges. Though small in both size and scope in comparison to the bombing raids conducted 
by the RAF in the last six months of 1918, for the first time in the war the results were 
encouraging. At least five trains were derailed or damaged, at least two of which were 
ammunition trains, and at least twenty trucks loaded with ammunition were destroyed before 
or during the battle.226 The RFCs deepest penetration was thirty-six miles behind the Germans 
lines and a total of five and half tons were dropped on fifteen targets.227  RFC aircraft 
conducting observation and direction of artillery were also doing their share to assist the army 
on the ground. A captured diary from a German artillery battery provided some evidence of 
the effectiveness of the RFC’s before the battle. An entry dated 18 September recorded 
“Enemy has worked hard all the morning at communication trench. The presence of hostile 
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aeroplanes near the battery has prevented it from effectively doing its work.” Another entry 
dated five days later stated “The enemy fire on our trenches cannot be replied to immediately 
as enemy aeroplanes, little or not fired at, are flying over the battery.”228 
 Though Loos proved to be no more successful than the limited spring offensives and 
sixty thousand more British soldiers had become casualties, Sir John French was pleased with 
the effort of the RFC and issued a special order of the day after the battle’s conclusion. 
The Command[er]-in-Chief desires to express  . . . his appreciation of the 
valuable work they have performed during the battle which commenced on 
the 25th of September. He recognizes the extremely adverse weather 
conditions which entailed flying under heavy fire at very low altitudes. He 
desires especially to thank pilots and observers for their plucky work in co-
operation with the artillery, in photography and the bomb attacks on the 
enemy’s railways, which were of great value in interrupting his 
communications. Throughout these operations the Royal Flying Corps has 
gallantly maintained the splendid record they have achieved since the 
commencement of the campaign.229 
 
Trenchard realized that the message was for morale purposes only.230 He more than anyone 
knew what he asked of his airmen to do but regardless of their Herculean efforts the battle had 
still been lost and the RFC’s ability to influence the fighting had been negligible.231 As David 
Devine correctly concluded “The Flying Corps had, in fact, been asked to do the impossible-to 
carry out roles for which it had neither the experience, the aircraft, nor the techniques.”232 
Even more troubling was the fact that during the Battle of Loos the number and intensity of air 
combats with the GAAS had greatly increased over what had previously been experienced. 
Though overall RFC casualties from the five day battle had been light with only four aircrew 
wounded and another seven missing, presumed killed or taken prisoner, there had been 
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seventeen reported air combats.233 It was now becoming evident to the wing commanders and 
to Trenchard himself that the RFC would have to gain some form of aerial superiority over the 
GAAS if it was to be able to provide the support to the BEF that Trenchard had convinced 
Haig they were capable of providing. Trenchard’s chief of staff, Brooke-Popham had written 
just before Loos that 
If the enemy brings troops over from the Eastern Front and resumes his 
offensive, he will doubtless make a determined effort to prevent our 
discovering his movements. Then will commence the real struggle for air 
supremacy where numbers will be one of the essentials for success.234 
 
What was of greatest concern to Trenchard was the impact that one German aircraft, the 
Fokker Eindecker, armed with a synchronized machine-gun, was having on both the RFC and 
the French Service d’ Aviation Militaire.235 Though the Eindecker had first appeared in late 
July it was not until October that it began to demonstrate a gradual dominance of both the 
British and French aircraft it came into contact with. Within weeks both allied air services 
found themselves at a tactical disadvantage of the GAAS.236 Aside from the lone squadron of 
Vickers ‘Gunbus’ fighters, the RFC was for the most part still equipped with the aircraft that it 
had started the war with fourteen months previously.237 Addressing the qualifications of 
aircrew for this new type of warfare Trenchard advised Henderson and the War Office that it 
                                                            
233 Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, (London: William Kimber and Co, Limited, 
1969), 50-52. 
234 Letter from Brooke-Popham to Trenchard, 15 August 1915, quoted in WITA, Vol. II, 144. 
235 Andrew Boyle, 153. For brevity I will use Aviation Militaire for the remainder of this paper when 
identifying the French Military Aviation Service.   
236Part of this delay can be explained by the fact that the entire fleet of Eindeckers was grounded for 
several weeks in September, 1915 after three fatal crashes occurred at the Fokker training unit at 
Doberitz. This respite for the Allied air services was short lived however and after much pressure from 
the German commanders at the front, the ban was lifted and the Fokkers were cleared for operational 
flying. See Peter Kilduff, Germany’s First Air Force, 1914-1918, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 
1991), 36-41. See also Alex Imrie, German Fighter Units, 1914-1917, (Oxford, England: Osprey 
Publishing Ltd.,1978), 3-10. 
237 Richard Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918, 18. 
62 
was critical that air fighting techniques be added to the training programs for both pilots and 
observers in England before they reached their operational squadrons in France.238 
 
 
 
From October 1915 through March 1916, the Germans were able to take control of the 
skies over the Western Front.  In a period of four months, the GAAS destroyed or forced down 
sixty-three RFC and Aviation Militaire aircraft against the loss of sixteen.239  To fly over 
German controlled territory was too often invite a quick and violent death. The Fokker 
Eindecker was not a superior aircraft by any means but flown by a competent pilot and armed 
with a synchronized interrupter gear for its forward firing machine gun, enabled the German 
pilots to become “sharks flying amidst the allied minnows.”240The RFC alone suffered fifty 
aircrew killed or wounded and twenty-eight aircraft shot down by enemy aircraft during a six-
week period from mid-November 1915 to early January 1916, the two worst months of the 
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“Fokker Scrouge.”241  The Germans shot down four enemy aircraft for every one they lost. 
Lieutenant H. B. R. Rowell, Number 8 Squadron, recorded in his diary that during that period 
his squadron replaced  the entire complement of twelve assigned pilots three times in eight 
weeks thus suffering an astounding three hundred percent casualty rate.242 With losses such as 
these it was natural that the morale within the entire RFC would be affected.   
It may be clearly stated, however, that good as the Fokker was, and 
resourceful as were its pilots, its moral effect, when it was in the heyday of its 
superiority, was far greater than its actual success justified. The tendency to 
credit the monoplane with exaggerated fighting capabilities has often a 
cramping effect upon its opponents.243 
 
Most of the British casualties occurred conducting either long-range reconnaissance or 
bombing raids deep into German occupied territory. A typical example occurred on 29 
December, 1915 when two BE 2cs from Number 8 Squadron crossed the German lines at 
6,500 feet to conduct a reconnaissance mission between Cambrai and St. Quentin. The 
mission was progressing well until six Fokker Eindeckers attacked the two British aircraft. 
Lieutenant David Glen, piloting the escort BE 2c aircraft was shot down almost immediately 
by two of the Fokkers while the other four Eindeckers attacked the aircraft crewed by 
Lieutenant Sholto Douglas (pilot) and Lieutenant James Childs (observer).244 Outnumbered 
and outclassed in respect to the aircraft involved, Douglas was able to outmaneuver the enemy 
fighters for nearly thirty minutes and in the process Childs shot down one of the Eindeckers. 
Douglas was able to evade the remaining three aircraft before crossing the lines and though his 
aircraft had been badly damaged he made an emergency landing south of Arras next to a 
French artillery battery. Upon inspection the young British pilot found nearly 100 bullet holes 
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in his aircraft.245 Douglas and Childs did not realize how lucky their escape had been. Amidst 
the flight of Fokker Eindeckers were two highly experienced and successful pilots, Leutnants 
Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann. During the fight Boelcke had run out of ammunition 
and one of Immelmann’s two machine guns had jammed. If not for Douglas’ superior flying 
skill and some bad luck for the two German pilots it was highly likely that Douglas and Childs 
would have become two more casualties of the ‘Fokker Scrouge.’246  
 
 
 
 
The German pilots, under orders, operated exclusively over their own side of the lines. 
This was for three reasons. First, the GAAS was outnumbered approximately three to one by 
the combined strength of the British and French air services. Second, they were adhering to a 
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defensive strategy on the ground as well as in the air and thus waited for the Allied machines 
to fly over German controlled territory before engaging them. Third, the Germans did not 
want to present the allies the gift of an Eindecker with its synchronization gear if it either 
crashed or was forced to land in allied territory.247  
Boelcke and Immelmann would both play critical roles in what became known as the 
‘Fokker Scrouge’ which saw the GAAS gain almost complete air supremacy over the Western 
Front from August 1915 till the early spring of 1916. Both would also be heavily involved in 
the air campaign over the Somme, Immelmann in the first phase and Boelcke in the last.248  
To counter the ‘Fokker Scrouge’ the three RFC wing commanders had contemplated, 
since as far back as September, 1915, whether or not they should assign armed aircraft to 
escort the slow BE 2c’s that flew the majority of the reconnaissance missions. Sefton 
Brancker, commander of Third Wing, had two squadrons of BE 2c’s (Number 4 and 8) and 
had just received Number 11 Squadron equipped with Vickers FB 5 ‘Gunbus’ fighters from 
England in the days before the Battle of Loos. Having suffered several losses during the 
interdiction bombing raids conducted in support of First Army during the battle, Brancker 
directed that his aircraft begin flying in groups in the belief that there was safety in numbers. 
We used to send two or three machines together and try to keep the air clear 
of enemy by patrolling with Vickers Fighters. I believe that these operations 
mark almost the first time in the British Army that any effort was made to fly 
in formation and to employ fighting patrols.249 
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It would seem that Brancker’s actions had some influence on the RFC commander.250 By the 
end of the year Trenchard faced a crisis and knew he had to alter the tactics that his air service 
was using or risk his force being driven from the sky. On 14 January, 1916, he sent a message 
to his squadron commanders. It is worth quoting the entire message: 
Until the Royal Flying Corps is in possession of a machine as good as, or better than 
the German Fokker, it seems that a change in policy and tactics has become necessary. 
It is hoped very shortly to obtain a machine which will be able to successfully engage 
the Fokkers at present in use by the Germans. In the meantime it must be laid down as 
a hard and fast rule that a machine proceeding on reconnaissance must be escorted by 
at least three other fighting machines. These machines must fly in close formation and 
a reconnaissance should not be continued if any of the machines becomes detached. 
This should apply to both short and long reconnaissances. Aeroplanes proceeding on 
photographic duty east of the line should be similarly escorted. From recent 
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experience it seems that the Germans are now employing their aeroplanes in groups of 
three or four, and these numbers are frequently encountered by our aeroplanes. Flying 
in formation must be practiced by all pilots.251 
Trenchard knew his message was an admission that the RFC could not accomplish its 
missions without adjusting its tactics but the change was necessary.252 The change in tactics 
would produce shrinkage in the overall strength of the RFC until more squadrons arrived from 
Britain. At least four aircraft had to be allocated to conduct a single reconnaissance mission 
that previously was done by one.  Trenchard had made a convincing argument to Haig that the 
solution to the ‘Fokker Scrouge’ was not to stop flying into German airspace but instead all 
British aircraft were to fly in formation so that they could protect one another from air 
attack.253 Haig, who having replaced French as commander-in-chief of the BEF in mid-
December 1915, agreed with Trenchard’s revision of tactics, in large part because he did not 
anticipate the next major ground offensive taking place until mid-summer at the earliest and 
thus the demand for air support to the army would be reduced until the spring.254  
In responding to the government’s inquiry in mid-January about the increase in RFC 
casualties, Haig sent a letter to Prime Minister Asquith, using an analogy from the Napoleonic 
war to illustrate his argument.  
 
 . . . As to aircraft, I enclose a note of General Trenchard with which I agree. 
We must continue to reconnoiter. The remedy is not to stop sending machines 
out for this purpose but to send them out in groups rather than singly. This is 
now being done and will be done to an increasing extent in the future. Our 
present experience with aeroplanes is somewhat similar to Napoleon’s in the 
matter of cavalry patrols before Jena in 1806. I think the Germans cavalry was 
very efficient and regularly mopped up the French reconnaissances until the 
latter went out in double strength to the enemy’s patrols. Distant 
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reconnaissances are not sent out without some object sufficiently important to 
justify the risk of loss involved.255  
 
 
Up until this time in the war there had been little effort given toward formation flying but now 
much thought and experiment was devoted to solving this problem. Numerous formations 
were tested but the three found most effective were the Line Abreast, the Line Astern and 
Echelon. All three had their advantages and disadvantages.256 Their inception and use would 
play a pivotal role in defeating the “Fokker Scourge” and in the development of air combat 
tactics before and during the Somme battle.257 The drawback with the change in tactics was 
that by increasing the number of aircraft required for a single mission, the number of missions 
that could be flown was reduced. Dependent on aircraft and aircrew reinforcements from 
England, Trenchard thus found his hands were tied until he received more aircraft and more 
airmen capable of flying them. The message was a critical statement to his commanders and 
though on the surface its focus was on tactics, it more importantly reinforced Trenchard’s 
stated objective of maintaining an offensive posture, regardless of the heavy losses the RFC 
was experiencing and the decline in aircrew morale. He would later write to Henderson “I 
have cut down the work, in my opinion enormously. I have dropped bombing, no long-
distance reconnaissances are done, and jolly few short ones, and these are just over the 
line.”258  
 Though some of the squadrons within the RFC were already experimenting with 
formation tactics, it would take several months to adequately train all the pilots in France on 
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the new tactics. By the beginning of the air campaign over the Somme in the spring of 1916 
most if not all of the squadrons in the RFC were using them with increasing success.259 
 
Trenchard’s Policy of the Strategic Air Offensive 
By early 1916, the RFC was conducting nearly a half-dozen tasks to support the BEF 
in France and Belgium. These tasks included: aerial reconnaissance, aerial photography, 
observation and direction of artillery fire, contact patrols with the infantry, and tactical 
bombing.260 A sixth mission, air combat against aircraft from the GAAS, had also become 
increasingly more important as each week passed and Trenchard realized that for his 
squadrons to be able to conduct all of their assigned missions successfully the RFC had to 
assume a more offensive posture to prevent the GAAS from interdicting his air service’s ability 
to provide support to the British ground forces.261 It was these tasks or missions which would 
become the key elements of the British air campaign during the Battle of the Somme. 
It is hard to pinpoint a date as to exactly when Trenchard came to the conclusion that  
the RFC must attain air superiority to conduct the missions and tasks that the army required of 
it. It would not be until the middle of the Somme campaign in September, 1916 that Trenchard 
officially put his refined air strategy on paper (with much assistance from his aide, Captain 
Maurice Baring, who transcribed his commander’s ideas into a cogent document).262 With the 
Battle of Loos ending in early October and the effects of the Fokker ‘Scrouge’ growing more 
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deadly each week, it was during the last quarter of 1915 that Trenchard began thinking about 
the ways and means to wrest the air over the BEF away from the GAAS.263 
According to the RFC’s Official Historian, Trenchard developed his policy of the 
strategic air offensive in late 1915 during discussions with his French counterpart, 
Commandant Paul-Ferdinand du Peuty, the Air Commander of the French Tenth Army.264 
Although there was not an established policy in early 1915, British pilots were attempting 
offensive operations as far back as the opening days of the war when men like Lieutenant 
Strange attempted to arm his aircraft with a machine-gun. Months before Trenchard took 
command of the RFC however, Sykes had written that “The principle of attacking hostile 
aircraft whenever and wherever seen . . . has been adhered to and has resulted in the moral fact 
that the enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat when chased.”265 When the first 
few machine-gun equipped pusher aircraft began to arrive in France in the summer of 1915, 
Henderson believed they should be combined to form a squadron. His subordinate wing 
commanders, Trenchard among them, argued that they every squadron should receive at least 
one or two to allow every pilot the chance to take part in offensive operations against the 
GAAS. 
Pilots in the squadrons often alternated reconnaissance or artillery work on the 
rifle-armed two-seaters with fighting patrols on the machine-gun armed 
single-seater tractor or two-seater pusher [machines] . . . [General] David 
Henderson held the view that the fighting type aeroplanes should be 
concentrated in one or more squadrons but the opinion was strong in the 
Wings that they should be distributed so that each squadron should have a 
leavening of offensive aircraft. Henderson gave way and the fighters were 
split up, although the policy of grouping the fighters [into homogenous 
squadrons] was adopted later on.266 
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Henderson acquiesced on this issue to the wishes of his commanders until Number 11 
Squadron arrived in France in July 1915. Formed in February, the one hundred and fifty plus 
personnel spent nearly four months training on the Vickers FB 5 ‘Gunbus’ before the 
squadron deployed.267 Having become the first homogenous fighter squadron in the RFC, the 
squadron established a second precedent. Having proven its worth over the battlefield, 
Henderson made the recommendation to the War Office in November that all future squadrons 
being sent to France should be homogeneous in that they should be equipped and trained on a 
single purpose aircraft before deploying overseas.268 
With the arrival of a unit whose primary purpose was to seek out and destroy enemy 
aircraft, the RFC now had the beginnings of a technological capability to support Trenchard’s 
offensive strategy in the air. Trenchard firmly believed that once the two opposing air services 
began shooting at one another that it was only a matter of time before the battle for air 
supremacy would have to be fought. The introduction of the Fokker Eindecker had enabled the 
Germans to seize control of the air but he recognized that they were still fighting a defensive 
battle. Trenchard would later write that “there could be no standing on the defensive” in the air 
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and that survival in three-dimensional warfare depended on maintaining the offensive, 
whatever the odds or the costs.269  
Trenchard believed that to achieve air superiority the RFC required both a moral and 
material superiority over the GAAS.270 By moral he meant that every man in the RFC had to 
have the willpower to overcome any adversity (heavy losses of men and aircraft) and the 
courage to maintain offensive operations at all times. Material simply meant that the RFC had 
to have aircraft as good as or better than their opponents to be able to conduct the missions 
required of it and maintain an offensive strategy.271 He knew that aircrew morale was also a 
critical variable to achieving his endstate. If his airmen were equipped with aircraft that at 
least gave them a fighting chance then regardless of casualties the RFC would prevent the 
Germans from interfering with both British air and ground operations and at the same time 
deny them the successful use of their own air assets.272  
In analyzing Trenchard’s concept of air superiority it is evident that it parallels the 
ideas and concepts presented by sea power theorists at the end of the nineteenth century and 
the decade before the First World War. There is no evidence to suggest that Trenchard ever 
met or discussed the concepts proposed by either the American naval strategist, Admiral 
Alfred T. Mahan or his British counterpart, Sir Julian S. Corbett, both of whose works were 
extremely popular within British military circles during the immediate years before the war. It 
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can be assumed however, that because of the language that Trenchard used in his concepts 
defining air power, that he was probably familiar with either Mahan’s The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History, 1660-1783273 or Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 274 and 
possibly both. Robin Higham has argued that Trenchard used several key concepts from 
Mahan to develop his own thoughts on air power.275 Mahan’s tenets of the physical 
destruction of the enemy as well the strategic offensive were both adopted by Trenchard, 
either by design or not. It is evident that he also used several of Corbett’s concepts, most 
especially his principle that command of the sea was not absolute and therefore it would have 
to be categorized as general, local, temporary or permanent.276 Trenchard would make a 
similar argument in his discussions with both military and political leaders about control of the 
air during the planning and execution of the Somme air campaign.277 As has been previously 
stated it is safe to say that through Henderson Trenchard was aware of the writings of 
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Frederick Lanchester and there is some evidence that Lanchester’s ideas influenced 
Trenchard’s own thinking on the use of aircraft in combat, both before the Somme and most 
especially in the later stages of the war.278  
Using Mahan’s definition of “command of the sea through naval superiority,” 
Trenchard would have interpreted that as ‘keeping the air clear for your own purposes and 
denying the air to the enemy for his use.’279 Trenchard applied this concept to air warfare. It 
was his intent to send RFC aircraft deep into German controlled territory to dominate the air 
space, and prevent the Germans from doing the same to the British. He was in fact practicing 
what the Royal Navy had done over the world’s oceans for the previous two hundred plus 
years.280 
 Given more advanced fighter aircraft that were at least equal to the Fokker Eindecker, 
as well as adequately trained airmen, Trenchard firmly believed that his vision could be 
attained in a matter of weeks.281 To maintain that supremacy over time however would require 
tough and dedicated leadership, almost super-human effort from the aircrews and maintenance 
personnel, and an adequate supply of replacement aircraft. He expected that both aircrew and 
aircraft losses would be heavy, but if the RFC’s offensive operations prevented the enemy 
from interdicting the ground force in accomplishing their objectives, the losses would be 
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acceptable to both Trenchard and Haig.282 Since the RFC was part of, and entirely subordinate 
to the needs of the army than whatever Haig and his subordinate commanders required, the 
RFC must and would accomplish.283 Haig fully supported Trenchard’s vision primarily 
because it was firmly linked to his own.284 It would be put to the test in the months leading up 
to and during the Battle of the Somme.  
As successful as the GAAS was with its small formations of Eindecker fighter aircraft, 
Trenchard firmly believed that the Germans had failed to exploit their enormous technical 
superiority. Putting himself in his counterpart’s place, he argued that “he would have striven 
to drive the RFC out of the sky by an unremitting onslaught until every squadron was 
destroyed on the ground or over its own airfields.”285  
1916: The Battle of Verdun: Trenchard’s offensive air strategy is put to the test. 
Having very nearly gained both strategic and tactical surprise, the Germans launched a 
massive attack, along the banks of the Meuse in north-eastern France on 21 February, 1916 
against the French town and fortress of Verdun. It was the beginning of a battle of attrition 
that would last nearly ten months and costs the lives of more than 377,000 French soldiers.286 
The events which took place at Verdun would have great impact on the British Army’s future 
operations as well as those of the RFC. 
When the firestorm broke at Verdun, Trenchard immediately contacted his old friend, 
Commandant Paul-Fernand du Peuty, commander of the10th Army’s air units. Without 
waiting for a call for assistance, the RFC commander immediately transferred every 
                                                            
282Autobiographical Notes, Trenchard Paper, MFC 76/1/61, RAFM. 
283 Peter Hart, Somme Success:  The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme, 1916, 20-21. 
284 David Jordan and Gary Sheffield, ‘Douglas Haig and Airpower’, Airpower Leadership: Theory and 
Practice, (London: The Stationary Office, 2002), 272. 
285 Autobiographical Notes, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/61, RAFM, and Boyle, 162.   
286 Malcolm Brown, Verdun, 1916, (Gloucestershire, England: Tempus Publishing, Limited, 2003), 
230-231. According to Brown, German casualties at Verdun were at least 337,000.  
76 
bombsight, every machine gun and every round of ammunition he could spare to the French 
squadron’s in the south. Trenchard knew the Aviation Militaire’s air battle was also his.287  
With the French forced to transfer divisions from northern France south to Verdun 
Haig and the BEF assumed an additional one hundred miles of territory and Trenchard’s RFC 
gained an additional one hundred miles of air space as French squadrons were also transferred 
south to the battle zone.288 Trenchard immediately requested additional squadrons from 
England to fill the gap.289 Two fighter squadrons, Number 20 equipped with the FE 2b and 
Number 24 equipped with the de Havilland DH 2, having just completed their final phase of 
training as a squadron, arrived in France on 23 January and 8 February respectively.290 These 
two squadrons with their pusher aircraft and their aggressive tactics would serve an 
instrumental role in bringing to an end the ‘Fokker Scrouge.’291  
Trenchard and du Peuty had formed a strong relationship the year prior and had met 
occasionally to discuss, debate and even argue over the best strategy and tactics to employ in 
the air against the Germans. Using his aide Maurice Baring as his interpreter, since neither 
Trenchard nor du Puety spoke the other’s language, the two commanders’s held “animated 
conversations, elaborating their words with gesticulations and diagrams and understanding 
each other perfectly.”292 Du Puety was not totally convinced by Trenchard’s argument that the 
best way to gain air superiority was to conduct a constant air offensive campaign against the 
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enemy.293 Trenchard believed that by taking the fight to the enemy, German aircraft would be 
too busy dealing with British and French fighters and bombers which would allow the 
reconnaissance and artillery directing aircraft that supported the army the freedom to carry out 
their key tasks unhindered.294 The French air commander believed that defensive tactics also 
were a requirement for airmen, just like they were for soldiers on the ground. Though he 
respected Trenchard’s ideas for a ‘strategic air offensive’ du Peuty had no intention of 
emulating the proposed strategy of the RFC until the situation or events forced him to do so.295 
The surprise attack at Verdun would in fact force the Aviation Militaire to adopt the offensive 
strategy or risk being driven from the sky.  
Verdun did in fact provide the laboratory where Trenchard’s offensive strategy was 
put to the test by both the French and German air services. When du Puety’s Tenth Air Wing 
was transferred to the Verdun sector he and Trenchard exchanged liaison officers.296 Over the 
course of the battle and up until the beginning of the Battle of the Somme in July, Trenchard 
received detailed accounts from both his liaison officers and du Peuty himself. The reports 
covered everything from the strategy and tactics that both sides were using to advances in 
aircraft and maintenance technology.297Du Peuty’s personal bi-monthly reports provided 
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Trenchard an unvarnished view of both the accomplishments and failures of the Aviation 
Militaire in the areas of bombing, aerial photography, coordination with the artillery, 
surveillance, and efforts to conduct night flying operations.298 These candid reports were a 
testament to the Frenchman’s professionalism and his respect for Trenchard as a fellow 
airman.  
Weeks before the opening attack on Verdun, the GAAS had begun concentrating its 
aircraft in the sector nearest the fortress city and by doing so provided a welcome respite to the 
RFC squadrons in the north. A total of one hundred and sixty-eight aircraft, twenty-one of 
which were Fokker Eindeckers, were brought together to prevent French observation aircraft 
from detecting the German build-up prior to the attack.299 The Germans had organized several 
new Kagohls (battle groups) in the weeks before their offensive that included the best trained 
and experienced two-seater pilots in their air service.300 Within the first month of the battle 
five Kagohls would be conducting operations. Each Kagohl had six Kampstaffeln (Kastas: 
fighting sections) and were mobile enough to be able to relocate to any area of the front in 
order to conduct bombing or air attack missions against the Aviation Militaire.301 
Reconnaissance and bombing aircraft were also assembled as well as six artillery observation 
flights and two Grossflugzeuge (large two-engine aircraft) as well as four Zeppelin airships.302 
The French had only one fighter and three reconnaissance squadrons at Verdun when the 
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German attack began. It was a hardly surprising that the Germans gained air superiority in just 
a matter of days.303  
Kagohls I and II conducted bombing operations against railroad junctions and airfields 
and attacked any French aircraft they encountered in the air.304 Ten Feldfleiger Abteilungen 
(FFA) whose primary mission was aerial photography were directed to prevent French aircraft 
from entering the airspace above the battlefield.305 Six Artillerie Flieger Abteilungen were 
assigned to conduct artillery observation and direction while the twenty-one single-seat 
fighters, identified as Kampfeinsitzer Kommando (KeK), (single-seater fighter detachments) 
were formed into three independent units.306 These fighter detachments provided aerial escort 
to the two-seater aircraft and conducted fighter patrols as well. Prior to the battle all fighter 
aircraft had been integrated into the FeldFleiger Abteilungen but at Verdun the KeKs would 
become semi-permanent units.307 
Realizing that the Aviation Militaire had been forced onto the defensive, the French 
High Command (Grand Quartier General or GQG) ordered six fighter squadrons, eight 
reconnaissance squadrons and two heavy artillery aviation sections to relocate to the Verdun 
sector.308 This reallocation of aircraft included du Puety’s 10th Army aviation units.  A week 
after the opening attack GQG issued a directive that changed the aerial tactics being used by 
French squadrons. As of 29 February, all fighter aircraft conducting offensive air patrols were 
to fly in formation in groups of at least three or four aircraft. The days of operating as 
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individual aircraft were over.309 The French were aware from air commanders such as du 
Puety and de Rose, that the RFC had begun using formation flying tactics in mid-January to 
maintain offensive operations. The RFC’s change in tactics to deal with the Fokker threat did 
in fact influence the French decision to do the same.310  
Flying in groups of three or four aircraft the French escadrille’s (squadron’s) went on 
the offensive. The change in tactics brought almost immediate results but there was a cost. 
There was a notable increase in aircrew casualties and French ground units no longer received 
the tactical air support they were accustomed to.311  Though the Germans were also operating 
in groups as large as a dozen aircraft they soon found themselves outnumbered and were 
unable to stop French reconnaissance and artillery directing efforts. The tide quickly turned in 
favor of the French air service.312 
A critical factor that paid dividends at Verdun took place before the battle began. This 
had to do with the actual organization of the Aviation Militaire itself.  The French air service 
had reorganized their aircraft into squadrons by function in mid-1915 (observation, 
reconnaissance, bombing, and fighting) under the direction of Colonel Joseph Bares, the GQG 
aviation chief.313 When the situation grew desperate at Verdun in early March, Bares ordered 
the commander of MS 12, Commandant Tricornot de Rose, to regain the initiative from the 
Germans.314 De Rose assembled fifteen squadrons of escadrilles de chase (fighter squadrons) 
and formed them into an effective fighter command.315 By concentrating fighter aircraft into 
                                                            
309 S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force, Volume 1, 359-360. See also John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air, 132. 
310 Aaron Norman, The Great Air War, 101. See also Andrew Boyle, Trenchard Man of Vision, 168-
171.  
311 S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force, Volume 1., 360. 
312 Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918, 27-29. 
313 John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air, 132-133. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
81 
homogenous units that were not assigned or under the control of French army units, de Rose 
was able to concentrate on attacking the Germans and not worrying about providing direct 
support to French ground units.316 Secondarily, the French fighter squadrons were able to 
magnify the strengths of the small but agile Nieuport 11 single-seat tractor biplane and its later 
variant the Nieuport 17. Powered by an 80 horse-power Gnome engine and later a 100 hp Le 
Rhone and armed with a single Lewis gun over the top wing, in the hands of well trained 
pilots the Nieuport was far better than the German Fokker and Albatross fighters.317  
By taking the offensive and attacking the German fighters the French realized that 
their own reconnaissance and artillery observation aircraft were able to conduct their missions 
unmolested by the GAAS. At the same time the French were also able to attack German 
reconnaissance and artillery directing aircraft preventing the enemy from interdicting French 
ground units.318 
The Germans response to the French aerial offensive was to order their shrinking 
number of fighters to provide close escort to their reconnaissance aircraft and prevent French 
aircraft from flying into German held territory. It basically became a policy of trying to 
occupy airspace so that the enemy could not use it. The skies above the German Fifth Army 
were then divided into four sectors, each with its own dawn-to-dusk patrols. The intent of the 
“barrage flights” or Luftsperre was to deny the French access to German air space and prevent 
French aircraft from attacking German reconnaissance and artillery directing aircraft as well 
                                                            
316 John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air, 133. 
317 John Batchelor and Bryan Cooper, Fighter: A History of Fighter Aircraft, 19. See also Kenneth 
Munson, Fighters 1914-1919, 137-139. 
318 Henri Philippe Petain, Verdun. (New York: The Dial Press, 1930), 190-192. Petain, commander of 
the Second  French Army and then the army group responsible for the defense of Verdun later wrote 
“The Nieuport pursuit planes distinguished themselves for boldness and activity, continually attacking 
the enemy planes and balloons, incessantly flying over the front either in powerful patrol squadrons or 
in small groups, and appearing always at different hours.”  He concluded that Verdun was “the crucible 
in which the aviation of the French was fired.” See also John H. Morrow, The Great War in the Air: 
Military Aviation from 1909-1921, 132-134; Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, 73-74. 
82 
as ground units.319 The tactic was self-defeating, for while the German fighters were flying 
escort or flying up and down their own lines, they were not searching for or attacking French 
aircraft, airfields, or logistics centers and by doing so assisting the ground commander. The 
defensive tactic dissipated German strength and at the same time failed to prevent the French 
Air Service from entering German-held territory. While the Germans flew their ‘barrage 
flights” French aircraft were attacking German infantry positions, artillery batteries, rail 
centers, and road networks practically unopposed.320 
What saved the GAAS from destruction were the French ground commanders. After 
several German aircraft strafed and bombed several infantry units the GQG began receiving 
complaints that the only aircraft seen over Verdun were German. Instead of continuing the 
French air offensive, the GQG directing that all French aircraft were to provide direct support 
to the French army around Verdun.321 By doing so the Aviation Militaire went on the 
defensive and within days lost both the initiative and air superiority over the battlefield. In less 
than a week the roles for both air services had been totally reversed. As the French tried to 
occupy the sky above their ground units, with too few aircraft, the Germans went back on the 
offensive and in turn achieved air superiority.322 The Germans bombed French ground units, 
artillery batteries and airfields but strangely failed to interdict the road from Bar-le-Duc to 
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Verdun, the road that was the life-blood of the French army and which provided the necessary 
reinforcements and supplies into the Verdun sector that kept the battle from becoming a 
disastrous defeat.323 
As the Aviation Militaire’s casualty list began to grow at alarming rates du Peuty took 
a huge risk and made the decision to reissue his original orders to his squadrons and to set the 
example he led several long-range intruder missions in person.324 His fighter squadrons were 
to attack every German aircraft they encountered. They would also attack the enemy’s front-
line units, supply depots, rail centers and staging areas. Under seemingly constant pressure 
from the air the Germans once again resumed a defensive posture when their ground 
commanders made the same demand for support that their French counterparts had made after 
being under attack by German aircraft. Within six weeks of the beginning of the German 
offensive against Verdun, the Aviation Militaire had for the second time gained control over 
the skies of Verdun. By trial and error, du Peuty learned that Trenchard’s strategy was valid.325 
Offensive action did in fact seem to be the key to gaining air superiority. 
In April, du Puety sent a letter to Trenchard that provided some critical insight as to 
the strategy and tactics the Aviation Militaire was using against the German air service.326 It 
was becoming more and more evident to the French air commander that many of Trenchard’s 
assertions about the conduct of a strategic air offensive to gain air superiority were being 
proven over the skies of Verdun. 
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By flying together in threes, our army machines have shown that they can protect 
themselves, so freeing the real combat aircraft for independent offensive action 
against enemy fighters which are already organized in such groups. I’d like to draw to 
General Trenchard’s attention also to the following point: in the near future the 
advantage will go to the group which can carry its striking power the farthest. . . . 
Aircraft can be divided into two groups: army machines and combat machines. These 
aircraft can be employed in two separate ways: either by using the combat machines 
to protect the army machines, or by letting the latter fend for themselves so that the 
combat machines can do their real jobs of fighting. We employed both methods, and 
here are the results. Like the Germans, we began by adopting the second method, and 
thanks to our offensive efforts we attained a material and moral superiority so marked 
that the enemy were forced to protect their army machines. We were proud of this. It 
made us a little complacent; we yielded to the demands of our own army corps which 
wanted close protection for their hard-pressed co-operation machines. We in turn were 
driven to adopt the first method, and were barely able to hold our own with the 
enemy. The strongest formations of aircraft proved themselves masters of the 
situation. We then resumed the second method and immediately recaptured local air 
superiority by going after it. There were two main drawbacks. The first was this: the 
corps commanders, misunderstanding what was at stake, protested shrilly at being left 
in the lurch, despite the fact that their corps machines, by flying in formations of 
three, as ordered, managed to do their work, protect themselves and suffer relatively 
few casualties in the process. The second drawback has been the acute nervous strain 
imposed on our combat pilots, who are carrying the fight non-stop to then enemy’s 
back areas, fighting and dropping their bombs far from their own bases and within 
constant range of the German anti-aircraft defences. Our losses in the air may be 
heavy, but they are much less than those we are inflicting on the enemy. And our air 
mastery is proving of enormous advantage to the troops on the ground.327  
When the Battle of Verdun entered its third month, du Peuty notified Trenchard that 
he had identified three key lessons that the Aviation Militaire had gained from their experience 
so far.328  The first was that it was necessary that all fighter units should be organized into 
separate groups outside the ordinary army-co-operation squadrons and placed under the 
command of the air service. Second, in this particular battle, intelligence, photography and 
reconnaissance operations held greater priority and urgency than artillery observation and 
direction and that both the army and the air service required intelligence sections that were 
trained to exploit the products received from the aircrews. Third, all aviation units must be 
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well trained which would enable them to be both adaptable and flexible enough to perform a 
multitude of tasks and missions.329  
Du Peuty also recommended that numerical superiority should be used to mount 
continuous fighter patrols, flying in formation and over the German lines which would then 
create an area where no hostile aircraft could fly without heavy escort.330 The French air 
commander added that by following these tenets the air service must anticipate heavy 
casualties since “our machines fight in the enemy country” and any aircrew whose aircraft was 
forced to land behind the German lines would become prisoners of war at best.331 
Furthermore, the constant offensive would take a great toll both physically and mentally on 
pilots and observers. He concluded that “However heavy our losses may have been, those of 
the Germans have been heavier.”332 He also provided Trenchard with a warning stating that 
there was no such thing as total air superiority. The side with the smaller air service could in 
fact gain temporary dominance by concentrating their squadrons at a given point and that 
individual aircraft would always be able to conduct reconnaissance or bombing missions, and 
aircraft flying at low-level might be able to evade fighter formations flying at higher 
altitudes.333  
When Trenchard forwarded the eighteen page document to the Director of Air 
Operations at the War Office, he made only one clarification and this was to du Puety’s 
second lesson reference the low priority assigned to artillery co-operation. “For an offensive 
battle he considers that the relative importance of the various nature of the work would be 
different, artillery work being of primary importance, especially during the preliminary stages 
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of the battle.”334 As the author of the Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force 
concluded “du Peuty’s findings anticipated to a remarkable degree the offensive tactics 
Trenchard was to pursue relentlessly for the remainder of the war.”335 
With du Peuty’s reports confirming his theory, Trenchard believed that both he and 
his offensive air strategy had been vindicated. He was now convinced that he had identified 
the crucial tenets necessary to gain air superiority.336 The fact that the Germans had the better 
aircraft with a synchronized machine gun did not deter him. He told both his superiors and his 
subordinates that the best way to provide adequate support to the army was to ensure that the 
air service maintained a constant offensive posture.337 There could be no “standing on the 
defensive” in the skies. “Survival in three-dimensional warfare depended on maintaining the 
offensive, whatever the odds or the cost.” In Trenchard’s mind one had a choice of destroying 
the enemy air service or being destroyed by that same enemy force.338 
During the winter and spring of 1916, while the Aviation Militaire was fighting to 
gain air superiority over Verdun, the RFC was in the process of a major expansion program in 
which the flying service nearly doubled in size since the previous autumn.339 It was also 
reorganizing to better support the greatly expanded BEF which began receiving divisions of 
Kitchener’s New Army during the same time period. Having already convinced Haig that the 
air service could and would make even greater contributions than it had at Loos, Trenchard’s 
strategy of air warfare had two basic assumptions. The first was that continuous air support 
was vital to enable success of offensive ground operations and second, that the only way to 
ensure this constant air support was to pursue a strategy of air interdiction of the GAAS far 
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behind the enemy’s lines.340 As Malcolm Cooper has identified “it was Trenchard’s 
conversion of Haig to the doctrine of close air support which finally made the RFC an integral 
part of the growing war machine” that Haig commanded.341   
With the success of the Aviation Militaire at Verdun having proven his strategy valid 
and with the arrival of more and better equipped RFC fighter squadrons in France occurring 
on nearly a monthly basis, Trenchard was convinced he had both the correct strategy and the 
technology that would allow his force to best support the army by interdicting the enemy air 
service as far forward of friendly units as possible.342  Trenchard awaited the opportunity for 
the RFC to demonstrate the effectiveness of his offensive air strategy in the coming offensive 
on the Somme. 
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 The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) consisting of a Military Wing (Army) and a Naval 
Wing (Royal Navy) officially became part of the British Army on 13 April, 1912 when King 
George V granted a royal warrant for its formation.343 The motto chosen to represent the new 
arm was ‘Per Ardua ad Astra’ (With Effort to the Stars).344 Based on the trials and tribulations 
that the RFC would experience both in peacetime and in war it would prove to be a fitting 
motto. 
Captain Frederick Sykes had recommended that the squadron be the primary unit 
within the RFC as it would be manageable and if required expandable and this was approved 
by the ‘Flying Corps Committee.’ Each squadron would consist of three flights of aircraft with 
four machines to a flight. Sykes rejected the French concept of the ‘escadrille’ which had two 
and later three flights of six aircraft on the grounds that the RFC did not have enough trained 
officers “to command a large number of small independent units.”345   
 The Military Wing of the RFC was authorized a Wing Headquarters, seven aircraft 
squadrons (one to be assigned to support each of the seven infantry divisions that were to 
make up the BEF in the event of a major European war), each with twelve aircraft and an 
additional aircraft for the squadron commander.346 An airship and kite squadron with two 
airships and two flights of kites was also authorized as well as a Line of Communications RFC 
workshop which eventually became the Aircraft Park.347 The first two squadrons to be formed 
were Number 1 and Number 3. Number 1 Squadron took possession of the airships and kites 
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from Number 1 (Airship) Company of the Air Battalion when it was stood down. It was 
assigned to Farnborough and by spring 1914 it was directed to transfer its airships and kites to 
the Royal Navy.348 When war was declared in August the squadron was still in the process of 
becoming an aircraft squadron. Number 3 squadron had been formerly Number 2 Company of 
the Air Battalion and was stationed at Larkhill. By September, 1912 the squadron possessed 
18 aircraft of six different makes and designs. Number 2 Squadron was the first of the newly 
designated squadrons that formed at Farnborough to in-process its assigned personnel, conduct 
initial training, collect its assigned aircraft and vehicle transport before moving to one of the 
other new RFC airfields that were being established throughout Britain.349  In September, 
1912, Number 4 Squadron was stood up and upon completion of all requirements was moved 
to Netheravon to share the airfield there with Number 3 Squadron. In July 1913, Number 5 
Squadron was formed from a flight detached from Number 3 Squadron and was later moved to 
Gosport a month before the war broke out. Number 6 and 7 Squadrons were formed in January 
and May 1914 respectively. Neither squadron was completely formed when the war began and 
thus did not make the initial deployment to France.350  
 In addressing aircrew requirements the RFC had proposed that two pilots be assigned 
to each aircraft. Additionally, based on the lessons learned from the Italians in Libya, a reserve 
of at least twenty-four pilots per squadron was to be formed to compensate for what the 
Official History termed ‘wastage.’351 Based on requirements to support an expeditionary force 
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the decision was made that the Military Wing should have 91 aircraft and 364 trained pilots, 
half of whom would be made up of commissioned officers while the other half were to be non-
commissioned officers (NCOs).352 When the Naval Wing offered commissions to trained 
pilots, the Military Wing was forced to forgo its original plan and do the same.353 The 
projected numbers were in fact both unrealistic and unobtainable in the near term. When the 
Military Wing went to war more than two years after its forming it had four squadrons with 
less than seventy operational aircraft and just over one hundred trained pilots, all of who were 
commissioned officers.354  
 Promoted to Major, Sykes was chosen to command the Military Wing of the RFC 
whose headquarters was at Farnborough. Captain Godfrey Paine, R. N. was selected to 
command the Central Flying School (CFS) whose mission was to conduct ‘elementary 
training in flying’ and indoctrinate those pilots without military experience into the military.355 
It would be several weeks before the Navy appointed Captain Murray F. Sueter to be the 
Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty, which also included command of the Naval 
Wing whose headquarters was in London.356 Friction between the Military Wing and the 
Naval Wing began from the start. One of the main friction points between the two 
organizations was the Central Flying School. It began in the fall of 1913 when Henderson 
made the decision to reorganize the RFC. He removed nearly half of the duties of the 
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commander of the Military Wing in an effort to decentralize the organization and bring it on-
line with the other branches of the army.357 
Henderson’s plan called for the division of the RFC into two branches; a Combat 
Wing, commanded by Sykes, and an Administrative Branch which would consist of the 
Aircraft Depot, the Flying Depot, Inspection  Branch, Records Branch, Experimental Branch, 
the CFS, and the Royal Aircraft Factory.358 Sykes only responsibility would thus be “the 
command and training of the flying squadrons.”359 Sykes believed it was the wrong decision to 
make because in his expert opinion it would “undermine the effectiveness of military flying by 
divorcing peacetime operations from those of combat.”360 Two of the major issues that Sykes 
had with the plan were that the Admiralty would gain more control of the CFS than it already 
had and all experimentation and quality control of aircraft was transferred from the Military 
Wing to the Royal Aircraft Factory.361 Though Sykes himself had recommended that the 
RFC’s primary aircraft should be the BE 2 and the Royal Aircraft Factory would produce it in 
quantity long after it was proven obsolete in combat, Sykes believed the Factory’s 
organizational processes under the civilian leadership of Mervyn O’Gorman, were inefficient 
which forced the RFC to conform its operations and its tactics with the production capabilities 
of the Factory.362 Identifying a problem without a solution was not Sykes methodology so he 
developed a detailed plan that encompassed a total reorganization of the RAF which he 
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believed would improve civilian workforce efficiency and at the same times cater to the needs 
of the RFC. With the British military’s lone aircraft producing company experiencing a near 
state of constant change between 1911 and 1914, it is not surprising that Syke’s 
recommendations were not acted on.363 
 Eric Ash contends that Sykes, though a key member of the committee that would be 
responsible for the formation of the RFC, argued from the beginning against the formation of 
a separate air service on the grounds that ‘soldiers historically did not work well with sailors’ 
and ‘that it ruined their morale.’364 He further argued that Sykes position in the RFC and his 
negative attitude toward the Naval Wing may have played a major factor in the Admiralty 
decision to form its own separate air service.365 What impact Sykes had on the Admiralty’s 
decision is debatable but what is not is the fact that Sykes, as one of the senior leaders of the 
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young air service, fostered a deep anti-navy sentiment that would greatly affect army-navy 
relations as the two organizations prepared for the coming war.366  
The War Office’s belief that aircraft development and construction should be 
controlled by the military through the Royal Aircraft Factory (RAF), would prove to be a 
major strategic error that would lead directly to the heavy casualties in both aircrew and 
aircraft suffered by the RFC during the Battle of the Somme.367 The War Office would be 
challenged by several private aircraft manufacturers arguing that the RAF had become a 
monopoly and that their firms were excluded from competing with it. A government 
committee would rule in favor of the RAF and by doing so forced these same firms into the 
open arms of the Admiralty who then began issuing contracts for aircraft.368 Unfortunately 
because of their peacetime requirements there was not enough demand to provide or ensure 
greater growth within the aircraft industry. When the war broke out and the War Office finally 
realized that the RAF could not meet the demands of the expanding RFC, the army was forced 
to ask for assistance from the navy.369 Thus began the struggle for resources between the two 
air services, most notably for aircraft and engines, which would have a major impact on the 
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entire air effort for most of the war. It would also be a major reason why the two air services 
would eventually be combined to form the Royal Air Force in 1918. 370 
In the final year before war was declared, two major organizational changes took 
place that would not only have a great impact on the structure of the RFC but also its 
performance in the first year of the war. The first was the creation of the Experimental Branch 
of the Military Wing formed in March 1913 under the command of Major Herbert 
Musgrave.371 Its tasks included the development of balloons, man-lifting kites, aerial 
photography, bomb-dropping, meteorology, aerial gunnery, and artillery observation. But the 
section’s most notable contribution to the RFC and aviation in general was the advancement 
of wireless communications from aircraft to ground units.372 With the assistance of 
Lieutenants D. S. Lewis and B. T. James, and building on the work already done by Captain 
H. P. T. Lefroy who had been in charge of the army’s wireless experimental work since 1909, 
Musgrave and his assistants had proven that aircraft could communicate with one another two 
months before the war.373 Musgrave, though a tough disciplinarian and somewhat of an 
eccentric, would be an instrumental leader in overcoming the logistics problems of providing 
wireless sets and wireless mounted aircraft to the RFC in the first year of the war.374  Six 
months before the war, Musgrave received a flight of aircraft with which to conduct his 
experiments and ‘to serve as a link between theory and practice.’375 When the war began the 
flight was broken up to bring each of the four deploying squadrons up to strength but a new 
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Wireless Flight was formed and then attached to Number 4 Squadron.376 It was during the first 
few weeks of fighting that Musgrave directed the first experimental operations where wireless 
equipped aircraft attempted to direct artillery. These were successful and by December, the 
Wireless Flight was expanded and became Number 9 Squadron, Experimental led by 
Musgrave. It became the RFC’s first wireless telegraphy organization and was tasked to 
support the entire air service with wireless communications.377 It was largely because of the 
work done by the Experimental Branch that techniques and methodologies were developed 
that established both the feasibility and the parameters for the six missions the RFC would 
assume in its efforts to provide support to the army in combat.378  
The second major organizational change took place in September, 1913 when the 
Directorate of Military Aeronautics (DMA) was created to replace the Air Committee.379 It 
was also decided that the newly created directorate would become independent of the four 
principal departments of the War Office and directly responsible to the Secretary of State. 
Brigadier General Henderson who had been the Director of Military Training was selected to 
be the Director General of the new organization with Captain Brancker appointed as his 
deputy.380 The Directorate was organized with three sections. The first was responsible for 
administration and training, the second for equipment, and the third for contracts. The 
inclusion of a section to handle contracts set a new precedent within the War Office in that 
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previously all contracts had been the responsibility of the Director of Military Training.381 
Once the war began Henderson became dual-hatted in that he assumed command of the RFC 
and retained his position as the DGMA. As has been previously mentioned this would cause 
several problems for the air service, most especially back in England where Brancker as his 
deputy was outranked by his counterparts in the Admiralty and ill-prepared to deal with the 
political aspect that was a pre-requisite for the DGMA. This dilemma would not be solved 
until Henderson gave up command of the RFC in August, 1915 and returned to London to 
resume his duties as the DGMA full-time.382  
Three months into the war the RFC conducted its first wartime organizational change 
to meet its growing requirements due to the expansion of the BEF. Sir John French, 
commander of the BEF, created two armies, each of which were planned to consist of up to 
three army corps.383 He then requested that the War Office authorize an increase in RFC 
squadrons due to  
The necessity for watching the enemy’s line for prolonged periods . . . during 
which movements of great masses, both from reserves and from distant parts 
of the fighting line, may take place at a distance of from fifty to sixty miles, 
demands continuous and extended reconnaissance to an unforeseen degree. At 
the same time tactical aeroplane reconnaissance has proved so valuable that, 
for this purpose and for directing artillery-fire, it has been found necessary to 
attach aeroplanes continuously to Army Corps.384 
Because of the demand he requested that three more squadrons (No. 1, No. 7 and No. 
8) complete their final preparations and deploy to France.385 Henderson directed his chief of 
staff, Sykes, to develop a reorganization plan that centered on one tenet: the decentralization 
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of the RFC by forming it into wings that would then be attached to each Army corps.386 He 
then informed Brancker and Trenchard back in England about his ideas for a proposed 
reorganization and invited them to submit their own concept to him.387 He would then 
consider what each of them provided before making his decision.  Henderson and Sykes 
agreed that the RFC should remain an autonomous unit under the command of an RFC general 
officer because the branch had become too technical and too specialized to hand over the 
duties to an Army corps commander who did not understand the capabilities of the air 
service.388 The reorganization plan called for the RFC to be formed into wings of two or three 
squadrons with one of the wings remaining under RFC headquarters and one to be attached to 
each army.389 The squadrons within the Headquarters Wing would conduct strategic 
reconnaissance to a depth of sixty miles behind the German lines and also conduct any special 
missions as directed by the RFC commander.390 A wireless squadron was to be formed with a 
flight attached to each wing. The squadrons attached to an army would provide both army 
strategic and tactical reconnaissance to a depth of twenty miles and artillery observation and 
direction.391  
Back in England three wings were formed: the Administrative Wing which 
encompassed Farnborough and Brooklands, the Aircraft Park, the Record Office, and the 
Recruits Depot; the Training Wing with headquarters at Netheravon and finally the Central 
Flying School.392 Though the original plan called for the wings to be commanded by colonels, 
the War Office approved the command position to be filled by a lieutenant colonel. Henderson 
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submitted his reorganization plan to the War Office at the end of October.393 As the Deputy 
Director of Military Aeronautics (DDMA) Brancker sent a letter to the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS), Sir James Wolfe Murray, which raised the question of RFC expansion. 
“We have been living hand to mouth so far, but I think that the time had now come for a more 
or less definite statement of policy for the future development of the RFC.”394 Working with  
Kitchener in the first few months of the war, Brancker knew that the Secretary of State for 
War had envisioned building six armies with three corps each.395 For the RFC this meant a 
further thirty squadrons and Brancker added five more to form a reserve. Brancker had 
recommended one squadron for each army headquarters and each army corps at the front with 
an additional six squadrons assigned to the RFC headquarters.396 The recommendations were 
forwarded to the War Office on 1 November and after briefing Kitchener on 3 November, the 
Henderson-Sykes’s re-organization plan was approved by the CIGS on 21 December.397 On 
the issue of number of squadrons, Kitchener, believing Brancker’s figures were too 
conservative, arbitrarily doubled them.398 Kitchener expected a long, drawn out war and he 
realized it would take years for his expansion plan to be completed. Shortages of aircraft, 
aircraft engines, trained aircrew, and support personnel would ensure that the additional 
seventy squadrons that Kitchener envisioned for the RFC would be a long time in coming in 
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fact eighteen months after the plan was approved there were only 27 operational RFC 
squadrons on the Western Front.399  
Whereas Henderson and Sykes viewed the reorganization from an operational 
command and control perspective, Trenchard and Brancker focused largely on the logistical 
issues of an expansion of the RFC which they were both heavily involved with at that time.400 
Brancker also supported decentralization of the force and agreed with Trenchard that the RFC 
commander in the field should be a staff officer.401 Trenchard however went even further. He 
wanted the RFC in the field to replicate the organizational structure of a corps or divisional 
unit, recommending that they “definitely [be] allocated to the large units of the field army, the 
squadron commanders being directly responsible to the high [Army] commanders.”402 
Furthermore, Trenchard believed that the senior leaders of the RFC in the field should serve as 
advisors to the ground commander like the senior artillery and engineer officers did and thus 
there would be no need for this senior aviator to command air units or direct flying 
operations.403 
Henderson disagreed with both Brancker’s and Trenchard’s recommendations, 
believing that they went against all of the work and effort that had created the air service.404 
He believed that if their reorganization plan was accepted it would eliminate the autonomy of 
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the RFC and in turn greatly reduce the branch’s ability to adequately support the army.405 
Fortunately for the RFC, the Henderson-Sykes plan was published by the War Office and went 
into effect on 15 January, 1915.406 Its approval only added further fuel to the on-going Sykes-
Trenchard feud but Henderson was not concerned with the personal issues the two officers had 
with one another as long as they performed their duties. He was more focused on the greater 
good of the organization as a whole. The Trenchard-Brancker reorganization plan as proposed 
would have been quite detrimental to the future of the RFC and the future of military air 
power in Britain in general had it been accepted.407 Sykes argument that “the RFC as a 
separate service would virtually have ceased to exist” was valid.408 The RFC would more than 
likely have become an auxiliary to army and corps level units and without adequate command 
and control by an aviation-centric headquarters would have been unable to concentrate its 
squadrons when necessary and would have had even greater difficulty attempting to conduct 
combined-arms operations. Instead the RFC would have been decentralized down into small 
formations similar to those used by the Germans in the first two years of the war. The results 
being that they were unable to provide even a modicum of strategic or tactical support to the 
army.409  
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Thus the RFC was decentralized into wings for tactical support of the army but also 
maintained its autonomy as an air service with its own chain of command. This reorganization 
would prove to be most critical to the future development of the RFC in that it provided the 
required organizational framework necessary for the even greater expansion programs that 
were to take place over the course of the following three years.   
By the time Henderson returned to England to resume his duties as DGMA and 
Trenchard replaced him as commander of the RFC in August, 1915, the BEF had expanded 
from four to thirty divisions but the number of RFC squadrons had only increased from four to 
eleven with 153 operational aircraft.410 Two days after taking command Trenchard submitted a 
plan to the CIGS that built on the Henderson-Sykes plan from the previous November. To 
meet the requirements that would be expected with a massive expansion of the army he 
recommended that the RFC organize into higher formations than wings. By this stage of the 
war the aviation needs of the army were divided almost equally between close or short-range 
reconnaissance, photography, and artillery co-operation missions on the immediate front of 
each army corps. There was also a demand for reconnaissance work beyond the area covered 
by the corps, which belonged to the army commander.411 Thus it was logical that the wings 
should be reorganized so that one or more would conduct missions for the corps while one or 
more conducted missions for the army. “I think a guide for the future should be at least one 
squadron to each corps, one squadron to each army headquarters, and one for General 
Headquarters. In addition I would ask that a squadron per army be sent out when formed, for 
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special work such as bomb raids.412In short Trenchard was requesting one squadron to support 
each army corps for the direction and observation of artillery, aerial photography, and tactical 
or short-range reconnaissance; a squadron for each army headquarters to conduct strategic or 
long-range reconnaissance as well as other missions as directed by the commander.413 Lastly, 
he was requesting that each army should be assigned a squadron whose primary mission was 
to conduct bombing raids. If his plan was approved, Trenchard envisioned that thirty-two 
operational squadrons would be in France by mid-April, 1916. Sixteen of these squadrons 
were to be assigned with one to every corps of the four armies for corps works; twelve to the 
four armies with three squadrons to each army for army work and four squadrons assigned to 
General Headquarters.414 
Trenchard’s expansion plan was approved by Kitchener and the Army Council in 
December, 1915 and went into effect on 30 January, 1916.415 The result was that there were 
corps wings and army wings and these were formed into brigades, one for each army. 
Trenchard’s request that army headquarters should also have a squadron of aircraft for long-
range reconnaissance and aircraft that were capable of fighting “for their information” was 
also approved.416 Henderson recommended to the CIGS that once the RFC had thirty-six 
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squadrons on hand, the strength of each would then be increased to eighteen aircraft along 
with the required pilots and mechanics to fly and service them.417 
The results were a second major reorganization of the RFC which further 
decentralized the command structure and organization of the RFC. Three brigades were 
formed from the three existing wings. First and Tenth Wing along with an aircraft park and 
kite balloon section formed  I Brigade commanded by Brigadier General E. B. Ashmore; 
Second and Eleventh Wings were combined to form II Brigade under Brigadier General J. M. 
Salmond; while Third and Twelfth Wings formed III Brigade under Brigadier General J. F. A. 
Higgins.418 Each brigade was to provide aviation support to one of the army’s assigned to the 
BEF and would consist of a corps wing for general cooperation duties and an army wing for 
strategic reconnaissance, bombing and aerial fighting.419 Each brigade would also have two 
balloon sections assigned to it. By early March 1916, the first three brigades were formed 
from squadrons and wings then in France. That same month Trenchard was notified that a 
Fourth Brigade must be formed to support the newly formed Fourth Army and so the 3rd Wing 
was detached from the III Brigade and the 12th (Army) Wing was reconstituted as a corps 
wing. The III Brigade received the 13th (Army) Wing to replace 3rd Wing. An RFC 
Headquarters wing, the Ninth Wing, was formed on 6 May and a week later was designated as 
the 9th (GHQ) Wing providing support directly for General Headquarters, BEF.420 As the 
expansion of the RFC took place it began to take on the force structure of an army division. 
With the increase in size as well as capability, Trenchard’s responsibilities and command 
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authority also increased to that on par with a division commander. He was subsequently 
promoted to the rank of major general.421 
As part of the overall organizational change to the RFC the fighter squadrons were 
gradually removed from the Corps Wings and transferred to the Army Wings. At the end of 
April, Trenchard held a meeting with his four brigade commanders and explained why he 
believed it necessary to remove the fighters from the corps squadrons and concentrate them in 
the army wings. The process was to be gradual and was not completed until the middle of 
August, six weeks into the Battle of the Somme.422 
A secondary issue of the expansion had to do with the number of aircraft and pilots 
assigned to each squadron. Since its formation the RFC squadron had consisted of twelve 
aircraft forming three flights of four aircraft each but discussion to increase the number of 
aircraft in each squadron began as early as the first reorganization of the RFC in November, 
1914.423 With the RFC expanding a second time the squadron and wing commanders made the 
recommendation to Trenchard that that number of aircraft in each squadron should be 
increased to eighteen forming three flights of six aircraft and that the number of pilots per 
squadron should be increased from twelve to twenty.424 Henderson, Trenchard, and Brancker 
agreed with the concept but questioned the practicality of the increases when the RAF at that 
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time was just able to replace the number of aircraft that were lost in training accidents or from 
combat action each month. 
 
 
 
  All three leaders agreed that “the raising of squadrons to the higher establishment [of 
eighteen aircraft] should take precedence over the formation of new squadrons.”425 In their 
almost daily written communications in the months leading up to the battle of the Somme, 
Trenchard and Brancker brought up this topic repeatedly.426 Along with the aircraft issue, the 
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ability to recruit and train aircrew and support personnel was also a major concern for the RFC 
forcing Trenchard to consider asking the War Office and the Admiralty to transfer thirty to 
forty RNAS pilots to the RFC on a temporary basis until the squadrons in France were brought 
up to strength.427  
As final preparations were being made to launch the Somme offensive, Haig and 
Trenchard were already formulating the RFC’s next major expansion in concert with that of 
the BEF. Haig submitted his proposal (with Trenchard’s assistance) to the War Office on 15 
June, 1916. 
By the spring of 1917, the British army in France will consist of five armies 
of four corps each. For these a total of fifty-six squadrons will be required, 
each squadron to consist of eighteen machines. I fully realize that my demand 
for this large number of squadrons involves the provision of a very large 
number of pilots and observers. The importance of this service, however, is so 
great that I consider it essential that the necessary personnel should be found 
even at the reduction in other directions.428 
Before the War Office would contemplate acting on further requests for more squadrons than 
were already in the process of being trained and equipped within the U.K., questions were 
being raised within the government on the soundness and feasibility of Trenchard’s offensive 
strategy and its impact on the RFC.429 The debate on whether or not the RFC was using the 
correct strategy and the corresponding increasing casualty rate amongst aircrew in France put 
all discussion about expansion for the air service on hold until an investigation was conducted, 
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much to Trenchard’s consternation.430 There were also manpower issues involved that would 
affect any future expansion of the RFC as Brancker was quick to remind Trenchard. 
The Adjutant-General is at his wit’s end to find men, let alone skilled 
mechanics. The Expeditionary Force have put in further enormous demands 
for heavy artillery, and neither the Master-General of Ordnance nor the 
Quartermaster-General know where to look for the necessary skilled artificers 
. . .  Heavy guns and aeroplanes need the same class of men to maintain them 
in the field and to manufacture them.431  
The organizational changes that had taken place or were under way when the air campaign 
began in early April, 1916, provided sufficient evidence to the army leadership that the RFC 
was both adaptable and flexible in accomplishing any mission assigned to it. A critical 
element of the organization’s ability to expand and modify its structure during combat 
operations was largely due to the leadership of the organization itself. Much of the credit for 
the RFC’s success rests with four men, two of whom were largely responsible for the creation 
of the RFC before the war began while the other two established the conditions for the air 
service to expand when it was realized that the war would not be ‘over by Christmas’ like so 
many had first thought in the summer of 1914. Almost as important, all four men would have 
some role in the formulation of the offensive strategy that the RFC would follow during the air 
campaign over the Somme.432 
The third element identified as playing a significant role in the RFC’s air campaign on 
the Somme was leadership. Any analysis of the RFC during the First World War must include 
detailed assessment of the senior leadership─ those individuals who were directly involved in 
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the creation, expansion and actions of the British Army’s air service prior to and during the 
Battle of the Somme. The three most influential leaders of the RFC during this period were 
Major General Sir David Henderson, Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard and Brigadier 
General William Sefton Brancker. A brief biography of each will be presented with emphasis 
on their duties and accomplishments within the RFC prior to the start of the air campaign.433  
Major General Sir David Y. Henderson 
Henderson entered the British Army at the age of twenty in August, 1882 after having 
spent four years studying engineering at the University of Glasgow and then graduating from 
the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.434 Commissioned into the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders, Henderson saw active service with the Nile Expedition of 1898 and was 
wounded during the Siege of Ladysmith during the South African War (1898-1902). During 
this campaign he was awarded a Mention in Despatches (MID) and later a Distinguished 
Service Order (DSO) and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. In October, 1900 he was 
selected to serve as Kitchener’s Director of Military Intelligence, a post he held for almost two 
years. While in this position he established himself as one of the British Army’s leading 
experts on the gathering and analysis of tactical intelligence.435  
What made Henderson stand out amongst his peers was the fact that he worked hard 
to make himself a professional soldier. He spent many hours each week reading and studying 
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topics that would make him a better soldier and a better leader. Just as important, he also 
wrote about his profession.436 He authored two important manuals after the South African 
War: Field Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice (1904) and The Art of Reconnaissance 
(1907), both of which further solidified his reputation as the army’s expert on tactical 
intelligence.437 His great interest in reconnaissance operations led him inevitably to the 
potential use of aircraft for reconnaissance purposes and it would be Henderson who was one 
of the first senior military leaders to recognize that the aircraft could serve that role in support 
of the army in wartime.438  
Believing it essential that he understand the capabilities and possibilities of aircraft 
and their potential use by the military, Henderson learned to fly at Brooklands and in 1911, at 
the age of 49 he was awarded his Royal Aero Club certificate (RAeC) and in the process 
became Britain’s oldest pilot at that time.439 Henderson’s influential work on the CID’s 
technical sub-committee led directly to the formation of the RFC in May, 1912, has already 
been discussed. In July, 1912, he was assigned to the War Office and appointed Director of 
Military Training where he “enjoyed a good reputation as an able staff officer with an open, 
direct personality which made him respected by soldiers and politicians alike.”440 His next 
assignment would lead directly to his command of the RFC. On September 1, 1913, control of 
Britain’s military aviation was separated from the responsibilities of the Master-General of 
Ordnance and a new Directorate of Military Aeronautics was created. Henderson being one of 
the few senior army officers who was also a certified pilot, was logically chosen to be the first 
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Director-General.441 It was a role he was qualified for but it was also an assignment he would 
never enjoy.442 Describing the future RFC commander, Sefton Brancker, then serving as 
Henderson’s deputy wrote “David Henderson . . . was a born diplomat with a very subtle 
mind, and a keen sense of humour. His foresight and soundness of judgment were wonderful, 
and his tact and skill in dealing with a tangled and delicate problem used to fill me with 
envious admiration.”443 
 
 
Henderson’s role in the development and organization of the RFC before the war has 
already been discussed. When war was declared he assumed command of the RFC but also 
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retained his position as Director General of Military Aeronautics (DGMA). Thus for the first 
year of the war Henderson maintained two critical leadership positions with one in England 
and the other in France, both of which had two interconnected but different objectives. As 
commander of the RFC, Henderson was tasked with providing aviation support directly to the 
BEF and in the first few months of the campaign this primarily consisted of strategic and 
tactical reconnaissance.444 Though he directed Brancker and Trenchard to oversee the 
recruiting, selection, and training of all RFC personnel, Henderson was still responsible for all 
three programs.445 As DGMA he was responsible for a multitude of duties but arguably the 
two most important were serving as both a liaison and coordinator between the War Office 
and the Admiralty on all aviation issues and planning and budgeting the required resources for 
the RFC, both within the training base and operationally in the field. Within this vital area the 
most important was the development and procurement of aircraft.446  
Believing that no one single man could adequately handle the responsibilities of both 
positions, Sykes and Brancker recommended that Henderson relinquish command of the RFC 
in favor of the position of DGMA as both believed that because of his seniority, his command 
experience, and his political acumen he could do more good for the air service in that position 
within the War Office.447 Three months after the RFC deployed to France, Sykes, serving as 
Henderson’s Chief of Staff, wrote a memorandum outlining his reasons for the critical 
importance of the DGMA position. In it he made inferences that some of the reorganizational 
problems then being experienced within the RFC could be traced to Henderson’s inability to 
conduct both positions simultaneously. “In the strained and abnormal conditions of war, the 
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weight of control would seem to be even more essential. But, as a fact, the Directorate of 
Military Aeronautics has been heavily weakened by the services of the Director General 
himself being required in the field.” 448 Sykes comments were accurate but they were not 
much appreciated by Henderson who during this same time period was selected by the BEF 
commander to take command of the 1st Division after its commander had been wounded. For 
nearly a month Henderson commanded an infantry division, leaving command of the RFC to 
Sykes. This provides some evidence that Henderson was in fact placing his own career ahead 
of the air service. As a division commander he would be promoted to major general but his 
time as a division commander was short-lived, as Kitchener overruled the BEF commander 
and by Christmas, 1914, Henderson returned to command the RFC and Sykes, to his chagrin, 
returned to his position of chief of staff.449 Divine contends that Henderson was never truly an 
airman because he was not passionate about flying and only gained his pilot’s certificate out of 
duty to his profession, unlike the majority of young military officers who were learning to fly 
because it was new, challenging, adventurous, and patriotic as war loomed on the horizon. 
Henderson on the other hand had loftier goals and he “looked always beyond the auxiliary of 
the air to high command in the field.” 450 It is true that once Henderson had earned his pilot’s 
certificate he rarely flew an aircraft after that time. 
By July, 1915, Brancker was also convinced that the command of the RFC in France 
“was child’s play compared with the work which I was doing [in Henderson’s absence].” 
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. . . We must wake up in the senior officer line or get left. The drawback to the 
situation is that you are our only really senior officer. I do not feel that I fill 
this place properly. If it requires a Major-General to command the R.F.C. in 
the Field, it certainly wants one here, where instead of being a valuable asset, 
the R.F.C. is still an expensive and precocious innovation. The fact that you 
come home occasionally does not help; rather the reverse, for it makes my 
position much weaker-the innate but, I presume, unconscious obstructor 
financial and otherwise, will not treat me seriously, and they use the desire to 
treat with you and not with me as a means of avoiding action . . . in any case I 
don’t think you and Trenchard should be on the same side of the water. . .451 
Two weeks later, Brancker followed this with a second letter after returning from visiting 
Henderson at his headquarters in France. He recorded that his efforts ‘had their effect’ since 
shortly thereafter Henderson gave up command of the RFC in the field to Trenchard on 19 
August, 1915. There is no evidence to support the contention that it was Kitchener who 
directed Henderson to give up command of the RFC in France and take up his position as 
DGMA full time or that he gave up command in the field due to ill health.452 The Official 
History implies that it was Henderson himself who made the decision to return to England. 
“On August the 19th, Colonel H. M. Trenchard took command of the RFC in France, and Sir 
David Henderson returned to the War Office to deal with the multitudinous problems of 
supply of men and material for the rapidly expanding air service.”453 
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 Once back in London and in the months leading up to the Battle of the Somme, 
Henderson focused heavily on three priorities. The first was improving the training of new 
aircrew and equipping new squadrons preparing to deploy to France. The second was the 
creation of a Home Defense system of ground stations and aircraft against the incursions of 
Zeppelin raiders and the third was the production of new, better performance aircraft capable 
of defeating the German Fokker in France.454  With his plan of merging wings into brigades 
approved by the Army Council and underway by the end of January, 1916, and the expansion 
scheme for the RFC on track, the Army Council made the decision that Henderson should 
return to France in mid-February to take command once more of the RFC and Trenchard 
would become DGMA in London. But Henderson’s dreams of returning to the field and a 
combat command were not to be. After nearly three months without a Zeppelin raid on 
England the lull was broken on the night of 30-31 January, 1916.455 Though the bombing was 
scattered over the Midlands the fact that the Aerial Home Defence Organization was unable to 
intercept or shoot down any of the attacking Zeppelins which resulted in a massive public 
outcry that was led by political leaders and the press who demanded the government take 
action to address the issue of Britain’s air defences.456 The Cabinet and Kitchener believed the 
solution to the Zeppelin problem lay with Henderson. Instead of returning to France, 
Henderson would be given a permanent seat on the Army Council so that he could address the 
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“conflicting air interests of the army and navy.” 457By doing so he would also, it was believed, 
solve Britain’s air defense problem.458 Additionally, a select Committee was to be formed to 
investigate the roles and responsibilities of the rival air services. When informed of this 
Henderson quickly notified Trenchard. 
I have heard definitely that I am to stay at home for some time and will 
probably go on the Army Council, so you may make all arrangements for 
remaining in Command. . . Also the establishment of the new Joint Air War 
Committee is going to give me a lot of work, and I think very useful work as 
we are now bound to get the Navy more or less in line.459  
From the fall of 1915 through the conclusion of the air campaign over the Somme in 
November 1916, Henderson would play an important and critical role in coordinating the 
requirements of the RFC and fighting for resources he believed the army’s air service required 
to accomplish its assigned missions. Throughout the planning and execution of the air 
campaign he would be in almost weekly communication with his replacement, Trenchard, 
while his deputy, Sefton Brancker, communicated much more frequently via letter with the 
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RFC commander on the day-to-day issues and activities of the flying service during the 
campaign.460 
Brigadier General Hugh M. Trenchard  
What is remarkable about Trenchard’s military career is the fact that he attained both 
the rank of general officer and high command with little in his first twenty years of military 
service to indicate that he possessed the skills and competencies to achieve great success as a 
professional soldier. Having failed the Royal Navy entrance exam examination at the age of 
thirteen he then applied for a commission into the army but failed to apply himself and failed 
the entrance examination for the Military Academy at Woolwich not once but twice before 
being forced to apply to the Militia (later the Territorial Army) which had lower entrance 
requirements.461 Over two consecutive years, Trenchard failed the entrance examinations 
twice and was fortunate to be made a probationary subaltern with the Kincardine and Forfar 
Artillery.462 On his third attempt he passed the army’s entrance exam in March, 1893 and at 
the age of twenty was gazetted a second lieutenant in the Second Battalion, the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers, and sent to India.463  
It was Trenchard’s skill at sports which prevented him from being an outcast within 
his regiment as he was a poor communicator and lacked the social graces of many of his 
fellow officers. For this reason he earned the nickname “the camel” since he did not drink and 
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rarely spoke.464Realizing that he had been deficient in his studies, Trenchard started a personal 
reading program in an effort to make up for his past educational shortcomings. He spent many 
hours each week reading the biographies of men of action, primarily British military and 
political leaders from the 18th and 18th centuries.465 He was successful in educating himself “on 
the quiet” without his fellow officers catching on to what he was doing but there was little fear 
that he would be accused of being an ‘intellectual.’ His habit of reading primarily historical 
works and biographies became a life-long passion.466 
After serving several tours in Africa, including the Boer War, where he was badly 
wounded and then made a somewhat miraculous recovery, Trenchard commanded a regiment 
for nearly three years. Suffering an abscessed liver in 1910 he was evacuated back to England, 
seriously ill.467 After a long recovery, he was posted to Londonderry, Northern Ireland where 
the Second Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers were stationed. There he was reduced from 
temporary lieutenant colonel to major and given command of a company, a far cry after 
having just spent several years commanding a regiment.468 
Almost forty and having been turned down for duty with the Egyptian Army and the 
International Gendarmerie in Macedonia for being too old and having received no reply to his 
applications to join mounted units within the Colonial Defence Forces in South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand, Trenchard again considered leaving the army.469 It was a chance 
letter from one of his subordinate officers from the Southern Nigeria Regiment that provided 
Trenchard the direction he so desperately was in search for. Captain Eustace Loraine had 
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returned to England before Trenchard and had learned to fly. “You’ve no idea what you’re 
missing . . .  Come and see men like ants crawling.”470  
 
  
Though his commanding officer did his best to convince Trenchard that he was too 
tall, (Trenchard was six foot three inches) and too old to be an aviator, he granted the 
prospective flyer three months paid leave to pursue his dream. 471Arriving in London on 6 
July, 1912 Trenchard learned that the man who had lit the spark in him to pursue flying, 
Captain Loraine, had been killed in a flying accident the day before he arrived in London.472 
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The death of his friend only made Trenchard more determined to accomplish his goal. 
At that time applicants to the RFC had to have previously earned a Royal Aero Club 
certificate before being accepted into the Central Flying School. They also had to be in good 
physical condition and be between the ages of 18 to 40. Due to his wounding in South Africa, 
Trenchard only had one functioning lung, but he was less concerned about the physical 
requirements than he was about the time available before he turned forty in February, 1913.473 
He knew he needed to earn his certificate in less than four weeks and then earn a seat in the 
next CFS class before it was filled. With his fortieth birthday less than seven months away, 
Trenchard knew that if he failed his initial flying certification and did not gain acceptance into 
the next class he would have no chance of becoming an airman. He was most fortunate that he 
had Thomas Sopwith as a flight instructor. 
Major Trenchard arrived at my School at Brooklands one morning in August 
1912. He told me that the War Office had given him ten days in which to 
learn to fly and pass his tests for an aviator’s certificate, adding that if he 
could not pass by that date he would be over age. It was no easy performance 
to undertake but Major Trenchard tackled it with a wonderful spirit. He was 
out at dawn every morning, and only too keen to do anything to expedite 
tuition. He passed in about one week from first going in the air as a passenger. 
He was model pupil from whom many younger men should have taken the 
lead.474 
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After a total of sixty-four minutes in the air spread out over thirteen days and at the cost of 75 
pounds tuition, Trenchard earned his RAeC, No. 270 on 13 August, 1912.475 He then 
proceeded to Upavon and was enrolled into the CFS. Before he could join a flight and be 
tested on his flying skills, the school’s commandant, Captain Godfrey Paine, RN, “co-opted” 
Trenchard and made him adjutant of the school. One of his first official duties was to serve as 
the chief examiner of the exams given at the CFS. Directed by his new commander to redesign 
the exams for the ground portion of the training, Trenchard did so and then took the exams 
himself, graded them and awarded himself passing marks so he could advance directly to 
flight training.476 
 Trenchard was by no means a natural pilot and his instructor, Naval Lieutenant Arthur 
Longmore, found their initial test flight together quite harrowing. “At best, he [Trenchard] was 
an indifferent flier. His age told against him, though he showed enviable pluck and 
perseverance.”477  When his staff duties allowed, Trenchard was in the air as often as time 
would permit trying to improve his capabilities as a pilot. Upon passing his flight training he 
was officially made an instructor at the CFS but since he was a marginal pilot at best, he in 
fact never performed the duties of a flying instructor.478 His true strength lay in the myriad 
tasks of administrating and operating the CFS and he excelled at learning all of the specific 
duties and responsibilities of every section within the school.479Paine was extremely pleased 
with Trenchard’s performance in bringing order and discipline where there had previously 
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existed confusion. With a mixed cadre of instructors and students from the army and the navy, 
Trenchard created the guidelines and orders that would ensure the CFS accomplished its 
assigned purpose of providing qualified pilots to the two services. “Trenchard had to mix guile 
and diplomacy with firmness. He adapted what was best in the regulations of army and navy; 
and, with the set aim of offering the least offence to the greatest number, he jettisoned the 
rest.”480  
 Trenchard was correct in his assessment that the CFS primary purpose was to take 
novice pilots and turn them into specialists. He was also the first to admit that he had much to 
learn about the art and science of flying and he applied himself to understand what had been 
accomplished in the field in the decade since the Wright Brothers first flight in 1903.481 He 
read and studied what he could find in the popular press about the pioneer aviators and aircraft 
designers, who at that time seemed to be making almost weekly advances in the technology 
and potential of air power.482 As Paine’s assistant at the CFS, Trenchard’s dominant 
personality impressed the student pilot’s and because of his deep pitched and resonant voice 
Trenchard earned the new nickname of “Boom” which remained with him for the rest of his 
career.483  
 Probably the one single event which convinced Trenchard of the unlimited 
possibilities of the aircraft for military use was his involvement as an air observer during the 
annual Army Maneuvers in September, 1912. As part of General Grierson’s northern force, 
Trenchard, along with his pilot Lieutenant Longmore, observed units of Haig’s southern force 
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marching along a road in East Anglia.484 Reporting to Grierson with this information, 
Trenchard and Longmore were directed to make contact with the northern force cavalry which 
was moving in the wrong direction. Finding the cavalry, the two airmen landed and Trenchard 
notified the cavalry commander of Grierson’s orders. Now heading in the right direction the 
cavalry made off to attack Haig’s force. Maneuver observers admitted that the results of the 
war games had been heavily influenced by the intervention of aircraft which in fact had 
enabled Grierson’s force to defeat Haig’s.485 As for Trenchard, he had observed large 
formations of men moving across the countryside and saw first-hand how quickly critical 
information could be delivered by airmen to the ground commander and its impact on the 
outcome of a battle. It was from this experience that he began to understand the role aircraft 
could serve in combat.486  
 Less than a year after the conclusion of the 1912 maneuvers, Trenchard was appointed 
Assistant Commandant, CFS by Henderson.487 Promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant 
colonel and serving as Captain Paine’s second-in-command, Trenchard had no small influence 
on the overall operation of the flying school. In discussions with other members of the flying 
school staff Trenchard became involved in heated debates and arguments about how aircraft 
would be used in war. “Hugh Trenchard held extremely advanced views. He used to assert that 
the aeroplane would one day transform the battlefield, and did so one evening at table in the 
hearing of General Smith-Dorrien. His words were coldly received.”488 
 When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August, 1914, Trenchard recorded his 
disappointment at being informed that he would be remaining in England. “I was told I would 
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not be going to France with the Expeditionary Force, but would replace Sykes as commandant 
of the Military Wing. I handed over my duties at the Central Flying School on the 7th.”489 
After assisting in the first expansion of the RFC in the opening months of the war, Trenchard 
arrived in France in November, 1914 to take command of the First Wing, which consisted of 
two squadrons. In early January he met the new commander of the newly designated First 
Army, General Douglas Haig, for the first time.  
I was very nervous beforehand as I had always heard that he was very 
reserved, austere, severe and that he did not believe a great deal in the air. He 
ordered me to go round to his H. Q. at about five o’clock in the evening and 
asked me about the use of aircraft in battle. I tried to explain what I thought 
they would do in future besides reconnaissance work, how our machines 
would have to fight in the air against German machines and how we should 
have to develop machine-guns and bombs. He was interested. . . I could not 
help feeling then and for years afterwards that Haig said what he did to give 
confidence to me and the whole R. F. C. Though he did not understand very 
much about it, Haig believed in the air. And he accepted what I said.490 
Thus began what would become a very close and professional relationship between Trenchard 
and Haig. Trenchard would serve as Haig’s principle air advisor for more than three years. 
The two were similar in several ways. Both lacked good verbal communication skills and 
disliked speaking freely among those they did not know well or trust. Both were seen as silent 
and aloof to their staffs but could be very direct when they observed a problem that needed 
addressing. Mutual strengths included indomitable leadership skills which included a fierce 
drive to accomplish any mission assigned to them.491  
These similarities and the close working relationship the two men experienced during 
the planning and execution of the battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, enabled them to build a 
relationship built on trust and mutual admiration that eventually became a deep and lifelong 
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friendship.492 Haig was delighted when Trenchard was promoted to command the RFC just 
four months before he himself was promoted to command the entire BEF. He grew to rely 
totally on Trenchard’s technical expertise on the use of air power to the point where almost all 
of the official documents concerning the RFC and air strategy issued by Haig’s headquarters 
were in fact drafted by Trenchard and his staff.493  
It is somewhat hard to fathom that the man who had repeatedly failed to gain a 
commission into the army and had been so badly wounded that doctors had given him up for 
dead and then had to overcome several life-threatening illnesses, was able to continue serving 
in the army. Most surprisingly of all, Trenchard did not attend the staff college which was the 
usual prerequisite for future promotion and attaining positions of high command. By mid-
1912, his career seemed all but over until he received a letter from a fellow officer that 
convinced him that he ought to learn how to fly. Once he accomplished that task and with 
much hard work and a strong personality, and with the backing of both Kitchener and 
Henderson, Trenchard amazingly rose from the rank of major when war was declared in 
August, 1914, to brigadier general and commanding officer of the RFC just over a year 
later.494 His rapid rise to general officer did not hide his several weaknesses. “Discipline and 
organization were his [Trenchard’s] forte; strategy was not.”495 Though his communication 
skills were poor, both spoken and in writing, the fact that he had the BEF commander’s total 
support enabled Trenchard to defeat all attempts made by governmental officials, the press, 
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and even some of the leaders within the army and the RFC, to influence or change the 
direction of the air strategy that he had adopted as his own.496  
 To achieve his stated objective Trenchard directed an offensive based strategy and 
spent much time during his tenure of command visiting RFC wings and squadrons explaining 
how this strategy would lead to a successful air campaign (with much help from his trusted 
aide and confidant, Maurice Baring).497 In Trenchard’s mind the standards for success were 
clear: British aircraft would fly deep into German-controlled territory every day and interdict 
both the German Army as well as its air service and prevent both from interfering with BEF 
units as they carried out the Somme offensive.498 He did allow and encouraged his 
subordinates to use their initiative, be innovative and take risks as long as they enabled the 
larger organization, the RFC, to achieve its goals and objectives. Not all members of the air 
service, the army, or civilian leadership agreed with Trenchard’s leadership style, believing 
that he was overbearing to the point of ignoring their guidance or recommendations and to a 
degree they were correct, most especially with his adherence to following a continuous 
offensive strategy after it was determined that the casualties in the last three months of the air 
campaign over the Somme were prohibitive.499 His failure to adjust his strategy in the fall of 
1916 would have long-term consequences on the overall effectiveness of the RFC.    
Trenchard also set high performance standards and demanded much from his 
subordinates, maintaining close contact with his aircrew to ensure that he fully grasped and 
understood the pressure he had placed on them. “When the going was roughest, the distant 
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thunder of his voice rumbling in the mess, a hangar or workshop, conveyed its own peculiar 
reassurance to aircrews and maintenance men alike.”500 Though many have argued that 
Trenchard’s communications skills were weak, he had little trouble getting his message across 
whenever he addressed a group of aircrew prior to or after a mission. His comments were ‘off 
the cuff’ and heartfelt and he did not pull punches with them knowing the risks they faced on a 
daily basis. He often reminded the airmen that they should never take for granted the vital 
work of the ground crews: the mechanics and technicians who maintained the aircraft and 
performed daily miracles keeping the machines and their weapons airworthy. “They are the 
backbone of all our efforts” and without their hard labor and ingenuity the air campaign would 
have faltered long before it had begun.501 He also told his fighter pilots that whenever they 
shot down a German aircraft, the ground-crew deserved half the victory.502 He received little 
argument from any of his pilots with that statement. Trenchard was above all about teamwork 
and realized that if the technicians on the ground and the aircrew who engaged the enemy 
could form and maintain their effectiveness as a team than the battle was half way over before 
his men went into combat.503  
 As his biographer described, Trenchard may have been “abrupt, rude, jovial, 
unflattering or plain contrary” at times but he never took for granted what he was asking his 
men to accomplish.504 It was a tough, exhaustive, and deadly business they were engaged in 
and it demanded sacrifice from every member of the flying service. “I’m not asking you to do 
anything I wouldn’t do myself. . . Just because I’m condemned to ride about in a big Rolls-
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Royce and sit out the fighting in a chair, you mustn’t think I don’t understand.”505 When he 
said these words to them they knew they came from his heart and though some would accuse 
the RFC commander for being callous with his aircrew’s lives, the vast majority of the air 
service believed that ‘Boom’ was their champion and would not squander their lives 
needlessly.506 
Finally, analysis of Trenchard’s correspondence with both Henderson and Brancker 
throughout the air campaign demonstrates the fact that he was intent on developing the future 
leaders of the RFC. His letters are full of recommendations of which commanders needed a 
rest because they were nearing the breaking point; which leaders needed to be promoted or 
given increased responsibilities; and which leaders or aircrew needed to be returned to the 
army or assigned non-flying duties because they were not good pilots or observers after 
receiving ample time and opportunities to prove otherwise. Those who claim that Trenchard 
had little empathy for his men need only to read the RFC commander’s correspondence to 
Henderson and Brancker during the Battle of the Somme to correct that misconception.  A 
quote from a contemporary concisely describes the complexity of Trenchard’s leadership 
style: 
Trenchard [was] brusque and abrupt in his manner, had little time for politics 
and less for people who were thus engaged. Never very clear in his exposition 
of a case he often confused people he was trying to enlighten or persuade. But 
his transparent honesty, his great determination and his ability to come to a 
just conclusion by an apparently erroneous process of thought, endeared him 
to those who worked under him though his manner often repelled or 
frightened them.507 
 
                                                            
505 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, 190. See also Autobiographical Notes, Trenchard Papers, 
MFC 76/1/76, RAFM. 
506 Ibid.  
507 Joubert de la Ferte, The Third Service, 19. 
129 
 
Brigadier General William Sefton Brancker 
  The son of an artillery colonel in the British Army who had fought in the Crimean 
War, William Sefton Brancker attended the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich where he 
graduated as the “Top Gunner” before he was commissioned into the Royal Artillery (RA).508 
In 1897 he was assigned to the 20th Company, Southern Division, RA. Six months after 
joining his unit he volunteered to serve as an observer in a captive balloon during an 
experiment the Royal Engineers were conducting with using a balloon for observing artillery 
fire. Though the experiment was considered a failure due to instability of the balloon in even 
the most moderate of winds and though its passenger suffered from violent airsickness, the 
experience convinced the young artillery officer that there was great potential for observation 
from the air.509   
 After serving in several artillery units in England and Ireland and deploying to the 
South African War where, like Sykes and Trenchard, he was wounded, decorated and 
promoted, it was not until his ninth year of service when he was nominated to attend the new 
Indian Staff College in June, 1906 that Brancker realized he was beginning “to develop into a 
serious soldier.”510 It was there that he caused “some surprise and not a little derision by 
advocating [the use of] observation aircraft for [directing] howitzer fire─and there was a 
consensus of opinion during the discussion which followed that no one was likely to employ 
such foolhardy methods.”511 
 After graduating from the staff college he spent an additional four years in India 
becoming fluent in both Hindustani and Tibetan. In the fall of 1910 he joined the Royal Aero 
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Club and several months later became the first passenger to fly in an aircraft in India. In 
January, 1911 he then served as an observer in the British Army’s first military aerial 
reconnaissance conducted in India during maneuvers at Aurangabad where he flew with a 
French pilot, Henri Jullerot, in a Bristol biplane. It was during this exercise that Brancker 
received sealed orders from Chief of the General Staff in India, General Sir Douglas Haig that 
detailed the following day’s operations. It was the first time “a British General issued official 
orders for an aeroplane to fly and bring back information about troops opposed to his.”512 
 In April, 1912, Brancker returned to England where he was assigned to the 43rd 
Battery, Royal Field Artillery stationed near Aldershot. The battery was commanded by Major 
E. B. Ashmore who would himself later transfer to the RFC.513 Because the battery was only a 
few miles from Farnborough, then Britain’s primary military airfield, Brancker was able to 
spend much of his free time at the airfield learning to fly. In July, the army began to conduct 
experiments in using aircraft to observe and direct artillery fire. Brancker volunteered to fly as 
an observer with the newly established RFC as often as his duties would allow but progress 
was slow due to poor weather and a shortage of aircraft. Brancker did no flying during the 
Army maneuvers of 1912 but instead was attached to the 1st Division General Staff during the 
exercise and observed first-hand the work and subsequent results of both the Naval and 
Military Wings. 
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 Brancker had hoped to transfer to the RFC in 1912 but his inability to meet the vision 
requirements due to short-sightedness and the fact that he could not afford the 75 pounds 
required to pay for flight training to earn his RAeC, convinced him that he was not meant to 
be a pilot. Instead he went to Germany with the intent to “learn the language and study the 
habits of our potential enemies.”514  
 Upon his return, Brancker was promoted to major and was appointed GSO 3 (General 
Staff Officer, 3rd class) in the Education of Officers Branch of the Training Directorate within 
the War Office.  Attached to the Aviation Section of the Military Training Directorate to fill in 
for an officer on leave, Brancker was surprised to find himself once again heavily engaged in 
all matters pertaining to British military aviation. It was in this role that he worked for General 
Henderson who was the Director of Military Training. Henderson believed that everyone 
assigned to the Military Aeronautics Directorate should be able to fly, Brancker happily 
enrolled in the Vickers School at Brooklands. Flying in the evening until dark after a full day’s 
work, Brancker achieved his goal within four weeks, successfully passing all requirements and 
earning his Royal Aero Club certificate Number 525 on 18 June, 1913.515  
His next goal was to qualify as a military pilot. The first hurdle was the medical test. 
Though his medical examiner recommended that he not be allowed to enroll in the CFS 
because of his short-sightedness, Brancker was able to get an exemption because of his duties 
in the War Office. With that hurdle overcome, Brancker was given six weeks leave and sent to 
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Upavon to attend the CFS’ first short course in July, 1913.516 His observations of the two 
leaders of the CFS are worth noting. 
At this time Captain Godfrey Paine, R.N., was the commandant, Major 
Trenchard his second in command, and Jack Salmond, Webb-Bowen, 
Gerrard, and Fulton were among the instructors. The Central Flying School 
was a joint Naval and Military concern administered by the War Office. 
Godfrey Paine was an ideal Commandant; a born leader of men. Enthusiastic, 
enterprising, with boisterous manners and a delightful personality. . . In all the 
competition and friction which occurred between the Naval and Military 
elements of aviation then and later, there was never the faintest sign of 
discord at the Central Flying School. . . Trenchard was responsible for the 
discipline and domestic organization of the C.F.C. and was already displaying 
those qualities of untiring energy, concentration on essentials, and rigid 
discipline which meant so much to the Royal Flying Corps later on.517  
   
Flying was even then considered a young man’s adventure but Brancker also noted that 
though he was thirty-six years old there were two other student pilots that were older than he 
was in the course. Reflecting back on his flight training Brancker commented on how little 
was known at the time about the actual theory and mechanics of flying. Though several 
instructors had two or three years experience, neither had successfully mastered “the art of 
teaching pupils to fly. They did things instinctively without being able to explain how they 
were done, and the young pilot really had to teach himself all that was to be known beyond 
simple turns and landings.”518 
Brancker completed his course at the CFS in August, 1913 and returned to the War 
Office to find that General Henderson had been replaced as the Director of Military Training 
(DMT) and had taken the new role of Director-General of Military Aeronautics (DGMA) with 
direct access to the Secretary of State for War.519 Brancker was also assigned to the 
Directorate of Military Aeronautics and was made Henderson’s deputy (DDMA). Once 
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Britain began mobilization in August, 1914, Henderson took command of the RFC and 
Brancker was promoted with the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel so that he could be on a 
more equal footing with the more senior officers within the War Office.520 In this role 
Brancker had direct access to the new Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener and as 
already has been described it was Kitchener who was largely responsible for directing the 
massive expansion of the RFC in the first year of the war. 
 
 
 
 
Lord Kitchener was an enormous asset to the R.F.C. He instinctively 
understood aviation, and realized fully its vast possibilities; he saw me 
constantly, perhaps four or five days a week at least, and often twice a day. . . 
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In the first month of the war, he was talking about [conducting] bomb-raids 
against the industrial centres of Germany. . .521 
 
Brancker’s greatest challenge however came about from the lack of centralized control on all 
issues concerning aviation matters between the War Office and the Admiralty.522 Though the 
Air Committee had coordinated the efforts between the Military and Naval Wings before the 
war, when war broke out the Committee ceased to function when most of its members either 
deployed to France or assumed positions of greater responsibility. All efforts to maintain co-
operation between the two air services virtually ended when the Air Committee disbanded.523 
 Once mobilization was declared Brancker met with Sueter, his counterpart in the 
Naval Wing, to discuss “the allocation of available contractors, aircraft and engines.”524 The 
two agreed that all seaplanes and engines above 100 hp (except for the 120 hp Beardmore 
engine) would go to the Navy and aside from a few aircraft and low-powered engines needed 
for training purposes, all aircraft as well as engines of 100 hp and below would go to the 
Army.525 The contractors were then divided equally to support this agreement. As Brancker 
soon found out the agreement he made with Sueter would not be supported by the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, Churchill, who was convinced that with war declared that the Naval Wing, 
only weeks before officially recognized as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), should focus 
on attacking strategic targets inside Germany from the air.526 
 For the remainder of 1914 and through 1915, Brancker found himself and the RFC “in 
constant competition” with the RNAS for the manufacture of aircraft, engines and recruitment 
of qualified craftsmen. When the RNAS conducted a successful attack on the Zeppelin sheds 
at Friedrichshafen in early 1915, Churchill directed that the RNAS expand and develop a 
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bombing force capable of strategic attacks on Germany, specifically the industrial districts of 
Metz and  the Rhine Valley.527 Both Henderson and Trenchard (by then commanding the First 
Wing), as well as Haig were convinced that the Admiralty should not be allowed to strip away 
valuable air assets that were required to win the air war on the Western Front and that if any 
targets needed to be bombed they should be of a tactical nature in support of British ground 
units.528    
Henderson and Brancker placed the blame for this duality of effort on the lack of 
organization within the government to control the two air services which enabled the Navy to 
develop an air strategy that army leadership believed was counter-productive to the RFC’s 
efforts in France. 
The aviation resources of the country in August, 1914, were practically nil, 
and everything had to be created ab initio; it is not to be wondered that the 
burning zeal of junior and enthusiastic officers of two entirely different 
Services without any efficient central control, and whose demands on aviation 
material always clashed, led to undesirable competition, friction, and general 
unpleasantness.529 
 
  During the early months of the war while he worked diligently with Trenchard and 
Kitchener to build and train new squadrons for the RFC, Brancker was able to travel to France 
on three different occasions between October and December, 1914. “These visits were of 
intense interest. I went the round of the squadrons and talked to everyone I saw, and I learnt 
more of the work and the needs of aviation in the Field in a few hours than I could have done 
by months of correspondence. After this I always made it a rule to keep personal touch with 
Squadrons and Wings both at home and abroad, no matter how much the War Office 
demanded my presence.”530 This says much about Brancker’s style of leadership and the 
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importance he placed on meeting and talking with the aircrew and their leader’s first-hand, the 
men who had to fight the war with the equipment and personnel that he was responsible for 
providing them. 
 Under immense strain to provide replacement aircrew and aircraft to the RFC in 
France after the Battle of the Marne, Brancker recommended to the War Office that the army 
should take responsibility for “all aerial work with the expeditionary force abroad and with the 
mobile forces at home, while the navy should undertake the aerial work for all fixed defences 
at home.”531 The RNAS had been given permission to form two squadrons to be trained for 
military vice naval operations and was in the process of standing up the new squadrons when 
the army rejected the plan fearing that the navy was encroaching on its primary mission. The 
Army Council informed the Admiralty that the best way the navy could support the army was 
to transfer the aircraft destined for the new squadrons directly to the RFC.532 
 Six weeks later, with the aircraft and aircrew shortage becoming even more severe in 
France, Brancker sent “an urgent appeal” to the Air Department of the Admiralty.533 He 
formally requested that the aircraft being produced for the two new squadrons being built by 
Avro and all of the Vickers fighters then in production be transferred to the War Office as well 
as four Maurice Farmans being built in France under license. He also requested that the RNAS 
‘loan’ as many as twenty pilots and the same number of wireless operators temporarily to the 
RFC until the crisis was over.534 The Admiralty was willing to transfer twelve Vickers fighters 
and six Maurice Farman’s to the RFC and also agreed to send a squadron of eight Avro’s and 
four Sopwith Scouts to France by the middle of January, 1915 to serve “under the orders of 
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the officer commanding the Military Wing.”535 It was not until 1 January, 1915 that the War 
Office responded to the Admiralty’s offer. 
It has been decided to send no further new aeroplane squadrons to join the 
Expeditionary Force until the winter is over; the bad weather renders aerial 
reconnaissance difficult, and we find that owing to the impossibility of 
protecting the machine from deterioration it will be better to keep our new 
units at home until conditions improve.536 
 
Because there had been little air to air fighting in the first five months of the war, the War 
Office made the decision to defer the Admiralty’s generous offer and wait until the spring of 
1915 to reassess the needs and requirements of the RFC. The RNAS did in fact transfer a large 
number of aircraft to the RFC but did not transfer the combat ready squadron as was originally 
planned.537  
For his efforts as the DDMA, Brancker was sent to France to take command of 3rd 
Wing.538 During his first month in command, 3rd Wing was heavily involved as a supporting 
effort during the Battle of Loos in September, 1915. It was during this operation that Brancker 
directed that his lone Vickers FB5 squadron provide escort to his three squadrons of BE 
2c’s.539 Brancker’s unit had thus initiated a new technique to the air war which by doing so 
began the reduction of RFC aircrew and aircraft losses caused by the ‘Fokker Scrouge.’540 
Even with the use of new tactics, by the end of 1915 it was evident to the RFC leadership that 
the GAAS had attained a level of air superiority over most of the British sector on the Western 
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Front, primarily because of the introduction of the latest model of the Fokker Eindecker, the 
EIII and its forward firing machine gun.541   
After five months of command and with the RFC about to transition to the brigade 
organizational structure, Brancker was promoted to brigadier general and transferred back to 
England where he took command of the Northern Training Brigade with his headquarters at 
Birmingham.542 It was evident from his inspection tours of the airfields under his command 
that the RFC in England had grown too quickly and was critically short of its two most 
important assets: instructors and aircraft. Even worse was the fact that the training units were 
tasked with producing pilots “in numbers which it was quite impossible to attain with [any] 
proficiency.”543 After only four weeks in command, and with the Military Aeronautics 
Department having been reorganized into three directorates, Henderson recalled Brancker to 
take over the first directorate. In March, 1916 Brancker became the first Director of Air 
Organization (DAO), responsible for “all General Staff and Adjutant Generals work.” 544 That 
same month Brancker notified Trenchard that because of the rapid pace of expansion, 
the training brigades were not capable of providing enough trained pilots to France.  
I am not happy about the pilots; we have rushed the Brigade system and the 
new squadrons too fast; and I fear that the dispatch of the squadrons promised 
to you on March 31 will seriously interfere with output of pilots at home.545  
 
Five days later, Brancker notified Trenchard that the situation was even more desperate than 
he had at first thought. 
Not only is it impossible to let you have five more new squadrons during 
April, but it has proved absolutely necessary to postpone the departure of the 
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last three due to join you before March 31st. This will be extremely 
inconvenient and annoying for everyone, but I was forced to advise it, as I 
find that the pilot situation is really serious, and unless we take a pull and get 
level with your demands and those of the various organizations at home at 
once, we shall land into most awful trouble. I reckon that at the moment we 
are actually about 100 pilots short of what we require to be on a really sound 
basis both at home and abroad. This shortage is partly due to weather, partly 
to optimistic estimates, and partly to sending out new squadrons too early.546 
 
As planning continued for the summer offensive on the Somme, Trenchard requested 
Brancker make a second request to the Admiralty for the ‘loan’ of thirty to forty pilots but 
aircraft were not required.547 The RNAS promised to temporarily transfer fifteen experienced 
pilots but then the promise was cancelled when the naval pilots who were notified of the 
temporary transfer objected to having to fly the BE 2c.548 It was well known throughout the 
RNAS that during the last four months of 1915 the BE 2c had suffered ever increasing losses 
during the ‘Fokker Scrouge.’549 Though the second request failed to provide the RFC 
additional pilots, a month later the Admiralty agreed to transfer a number of Sopwith 1 and 1/2 
Strutters, which were some of the first tractor aircraft equipped with a forward firing machine 
gun and interrupter gear to serve in the RFC.550 “They proved invaluable to [the RFC, but] 
because Sopwith was an Admiralty contractor we could not get them ourselves.”551  
Brancker spent the ninety days leading up to the start of the ground offensive heavily 
involved with the expansion of the training program for pilots, which included the planning 
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for opening schools in France, Egypt and in Canada.552 He also strongly supported the 
recommendation which called for centralizing the training scheme within the RFC and in 
March, 1916 the War Office approved Henderson’s recommendation that the two separate 
RFC brigades in England as well as the Training Wings be combined into one command and 
renamed the Training Brigade. A Home Defense Wing was also created and placed under the 
command of Commander-in Chief, Home Forces.553  
Brancker’s role as Trenchard’s liaison officer and conduit to Henderson during the air 
campaign cannot be understated. As Henderson’s deputy he provided sound council and 
recommendations or suggested solutions to the man-power problems as well as the number of 
squadrons that would be available for the RFC in France.554 When the training brigade could 
not provide aircraft or aircrew and in several cases entire squadrons per the agreed upon 
timelines, it was Brancker who delivered the bad news to Trenchard. His leadership skills 
along with his ability to negotiate with the other directorates within the War Office and just as 
importantly, within the Admiralty, would prove crucial both to Trenchard and the RFC and its  
ability to carry out the air campaign during the Battle of the Somme.  
Each of the three key leaders of the RFC during the Battle of the Somme: Henderson, 
Trenchard, and Brancker, possessed different skills and competencies. All three played a 
significant role in organizing and developing the RFC from its beginnings through the first 
two years of the war.  As the senior leaders of the army’s air service they were also 
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responsible for setting the conditions for the RFC to regain air superiority as a prerequisite to 
the start of Britain’s first major ground offensive of the war. It was these three same leaders 
who would also be responsible the successes as well as failures that occurred during the air 
campaign over the Somme as well as what took place in the air campaign that followed. 
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The British Plan for an Offensive on the Somme. 
Within weeks of taking command of the BEF on 19 December, 1915, Haig was 
envisioning conducting an offensive campaign in the Flanders sector, specifically near Ypres, 
in the late spring of 1916.555 Haig’s hopes for an offensive in Flanders were stillborn when the 
French Commander-in-Chief, General Joseph Joffre, proposed a British-French combined 
offensive in the Somme sector during a second conference between the Allied leaders at 
Joffre’s headquarters at Chantilly.556 Joffre’s plan called for the British to conduct a 
supporting attack north of the river Somme to force the Germans to expend their reserve units 
in that area while the French as the main effort attacked several months later south of the 
river.557  
Though agreeable to a combined British-French offensive in the Somme area, Haig 
had no intention of allowing his armies to be a supporting effort in a ‘wearing down’ battle 
while the French remained in their trenches for weeks if not months.558 Instead he counter-
proposed that the two armies conduct a simultaneous attack along the river Somme and the 
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British would commit even more units to the operation. Joffre agreed to this proposal.559 On 1 
March, the Fourth Army was formed with the expressed intent that it would be the main effort 
for the British offensive on the Somme. Haig selected General Sir Henry Rawlinson to be its 
commander.560 When the Fourth Army officially came into existence, it consisted of three 
corps and eight divisions with many of the subordinate brigades and battalions made up of 
Kitchener’s ‘New Army’ soldiers.561 By the time of the start of the Somme offensive it would 
grow to five corps with eighteen divisions and total of more than 400,000 men.562 
When the German attack on Verdun began on 21 February, 1916, the French were 
forced to shift many of their divisions in the Somme sector to the southeast and as a result the 
British Third Army took over the sector vacated by the French Tenth Army.563 Rawlinson’s 
Fourth Army then took control of the area between the Third Army and the Somme and over 
the course of the next four months occupied a twenty-mile front that stretched from 
Fonquevillers on the left (north) to Maricourt on the right (south).564  
After providing his initial guidance to Rawlinson, Haig became perturbed over his 
subordinate’s proposals for the offensive and recorded in his diary on 5 April: 
His intention is merely to take the Enemy’s First and Second system of 
trenches and ‘kill Germans.’ He looks upon the gaining of 3 or 4 kilometers 
more or less of ground immaterial. I think we can do better than this by 
aiming at getting as large a combined force of French and British across the 
Somme and fighting the enemy in the open.565  
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Map 1: Fourth Army Plan of Attack for start of the Somme Offensive. 
(Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., 1972), 66.
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Simply put the plan that Rawlinson and Haig finally agreed upon after numerous changes and 
revisions, called for an attack by the Fourth Army on the north side of the River Somme to 
seize the high ground along the Thiepval-Pozieres ridge on a ten-mile front from Montauban 
in the south to the River Ancre in the north, while the French Sixth Army attacked on the 
south side of the River Somme.566 (See Map 1). Once the initial objectives were captured, the 
Fourth Army would continue the attack until a breech occurred. The other three armies of the 
BEF: the First, Second and Third, were to conduct diversionary attacks along their fronts to 
prevent the German forces opposing them from reinforcing the German formations under 
attack by Rawlinson’s army.567  
 
The Beginning of the RFC’s air campaign over the Somme 
 
To support the Fourth Army’s attack plan Trenchard coordinated with Haig, 
Rawlinson and his staff beginning in early April to identify and prioritize the missions that his 
Army and Corps squadrons should conduct to provide the best possible support to the Fourth 
Army in their preparations for the offensive.568 It was determined that in priority the Army 
squadrons would be required to conduct strategic reconnaissance and at the same time begin 
the process to achieve air superiority against the GAAS followed by long-range bombing of 
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German communication networks. For the corps squadrons the priorities would be observe 
and direct counter-battery fire against German artillery followed by contact patrols with the 
infantry, close reconnaissance and special missions which consisted of destruction of enemy 
observation balloons, aerial photography as well as maintain a small tactical reserve missions 
to be determined by the RFC commander.569 
 The true start of the RFC’s aerial offensive began in the first week of April when 
observation aircraft began to identify and target German artillery batteries opposite the Fourth 
Army.570 Simultaneously, the army and corps squadrons within the Third and Fourteenth Wing 
began to photograph every yard of ground in that same sector to assist Rawlinson and his staff 
in their planning for the upcoming offensive. Over a period of several weeks the German First 
and Second lines of trenches were completely photographed from the air.571 RFC fighter 
aircraft were given the dual-task of protecting the corps and army aircraft from enemy attacks 
as well as preventing German observation and reconnaissance aircraft from venturing into 
British airspace where they could witness the gradual build-up of units and logistics that were 
obvious signals that a major attack was in the making.572 
The process of taking a series of photographs from several thousand feet was both 
taxing and difficult. In many aircraft the pilot and not the observer had to take the 
photographs. The camera was located just outside the pilot’s cockpit and to take the 
photograph the pilot had to lean out of his seat and look downwards through a ball sight while 
still flying the aircraft with his left hand and operate the camera with his right hand. An RFC 
pilot described the procedure. 
 
                                                            
569Sir James Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916 Vol. I., 268-269. 
570Peter Hart, Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme, 1916, (London: 
Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2001), 32. See also WITA, Vol. II, 173. 
571Air Historical Branch, The RAF in the Great War, 120. See also WITA, Vol. II, 196. 
572Sir Robert Thompson, The Royal Flying Corps, 65. 
148 
As far as possible the whole of the German front line would be photographed 
for a depth of about a thousand yards every month. The cameras that we used 
for this work were box cameras with an infinite focus, containing an auxiliary 
magazine or changing box of twelve plates. As each of these plates was 
exposed, they were transferred into a second box by means of a sliding handle 
that worked on top of the camera. This handle reset the shutter for another 
exposure at the same time. The shutter release had a piece of cord attached to 
it so that the pilot might pull it easily with his thick-gloved hands.573 
 
It took an expert to analyze a set of aerial photographs but by the period before the Somme 
offensive both BEF and RFC headquarters had sections that could locate man-made features 
with a great deal of accuracy.574 From these photographs maps would be made and then issued 
to the infantry and artillery units to assist them with their planning of operations.  
Once the RFC converted to brigade sized elements in January, 1916, squadrons were 
allocated to the army wings which were best able to protect themselves. Air operations were 
becoming more and more specialized. Drawing on the lessons learned from the French 
Aviation Militaire at Verdun, in late April, Trenchard met with his brigade commanders and 
explained to them that it was his intent to remove all fighter aircraft from the corps squadrons 
and place them in squadrons assigned to the army wings.575 Although not fully completed by 
the opening of the Somme offensive two months later, it proved to be so effective that this re-
organization of assets and units within the RFC became permanent for the remainder of the 
war.576 As winter turned to spring and new fighter squadrons arrived from England, the corps 
squadrons focused on accomplishing the missions of reconnaissance, photography, artillery 
observation, and bombing key targets in the German rear area opposite the British Fourth 
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Army while the army squadrons denied the GAAS from interfering with the corps squadron 
aircraft.577  
Of the six missions given to the RFC prior to the beginning of the Somme offensive, 
the one that garnered the most attention initially from the Fourth Army commander was 
artillery observation and direction.  At a conference in mid-April, 1916, he stated “Much more 
practice is still required with aircraft and artillery. There has been improvement, but not yet 
enough.”578 A pamphlet addressing the importance of cooperation between the RFC and the 
artillery most especially, had been written by the RFC staff in August, 1915 and revised and 
reissued to all units within the BEF in January, 1916.579 It stated that artillery programs had to 
be planned by the artillery commander of the counter-battery group in consultation with the 
squadron commander whose squadron was supporting him. Air observers were to discuss, 
plan, and rehearse every aspect of each day’s mission with the battery commander and then 
conduct an after action review upon returning from each aerial mission.580 
During the winter and spring of 1916, the artillery and the RFC developed improved 
procedures that would serve them well in the coming battle. Several shortcomings were 
identified, the most critical being communications between the aircraft and units on the 
ground. 581A drawback to wireless communications was that it could be jammed by the enemy 
or by overlapping messages sent out from other nearby aircraft. This limited the number of 
aircraft that could work with artillery units along any given length of the front.582 
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The solution to both enemy and friendly jamming was to reduce the number of 
wireless messages to a minimum and by the invention of what was to be called the “clapper-
break.”583 The British found that by varying the pitch or tone of the signal sent by the aerial 
observer, a ground operator could distinguish one aircraft from another working on the same 
wavelength, The wireless set used by the RFC normally gave off a high note. Once fitted with 
the clapper-break the set could be tuned to give off either a low or medium note. Two flights 
of each corps squadron were quickly equipped with ‘clapper-breaks,’ one with low note, the 
other medium.584 The third flight operated its wireless in normal mode without the new device. 
It was also found that the low note had longer range so that flight was assigned long-range 
work while the high note squadron was assigned to contact patrols. The significance of this 
device was instrumental in enabling the RFC to double the number of artillery observation 
aircraft over a given sector.585 In April, the Third Wing, whose personnel developed the 
‘clapper-break,’ proved that one wireless aircraft could cover nearly 2,000 yards of trench line 
without fear of causing interference to another aircraft’s communication set.586 
Another major step forward was the improvement of the ‘clock code’ for transmitting 
the call for fire from the aircraft to the firing battery. The ‘clock code’ was created by two 
RFC pilots at an artillery/RFC coordination conference in January, 1915.587 The artillerymen 
had wanted to continue using the original method of using signals of ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘short’, and 
‘over’ but the airmen suggested using a new system─the hour positions on the clock. Using a 
transparent celluloid disc marked with six concentric circles signifying the distances from the 
target from 50 yards to 500, each circle was also identified by a letter (A, B, C, D, E, and 
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F).588 A set of radial lines on the disc numbered by the hours from the clock were used for 
direction. This allowed the observer to send a short coded message containing just a single 
letter and single number to represent the distance and direction that the round landed from the 
target. The ‘clock code’ used the standard army squared map which were lettered and 
numbered so that any location on the ground could be identified.589 
The aerial observer placed the thin celluloid sheet over the map square with the target 
in the center of the clock at the juncture of the hands with twelve o’clock always pointed true 
north. Three o’clock represented due east, six o’clock due south and nine o’clock due west. If 
a round landed north of the target the observer signaled that it had landed at twelve o’clock. 
After actual experimentation in the field it was found that to ensure greater accuracy two 
additional circles were added at ten and twenty-five yards radius from the target with these 
circles being lettered Y and Z. From this starting point the relative position of each artillery 
round could then be provided by wireless from the airborne observer to the artillery battery, 
regardless of whether or not the observer knew the location of the battery.590 Thus “A9” sent 
via Morse code told the artillery battery that their rounds had landed 100 yards west of the 
target. 
The ‘clock code’ was first used during the preliminary artillery bombardment at 
Neuve Chapelle but because of the inexperience of the artillery units working with wireless 
aircraft who were using the ‘clock code’ the effects achieved were limited at best.591 However, 
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both the artillery and the RFC realized that with more training the ‘clock code’ was simpler, 
faster and reduced the chances of error to practically zero. With slight modifications it became 
the standard system for directing artillery from the air for the remainder of the war.592 
 
 
 
   
It was hoped by the senior British leadership, but most especially General Haig, that 
the Somme offensive would create a breakthrough of the German lines and lead to open 
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warfare.593 If this did occur the artillery batteries would be moved forward where they would 
have to fire on new and unknown targets versus the static enemy trenches and artillery 
positions they had been engaging for months prior to the battle.594 There would be little time 
for coordination between the batteries and the corps squadrons if a war of movement took 
place. Major E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, commander of Number 3 Squadron, had been working on 
modifying the ‘clock code.’ His modification was the Zone Call for Fire and it was accepted 
and put into practice just weeks before the start of the offensive.595 
Using the ‘clock code’ methodology, the Zone Call for Fire was based on the lettered 
squares of a 1/40,000 scale map. Each square was divided into four zones, lettered, for 
example A, B, C, and D. Each zone, covered an area of 3,000 yards square, had a two-letter 
identifier made up of the map square letter, followed by the zone letter.596 The aircraft 
observer sent his request for fire by using the particular zone in which the target was located. 
The artillery battery would only respond to those calls for fire in which their guns could fire 
into.597 
The group artillery commander had a choice, depending on the mission or size of the 
target, to allow his subordinate batteries to fire upon receipt of a call for fire into their zone or 
he could retain control, giving instructions directly to battery commanders once he received 
the call from the aerial observer. 598The strength of the Zone Call for Fire was it ensured at any 
given point in time every sector of the battlefield was covered by supporting artillery units. 
Air observers, without knowing the locations of the batteries, could submit a request for fire 
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and then provide the corrections. It reduced the requirement for liaison between RFC crews 
and artillerymen to a minimum and eliminated any confusion which could arise due to 
problems of communications while the ground forces were on the move.599 Although the 
Somme would not bring about the war of movement the British hoped for, the Zone Call for 
Fire would be used throughout the five month campaign with much success.600 
Beside using aircraft to observe and direct artillery fire, kite balloons were an 
important asset that had gained increasing use within the RFC. Having learned from the 
French Air Service about their successful employment of balloons, Haig and Trenchard 
directed an increase in the number of balloons available to the BEF.601 By the summer of 1915 
the RFC had received fourteen kite balloons from the RNAS and had positioned them along 
the British Army’s sector of the Western Front.602  The major advantage of the kite balloon 
over the airplane was that it could remain in the air continuously for long periods of time and 
only needed to be lowered to the ground to change out observers or escape from enemy air 
attacks.603 Each balloon was supported with its own vehicle section as well as an engine 
operated winch, both of which  allowed the balloon to be moved to different locations of the 
front as required.604 
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Balloon observers usually were teamed in pairs and operated from a basket that 
suspended from the kite balloon which was tethered at a height of between 1,000 and 1,500 
feet within a few kilometers of the front lines.605 A telephone line provided them direct access 
to the artillery batteries they supported and when conducting observation and direction of 
artillery fire the balloon observers used the same ‘clock code’ methodology that aircraft 
observers used.606 The Germans used kite balloons in much the same way in France and 
Flanders and this made balloons lucrative targets. Fighter aircraft who were often directed to 
remove ‘the eye in the sky’ that kite balloons provided.607 Because the balloon observers were 
unarmed Trenchard directed that they be equipped with parachutes.608 
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The RFC used the C. G. Spencer Static Line (Automatic) type parachute which was attached 
to the outside of the basket as it was too large to be worn by the observer. The parachute was 
contained within an elongated wicker container and when the observer jumped from the basket 
his downward fall pulled the canopy from its case. Because of the overly large size of the 
parachute it would not fit within the confines of an aircraft’s cockpit, and for this practical 
reason as well as several others that were fallacious at best, RFC aircrew were not issued 
RFC Balloon observer’s preparing to ascend. The canvas bag contains the parachute 
for the observer on the left. http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/observation  
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parachutes.609 A secondary reason given by senior army leaders was that since both pilot and 
observer were armed with machine guns to defend themselves they did not require parachutes 
and should thus stay with their aircraft to the bitter end. This flawed logic and decision making 
would cost thousands of British, French, and American as well as German airmen their lives 
by war’s end.610    
Both Rawlinson and Trenchard agreed that the use of airborne contact patrols would 
also be an important task for the RFC once the battle began.611 It was hoped that the contact 
patrols would assist the corps and division commanders and their staffs by providing the 
locations of units during the initial and subsequent assaults. During April and May, 1916 the 
Fourth Army and the RFC conducted numerous training exercises together, rehearsing for the 
upcoming offensive.612 On 26 May, Rawlinson’s headquarters published instructions for 
contact patrols which would allow the ground units to identify aircraft in this role.613 The 
aircraft would bear distinctive markings: broad black bands painted underneath the lower wing 
and blue streamers attached to the wing struts, were to have the sole duty of tactical 
observation of the battlefield, reporting directly to army corps headquarters. The infantry were 
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to indicate their progress by lighting flares as directed by the company commander or as far 
down the chain of command as the section commander. Certain infantry units would also have 
small mirrors or small triangular tin sheets tied onto soldier’s packs. It was hoped that sunlight 
reflecting off the tin would allow an air observer to follow the advance. Of course this system 
would only prove feasible if the attacks took place on a sunny day.614 
Aircraft would also receive messages from battalion and brigade headquarters via 
lamps or other ground signals. The air observer, besides transmitting information signaled 
from ground units, was also to keep corps headquarters informed of enemy movements during 
the preliminary bombardment, the progress of advancing friendly forces and the movement of 
enemy reserves and the staging of counterattacks.615 
A code was also established between the RFC and all ground headquarters using 
signal panels.616 There were several available. The first consisted of large Louvre shutters of 
six to eight laths painted white on one side and neutral on the other. The laths were connected 
by tapes and the ground operator could work his tapes so as to expose the white side of the 
laths to spell out a message using Morse code. In training it was found that a message could be 
read up to a height of six thousand feet.617 Another consisted of a simple canvas sheet staked 
to the ground with a series of colored panels painted dark green on one side or white on the 
other allowing the sender to send messages using Morse code. Under actual combat conditions 
the infantry put themselves at great risk to use this marking system and the dust and smoke 
caused by artillery fire often times obscured the panels from the searching airmen.618  
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In training and in combat, balloon observers could spot a moving column of infantry 
or artillery up to 12,000 yards away. Flares could be seen out to 7,000 yards.619 Because of 
this Rawlinson requested that three kite balloon sections be attached to his army to support his 
attack.620 
A distinct mission for the RFC that would prove of great benefit to Rawlinson and his 
army, both before and during the upcoming battle, was that of bombing.621 In November and 
December, 1915, 3 Wing, RFC had conducted several bombing operations against German 
logistic and rail centers in the Somme area with surprising success.622 After Trenchard’s edict 
to conduct formation flying, RFC squadrons began to concentrate all available aircraft of the 
wing to bomb a single target.623 This was a major change over previous raids where a 
squadron would attack multiple objectives by assigning two or three aircraft to each target. 
Now mass bombing of a single target became doctrine.624 
Trenchard believed that if the objective was not more than thirty miles behind enemy 
lines, the bombers would be adequately protected by fighters flying patrols between the 
bombers and enemy airfields.625 His subordinate commanders believed that the bombers, 
minus the observer, could carry additional bombs and did not require escorts.626 If the 
objective was more than thirty miles away, two out of every ten bombers would carry an 
observer with two Lewis machine guns instead of a bomb load to provide protection for the 
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bombers.627 By the middle of March, 1916 squadrons assigned bombing missions increased 
from fourteen aircraft to thirty-one (twenty three bombers and eight escorts).628 
A month prior to this, Haig had given Trenchard permission to conduct night bombing 
operations against targets not more than six miles behind the German lines.629 Because of the 
inherent dangers with flying and navigating at night, Trenchard placed a constraint on his 
squadrons. He directed that until all crews were trained in night operations, no more than two 
aircraft per night from each army wing could conduct night bombing missions.630 Limited 
night bombing operations were carried out prior to the start of the Somme offensive but 
because of generally poor weather and the shortage of trained pilots Trenchard husbanded his 
resources on accomplishing those missions that more directly supported ground operations.631 
This would change once the battle began. 
While the corps squadrons focused on carrying out their aerial reconnaissance, 
photography, artillery observation and direction and bombing missions, the army wing 
squadrons began the deadly struggle for air superiority as Trenchard had ordered.632 Only by 
accomplishing this difficult task would the RFC be able to complete its other missions, and in 
doing so assist the Fourth Army in its upcoming offensive. 
Since late January, 1916, the RFC had been receiving new squadrons that had been 
organized and trained as fighter units to engage the GAAS and end the ‘Fokker Scrouge.’ On 
23 January, Number 20 Squadron, the first to be fully equipped with the FE 2b, arrived in 
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France.633 Number 24 Squadron, equipped with Britain’s first single-seat fighter aircraft, the 
de Havilland DH 2, arrived in France two weeks later on 7 February; followed by Number 25 
Squadron (FE 2b’s) on 20 February.634 Two more fighter squadrons, Number 29 Squadron 
(DH 2’s) and Number 23 Squadron (FE 2b’s) arrived on 16 and 25 March respectively.635 
 
 
 
 
When the FE 2b and the DH 2 had been designed, the British did not have an 
interrupter gear that allowed a machine gun to fire through a forward mounted propeller. Thus, 
they followed the conventional design of pusher aircraft: a nacelle which accommodated the 
pilot (or in the case of the FE 2b a pilot and observer/gunner), instrument panel, weapons and 
a rear mounted engine.636 The FE 2b had a 120 horsepower Beardmore engine while the DH 2 
had a 100-horsepower Monosoupape rotary engine, with the tailplane and rudder carried by 
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converging booms from the top and bottom mainplanes on both aircraft.637 The armament for 
the DH 2 was a single .303 Lewis machine gun while the FE 2b had two or three Lewis 
machine guns for the observer to use in either a sitting or standing position.638  
 
 
 
Leading the RFC’s efforts to gain air superiority was Number 24 Squadron 
commanded by Major Lanoe G. Hawker, winner of Britain’s highest award for gallantry in 
combat, the Victoria Cross. He had received this honor for single handedly shooting down two 
German aircraft in one day on 25 July, 1915.639 He was the first RFC fighter pilot to win this 
award in the First World War and prior to the Somme offensive was one of the most 
experienced combat leaders in the RFC.640  
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While the GAAS focused on Verdun, Hawker spent days and weeks training his pilots 
in tactics and formation flying.641 Trenchard had directed that due to their combat leadership 
and experience, squadron commanders were not allowed to take part in contact patrols or 
operational flights against the enemy.642 Though constrained by this restriction, Hawker like 
most of his fellow squadron commander’s, still flew an occasional patrol, allowing his 
subordinate flight commanders to lead while he flew as just another pilot in the formation.643 
Hawker found that commanding a fighter squadron was rewarding despite the 
numerous challenges of administration and personnel problems that confronted him on a daily 
basis. He also understood that the orders he received from wing headquarters which directed 
he provide escorts for deep reconnaissance designated urgent, despite terrible weather were 
the result of insistent and sometimes unreasonable demands from the army which Trenchard 
would never disapprove.644 
Hawker had many strengths: he was an operational pilot, an excellent trainer, a 
tactician, and an innovator; among the many things he developed for use by his pilots and 
observers were a more practicable gun mount for the Lewis gun, an improved gun sight, and 
thigh high fur boots for DH 2 pilots who easily suffered near frostbite from the intense cold in 
their open cockpits.645 He originated the de-briefing sessions that became standard procedure 
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in the RFC after every flight.646 He was popular and well known throughout the RFC and had 
become the model for every British fighter pilot.647 
 
 
On 2 April, 1916, Number 24 Squadron achieved its first of many victories under 
Hawker before and during the Battle of the Somme. Lieutenants Tidmarsh and Sibley shot 
down an Albatros two-seater but it would be nearly three more weeks before the squadron had 
their first combats with the Fokker Eindecker.648 Three weeks later on 25 April, Hawker’s men 
finally met the Fokker Eindecker in combat. While escorting five BE 2c’s from Number 13 
Squadron on a reconnaissance mission, four DH 2’s led by Lieutenant J. O. Andrews attacked 
a single Eindecker 10,000 feet over German held Bapaume. The Eindecker dove away and 
avoided combat. Rejoining the BE 2c’s, the British fighters were attacked by three newly 
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arrived Eindeckers. In his DH 2 Lieutenant S. E. Cowan was set upon by two German 
fighters.649 He outmaneuvered one of the Fokkers by flying in an upward spiral. He then found 
himself below a second Fokker. He elevated his Lewis gun and fired more than 20 rounds into 
the German aircraft. Cowan easily climbed upwards and got on the tail of the enemy machine, 
emptying the remainder of his drum of ammunition and loading a fresh one. His DH 2 was 
being badly bumped around in the Fokker’s slipstream and he found it difficult to aim and fire 
properly. The German pilot was desperately trying to shake his pursuer off his tail. The 
German banked vertically, side-slipped, and then dove 500 feet before flattening out and 
heading east as fast as his aircraft would go. Cowan did not know that he, a relative new pilot 
to air combat and the Western Front had just bested in aerial combat the infamous Leutnant 
Max Immelmann, then the top-scoring Fokker pilot with 14 victories.650 The German fighters 
had the advantage in both the dive and in climbing capability but the DH 2 could out-turn it 
without losing much height much to the surprise of Leutnant Max Immelmann of Flieger 
Abteilung 62. 
I had a nasty fight in the air today. I took off at about 11am and met two 
English biplanes southward of Bapaume. I was about 700 metres higher and 
therefore came up with them very quickly and attacked one. He seemed to 
heel over after a few shots, but unfortunately I was mistaken. The two worked 
splendidly together in the course of the fight and put eleven shots into my 
machine. The petrol tank, the struts on the fuselage, the undercarriage and the 
propeller were hit. I could only save myself by a nose-dive of 1,000 metres. 
Then at last the two of them left me alone. It was not a nice business.651 
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This action, one of many that occurred during April and May, 1916, demonstrated without a 
doubt, to both the British and the Germans, that the Fokker Eindecker was no match for the 
agile DH 2.652  
While Cowan’s air to air combat was taking place the crews of the BE 2c’s were able 
to conduct a detailed reconnaissance unmolested and discovered that the Germans were 
building a third line trench system opposite the Fourth Army’s sector. They also reported that 
many of the towns and villages in that same sector were being fortified.653 Reporting back 
with this information, several other aircraft were tasked to immediately photograph this 
entirely new trench system.654 
The FE 2b also fought many air to air combats during this period and it too more than 
held its own against the best the GAAS could put in the air. One German fighter pilot had this 
to say about the British aircraft: 
The techniques and tactics of the English were amazing, their main principle being 
that each machine could not look after itself but its partner. Each one therefore 
protected the other against any attack by their German opponents, and each pair tried 
to attack the same foeman. . . . The Englishmen refused to be rushed and their 
steadiness gave them an absolute superiority. Meanwhile our machines tried to break 
their formation by a series of advances and retreats, like dogs attacking a hedgehog. 
They pirouetted and spiraled, but their movements exposed them to more risks than 
their opponents, who appeared to be invulnerable and unassailable.655  
More importantly, by the end of April, Trenchard’s tactics produced the visible results he 
required to demonstrate to both the army commanders and the political leaders back in 
England that the RFC was gaining control of the sky over the Somme as well as Flanders. 
From 1 February to 30 April, the RFC shot down or destroyed 42 German aircraft for the loss 
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of 32.656 This was considered an acceptable ratio by Trenchard but also illustrates that the war 
in the air, like that on the ground, had become a war of attrition. 
Also of great importance to the RFC was the fact that in April a new two-seater tractor 
biplane arrived in France. This was the Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutter. Initially armed with the 
standard Lewis machine gun for the observer, it had performed so well during its initially 
testing that it was chosen to be the first British aircraft to be equipped with the newly 
developed interrupter gear, which allowed a nose mounted Vickers machine gun to fire 
through the propeller.657  
 
 
 
Trenchard was pleased to learn of the Sopwith’s capabilities and even more pleased 
when notified that a flight from RNAS Number 70 Squadron, equipped with the Sopwith 1 
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and 1/2 Strutter would be attached to the RFC by mid-May.658 The additional two flights of 
eight Sopwith’s were expected to deploy to France in June.659 More good news for the RFC 
came in the way of sheer numbers. From the start of the war through the middle of 1915 
squadrons had been organized and equipped with 12 aircraft. Trenchard’s recommendation to 
increase all squadrons to 18 aircraft had been approved in late 1915 and by the spring of 1916, 
all squadrons on the Western Front were in the process of receiving the additional aircraft as 
the air campaign began.660 The squadrons within 4th Wing who were to support Rawlinson’s 
Fourth Army were given first priority of receiving the new aircraft and pilots.661 
While this was taking place the French fielded the Nieuport 11, an outstanding V 
strut, tractor sesquiplane (a biplane with the upper wing-span greater than the lower). It was 
small in size, very fast (ten miles an hour faster than any RFC aircraft at the time) and had an 
excellent rate of climb (10,000 feet in 10 ½ minutes). It was armed with a Lewis gun on its top 
wing, which fired over the propeller arc. The Nieuport 11 had great success against the 
Germans over Verdun and because of this the RFC immediately purchased six of these 
fighters.662 Number 1 and Number 11 Squadrons were the first to receive the Nieuport and by 
the end of summer, three RFC squadrons would be equipped with Nieuport 11’s and the more 
improved Nieuport 16 and 17.663  
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Air combat between Number 24 Squadron and several squadrons of German fighter 
and observation planes became much more numerous as the spring weather improved, 
especially in May.664 Lieutenant Cowan shot down an Albatros two-seater on 4 May.665 
During this same air combat his thumb switch jammed, stopping the engine and forcing him to 
land behind the German lines. Fortunately the impact of landing corrected the malfunction and 
he was able to take off before being captured by German infantry.666 On 20 May two DH 2’s 
piloted by Lieutenants Tidmarsh and Wilson also of Number 24 Squadron joined in the attack 
by Captain Summers of Number 22 Squadron against a lone Albatros two-seater. Lieutenant 
Tidmarsh was credited with destroying the enemy aircraft after it crashed in flames.667 During 
this same patrol, Lieutenant Wilson shot down another German aircraft, which crashed in 
flames into the British lines south of Maricourt.668 
By mid-May the RFC began to gain dominance along the British sector of the 
Western Front.669 On 23 May, Sir Henry Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army, sent a 
note to Haig recapping air operations in his sector. He was convinced that the RFC had 
achieved aerial superiority in the skies over the Fourth Army front. 
It was about the first week of May that we sent out our reconnaissance over Bapaume 
escorted by the de Havilland machines. Up to that time we had been carefully training 
our young pilots and it was not till then that Ashmore thought them sufficiently expert 
to take on the Fokkers. In carrying out the reconnaissances they were attacked by the 
Fokkers and rendered a good account of themselves for they reported that on the first 
occasion they sent two Fokkers to earth in a damaged condition and on the second 
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they destroyed another which fell in the town of Bapaume and was smashed against 
some houses. All three of these machines fell of course in the enemy’s lines so we 
have no certain information of what actually happened to them. But the fact remains 
that since this occurrence we have successfully photographed the whole of the 
enemy’s trenches in front of the Fourth Army, the first line, over a front of more than 
twenty miles without being once attacked by the Fokkers. This was done on the 15th, 
16th, 17th, and 18th May and clearly shows that for the moment at any rate we have 
command of the air by day on the Fourth Army front. I cannot speak too highly of the 
work of these young pilots, most of whom have recently come out from England, and 
the de Havilland machine has unquestionably proved itself superior to the Fokker in 
speed, maneuver, climbing, and general fighting efficiency.670 
Rawlinson’s assessment was accurate. After nine months the “Fokker Scrouge” was officially 
over. Largely due to a combination of the hard work and dedication of the RFC aircrews and 
the introduction of the DH 2 and FE 2b aircraft, the RFC had achieved aerial superiority over 
the Somme six weeks before the start of the ground offensive.671 Whether it could maintain 
that superiority during the upcoming offensive was yet to be determined. 
Though the RFC had a distinct advantage in numbers of aircraft and aircrew over the 
GAAS in the Somme sector, Trenchard realized that numbers were only one factor in the 
equation of maintaining air superiority once the battle began.672 He was still very much 
concerned about the lack of trained aircrews.673 The RFC on the Western Front received on 
average ten pilots a week which barely replaced even a low number of casualties, and it was 
hardly comforting to know that most of these replacements had only the minimum allowable 
15 hours of flight time upon reaching their squadrons.674 When notified that pilots from 
Number 32 Squadron were being transferred to Number 29 Squadron to bring it up to strength 
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which would result in Number 32 Squadron missing its deployment date to France, Trenchard 
vented his anger and frustration in a letter to Brancker.675 It would not be the last time that a 
shortage of trained pilots would impact a squadron’s ability to deploy to France. The issue of 
trained aircrew would be one of Trenchard’s top concerns throughout the spring but most 
especially in the month prior to the start of the offensive.676 In many of the letters and 
communiqués exchanged between Trenchard and Brancker between April through June and 
even after the Somme offensive got underway, the topic of both the number and the 
qualifications of aircrew were discussed, sometimes quite heatedly.677 The issue became even 
more contentious when the War Office approved Trenchard’s recommendation to increase the 
number of aircraft in each squadron from 12 to 18 aircraft. The Training Wing back in Britain 
was nearly overwhelmed fighting their own battle to replace the casualties in France as well as 
provide men for the new squadrons being formed.678  No other issue caused Trenchard more 
concern than whether or not he would have enough trained aircrew to conduct the air 
campaign that he and his staff had planned so diligently to support Rawlinson’s Fourth 
Army.679  
On 11 June, the French liaison officer to BEF headquarters notified Haig that the 
situation at Verdun was desperate and that Joffre requested that the start date for the British 
offensive on the Somme be moved up from 1 July to 25 June, which meant the artillery 
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bombardment needed to begin five days prior.680 Haig directed Rawlinson to prepare to attack 
on 25 June.681 Then the situation at Verdun improved and the Russian offensive, led by 
General Brusilov, which had begun in early June, was making good progress.682 Therefore, the 
French requested the assault be postponed until 29 June. Haig agreed to this latest change. On 
17 June, Joffre arrived at Haig’s headquarters and requested the date be moved back to 1 July. 
Haig reminded Joffre that the logistics required to support a five day artillery bombardment 
was no easy matter and the movement of units from one sector of the line to take the place of 
units moving into attack positions would signal to the Germans that the offensive was 
imminent.683 Joffre concurred with Haig’s logic and notified his commanders that the attack 
would begin on 29 June as earlier agreed. 
Three days before the start of the offensive, Haig met with Joffre at Rawlinson’s 
headquarters and reiterated his objectives to the French commander: 
1st. To aim at breaking the enemy’s front first of all between the 
Somme and Serre. 
 
2d. To secure the positions about Bapaume and thence southwards to 
Ginchy, while the French forces aim at reaching Sailly and Rancourt (as 
agreed at our last meeting, Saturday, 17th June). 
 
3rd. To enlarge the breach by gaining possession of the area lying 
between Bapaume and Arras. With this object an attack will be launched from 
the N.W. against Blaireville and Ficheux in co-operation with all available 
troops (including cavalry) working northwards from the line Miraumont-
Bapaume. 
 
4th. Having once broken the enemy’s front between Arras and the 
Somme, opened the roads comprised in that sector eastwards and established 
our forces on the line Monchy-le-Preux-Bapaume-Rancourt, I shall then be 
prepared to move forward to the line Cambrai-Douai, with the object of 
continuing the  operations against the enemy’s forces, the direction of the 
further operations depending on whether he clings to his fortified positions to 
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the north, or has succeeded in concentrating a force to oppose our advance 
eastwards.684  
 
On 28 June, Haig received a letter from Foch that criticized the BEF commander’s plan.685 
Foch “desired that the British on reaching Bapaume should first extend six miles southward to 
Sailly-Saillisel to enable the French to get forward, after which a combined movement upon 
Arras might be made.”686 Haig was upset that his plan was being questioned and that the 
criticism failed to take into account the likelihood of a German assault against the exposed 
British left flank during the operation.687 He sent no reply to Foch. Instead he met with 
General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, at Rawlinson’s headquarters that same 
evening. Joffre raised the same points that Foch had brought up in his letter so Haig attempted 
to clarify why he thought it was critical to take the offensive north of Bapaume once that city 
was captured.688 He was convinced that the Germans would counter-attack from the north and 
attempt to cut the Fourth Army off from it’s as logistics support. Haig thought he had 
convinced Joffre as the issue was dropped. “Foch seems anxious that the British should do all 
the fighting required to get the French on the open ground between Bapaume and Peronne, 
and he ignores the danger to our left flank which is very real if we do not enlarge the gap 
northwards as soon as possible.”689   
    The artillery fire plan developed by Rawlinson’s chief of artillery, Major General N. 
Birch, called for a six-day concentrated barrage along the entire 25,000 yard front that 
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encompassed the Fourth Army attack.690 The plan entailed three stages; the first stage involved 
two days devoted to cutting the wire obstacle belts in front of the two German trench lines to 
be attacked as well as the registration of targets. During the second stage lasting three days, all 
targets identified in stage one as well as the wire obstacle belts that had not been damaged, 
were to be destroyed and finally the third stage, Z Day, the day of the attack, the British 
artillery would provide a supporting bombardment as the troops left their trenches and crossed 
No-man’s land.691 During each stage there were planned pauses to allow RFC aircraft to 
conduct aerial photography followed by detailed assessments of the photographs to assist in 
planning the next day’s targets.692  
 The intent of the bombardment was to destroy the enemy trenches as well as fortified 
positions in and around the villages that were to be attacked. Command posts and lines of 
communications were also heavily targeted as were hundreds of German artillery batteries. To 
accomplish this herculean task Haig and Rawlinson amassed 1,537 guns and howitzers to 
support the Fourth Army.693 This averaged out to one field gun for every twenty-one yards of 
front and one heavy artillery piece for every fifty-seven yards.694 The logistics support 
required to supply the artillery units was staggering. It required seven trains a day to move 
forward the three million artillery rounds required to be fired for the barrage. Seven thousand 
miles of underground communication lines were laid and buried and another forty-three 
thousand miles of surface line was laid as well. All of this was accomplished by 20 June.695  
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Throughout the month of June as Rawlinson’s army and the French units on its 
southern flank prepared for the start of the offensive, the RFC did a commendable job in 
preventing most German observation aircraft from crossing the line and detecting the build-up 
in the Fourth Army sector.696 But as Trenchard knew it was impossible to patrol the limitless 
depths of the sky. Both the German Second Army and its supporting aviation units had 
detected signs of an impending attack as early as March.697 By the middle of May German 
observation aircraft had photographed two new airfields being built east of Villers-Brettoneux 
as well as the construction of new railways and camps to base both troops and logistics.698 
Two weeks before the start of the offensive German aircrew reported signs of new 
communication trenches being dug north of the River Somme. With the increase in artillery 
fire as well as British aerial activity, the Germans logically deduced that an attack both north 
and south of the river was imminent.699   
When the Fourth Army was formed, Trenchard had created and then assigned the IV 
Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General E. B. Ashmore, to provide air support to 
Rawlinson’s army. It comprised the 3rd (Corps) Wing which consisted of Number 3 Squadron 
(Morane Parasol’s), Number 4 Squadron (BE 2c’s), Number 9 Squadron (BE 2c’s), and 
Number 15 Squadron (BE 2c’s). Number 1 Kite Balloon Squadron with two sections was also 
assigned to 3rd (Corps) Wing. Two fighter squadrons from the 14th (Army) Wing consisting 
of Number 22 with FE 2b’s and Number 24 with DH2’s would serve as the fighter arm that 
would support Ashmore’s squadrons. In addition to the squadrons belonging to 4th Brigade, 
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the 9th Headquarters Wing, which consisted of three squadrons: Number 21 (RE 7’s), 27 
(Martinsyde G100’s), and 60 Squadron (Morane Scouts) were tasked to support the Fourth 
Army by conducting strategic reconnaissance, the bombing of communication and supply 
lines, and general offensive operations as required against the GAAS. II Brigade with Number 
7 Squadron and 16 Squadron as well as III Brigade with Number 8, Number 12, and Number 
13 Squadrons (each with 12-14 BE 2c’s) were also available to support Trenchard’s tactical 
bombing offensive against the German rail network supporting the German Second Army.700   
Thus by the beginning of the offensive, the Fourth Army was supported by nine 
squadrons totaling 167 aircraft and another five squadrons in support as required. The overall 
strength of the RFC by 1 July had increased to 27 squadrons, consisting of 421 aircraft and 
four kite balloon squadrons consisting of a total of fourteen balloons available for observation 
duties.701  In total the RFC had 185 aircraft in direct support of the Fourth Army including the 
Army squadrons whose mission it was to protect the Corps aircraft and engage the GAAS in 
aerial combat.702 
Opposing Rawlinson’s Fourth Army on the Somme was the German Second Army, 
commanded by General Fritz von Below. Von Below had six divisions in the front line with 
an additional four and a half divisions in reserve.703 The Second Army was supported by air 
units which consisted of six reconnaissance flights (Feldflieger Abteilungen) totaling forty two 
aircraft, four artillery flights (Artllerie Flieger Abteilungen) with seventeen aircraft, a fighter- 
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bomber squadron (Kampfgeschwader Number 1) with forty three aircraft, a fighter bomber 
flight (Kampfstaffel Number 32) with eight aircraft and one single-seater fighter detachment 
(Kampfeinsitzer Kommando) of nineteen aircraft.704 The total air strength of the German 
Second Army, not counting those at depot level, was 129 aircraft.705 The GAAS supporting 
von Below’s army were thus heavily outnumbered by the RFC in aircraft.706 
It was also evident to both Rawlinson and von Below that not only did the RFC 
outnumber the GAAS in aircraft, but that the British had also gained the technical advantage in 
fighter aircraft with the introduction of the DH 2, FE 2b and the Nieuport 11.707 Because of 
this, German aircraft were forced away from the main battle area which allowed RFC Corps 
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squadrons to complete their missions unmolested by enemy fighters as the offensive loomed 
ever nearer.708  
 
During the last two weeks of June, 1916, the tempo of the air war over the Somme 
increased in preparation for the start of the offensive.709 RFC fighter and reconnaissance 
squadrons became engaged in daily combats as they flew over German-held territory.710 In 
trying to accomplish its missions to support the British Army and maintain its offensive 
strategy, the RFC suffered losses that were vastly higher than those it imposed on the GAAS. 
From 1 January to 1 June, 1916, the RFC lost on average one aircraft and its pilot or crew 
every day. March and June were the costliest, where casualties rose to 40 per month.711  
On 18 June an incident occurred that seemed to signify that the RFC truly held air 
superiority over the Somme when the GAAS lost one of its premier fighter pilots, Leutnant 
Max Immelmann, “The Eagle of Lille,” in aerial combat.712 At approximately 2100 hours, on 
the last patrol of the day, seven FE 2b’s from Number 25 Squadron were attacked by 
Immelmann and four other Germans, who were all flying Fokker EIII’s. Immelmann shot 
down one of the FE 2b’s, but was in turn attacked by a FE 2b piloted by Second Lieutenant G. 
R. McCubbin and his observer, Corporal J. H. Waller. Waller opened fire once the German 
aircraft came into range as Immelmann flew passed the nose of the British aircraft. Seconds 
later the Fokker staggered and went into a dive where it was seen to break up in the air. 
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Immelmann, one of the war’s first great fighter pilots and tacticians, fell from nearly 5,000 
feet and was killed.713  
The RFC awarded the FE 2b crew with the aerial victory and both were decorated 
with Waller earning promotion to sergeant as well.714 The Germans believed that since 
Immelmann’s aircraft broke up in the air he had either been hit by anti-aircraft fire or that his 
synchronization gear had malfunctioned and he had shot his propeller off.715 Either way, 
Immelmann was dead.  
For the RFC and the GAAS, Immelmann’s death had major ramifications. He had been 
one of the most widely renowned fighter pilots of the war, highly respected by his own air 
service as well as the RFC.716 Immelmann, along with Boelcke, was one of the most 
successful German fighter pilots during the “Fokker Scourge.”  His death was a major blow to 
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German morale and provided further evidence to British as well as German leadership that 
German air superiority above the Somme was over.717 
For the British, aircrew morale soared to its highest point of the campaign.718 In the 
months leading up to the ground offensive they had been equipped with several good aircraft 
that were more than a match for what their enemy could put in the air. They had been on the 
offensive for three months and by all accounts had attained air superiority as directed prior to 
the start of the British ground offensive. In concert with the Aviation Militaire, the RFC had 
also achieved air superiority over most, if not all, of the Western Front during this period.719 
The GAAS on the other hand had lost one of its best tactical leader’s. Morale dropped 
as German aircrew realized that not only were they greatly outnumbered by the RFC in men 
and machines but they no longer held the technological advantage over the RFC.720 To make 
matters worse, the recently promoted Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke was transferred away from 
front line operations so as not to risk the life of Germany’s remaining elite fighter pilot who 
had become a national hero. Just when Boelcke’s leadership was needed most, he was ordered 
to Turkey and the Balkans to conduct an inspection tour of air operations in those theaters that 
would take him away from Verdun and the Somme for nearly three critical months.721 
From the middle of June the British began an intermittent artillery bombardment of 
the German Second Army positions along the Somme. British kite balloons and their 
observers played a major role in locating German artillery batteries and directing British 
counter-fire onto them.  
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The observers went up for spotting purposes, trying to spot enemy gun 
positions, trenches and anything behind the German lines that they could see 
was of interest. That carried on every day that we had the balloons up. Two or 
three times a week, artillery officers, sometimes infantry officers, would go 
up as an observer with his sketching map and binoculars to spot whatever he 
could, making notes of it for his own purpose and for recording purposes, 
which was telephoned to the telephone lorry on the ground.722  
 
On Friday, 23 June, a major thunderstorm swept over the front and the kite balloons of 
Numbers 1 and 14 Sections were hit by lightning and destroyed and another three balloons 
were badly damaged.723 The next day the British began what became one of most intense 
artillery bombardments of the war. Intermittent rain and low cloud hindered the RFC’s 
artillery observation and direction, causing pilots to fly low and into the paths of their own 
artillery shells. Lieutenant Cecil Lewis of Number 3 Squadron observed 
Out of the corner of my eye, when I wasn’t really looking, I saw something 
moving like a lump. I didn’t really know what the devil it was. It was a 
mystifying sort of effect. Then I looked again and focused and about 100 
yards ahead there was the business part of a 9-inch howitzer shell right at the 
top of its trajectory-just about 8,000 feet. It had come up like a lobbed tennis 
ball and right at the top it was going quite slowly and it was a pretty hefty bit 
of metal, turning end over end before it gathered speed again and went off 
down to the ground again. The battery was evidently firing and we saw two or 
three shells and once you had caught them you could follow them right down 
to burst.724 
 
Primarily due to the poor weather and observation the RFC was only able to direct artillery 
fire onto forty targets, far below what the artillery plan called for.725  
On 25 June, the RFC made a concerted daylight attack against the German 
observation balloons all along the Somme front, with the main effort going against those 
balloons opposite Rawlinson’s Fourth Army.726 Fifteen balloons of the twenty-three in the air 
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found themselves under attack by RFC fighters and five were destroyed.727 This success in 
spite of the poor weather and intense anti-aircraft fire was followed up the next day when 
three pilots from Number 1 Squadron, flying Nieuport 11’s, shot down three more balloons, 
which had survived the previous day’s attacks.728  
On this same day, the second day of the British artillery bombardment, the German 
artillery began an intense counter-battery program. The RFC was able to locate and identify 
one hundred and two positions. Aircraft and balloon observers reported back that the entire 
Somme valley seemed to have caught fire as “blazing dumps and exploding ammunition over 
a wide area added to the inferno.”729 The GAAS was again noticeably absent in trying to 
prevent the RFC from accomplishing its missions. One Fokker Eindecker was seen near the 
lines over Courcelette but was immediately attacked by a DH2 from Number 24 Squadron and 
shot down.730 
For the next four days poor weather and heavy fog made the work of the RFC more 
difficult in supporting Rawlinson’s army. Every hour of bad weather that kept the British 
aircrews on the ground and away from the front, brought respite to a German artillery battery, 
unit assembly area or logistics center. No one understood what this meant better than 
Trenchard.731 
British crews took many risks in their flimsy wood and fabric machines, flying below 
the low clouds to direct artillery onto the German guns. The bad weather took its toll however 
and for this reason the British artillery bombardment was not nearly as effective as it could 
have been. Trying to emphasize the positive before the attack on 28 June the daily 
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communiqué for the RFC recorded: “Heavy rain and low clouds throughout the day. In the 
evening it cleared somewhat, and some successful artillery work was accomplished. There 
was no hostile aircraft activity”732 
Both Haig and Joffre had agreed that the offensive would begin on 29 June but Foch 
requested a two day delay to ensure that his assault forces were in position.733 Bad weather 
also set in and it was agreed to postpone the attack until 1 July.734 Because of this 
postponement, the artillery bombardment was extended from five days to seven. 
Air observation and direction of the artillery was the RFC’s most critical task in the 
week leading up to the attack.735 If the aircrews were unable to observe and direct the seven 
day artillery barrage with precision and accuracy, the lack of results could be devastating to 
the attacking infantry. NCO pilot Frank Courtney summed up the critical aspect of the mission 
succinctly. 
It was an unglamorous but hazardous occupation, and often a nerve wracking 
one. We did this work in all weathers, which often meant flying very low over 
German target areas and back and forth over the trenches, giving the enemy 
ample time to figure out what we were doing so that he could plaster us with 
Archie [anti-aircraft fire], machine guns, or any other hardware he had to 
offer. Losses among artillery co-operation planes were often exceptionally 
heavy.”736  
 
In conducting its reconnaissance and photography missions during the artillery 
bombardment, the RFC focused not only on the destruction and neutralization of German 
artillery batteries but also the impact the British artillery was having on the belts of barbed 
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wire obstacles the Germans had placed forward of their front line trench system. Destruction 
of these wire obstacles was one of the most important missions assigned to the artillery to 
accomplish before the Fourth Army attacked.737 These defensive positions had been 
constructed to comprise several trench lines and fortified villages, which were interconnected 
and protected by dense barbed-wire entanglements. These obstacles ran the length of the entire 
forward trench line and in some areas were forty yards in depth.738  
With the artillery assigned the mission of eliminating these obstacle belts, the RFC 
was tasked to observe and report the effects of the barrage on the wire. Thousands of 
photographs were taken during the final week before the start of the offensive.739 On the 
afternoon of 26 June there was a pause in the bombardment to allow RFC aircraft to 
photograph the entire area and these photos were then passed onto the artillery headquarters 
for analysis.740 
One of Rawlinson’s corps commanders reported: “The aeroplane photographs showed 
admirably the effect of the bombardment both on the wire and on the [enemy] trenches and 
were of the greatest value.”741 But the intermittent rain that had begun on the 24th played 
havoc with the RFC’s observation aircraft and their ability to observe and direct the artillery 
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barrage. Fog along with clouds of dust and dirt from the constant barrage fire made 
observation even more difficult throughout the last week of June.742 
Unfortunately for the one-half million British soldiers of the Fourth Army waiting for 
the attack to begin, the photographs were misleading and the wire was not cut or destroyed 
across the width and depth of the German defensive positions as Haig and his staff was led to 
believe.743 Of the five day planned bombardment (which was extended another two days), the 
weather was only good for less than two days. The bad weather was a critical factor in 
Rawlinson’s decision to postpone the attack for forty eight hours.744 Rain, mist, low cloud and 
even fog had restricted aerial observation during most of the daylight hours in the week before 
the start of the offensive. The RFC’s ability to photograph, locate, and direct the British guns 
against German artillery was greatly reduced through no fault of the men in the 
squadrons.745Though the weather was poor the final forty-eight hours prior to the start of the 
offensive, RFC aircraft were able to direct artillery fire against 57 German batteries on 29 
June and an additional 95 targets on 30 June.746 
As night arrived on 30 June, all was in readiness for the attack to begin the next 
morning. While fitters, riggers, and armorers made the final adjustments and preparations to 
the fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, the RFC’s commander visited several of his 
front-line squadrons.747 With the RFC having achieved aerial superiority over the Somme, 
Trenchard realized that that had only been the first phase of the air campaign. The struggle to 
maintain that superiority as well as support the Fourth Army’s offensive in the upcoming days 
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and weeks would task both he and his men. He was confident that both he and his aircrew 
were up to the task.748    
On the eve of the offensive, the General Officer Commanding, ‘Boom’ 
Trenchard, with his ADC [Maurice Baring], visited the squadron. Sitting on 
his shooting-stick, he called us all up round him, gave us a bird’s-eye view of 
the whole attack, and in the pleasant masterful way congratulated us all on our 
work. It had contributed, he said, more than we knew to the success of the 
preliminary bombardment. Artillery observation, photography, 
reconnaissance, all received their commendation. ‘Boom’ infused men’s 
enthusiasm without effort by a certain greatness of heart that made him not so 
much our superior in rank as in personality. When he left we were all sure that 
victory was certain, that the line would be broken, the cavalry put through, 
and the Allies sweep on to Berlin.749 
 
The pilots and observers of Number 3 Squadron as well as all of the other squadrons 
supporting the Fourth Army would be aloft well before the British infantry left their trenches 
the next morning. 
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Chapter Five 
ORDER OF THE DAY: “ATTACK EVERYTHING”  
JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lieutenant Geoffrey H. Bonnell, an American volunteer in No. 32 
Squadron in the nacelle of his DH 2, Summer 1916. (IWM  Q7237) 
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At 0730, Saturday 1 July, 1916, there was a momentary lull as the bombardment 
ceased. The skies had cleared and to those on the ground it looked to be “a perfect summer 
day.”750 Silence filled the air as the British artillery batteries reloaded their howitzers and 
cannons and prepared to fire on their secondary objectives. Platoon commanders blew their 
whistles all along the Fourth Army front and the first wave of British infantry from fifteen 
divisions left their trenches and proceeded out into no-man’s land. The Somme offensive had 
at last begun.751 
The aircrews of the six squadrons supporting the Fourth Army had been aloft since 
0400. As the sun rose and the early morning mist faded away, aerial observers were able to 
report to the ground units the effect of the bombardment. As the first waves of infantry left 
their trenches, contact patrols flew between 500 and 1,000 feet overhead, reporting back to 
each corps and division headquarters on the progress of their units.752 
Aerial observers, most of them flying in the outdated BE 2c, flew along the entire 
front of the Fourth Army, searching out and locating dozens of German artillery batteries who 
were now laying down an intense barrage of their own on the advancing British infantry. The 
airmen sent hundreds of requests for fire and loitered in the air to direct the counter-fire 
against the enemy artillery units but with hundreds of bursting shells landing seemingly 
everywhere below them, it became impossible to give more than general corrections.753 
Balloon observers from Number 1 Kite Balloon (KB) Squadron were linked by 
telephone directly to each of the corps artillery headquarters. Not only did they observe and 
direct counter-fire, they also reported the effects of the German barrage.754  
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Besides observing and directing artillery, the RFC also focused on its other missions 
to support Rawlinson’s army. Air reconnaissance during the early morning hours of 1 July 
revealed that there was very little movement on the roads and at the rail centers behind the 
German lines.755 The RFC gave special focus to the rail centers at Bapaume and Cambrai.756 
Reports were sent back to Fourth Army headquarters that there was no major activity taking 
place at either station. With this information in hand, Rawlinson was heartened by the fact that 
the Germans were not moving reinforcements into the area that his army was about to 
attack.757 
The RFC had been conducting bombing raids on key German installations and sites 
throughout May and June but with the start of the offensive Trenchard stepped up the intensity 
of these operations.758 Under his direction, the RFC Headquarters staff planned an intense 
bombing campaign, which began on 30 June with a raid on the St. Sauveur train station.759 
Aerial reconnaissance had confirmed that the train station was a critical logistics node in 
which the Germans could transfer reinforcements into the Somme sector from.760 The RFC 
dispatched six RE7’s from Number 21 Squadron to bomb the station. A second raid by the 
same squadron was conducted the following morning with some success. Bombs were plainly 
seen striking the station buildings and the rail lines. For each raid six RE 7’s were escorted by 
two Martinsydes and by two Morane biplanes.761 
Also on 30 June, the RFC attacked the Cambrai train station in the afternoon. The rail 
lines were struck by at least seven 112-pound bombs. Returning that evening for a second 
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strike, Second Lieutenant A.L. Gordon-Kidd from Number 7 Squadron bombed an 
approaching train from 900 feet, scoring a direct hit on the middle of the train, which caught 
fire and began to explode. An hour later the train was still burning.762  
At 1400, six aircraft from a III Brigade squadron, attacked the rail center at St. 
Quentin which was located more than thirty-five miles behind the German front lines.  
Lieutenant Lawrence Wingfield, piloting a BE 2c without his observer so he could carry two 
110 pound bombs located his target and dropped his bombs directly on what he thought was 
the rail station. He observed a column of smoke and on his return flight was attacked by a 
Fokker Eindecker. The BE 2C was shot down and Wingfield was captured by German 
infantry.763 The remaining British aircraft were also shot down after bombing the station. 
Since the RFC aircrew had all become casualties or prisoners of war the impact of this single 
bombing raid would not be learned for several weeks and only then when a captured German 
soldier revealed the details during his interrogation. 
On the 1st July the Division was warned to proceed to the Somme front. About 
3:30pm the first battalion of the 71st Reserve Regiment and the 11th Reserve 
Jaeger Battalion were at St. Quentin Station ready to entrain, arms were piled 
and the regimental transport was being loaded into the train. At this moment 
English aeroplanes appeared overhead and dropped bombs. One bomb fell on 
a shed which was filled with ammunition and caused a big explosion. There 
were 200 wagons of ammunition in the station at the time; 60 of them caught 
fire and exploded, the remainder were saved with difficulty. The train allotted 
to the transport of troops and all the equipment which they had placed on the 
platform were destroyed by fire. The men were panic-stricken and fled in 
every direction. One hundred and eighty men were either killed or wounded. 
It was not till several hours later that it was possible to collect the men of the 
71st Regiment. It was then sent back to billets.764   
 
The RFC had thus prevented one more German division from reaching the front lines in a 
timely manner to oppose the attack of the Fourth Army. Trenchard directed repeated raids 
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against the German rail system primarily targeting the junctions and railheads in Cambrai, 
Busigny, and St. Quentin.765 Though results for the most part were marginal at best, 
occasionally one or two bombs dropped by diligent pilots facing enormous odds did achieve 
significant results.  
The first offensive patrols by the RFC occurred when Number 32 Squadron took to 
the air at 0545. Number 24 Squadron was also airborne shortly thereafter. The squadron 
commander, Major Lanoe Hawker, VC, DSO, had issued his tactical orders to the seventeen 
others pilots the day before the start of the offensive: “Attack Everything.”766 In just two 
words Hawker summed up the ethos of the RFC since Trenchard took command. The pilots of 
these two RFC squadrons witnessed one of the largest attacks undertaken by a modern army. 
Patrols would continue throughout the day, the last leaving the front line area only after it 
became too dark to see.767  
The most noticeable air engagement on 1 July however took place before the infantry 
left their trenches. At approximately 0600, two DH 2’s from Number 32 Squadron intercepted 
ten German bombers crossing the lines at Festubert. Flying the lead DH 2 was the squadron 
commander, Major Lionel Rees, who had won the Military Cross as a flight commander in 
1915 flying an FB5 ‘Gunbus’ with Number 11 Squadron. With Rees in the other DH 2, was 
his wingman, a Canadian, Lieutenant John Simpson.768 
Simpson and Rees became separated and against 10 to 1 odds, Simpson attacked the 
German formation. Within seconds three enemy aircraft attacked him in turn. After a fierce 
exchange of machine-gun fire, Simpson’s DH 2 descended more than 5,000 feet, apparently 
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under control. In fact Simpson was dead, having been hit eight times in the head by the 
accurate fire from one of the German gunners.769 
Rees did not witness the attack but spotted the German formation and was surprised 
that a flight of enemy machines was actually attempting to cross over the lines into British 
airspace, something they had not done in any strength for weeks. 770 Rees, replicating 
Simpson, attacked without hesitation. Holding his fire until within 100 yards, he quickly 
disabled two German aircraft, both were seen to be trailing smoke and descending back 
towards the German lines. To the surprise of Rees and the thousands of British and German 
soldiers who observed the fight from the ground, the German aircraft turned back towards 
their lines. At least one of the bombers dropped its bombs onto German positions.771 
Rees gave chase and the faster DH 2 soon overtook the German bombers. He was, 
however, hit in the leg from one of the bomber’s observer/gunners firing at long range. Rees 
continued his attack and began to fire as he came within range of the German lead aircraft.  
I closed, just as I was about to open fire, a shot struck me in the leg putting 
the leg temporarily out of action. I fired another drum, but not having 
complete control of the rudder, I swept the machine backwards and forwards. 
I finished firing about 10 yards away, and saw the observer sitting back firing 
straight up in the air. . . . I then recovered the use of my leg and saw the leader 
going towards the lines. I got within long range of him. He was firing an 
immense amount of ammunition. Just before he reached the lines I gave him 
one more drum. Having finished my ammunitions I came home.”772 
 
One British pilot had single handedly prevented ten German bombers from crossing the 
British lines and accomplishing their mission. Rees was also credited with shooting down two 
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of the enemy machines. Thousands of soldiers from both sides were eyewitnesses to this act of 
incredible bravery.773  
As it turned out Rees had killed the observer of the lead aircraft, Leutnant 
Zimmermann, who in fact was in command and leading the bombing mission. The results of 
this single air combat were just another indicator to both armies that the RFC controlled the 
skies above the Somme.774 For his courage and resolution in the face of overwhelming odds, 
Rees was awarded the Victoria Cross. Although the air campaign over the Somme lasted 
another five months, Rees was the only RFC pilot to earn Britain’s most distinguished medal 
for valor during the campaign.775  
RFC pilots were probably the first to realize that events of the ground were not going 
as planned. As they watched the masses of British infantry moving across no-man’s land from 
the west, they also observed the German infantry scrambling from their deep dugouts, and 
proceed to lay down a barrage of machine-gun fire that swept through the British ranks.776 
Almost all British units that did penetrate the German lines were quickly cut off and it proved 
nearly impossible to send reinforcements to their aid due to the heavy German artillery that 
was targeting assembly areas and communication trenches where the third and fourth waves of 
British soldiers were forming up.777 The German artillery fire was also causing many 
casualties in no-man’s land, which also obscured the vision of British airmen from accurately 
observing their own artillery fire they were directed onto the German lines. RFC aircrew 
watched in frustration as the German units formed up and counter-attacked all along the 
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Fourth Army front.778 Contact patrols supporting the British infantry units, reported this 
information to several Corps headquarters via messages dropped from the air or by wireless.779 
The information was accurate but due to confusing reports that Rawlinson and his staff were 
receiving from subordinate unit headquarters, by the time decisions were made and orders 
were issued it was too late to influence the action that had been observed and reported by the 
airmen.780  
The left of the main attack, from Serre to as far north as Thiepval where VIII and X 
Corps attacked, ended with similar results. These two formations were supported by Number 
15 and 4 Squadrons, respectively. Forward ground observers were able to track the progress of 
the fighting but only the RFC observers were able to identify penetrations made at Pendant 
Redoubt and at the Schwaben Redoubt. Number 4 Squadron reported that several German 
artillery batteries between Gandcourt and Courcelette were conducting hasty displacements to 
ensure they were not overrun by the advancing British infantry.781  
Number 4 Squadron also reported at 1630 that the enemy was not massing any troops 
in the area near the Schwaben Redoubt but British units needed reinforcements to maintain 
their foothold within the German lines. Captain C. A. A. Hiatt of Number 4 Squadron was 
directed to fly over the fierce fighting that was taking place at Thiepval, where the Germans 
had fortified this French village. The penetrations that had been made into the German 
trenches in this village and along this part of the line could not be reinforced due to several 
German counterattacks that had regained much of the ground the British had captured. Based 
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on this information, X Corps headquarters directed that the British infantry attacking Thiepval 
and Beaumont Hamel withdraw.782 
The greatest advance for the British on 1 July was observed by Number 9 Squadron 
flying over XIII Corps on the British right flank. RFC aircrew conducting a contact patrol 
reported that the 30th Division had broken into the German front line and faced little 
opposition. They also witnessed the 18th Division occupy Pommiers Trench and then capture 
Pommiers Redoubt.783 
Another Number 9 Squadron aircraft observed a line of flashes, which reflected from 
the mirrors on the packs of the advancing British soldiers, in the direction of Montauban. The 
British crew, Captain J. T. P Whittaker and Second Lieutenant T. E. G. Scaife, spotted a 
German artillery battery coming into action in Bernafay Wood. Whittaker dove his aircraft 
down to 700 feet and dispersed the battery with machine-gun fire. They then attacked German 
troops occupying trenches east of the woods with machine-gun fire before breaking off the 
attack to observe the 16th Manchesters enter and capture Montauban.784 Rawlinson received 
this good news within the hour from the RFC aircraft and his RFC liaison officer. 
On the right of the British front the French had been much more successful in their 
attack on both sides of the Somme.785 Haig made the decision to concentrate his efforts 
between La Boisselle and the boundary with the French.786 He notified Rawlinson that Fourth 
Army would no longer be responsible for the sector from La Boisselle to Serre. That area was 
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being turned over to Lieutenant General Sir Hubert Gough, who would take command of the 
two northern corps of the Fourth Army.787 
When darkness set in over the Somme, the RFC aircraft returned to their airfields for 
well-earned rest. Many of the aircrew from the nine squadrons providing support to 
Rawlinson’s army had been in the air between six and twelve hours. This would be the norm 
for the duration of the first phase of the battle.788  
Darkness also brought an end to the sporadic fighting along the Fourth Army front 
(see Map 2). It also brought an end to one of the most horrific days of slaughter the British 
Army has ever experienced. The initial casualty report from the Fourth Army totaled nearly 
62,000 men killed, wounded and missing.789 It would be several days before the official 
casualty report was completed. It was only when the massive amounts of wounded had 
overwhelmed the medical system that had been set up prior to the commencement of the 
battle, that both army and civilian leaders realized how badly the British Army had suffered on 
the first day of the battle. An advance of one mile on a three-mile front had cost 57,470 
casualties: 19,240 were killed or died of wounds; 35,493 were wounded; 2,152 were missing; 
and 585 had been taken prisoner.790 As for RFC casualties Trenchard notified Brancker in a 
letter on 2 July. 
I enclose herewith casualties of the first days fighting. Considering it is 
practically a bare 2% of the whole lot engaged and its not as if they only went 
over the lines once as most of them did two or three trips, I think it is a very 
small percentage for pilots. The machines are a little bit heavier.791    
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Aircrew casualties were one killed, four wounded, and nine missing; an extremely small 
fraction of the tens of thousands amongst the infantry who had become casualties on the first 
day of the offensive.792 Though the German Army may have won the first round of the battle, 
the GAAS had been beaten in the air. All total more than 110 British aircrew had flown nearly 
108 hours between dawn and darkness and there had been only nine air combats between 
British and German aircraft.793  
The next day, RFC reconnaissance aircraft detected German troop trains bringing 
reinforcements from Douai towards the Somme front and this was reported to Rawlinson. 
While this air reconnaissance was taking place, Number 21 Squadron dispatched several 
flights of aircraft to bomb an infantry division headquarters and multiple ammunition dumps. 
Each aircraft carried six bombs with each bomb weighing 336 pounds apiece. The bombing 
mission was successful in that several ammunition dumps were engulfed in flames and burned 
out of control for most of the day. The RE 7 bombers were escorted by four Martinsydes from 
Number 27 Squadron while six Moranes of Number 60 Squadron flew over the Bapaume area 
while the attack was taking place. Not surprisingly, no German aircraft rose to the challenge 
and there was no interference from the enemy while the British bombers made their bombing 
runs.794On the Fourth Army front that day there were only four air combats. In the Third Army 
sector, there were seven, resulting in four German aircraft being shot down.795 To Trenchard, 
these were sure signs that the RFC was maintaining aerial superiority, if not supremacy, over 
the Somme battlefield.796 
On 3 July, as Rawlinson’s army continued to attack the German fortified villages of 
Thiepval and Ovillers, RFC observers flew over Cambrai and reported back to both RFC 
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headquarters and the Fourth Army commander that there were many troop trains in the 
town.797 The Germans were rushing reinforcements from the east and south-east and were 
moving them forward to Bapaume and Peronne. Within twenty-four hours, several of the units 
were identified and it was confirmed that they had been hastily transferred from the Verdun 
sector. If the much sought after breakthrough that Haig so desperately wanted had not 
occurred in the first seventy-two hours of the offensive, he could at least take some 
satisfaction in the fact that the enemy was removing units away from the battle in the south. 
He was thus achieving one of his missions, which was to relieve the pressure on the French at 
Verdun.798 
Trenchard directed that his bombing squadrons attack the enemy troop trains and 
interdict them before they could deliver the reinforcements into the Somme battle.799 Over the 
course of the next three days numerous missions were directed against these trains staging at 
Cambrai. RFC casualties were heavy, with eight bombers shot down and many more badly 
damaged returning often with wounded crewmen.800 These missions reaffirmed to all the 
bombing squadron commanders, that sending antiquated BE 2c’s deep into German held 
territory, flying without escort and without their observers (because of the weight of the bomb-
load), was as good as signing a death warrant for the pilot.801  Trenchard realized he had to 
make adjustments due to the increase in casualties. “A less resolute commander might have 
cancelled his bombing programme. Trenchard decided instead to revert immediately to  
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Map 2. The Somme, 1916: Ground gained evening 1 July, 1916. (Military 
Operations: France and Belgium, 1916, Vol. I, 479). 
200 
escorted attacks in big formations, realizing as he did that there would be fewer machines for 
reconnaissance and that more fighters would be needed.”802 Costly though the bombing raids 
were, the RFC commander had no intention of stopping them. At the end of the first week of 
the Battle of the Somme, Trenchard sent a note back to Brancker, recapping the critical events 
of the week. 
 
I have lost a good many machines lately and a certain number of pilots, but 
really they had done splendidly. We have done 1,200 hours’ flying a day 
which makes you think a bit, and a lot of pilots have done five to six hours’ 
flying a day, and this is going on day after day. I have lost, as you know, eight 
machines at low bombing, I am afraid that some of the pilots are getting a bit 
rattled, and it’s not popular. I have put in for two V.C.s. Contact patrols 
working with the infantry have been a great success this time, and the artillery 
work has been extraordinary. The fighting is going well, and the pilots are 
doing splendidly. We have crashed a good number of Fokkers and brought 
down a good many more than they admit. . . It’s a bit of a strain with so many 
hostile machines and anti-aircraft guns about. . . The depots are getting 
overworked mending machines that are shot to pieces and crash, issuing 
stores and repairing transport.803  
 
During the first week of the offensive the RFC fought continuously above the ground battle 
with only the occasional bad weather bringing the British aircrews limited periods of respite. 
By 9 July, there was a noticeable increase in German air activity along the entire Fourth Army 
front. Twenty-four air combats took place and several German aircraft penetrated as deep as 
ten miles into the British rear areas.804 
It was becoming more and more apparent to Haig and Trenchard that when the 
Germans transferred infantry divisions from Verdun to the Somme front, they were also 
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transferring fighter squadrons to provide support to their ground forces.805 The RFC 
commander was not surprised by the increase in enemy air activity, he expected it. He was 
even more convinced this his offensive policy was proving to be an effective measure to 
maintain air superiority, though the costs in crews and aircraft was becoming more expensive 
with each passing day.806 The Germans were definitely on the defensive over the Somme 
battlefield and the RFC was forcing them to require more squadrons for defensive patrolling. 
Trenchard knew that if the GAAS continued to conduct defensive patrolling, they would not be 
able wrest air superiority away from his squadrons.807 
When the first phase of the Somme offensive ended on 14 July, the British had gained 
six thousand yards at great cost. The Fourth Army had pushed forward and gained possession 
of the southern crest of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit.808 The 
effect the RFC played in supporting the Fourth Army was significant. Cooperation between 
the RFC and the infantry via contact patrols had provided results which made it clear to both 
ground and air commanders that this mission would be a requirement for all future 
operations.809 Feedback from aircrew confirmed that most information could be obtained by 
direct observation from a low height and if in doubt the pilot would fly low enough to draw 
fire, which usually verified friend from foe.  
The principle is for the pilot or observer to get to know the trench system of 
his own and the enemy area, by direct observation and by the careful study of 
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maps made from photographs, so that he merely had to look at the ground and 
know it by heart. When the battle is being waged the observer or pilot will 
watch our troops from above and report their progress or otherwise by 
message bag to Headquarters . . . To start with it was found that the staff were 
somewhat disbelieving, but after a time they learnt to trust us and we were 
often sent back to make further observations on important points.810 
 
What was somewhat unexpected to the RFC was the comparative immunity of the 
aircraft conducting the contact patrols.811 Trenchard had directed his squadrons to take 
extreme risks to ensure the infantry were supported from the air.812 During the first phase of 
the battle the only British aircraft casualty that occurred while conducting a contact patrol was 
shot down by British artillery engaged in the prepatory bombardment.813 That only one was 
lost from friendly fire was remarkable since almost all RFC crews flying between 500 and 
1000 feet during the last week of June reported numerous occasions when British artillery 
shells passed visibly by their aircraft during the conduct of their missions.814 
The artillery direction and observation by the RFC, hampered during the last few days 
of June by bad weather, was conducted as well as it could have been given the conditions and 
the enormity of the mission. There were several occasions during the first two weeks of the 
offensive where bad weather or poor visibility hampered aircrews from observing the effects 
of counter-battery missions.815 Several ground commanders commented that air observation 
made all the difference in whether attacks succeeded or failed. After a failed attack on 
Pozieres, the III Corps commander, Lieutenant General W. P. Pulteney stated: “aeroplane 
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observation now appears to be an essential preliminary to a successful attack.” 816 He was not 
alone in his beliefs. 
Lieutenant General Sir Thomas L. N. Morland, commander of the X Corps, sent a 
note through General Gough, the Reserve Army commander which provided examples in his 
sector of numerous successful attacks, due largely to the RFC-artillery cooperation.817 At 
Bailiff Wood, RFC directed artillery fire destroyed fourteen German artillery positions; 
another thirteen artillery pieces were abandoned by their crews due to the accuracy of the fire 
directed by aircraft.818 At Contalmaison Wood, several artillery batteries had been destroyed. 
The same results were found at Mametz, Caterpillar Woods, and Bottom Wood.819 The 
division artillery commander for the 32d Division, Brigadier General J. A. Tyler stated that: 
“The German artillery on our front has been in a great measure destroyed by our aeroplane 
observation for heavy artillery.”820In a note sent to Major A. B. Burdett, the commander of 
No. 9 Squadron, the artillery commander of XIII Corps, Brigadier General R. StC. Lecky 
stated that “The results obtained were entirely due to the gallant efforts of your observers and 
pilots.” 821 
On 9 July, Trenchard had written Haig stating that his policy was intent on keeping 
the GAAS from crossing the British lines or interfering with the corps squadrons conducting 
reconnaissance and artillery observation and direction missions.822 Even Trenchard could not 
have envisioned just how successful the RFC would be during the first two weeks of the 
campaign. Not once during this period was a corps squadron aircraft prevented from 
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conducting its mission by an enemy machine.823 As Trenchard realized, it was impossible to 
occupy the air so that no enemy aircraft could break through, the offensive patrols by the army 
squadrons into the German rear areas contained the GAAS to the point that they could not or 
did not provide the required support to their own ground forces.824 
At the conclusion of the first phase of the Somme offensive (1-14 July), Trenchard 
and his staff conducted an assessment as to how successful the air service had been in 
assisting the Fourth Army. They found that in conducting their direct support missions before 
the start of the offensive, the RFC had photographed the entire battle-space that Rawlinson’s 
army would fight on and they had reported on the condition of many of the barbed wire 
obstacles, enemy trenches, and on the probable strength of the German units in the Somme 
sector.825 They had been successful in keeping the corps and division headquarters informed of 
the location and status of their units during the initial and subsequent attacks, doing their best 
to prevent a ground attack from failing due to a commander’s lack of situational awareness.826 
At the same time and as equally important, there were several incidents where RFC crews 
prevented the British artillery from firing on British troops as the advancing units moved 
quicker than the artillery timetable had planned. 827 
RFC aircraft also conducted low-level bombing and strafing attacks on German 
artillery and infantry units with much success. The ground commanders were also especially 
pleased with the aerial observation and direction of artillery, both before and during the first 
phase of the battle which neutralized the fire of many German artillery batteries, and destroyed 
trenches and strong points that were holding up the infantry advance.828 
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At the same time, the army squadrons sought out and engaged the German fighters 
and bombers with an almost incredible intensity.829 They prevented the GAAS from providing 
aerial observation to his artillery batteries, direct support to his defending infantry and also 
preventing bombers from interdicting the advancing British infantry. On no occasion did a 
German aircraft attack the Fourth Army rear area where huge logistic centers had been 
established to support the offensive.830 
There were also the intangible effects on troop morale, both British and German, in 
which the RFC had a great impact because of its domination over the Somme during this 
phase.  
The morale of the British infantry before they went into the line suffered nothing from 
aircraft bombing. Moreover when the infantry moved up to attack they could do so in 
the knowledge that no spying aeroplanes would turn the German guns on to them; and 
they could go into battle reasonably assured that any rapid enemy movements to 
counter them would not go unnoticed by their own airmen.831  
Numerous battalion and brigade officers within Fourth Army reported similar comments to 
their division and corps commanders who then informed Rawlinson and Haig of the positive 
impact the RFC was having on soldier morale.832 
 The commander of the German Second Army also had high praise for the RFC. 
General Fritz von Below was fully cognizant that the RFC had gained aerial superiority of the 
skies over the Somme by the spring of 1916.  
The beginning and the first weeks of the Somme battle were marked by a complete 
inferiority of our own air forces. The enemy’s aeroplanes enjoyed complete freedom 
in carrying out distant reconnaissances. With the aid of aeroplane observation, the 
hostile artillery neutralized our guns and was able to range with the most extreme 
accuracy on the trenches occupied by our infantry; the required data for this were 
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provided by undisturbed trench reconnaissance and photography. By means of 
bombing and machine-gun attacks from a low height against infantry, battery 
positions and marching columns, the enemy’s aircraft inspired our troops with a 
feeling of defencelessness against the enemy’s mastery of the air. On the other hand, 
our own aeroplane’s only succeeded in quite exceptional cases in breaking through the 
hostile patrol barrage and carrying out distance reconnaissances; our artillery 
machines were driven off whenever they attempted to carry out registration for their 
own batteries. Photographic reconnaissance could not fulfill their demands made upon 
it. Thus at decisive moments, the infantry frequently lacked the support of the German 
artillery either in counter-battery work or in barrage on the enemy’s infantry massing 
for attack. Heavy losses in personnel and material were inflicted on our artillery by the 
enemy’s guns, assisted by excellent air observation, without our being able to have 
recourse to the same methods. Besides, both arms were exposed to attacks from the air 
by the enemy’s battle-planes, the moral effect of which could not be ignored833  
The German commander was not alone in his praise for the RFC. A German soldier in the 24th 
Infantry Division was one of many who felt the direct effect’s of the RFCs presence over the 
battlefield. He voiced his anger at the GAAS’s lack of courage in a letter home.  
Now just a word about our own aeroplanes. Really one must be almost too 
ashamed to write about them; it is simply scandalous. They fly up to this 
village but no further, whereas the English are always flying over our lines 
directing artillery shoots, whereby getting all their shells, even those of heavy 
caliber right into our trenches. Our artillery can only shoot by the map as they 
have no observation.”834 
 
Several days later the 24th Infantry Division was moved forward into the front line trenches 
near Warlencourt. The same soldier updated his family on his situation in a second letter 
home. 
What a bad position this is! You have to stay in your hole all day and must not 
stand up in a trench because there is always a crowd of English [aircraft] over 
us. Always hiding from aircraft. Always, with about eight or ten English 
machines overhead, but no-one sees any of ours. If German machines go up at 
all, they are only up for five minutes and then retire in double-quick time. Our 
airmen are a rotten lot.835 
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It was evident that the RFC was having a direct impact on the German units opposite the 
British Fourth Army. Relief of front line units had to take place at night or during extremely 
bad weather. Any attempt to conduct these operations in daylight would bring down a barrage 
of artillery fire, directed and observed by RFC aircraft.836 Reinforcements, food, water and 
most importantly ammunition, had to be brought from the rear area to the front lines during 
hours of darkness for the same reason.837 
As successful as the RFC was in the opening phase of the battle, it was evident to 
Trenchard and most of the BEF’s leaders, that the most the RFC “could contribute must 
remain a small part of the whole. Command of the air in this war would never make the 
difference between success and failure on the ground.”838 
The second phase of the battle lasted almost two months, from 15 July to 14 
September. The Fourth Army continued its battle of attrition, with the fiercest fighting taking 
place on the British right flank.839 A sharp salient had formed there at Delville Wood and 
Longueval which allowed the Germans to concentrate observed fire on the wood and the 
village. Rawlinson directed that this salient be eliminated but bad weather postponed the 
attack and allowed the Germans to prepare new defensive positions.840 Another delay was 
caused by a German counter-attack against the village of Longueval on the 18th and 19th of 
July. To assist the forces fighting in Longueval, several British and South African brigades 
attacked High Wood.841 RFC observers from Number 3 Squadron flew continuous contact 
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patrols and reported that all but the northern portion of High Wood had been captured by 
nightfall.842 
During the several days of bad weather the Germans had constructed a series of new 
trenches near Le Sars and Courcelette which were identified by crews from Number 4 
Squadron.843 Number 3 Squadron also identified a major new trench system between Le 
Transloy and Warlencourt and major improvements to the third line between Eaucourt 
l’Abbaye and Flers.844  
The RFC also reported that the village of Flers was strongly held by the enemy but 
more importantly discovered a new trench system had been built 300 yards forward of the 
Switch line, the main objective for III Corps in the coming attack.845 The RFC crew landed 
and immediately reported to the III Corps commander what they had seen. Based on their first 
hand knowledge, the corps commander amended his plan of attack and made this new trench 
the first objective for the 19th Division instead of the Switch line.846 
On 23 July, after a forty-eight hour bombardment along the whole front from Trones 
Wood to Pozieres, British troops began their attack at 0130. The Germans had reinforced their 
front lines and again used their machine-guns to good effect. The advance of the Fourth Army 
was repulsed except for the foothold achieved at Pozieres, with heavy loss.847 By the end of 
the month XIII Corps had gained control of Delville Wood, XV Corps had captured 
                                                            
842 Michael Chappell, The Somme, 1916: Crucible of a British Army, 85-86. 
843 WITA, Vol. II, 238. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Ibid., 239. 
846 WITA, Vol. II, 239. 
847 Ibid. In capturing what was left of the village of Pozieres the 2d Australian Division suffered more 
than 3,500 casualties in eight days. See Michael Chappell, The Somme, 1916: Crucible of a British 
Army, 90.  
209 
Longueval and had advanced forward to High Wood; III Corps was positioned along Munster 
Alley.848 
Haig convinced himself that these attacks would break the German line and so he 
persisted with them into August.849 These attacks would set the stage for his next major attack 
in September, where he would use a new secret weapon; one that he hoped would ensure the 
breakthrough that he was so desperate for. 
The RFC continued to conduct contact patrols above the advancing infantry and report 
back to the ground commander. Aerial observation and direction of artillery and aerial 
reconnaissance also proceeded with little interruption from German aircraft. However there 
were subtle changes in German air operations that convinced Trenchard that the enemy was 
learning from the RFC and was about to change their tactics in the air.850 On 19 July, the 
GAAS supporting von Below’s army received three additional reconnaissance flights 
(Feldflieger Abteilungen) of six aircraft each, one artillery flight (Artillerie Flieger Abteilung) 
of four aircraft, one bomber-fighter squadron (Kampfgeschwader) with thirty six aircraft plus 
an additional bomber-fighter flight (Kampfstaffel) with eight aircraft.851 Two new fighter 
squadrons (Kampfeinsitzer Staffeln) had also been formed by combining single-seat fighters 
that had been withdrawn from various artillery and reconnaissance units. As the British began 
the second phase of the Somme offensive, the GAAS had greatly increased its strength in that 
sector to 164 aircraft.852 
During the first phase of the offensive it was rare for a British pilot to report any 
contact with German fighters but this changed once the two new Kampfeinsitzer Staffeln 
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arrived on the Somme. Realizing that the Germans were transferring fighter units from the 
south to reinforce their Somme front, Trenchard had directed Number 32 Squadron with its 
DH 2’s to move south to reinforce this sector. They landed at Vert Galand airfield on 21 
July.853 This date would signal a noticeable increase in air combats that would continue for the 
remainder of the battle.854 
The previous evening, four aircraft led by Captain R. E. A. W. Hughes-Chamberlain 
from Number 24 Squadron engaged eleven German aircraft over Flers, shooting down three of 
them and driving down another two.855 At 0630 on 21 July, Number 24 Squadron’s Captain J. 
O. Andrews led a flight of five DH 2’s, along with two FE 2b’s from Number 22 Squadron 
and they engaged five Rolands and five Fokker Eindeckers over Roisel. One of the Fokkers 
was shot down and three others were damaged while the others were dispersed. One of the DH 
2’s and both FE 2b’s were also damaged and forced to return to the British lines. Now with 
only four aircraft, Andrews continued the patrol towards Peronne where they linked up with 
Number 24’s squadron commander, Major Lanoe Hawker. They encountered four LVG’s 
headed for the British lines. Hawker signaled the attack and they chased the German aircraft 
all the way back to their airfields before being forced to return to the British side of the lines 
due to lack of fuel.856  
Later that evening, six RFC aircraft from three different squadrons, including Number 
24 Squadron, attacked fifteen German machines over Bapaume in an air battle which lasted 
more than thirty minutes.857 This was very unusual, for most air combats lasted only a few 
minutes and the trend had been for the Germans to disengage and beat a retreat back to base 
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before they were shot down or damaged. Five German aircraft were shot down with no losses 
for the British.858 
On 22 July, Trenchard sent a note to Haig informing him of the noticeable increase in 
German air activity.859 He reiterated his message requesting more fighter squadrons and at the 
same time warned that he believed the enemy was about to make an attempt to challenge the 
RFC’s superiority above the Somme.860 
It was during the second phase of the Somme offensive where Trenchard drew a new 
wave of criticism from the political leadership back in London.861 Most of it was focused on 
the increasing aircrew losses and his refusal to relax the pressure on his squadrons, especially 
those supporting the Fourth Army. It was for this reason that Trenchard would accept no 
criticism from within his own command or any insinuation that his strategy was not the 
correct strategy to follow.862  
In early August, LTC Hugh C. T. Dowding, commander of the Ninth Wing, requested 
that one of his squadrons, Number 60, be temporarily withdrawn from frontline service to rest 
and reconstitute after having suffered a fifty percent casualty rate in less than four weeks.863 
Dowding’s request was both reasonable and feasible. A commander whose unit had suffered 
such heavy casualties in such a short period of time would be derelict not to discuss the issue 
of relief with his senior commanding officer. Trenchard did not see it that way however, and 
was afraid that Dowding’s concerns over the high number of casualties might spread alarm to 
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the other wing and squadron commanders which might then lead some of them to question his 
‘incessant offensive’ strategy.864 
 
 
Dowding had had what would appear on the surface to have been several minor 
confrontations with Trenchard before the air campaign over the Somme. The first occurred 
when Dowding was assigned to a new squadron being formed at Farnborough when the war 
began. Having just earned his RAeC certificate and graduated from the CFS in the spring of 
1914 and thinking the war might be over before his squadron would be operationally ready to 
deploy, Dowding met with the RFC commandant, then Major Hugh Trenchard, to request a 
transfer to a squadron in France.865 Dowding admits to having pestered Trenchard several 
times a week until finally he got what he requested, but not exactly. He was posted to France 
but not as a pilot. Instead he was sent out as an observer. “It was by way of being a fearful 
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insult to send out a qualified pilot as an observer, but I was well enough content.”866 In early 
1915, he was posted as a Flight Commander to Number 9 Squadron which had been assigned 
to experiment with wireless communications for the RFC. After some operational work in 
France, Dowding and the squadron were sent back to Brooklands to form the Wireless 
Experimental Establishment.867 His experiences with this unit made him one of the premier 
experts in the use of wireless within the British Army.868  
Dowding returned to France in the summer of 1915 to take command of Number 
Squadron 16 which was a subordinate unit within Trenchard’s First Wing.869 It was during this 
period that he had his second run-in with Trenchard. Several of his squadron aircraft were 
equipped with 80 horse-power engines and had received propellers meant for similar engines 
but with much less power capability. After trying to get the right propellers through his supply 
channels and making no headway, Dowding notified First Wing headquarters of the problem. 
Several days later Dowding was told that both types of engines used the same propeller. 
Dowding argued that that the propeller made for the less powerful engine did not fit the 
nosepiece of the more powerful engine as the bolt-holes were in different places.870 Trenchard 
then got involved and directed that a trial flight be conducted with an aircraft carrying a 
propeller whose hub had been bored out to fit the nosepiece of the stronger engine. Believing 
the modification might make the aircraft dangerous in the air and put the pilot’s life at risk, 
Dowding conducted the trail flight himself. Upon safely landing he notified Trenchard directly 
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that the propeller had not splintered or fractured under stress. Trenchard’s answered by 
informing his irate squadron commander that in fact Dowding had been correct.871 The French 
manufacturer had indeed shipped the wrong propellers to the RFC and the correct ones were 
being shipped to Number 16. Dowding was rightfully upset that his commander had taken 
“the word of ‘some half-baked motor-salesman from Paris’ against that of an experienced 
commander” and even more so because Trenchard refused to admit he had made a mistake.872 
After promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, Dowding spent some months in the 
Administrative Wing at Farnborough. When the RFC was reorganized into brigades with 
corps and army wings, two squadrons were assigned to RFC headquarters to form the 9th 
Headquarters Wing and Dowding was selected to command it.873 Either the two incidents 
between the RFC commander and Dowding were forgotten or more likely Trenchard gained a 
better appreciation for Dowding’s leadership and selected him because of how he handled the 
incidents.874  
Arriving back in France four weeks before the start of the Somme offensive, 
Dowding’s squadrons were equipped with two flights of the recently arrived Sopwith 1 and 
1/2 Strutter, a squadron of Martinsyde Scouts, a squadron of Morane monoplane Scouts and a 
squadron with RE 7’s. Their principle duties were strategic reconnaissance for Haig’s 
headquarters but they also played a major role in Trenchard’s tactical bombing campaign 
before and after the start of the offensive.875 Dowding’s two scout squadrons were also 
instrumental in securing air superiority over the Somme in the weeks before the battle 
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began.876 It was hoped that the bombers would not need escorts if the scout squadrons could 
maintain aerial superiority but heavy casualties amongst the BE 2c and RE 7 squadrons forced 
Dowding and the other wing and squadron commanders to provide escorts as often as 
possible. As the GAAS began to transfer fighter squadrons away from Verdun to reinforce the 
Somme, the number of aerial combats began to grow expeditiously and with them so too did 
the casualties amongst RFC aircrew.877 
 As the casualties mounted within Dowding’s wing he became convinced that 
Trenchard’s strategy for “relentless and incessant offensive” operations was incorrect.878 With 
a finite amount of aircraft and aircrew per squadron available, he realized that RFC squadrons 
supporting the Fourth Army could only put up several flights at any given time of the day thus 
allowing the Germans to mass their aircraft at a time and place of their choosing. 
 Unwilling to publicly challenge Trenchard’s strategy during the first month of the 
battle, Dowding, instead fought the order that forbid squadron or wing commanders from 
flying across enemy lines on operations.879 He strongly believed that by flying with his men he 
could at least be an active participant in what he was ordering them to do. Surprisingly, 
Trenchard gave Dowding permission to lead a formation of sixteen aircraft on a bombing 
operation during the second week of July.880 Lieutenant Donald Brophy, a Canadian pilot with 
Number 21 Squadron recorded his thoughts about the mission after its completion. 
The Colonel decided he would lead us to show us how. He was to lead and 
Captain Carr and I were next, four others in pairs behind and nine scouts. At 
6,000 feet we met thick clouds and when I came through I couldn’t see 
anyone anymore, so I just flew around and finally sighted three machines. I 
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went over and found Carr and the Colonel and two scouts, so I got into place 
and the Colonel went over the lines, and kept circling to get higher for half an 
hour, right over the lines. I thought this was a foolish stunt, as I knew the 
Huns could see us and would be waiting for us. I was very surprised that they 
didn’t shell us, but there was a battle on and they were probably too busy.  We 
were right over Albert, as I recognized two huge mine craters that had been 
sprung July 1st. When we did cross over with only two scouts, we hadn’t been 
over more than a couple of minutes before I saw three Fokkers coming 
towards us and a couple of LVGs climbing up to us. Another Fokker was up 
above me and behind, between our two scouts. I knew he was going to dive at 
one of us, but expected the scouts to see him and attack him, so I didn’t bother 
about him, but began to get the stop-watch time of my bomb-sight to set it for 
dropping. While I was doing this I suddenly heard the pop-pop-pop’s of 
machine guns and knew the Huns had arrived. I looked and saw them diving 
in amongst us and firing. There were seven LVGs and three Fokkers as far as 
I could make out, but they went so fast I could hardly watch them. Our scouts 
went for them and I saw the Colonel turn about. My gun being behind me I 
couldn’t get in a shot and turned around after Carr and the Colonel. They fired 
some more as we went back and didn’t hit me. The Colonel was hit and the 
show was over. He had about a dozen bullets in his machine and was hit in the 
hand. His gun was shot through and his observer hit in the face. He probably 
won’t try to lead us again.881 
 
Dowding suffered a grazed hand though the same bullet shattered his cockpit’s instruments. 
Fortunately his observer was only slightly wounded.882 As Lieutenant Brophy had inferred, 
Dowding was not current on the latest aerial tactics and thus had put his formation at risk and 
suffered the consequences for it.883 Though his leadership and administrative skills were 
admired by all who served with him, Dowding was not proficient as an operational pilot or 
flight leader and lacked situational understanding of the changing conditions of aerial combat 
then taking place over the Somme.884  
Three weeks later, Dowding submitted his request to Trenchard to withdraw Number 
60 Squadron temporarily from the battle. Both operationally and tactically it was a valid 
request and Dowding believed that the units that were most heavily engaged in the air 
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campaign over the Somme would and could be replaced on a temporary basis from squadrons 
who were not committed to the fight such as those operating further north in the much quieter 
Ypres sector. Somewhat surprisingly to the RFC staff, Trenchard approved the request and 
notified Haig of his decision.  
I have had to withdraw one of the GHQ fighting squadrons from work temporarily. . . 
This squadron, since the battle began, have lost a squadron commander, two flight 
commanders and one pilot-all killed or missing, and yesterday it lost two more 
machines and two pilots and two observers by anti-aircraft fire. Besides this, they 
have had several officers wounded. They have a difficult machine to fly [Morane 
Parasol monoplane], and I think a rest away from work is absolutely necessary.885 
Though he approved the request Trenchard questioned Dowding’s resolve. Though Dowding 
had not publicly criticized Trenchard’s offensive strategy the perception amongst some of the 
RFC staff who believed that by requesting an entire squadron be pulled out of the campaign at 
a critical time was in itself a challenge towards the strategy then in use.886 Concerned about a 
drop in aircrew morale due to the increasing number of casualties, Trenchard was more 
concerned about Dowding’s morale. Dowding commanded one of the nine wings within the 
RFC and if his morale was shaken, Trenchard was convinced that aircrew morale would not 
be “restored by a wing-commander who gave him the impression of being obsessed by the 
fear of further casualties.”887 Trenchard notified Brancker that Dowding had become a ‘dismal 
Jimmy’ and that he would replace him as soon as events would allow it.888  
 One of Trenchard’s subordinate wing commanders, Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Ludlow-
Hewitt, tried to explain the RFC commander’s actions in relieving Dowding. 
  
Trenchard at this time was bearing a stupendous burden, persevering in his 
offensive policy despite terrible losses. In this he proved of his faith in his 
men and his own strategical vision. . . . Trenchard later recognized that he had 
                                                            
885Trenchard to Haig, 3 August, 1916, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/26, RAFM. See also WITA, Vol. II., 
256. 
886 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, 184. 
887 Ibid. 
888 Trenchard to Brancker, 19 August, 1916. Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/7, RAFM.  
218 
misjudged Dowding. Though normally a good judge of men, Trenchard was 
liable at times to be misled by his own prejudices; and then, as in this case, he 
could be unjust. He hated complaints which he thought could be bad for 
morale and even when they were fully justified he was inclined to react 
against the complainant. Trenchard seldom admitted a mistake but when he 
recognised it [he] would quietly do his best to make amends.889   
 
 
Six weeks later Dowding was promoted to colonel and sent back to England where he joined 
the Southern Training Brigade whose primary mission was the conduct of pilot training and 
building new squadrons for the RFC. For the remainder of the war Dowding was involved 
with the training of aircrew in a variety of duties but he never served in another operational 
unit until long after the war came to an end.890  
Only Haig and Trenchard’s aide, Major Maurice Baring, understood the monumental 
burden that the commander of the RFC carried on his shoulders during the first two months of 
the Somme campaign. He continuously stressed his offensive tactics despite the terrible losses 
his squadrons were suffering and with the air fighting over the Somme consuming his small 
reserves he formulated a plan for what the RFC would require both in fighter squadrons and 
aircrews for 1917.891  
In early August, Trenchard requested ten squadrons to conduct long-range bombing, 
fifty-six fighter and army co-operation squadrons and sixty observation balloon units. This 
was more than a fifty percent increase in the overall strength of the RFC on the Western Front. 
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Though it was endorsed by Haig, once his request reached the War Office in London it was 
passed from office to office but gained little support.892  
Because the RFC had gained air superiority over the Somme, most political and 
military leaders back in England ignored Trenchard’s request. They argued that the 
incremental increase of a few squadrons over the previous year’s plan would suffice. It was 
this mentality of attrition warfare however that would have almost cataclysmic results for the 
RFC in the spring of 1917. Just as important were the heavy losses the RFC had sustained in 
July and August. Though Trenchard was concerned about his high casualty rate he was 
convinced they would decrease as the campaign continued since he believed that the GAAS 
was suffering even heavier losses in men and aircraft than the RFC. In reality the Germans had 
only lost 19 aircraft over the Somme during the month of July, 17 of them in aerial combat. 
Their total losses in August remained nearly the same with another 17 shot down by the RFC. 
German aircrew casualties amounted to less than sixty over the eight week period.893  
Because of the RFC’s success, Trenchard vowed to overcome any obstacle to ensure 
that his airmen were taken care of.894 His visits to the twenty-seven squadrons in northern 
France ensured he had the pulse of his force.895 He met and talked daily with squadron 
commanders, pilots, observers and the ground crews. He argued, haggled, cajoled and 
demanded more fighter squadrons from Brancker and ultimately the War Office, especially 
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those equipped with the DH 2.896 He also ensured the supply system provided the latest 
improvements in flying clothing to his men since more than a few suffered from frost bite in 
their open cockpits. He also established a leave plan for aircrews in which they had to take 
leave every six to eight weeks, primarily to prevent exhaustion as Trenchard expected the air 
campaign to last many months. In July and August alone his aircrews were averaging a 
minimum of six to eight hours a day in the air.897 He knew this would have to be sustained 
long after the ground campaign came to an end if the RFC was to maintain their mastery of the 
air.898 
As Trenchard maintained his focus on the readiness and capabilities of his operational 
squadrons, he also directed that the bombing campaign concentrate on interdicting the 
movement of reinforcements and the destruction of enemy logistics centers and depots behind 
the German front lines.899 By doing this he knew it would greatly support the Fourth Army 
and at the same time keep the GAAS on a defensive footing. With this in mind he identified a 
new target worthy of his bomber squadrons: the German airfields themselves.900 From mid-
July through early September RFC bombers began to take the war directly to the GAAS. 
Although in most cases only several hangers or aircraft were destroyed, the effects were much 
greater on the morale of the German airmen.901  
The German airfields at Douai, Queant, Bertincourt, Velu, Beaucamp, Trescault, and 
Hervilly were all attacked repeatedly during this eight-week period, primarily by two 
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squadrons: Number 27 and Number 70.902 These two units worked well together with the only 
major difference between the two was that Number 27 Squadron was equipped with the 
Martinsyde Scout single-seat aircraft and Number 70 Squadron flew the first RFC aircraft 
equipped with a synchronized forward firing machine gun, The Sopwith 1 and 1/2  Strutter.903 
The Sopwith was also equipped with the newly designed Scarff ring mount, which 
revolutionized the observer’s ability to quickly train and aim his twin Lewis machine guns 
onto incoming enemy aircraft. The new gun mount had a direct impact on crew and aircraft 
survivability. Trenchard demanded that all RFC two-seaters be immediately equipped with 
this new and improved gun mount. It would prove so successful that the French and American 
Air Services would adopt it for their own aircraft later in the war.904 
The RFC also concentrated on the destruction of German observation balloons, which 
were used in similar fashion by the British, as a source to gather intelligence and to observe 
and direct artillery fire. In the first week of August alone the RFC conducted thirty aerial 
attacks against the German balloons along the Fourth Army Front, destroying six of them.905 
Balloons were extremely difficult to destroy as they were protected on the ground by 
several anti-aircraft batteries.906 To destroy a balloon, the British pilot would have to penetrate 
an incredible amount of anti-aircraft fire with a single pass being about all the attacking pilot 
would get before he would need to fight his way home, usually into a stiff west wind.  
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As the ground battle continued into late August, the RFC maintained its superiority in 
the air. Corps aircraft supported the infantry with daily contact patrols and the artillery by 
directing their fires, but as the Official Historian identified “there were signs of a further 
increase in the German aircraft at the front.”907 The RFC continued its bombing campaign 
against German logistic sites and airfields with more and more success.908 The army squadrons 
sought out and engaged any German aircraft they could find and protected the corps aircraft 
from the enemy fighters that did try to intercept them.909 
There were three main reasons that the RFC was able to maintain aerial superiority 
over the Somme as the offensive entered its third month: First, the continuation of Trenchard’s 
offensive policy of taking the air war to the enemy. Second, the GAAS’s continued reliance on 
a defensive strategy; and three, the superiority of the British fighters over the German 
Fokkers, most especially the DH 2, the FE 2b, and the Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutter.910 Based on 
their lack of success against the RFC and their inability to prevent British aircraft from 
carrying out their assigned missions, July and August, 1916 were the blackest days in the 
history of the GAAS.911 Noted German aviation historian John Cuneo summarized the impact 
that the RFC had on the GAAS during these two critical months of the air campaign when he 
wrote “It had been swept into the rear areas and was unable to render the slightest assistance to 
the ground forces. The latter lost faith in them, but worse than that, its own faith in itself was 
shaken.”912 Though the British and French air services held a two to one superiority over the 
GAAS in aircraft by the middle of August and the allies controlled the skies over the Western 
Front, the German air service was far from being a defeated force.  
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For German aviation on the Western Front, the end of August was significant in that 
at long last, the in-balance in tactics, leadership and equipment was to be addressed. On 29 
August, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg replaced Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the 
General Staff.913 Hindenburg assigned General Erich von Ludendorff to be his Quartermaster 
General. Ludendorff had been one of the first two General staff officers to fly and had become 
an advocate of the airplane. He was firmly convinced that aircraft could and should be a 
prominent weapon on the modern battlefield.914  
The change in leadership had a huge impact for the Germans on the ground and air 
forces fighting on the Somme. First, von Hindenburg directed that the German Second Army, 
under von Below should be divided into two armies.915 The area south of the Somme was 
assigned to the Second Army and the area north of the Somme was assigned to the newly 
designated German First Army.916  
The German air order of battle was changed to allow the transfer of numerous aircraft 
formations supporting the battle at Verdun to the Somme front. By 1 September, von Below 
controlled 17 Feldflieger Abteilungen, 12 Artillerie Flieger Abteilungen, 4 
Kampfgeschwadern, 2 Kampfstaffeln, and sixty fighters formed up in a number of 
Kamfeinsitzer Kommandos.917  
Two other important organizational changes took place within the GAAS in late 
August. The first was the establishment of a Gruppenfuhrer der Flieger (Grufl) within each 
German corps headquarters.918 The mission of the Grufl was to coordinate the tactical use of 
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the Feldflieger Abteilungen that provided air support to the corps. The second major change 
was the establishment of the first Jagdstaffel (Hunting Squadrons) or Jasta. These units were 
formed for the sole purpose of aerial combat.919 They were to hunt out enemy fighters and 
destroy them and by doing so allow their army co-operation aircraft the freedom to 
accomplish their assigned missions.920 Secondarily, the Jastas were to destroy British and 
French observation and reconnaissance aircraft, especially those conducting artillery direction 
and observation.921 Each Jasta was to have a complement of 14 aircraft. In September these 
new fighter squadrons would receive the best trained and most experienced pilots across the 
air service. Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke, not allowed to participate in the first two months of 
the Somme battle, was directed to form Jagdstaffel 2 (Fighter Unit 2) in late August.922 He 
was given free rein to hand pick the pilots he needed from all over the air service to man this 
new fighter squadron. Jagdstaffel 2 or Jasta 2 as it was referred as was also the first unit to 
receive the new Albatros fighter plane on 1 September.923 With the arrival of this aircraft in 
the hands of well trained fighter pilots led by Boelcke, British air superiority over the Somme 
was about to be challenged for the first time since before the start of the battle.924 
During the first two weeks of September, those German fighter squadrons stationed on 
or being transferred to the Somme front, began receiving three new fighter aircraft: the 
Albatros DI and DII, and the Halberstadt DII.925 All three aircraft were equipped with two 
fixed machine guns synchronized to fire through the propeller whereas all the new British 
tractor type fighters had only one. These new German fighters were also strongly built to 
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sustain the rigors of air combat and were very maneuverable, having the ability to sustain 
long, steep dives, a distinct advantage over their allied counterparts.926 The Fokker Eindecker 
was still in service and in the hands of a well-trained pilot could still put up a good fight 
against the best British fighter being used by the RFC at that time. Flight Sergeant James T. B. 
McCudden had joined Number 29 Squadron in early August, 1916 and had been flying the 
DH 2 for nearly three weeks when he shot down his first German aircraft on 6 September 
north of the Somme over Ypres.927 Two days later however, he was almost shot down himself 
by a Fokker Eindecker. 
At about 14,000 feet over Gheluvelt I saw a monoplane west of us coming 
towards us from the direction of Ypres. . . I fired a red light to draw the 
attention of the rest of the patrol and then turned nose-on to the Fokker. We 
both opened fire together at about 300 yards range. After firing about three 
shots my gun stopped, and whilst I was trying to rectify the stoppage the 
Fokker turned round behind me and had again opened fire. I now did a silly 
thing. Instead of revving around and waiting for the other two D. H.’s to help 
me, I put my engine off and dived, but not straight. The Fokker followed, 
shooting as opportunity offered, and I could hear bullets coming far too close 
to be healthy. At one time I glanced upo and him just a hundred feet above me 
following my S turns. We got down to about 8,000 feet like this when I got 
my gun going, so I put my engine on, and zoomed. The Fokker zoomed also, 
but passed above me and in front of me. Now was my opportunity, which I 
seized with alacrity. I elevated my gun and fired a few shots at him from 
under his fuselage, but my gun again stopped. The Fokker, whose pilot 
apparently had lost sight of me, dived steeply towards Houthem, and I 
followed feeling very brave. Again I got my gun to function, but the Fokker 
had easily outdived me, and I last saw him restarting his engine in a cloud of 
blue smoke just over his aerodrome. . . My lucky star undoubtedly shone 
again on this day, for the Fokker had only managed to put two bullets through 
my machine, do I was indeed thankful, for if the German had only been a little 
skilful I think he would have got me. But still, this was all very good 
experience for me, and if one gets out of such tight corners it increases one’s 
confidence enormously.928 
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Had McCudden encountered a more experienced pilot it is unlikely he would have survived 
the encounter. 
As more and more German ground divisions and air squadrons arrived on the Somme, 
it was becoming even more evident to both British and French commanders that the BEF’s 
offensive on the Somme was reducing the pressure on the French Army at Verdun. However, 
as August became September, it was also evident to Trenchard, if not Haig, that the German 
First and Second Armies were not about to break and run. Trenchard wrote: 
I knew by early September that the Germans would not collapse because our army 
was unable to take advantage of the situation. I also foresaw that the Germans would 
recover in the air. . . and might even wrest supremacy from us unless our reserves 
increased and our weapons improved. Generals like Rawlinson thought I must have 
got jumpy, worrying in case the enemy would do to us what we had just done to them, 
but how true my forebodings turned out to be.929 
The buildup of German air units throughout August as well as a willingness to engage RFC 
fighter aircraft much more frequently convinced Trenchard and his squadron commanders that 
the air war over the Somme had entered a new phase.930  
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In early September, Haig directed Rawlinson to prepare his army for a major attack to 
occur not later than the fifteenth of the month.931 He was not pleased with the progress of the 
Fourth Army or the results achieved in the last eight weeks of the offensive in which the 
Fourth Army had “advanced barely 1,000 yards on a front of five miles” and suffered 82,000 
casualties for these small gains.932 On 14 September, High Wood still had not been captured. 
Guillemont and Ginchy were at last captured after many weeks of hard fighting on 3 and 9 
September, respectively. Both villages and High Wood were to have been captured in the first 
week of the offensive.933 
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From mid-July on, Rawlinson basically directed a long series of successive small 
attacks that were rarely synchronized between the battalions, brigades and divisions directed 
to conduct them. According to Somme historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, the Fourth 
Army conducted “90 operations (attacks by at least one battalion or more), only four of which 
were launched across the whole of its front” between mid-July to mid-September.934 
Rawlinson’s directive to conduct “bite and hold” attacks caused much higher casualties to the 
British than the Germans, with little success to show for it.935  
Though the BEF commander-in-chief was upset with his Fourth Army commander for 
his lack of success during the second phase of the Somme offensive, both he and Rawlinson 
were more than pleased with the performance of the RFC and how well it had supported the 
Fourth Army and the BEF overall during the summer campaign.936 
An assessment of how well the RFC supported the Fourth Army at the end of phase II 
of the offensive reads very similar to the plaudits already stated for the end of phase I. The 
corps squadrons performed almost flawlessly in accomplishing their reconnaissance, 
photography, and artillery observation and direction missions. The bomber squadrons had a 
greater impact than anyone in the British chain of command, ground or air, could have 
anticipated. Three squadrons had prevented at least two German divisions from reaching and 
reinforcing the enemy front lines when their trains were attacked and immobilized in July and 
August respectively.937 The RFC bombed numerous logistic sites, troop encampments, several 
corps and division headquarters, causing much chaos and confusion amongst the enemy’s 
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command, control and support of its forces.938 The bomber squadrons also had much success 
in attacking almost all of the enemy squadrons opposite the British Fourth Army. A captured 
German aviator stated “Enemy airplanes in squadrons of six, eight, and ten or more worked 
over our airdromes with almost absolute impunity.”939 
The army squadrons, consisting of Number 22 Squadron (FE 2b’s) and Number 24 
Squadron (DH 2’s) had achieved just as much success as their comrades in the corps flying 
units. These two squadrons were largely responsible for achieving air superiority above the 
Fourth Army and then maintaining it.940 The German fighter units suffered heavily in the first 
two months of the Battle of the Somme.941 They would have suffered even greater losses if not 
for the fact that the German’s refused to commit more aircraft to aerial combat, unless the 
numerical advantage was in their favor. The German decision to fly only on their side of the 
line also had much to do with preventing even heavier losses than they experienced in July 
and August.942 
As Phase II ended, Haig and Rawlinson may not have been happy with the staunch 
defense put up by the Germans or the lack of progress made by the British and 
Commonwealth divisions, but neither commander had any complaints about the RFC’s 
performance during the second phase. Haig had proven to be a keen supporter of Trenchard 
and was determined to do all in his power to get him the men and the aircraft he required to 
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maintain the air superiority he had achieved above the battlefield.943 Haig and Rawlinson also 
believed that the third and final phase of the offensive would break the German First and 
Second Armies and the aircraft, along with a new weapon of war, the tank, would be critical to 
that success.944 
The third and final phase of the Somme offensive began on 15 September with a 
major attack that became known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette (See Map 3). Haig was 
convinced that the Fourth Army could still cause a major breakthrough of the German 
defensive positions if it attacked with enough force and vigor.945 He also believed that by 
using the elements of shock and surprise predicated by a new weapon, the tank, success could 
be achieved with small loss to his infantry divisions. The tank had been tested with great 
secrecy in England and then again in France, where both Haig and Rawlinson observed it with 
high expectations for the coming battle. Haig had wanted at least 100 tanks for the initial 
attack on 1 July but only half that number had been produced so that by 15 September there 
were only forty-nine Mark I tanks available to Rawlinson’s command.946  
An intense artillery bombardment began on the morning of the 12th of September but 
the weather turned bad in the afternoon and the heavy rain continued for the next thirty 
hours.947 This bad weather greatly hampered the RFC’s ability to observe and direct the 
artillery which in turn greatly reduced the effectiveness of the bombardment.948 The weather 
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broke on the 14th, allowing the RFC to accurately direct the artillery onto its targets for the last 
day of the bombardment. 
 
 
 
On 14 September, Trenchard and his aide Baring visited those squadrons who would 
be supporting the morning attack. Gathering all of the officers of the Ninth Wing around him 
he briefed them on the importance of supporting the infantry attack. As one pilot commented 
[Trenchard] “said more to the point in five minutes than the rumourists had said in five 
weeks.”949 
No German machines could be allowed near enough to the lines for any 
observation. We must shoot all Hun machines at sight and give them no rest. 
Our bombers should make life a burden on the enemy lines of 
communication. Infantry and transport were to be worried, whenever possible, 
by machine-gun fire from above. Machines would be detailed for contact 
work with our infantry. Reconnaissance jobs were to be completed at all 
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costs, if there seemed the slightest chance of bringing back useful 
information.950 
 
To ensure that the forty-nine tanks reached their assembly areas unobserved by the enemy, 
Trenchard directed that all German observation balloons along the Fourth Army front be 
attacked.951 Fourth Army also requested that the RFC provide aircraft to conduct night flying 
missions above the tanks, to cover the noise they made as they moved forward the night before 
the attack.952 
Early on the morning of the fifteenth, Trenchard visited Number 60 Squadron at Vert 
Galand. The RFC commander gathered the squadron pilots around him and informed them 
that during the night the Germans had hoisted three observation balloons high into the air and 
several kilometers directly opposite the British tank assembly areas. It was not clear if the 
Germans had seen anything of the new weapon but Number 60 Squadron, with its Nieuport 
11’s and armed with Le Prieur rockets, was the only unit that could effectively engage and 
destroy the enemy balloons on such short notice. Trenchard asked for volunteers. Three men 
stepped forward. He spoke to each man in turn and to the last he said, “Good luck Gilchrist. 
But remember this: it’s far more important to get that balloon than to fail and come back.”953 
Trenchard watched the three aircraft take off realizing that as well defended as the enemy 
balloons normally were with anti-aircraft batteries and dedicated fighter aircraft support that 
he may in fact have just sent the three young men off to certain death. He waited anxiously for 
word on their progress when Fourth Army headquarters called and reported that the three 
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balloons had just fallen to earth in flames. Long minutes later the three Nieuports returned, all 
badly damaged but their pilots unharmed.954 
Less than an hour later, at 0620 on the fifteenth, nine British divisions, consisting of 
fifty infantry battalions, left their trenches. Each of the attacking divisions used what had 
become known as the “creeping barrage,” friendly artillery fire that the advancing infantry 
kept as close to as possible as they moved forward across No-man’s land.955 This type of 
barrage fire provided protection to the attacking infantry but also did a good job of killing the 
many German machine gun teams that positioned themselves in shell holes between the 
trenches.  
Lieutenant Cecil Lewis from Number 3 Squadron was assigned to conduct a contact 
patrol with the lead tanks on the morning of the 15th. He was airborne before first light and had 
a grandstand view of the first use of tanks in history. 
When we climbed up to the lines, we found the whole front seemingly covered with a 
layer of dirty cotton-wool-the smoking shell-bursts. Across this were dark lanes, 
drawn as it might be by a child’s stubby finger in dirty snow. Here no shells were 
falling. Through these lanes lumbered the Tanks in file, four to each lane. By 0620 
they had reached the front line and the barrage began to roll back as they advanced, 
the infantry with them. We could see them sitting across the trenches and enfilading 
the enemy with their four-pounders. By eight o’clock the complete network of 
trenches known as Switch Line and Flers Line was taken.956 
The British XV Corps, in the center of the attack, made significant progress and as Lewis 
observed, the 41st Division with twelve tanks of the seventeen attached to it still in action, 
captured the fortified town of Flers, destroying two German battalions in the process. The 
gains won by the three divisions within the XV Corps could not be exploited however as the 
Germans moved every reserve unit available to seal off the breech. Every German artillery 
unit that could range Flers was ordered to train its fire onto the village and its approaches. This 
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fire did much to inflict casualties on the advancing British units and though they made it into 
Flers the Germans had arrived in front of them and prevented the British from exploiting the 
success achieved earlier at Flers.957  
Elsewhere on the British left and right (III Corps and XIV Corps respectively), the 
XIV Corps suffered the heaviest casualties as they assaulted from Combles to Ginchy. The 
tanks had been directed to attack three important strong-points: Bouleaux Wood, the 
Quadrilateral between the British front line and the German first position, and the Triangle, a 
series of trenches in the German front line.958 Thirteen of the fifteen tanks failed to link up 
with the infantry and the 56th and 6th Divisions as well as the Guards Division, suffered great 
losses, mainly to machine-gun fire. In the III Corps sector, tanks assisted the 15th (Scottish) 
Division in capturing Martinpuich but fire from High Wood prevented the other two divisions 
in the corps from capturing any ground.959  
The RFC did its best not only to take German lives but to save British ones during the 
attack. A BE 2c crew, Captain C. H. B. Blount and Lieutenant T. S. Pearson from Number 34 
Squadron, on contact patrol supporting III Corps whose headquarters was trying to ascertain 
the status of three tanks which were to support units attacking High Wood. The RFC crew 
made their initial report to corps headquarters via a dropped message, that at 1000 hours they 
had located the three tanks.960 One was ditched and abandoned in a British trench, a second 
was upended against a tree and the third was on fire straddling the German trenches. The RFC 
crew flew back to the landing field next to III Corps headquarters to brief the commander that 
attacking troops on either side of the wood had pushed past High Wood, had linked up and 
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were consolidating their positions.961 Blount and Pearson found the staff planning a frontal 
attack on the German trenches straddling High Wood for that afternoon. The RFC crewman 
noted: “This would have resulted in the complete wiping out of the attacking force, for the 
enemy trench was manned literally shoulder to shoulder with a machine gun every few yards, 
and most of the wire uncut.”962 Based on the eyewitness report from the two aviators, the 
corps commander realized that the Germans in High Wood were surrounded and that they 
would be forced to surrender. He canceled the attack and as predicted at 1300, the German 
units occupying High Wood did in fact surrender.963 
Despite the setbacks on the left and right of the Fourth Army, both Haig and 
Rawlinson viewed the day’s advances as a success. “Of the three German trench lines under 
attack on this day, the first had been captured on a front of 9,000 yards, and 4,000 yards of the 
second line around Flers” had also been taken.964 Two key strong-points that had held up the 
British advance since mid-July had been captured: High Wood and the Switch Line. The 
fortified villages of Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers had all been captured and best of all, 
the Fourth Army had at last seized the Bazentin Ridge.965 As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson 
have assessed, the British were now in positions that enabled them to have good observation 
over the entire German forward and rear areas.966 On the negative side the German third line 
was still intact and German morale had not collapsed as Haig believed it would.967 Worse still 
was the fact that a breakthrough had still not occurred on the Somme and ten British divisions 
had suffered almost 30,000 casualties.968  
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The fifteenth of September was a ‘maximum effort’ day for the RFC.969 Its squadrons 
flew more hours and engaged in more air combats than on any other single day since the war 
began.970 The corps squadrons were highly successful in locating and engaging German 
artillery batteries. RFC aircrew used the Zone Call for Fire repeatedly throughout the day 
targeting 159 enemy artillery batteries. They were able to direct and observe artillery fire on 
70 of them, destroying 29, thirteen by direct hits.971 The corps squadrons also flew contact 
patrols continuously until well after the infantry had consolidated their gains. Rawlinson, his 
corps and division commanders had been kept fully informed on the progress or lack thereof 
of their units throughout the day from messages dropped by aircraft or in person from 
briefings provided by RFC aircrew.972 
The bomber squadrons dropped a total of eight and a half tons of bombs, a Herculean 
feat for the period.973 Targets attacked included General von Below’s Second Army 
headquarters at Bourlon by Number 27 Squadron, who also managed to shoot down four 
enemy aircraft during the raid, while losing one of their own.974 The same squadron also 
bombed the railheads at Achiet-le-Grand and Velu, striking at least three trains in the process 
and later in the day another three aircraft from Number 27 Squadron attacked a train carrying 
a German division enroute to the front lines. The three aircraft bombed simultaneously. The 
first bomb struck the engine bringing the train to a halt. The second aircraft bombed the rear of 
the train with even deadlier results. The 112-pound bombs from the third aircraft hit an 
ammunition car in the middle of the train which in turn set off a chain reaction that blew up 
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several train cars attached in front and behind it.975 Another five bombers from this squadron 
hit trains at Ribecourt and Epehy and a logistics site at Bantouzelle with great effect. German 
corps and division headquarters in Bapaume were also bombed by at least three RFC 
squadrons.976 
Many of the air combats that took place on 15 September took place above the 
German-occupied town of Bapaume.977 FE 2b’s from Number 11 Squadron shot down four 
German fighters and forced another two down without loss.978 Number 60 Squadron destroyed 
three enemy aircraft also without loss.979 All total, fourteen German aircraft were claimed by 
RFC aircrew as having been shot down over the German lines opposite the Fourth Army, 
another six being damaged and forced to land.980 RFC casualties were six aircraft shot down 
with seven aircrew killed in action and eight wounded, of whom three later died of their 
wounds.981 The impact of these air combats gave testimony to the success of the RFC’s fighter 
squadrons in support of Rawlinson’s army that day. By mid-afternoon, Number 70 Squadron 
conducted a reconnaissance of the Fourth Army front and reported seeing not one German 
aircraft during its three-hour patrol.982 This was welcome news to Number 70 Squadron for 
earlier that day four of its twelve Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutters had been shot down by Oswald 
Boelcke’s Jasta 2.983  
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Forty-eight hours later however, the GAAS became even more aggressive and the RFC 
suffered some of its heaviest losses since the ‘Fokker Scrounge.’ At 0930, 17 September, eight 
BE 2c’s from Number 12 Squadron, each carrying one 112-pound bomb and four 20-pound 
bombs, took off from their airfield at Avesnes-Le-Comte.984 By 1030 they had linked up with 
their escort, six FE 2b’s from Number 11 Squadron, and crossed the lines. Their target: the 
Marcoing railhead, a key logistics center for the German Second Army.985 Two of the BE 2c’s 
were forced to turn back due to engine problems but the remaining six flew on. The British 
bombers dropped thirty bombs on the rail center, creating a large fire and causing numerous 
secondary explosions.986 Before the RFC crews could conduct an assessment of the raid, six 
German Albatros DII fighters from Jasta 2, led by Boelcke, attacked the bombers from above. 
Another seven German fighters arrived within moments and joined the fight.987  
In numbers the two sides were near equal, but in fact the Germans had a distinct 
advantage. Boelcke and his pilots were flying the new Albatros DII fighter plane. It had a 
much improved Mercedes six-cylinder in-line engine and was armed with two forward firing 
machine guns.988 Six of the British aircraft were BE 2c’s aircraft that had been outdated more 
than a year previously and should not have been in service in front line squadrons. Short of 
new aircraft, Trenchard was forced to use them for reconnaissance, artillery observation and 
bombing. What was worse, because they had been conducting a bombing mission, none of 
them carried their observer/gunners. Thus the only real defense for these aircraft was evasive 
flying by the pilot.  
The six FE 2b’s did what they could to protect the bombers but Boelcke and his pilots, 
in their faster, more maneuverable fighters, focused on the RFC fighters and within minutes 
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shot four of them down.989 The Germans then attacked the BE 2c’s, shooting two down before 
four RFC aircraft from Number 60 Squadron arrived to lend support. It is doubtful if any of 
the BE 2c’s or FE 2b’s would have made it back to their airfield had Number 60 Squadron not 
arrived to drive off the German aircraft.990 
Boelcke was pleased with the performance of his flight. Of the six, only he was an 
experienced fighter pilot. Each of his five novice fighter pilots had shot down a British aircraft 
with Boelcke himself earning his 27th aerial victory:  
I engaged the leader’s machine, which I recognized by its streamers and forced it 
down. My opponent landed at Equancourt and promptly set fire to his machine. The 
inmates were taken prisoner; one of them was slightly wounded. The pilot had to land 
because I had shot his engine to pieces.991  
One of the six pilots in Boelcke’s flight, Leutnant Manfred von Richthofen, was ecstatic over 
his first aerial victory, one of the escorting FE 2b’s. He described the encounter in his diary: 
My Englishman twisted and turned, crossing my line of fire. It did not occur 
to me that there were other Englishmen in the squadron who could come to 
the aid of their hard-pressed comrade. There was only the growing thought: 
“He must fall, come what may!” Then, finally, there was a brief but 
advantageous moment. The enemy had apparently lost sight of me and flew 
straight ahead. In a fraction of a second I was sitting on his tail. I gave him a 
short burst from my machine gun. I was so close I was afraid I would ram 
him. Then suddenly, his propeller turned no more. Hit! The engine was 
probably shot to pieces, and he would have to land near our lines. Reaching 
his own positions was out of the question. I noticed the machine swaying 
from side to side; something was not quite right with the pilot. Also, the 
observer was not to be seen, his machine gun pointed unattended up in the air. 
I had no doubt hit him also, and he must have been lying on the floor of the 
fuselage. The Englishman landed near the airfield used by a neighboring 
squadron. I was so excited that I could not resist coming down, and I landed 
with such eagerness on this strange field that I almost went over on my nose. I 
landed near the Englishman and jumped out of my airplane. A group of 
soldiers was already streaming toward the fallen enemy. Arriving there, I 
found that my assumption was correct. The engine was shot to pieces, and 
both crewmen were severely wounded. The observer had died instantly, and 
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the pilot died while being transported to the nearest field hospital. Later I 
erected a gravestone to the memory of my honorably fallen enemies.992  
 
 
 
 
September 17th had been a very good day for Boelcke and his Jasta. Six British 
aircraft shot down, without loss to his flight. All total that day the RFC lost ten aircraft shot 
down with sixteen aircrew killed, wounded or missing while the GAAS had just four aircraft 
shot down.993 There was even better news for the GAAS in that the new aircraft had performed 
superbly in combat and more of them were en-route to the other fighter squadrons on the 
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Somme. From 17 to 30 September, Jasta 2 shot down twenty-five British aircraft for the loss 
of only three pilots.994 
It did not take Trenchard and his leaders long to realize that this single day of intense 
air combat signified a turning point in the air campaign over the Somme.995 Based on the 
accounts of the four surviving aircrew from Number 11 Squadron, Trenchard believed that the 
Germans had assigned at least one new fighter squadron to the Somme sector. It was now 
evident that the Germans had in their possession, a faster, more maneuverable fighter, armed 
with two fixed, forward firing machine-guns. The commander of the RFC knew that the 
pendulum was swinging against his aircrews and without more advanced aircraft than those 
his squadrons were presently flying, the RFC’s ability to maintain air superiority above the 
Somme was in jeopardy.996  
By the end of September, the balance for the two air services had shifted heavily in 
favor of the Germans. For that month alone the RFC and the Aviation Militaire had had 127 
aircraft shot down with the  RFC suffering 134 aircrew casualties in the process.997 The 
Germans had lost just seventeen aircraft.998 Trenchard knew the numbers partly reflected the 
Germans advantage of being on the defensive but he also knew that by introducing several 
new fighters that were better than any of the aircraft the RFC was using, the Germans were 
now ready to challenge the British for air superiority. Trenchard notified Brancker that he 
expected the number of casualties to increase even higher as the air campaign grew in 
intensity. 
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With regard to the number of pilots that we have had and are asking for, I 
admit that the demand has been enormous. I cannot understand, however, why 
the demand calls forth letters of protest. We are fighting a very big battle, and 
fighting in the air is becoming intense. The fighting will increase, I regret to 
say, not decrease, and it is only a question of our keeping it up longer than the 
Hun. If we cannot do this, then we are beaten; if we do it, then we win. I must 
warn you now that in the next ten days, if we get fine weather, I anticipate a 
very heavy casualty list. There are many more German machines than there 
were, fast and much better pilots which have appeared on our front. I hope 
you will take this letter very seriously, but what is to be chiefly remembered 
is, that whatever we suffer the Huns are suffering more, and it is only by 
keeping up our pressure that we can hope to keep the Huns under to the extent 
that we have them under now.999  
 
Brancker replied the next day: “I agree with every word of your letter and only wish that they 
would let us take pilots from Egypt or elsewhere in order to wear out the Huns.” Though 
casualties were heavy, Brancker was not nearly as concerned as Trenchard but did warn. “If 
your casualties go on at the same rate as they have for the last 2 months, I think we can 
guarantee to keep you up to strength, but if they increase I am afraid that a shortage may 
occur.”1000  
A related issue was the debate within the War Office and RFC Headquarters 
concerning the RFC’s policy of publishing the names of its aircrew casualties in the press. An 
argument was made to reverse the policy in the hopes that the near-continuous debate on this 
contentious topic would recede if the names of those airmen who had been killed, wounded or 
listed as missing not appear in the daily papers. It was decided to continue publishing the 
names of RFC casualties. Brancker recorded happily: “I was glad to say we stuck to the policy 
of telling the truth.”1001  
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On 29 September, with Haig’s approval, Trenchard drafted a letter to the War Office. 
In it he requested that the number of fighter squadrons attached to each of the BEF’s five 
armies be immediately doubled from four to eight, which would give the RFC twice as many 
fighter squadrons as corps squadrons.1002 The next day Haig sent his own endorsement of 
Trenchard’s request to General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) at the 
War Office. 
I have the honour to request that the immediate attention of the Army Council may be 
given to the urgent necessity for a very early increase in the numbers and efficiency of 
the fighting aeroplanes at my disposal. Throughout the last three months the Royal 
Flying Corps in France has maintained such a measure of superiority over the enemy 
in the air that it has been enabled to render services of incalculable value. The result is 
that the enemy has made extraordinary efforts to increase the number, and develop the 
speed and power, of his fighting machines. He has unfortunately succeeded in doing 
so and it is necessary to realize clearly, and at once, that we shall undoubtedly lose our 
superiority in the air if I am not provided at an early date with improved means of 
retaining it. . . . The result of the advent of the enemy’s improved machines has been a 
marked increase in the casualties suffered by the Royal Flying Corps, and though I do 
not anticipate losing our present predominance in the air in the next three or four 
months, the situation after that threatens to be very serious unless adequate steps to 
deal with it are taken at once.1003 
With the RFC sustaining an increasing amount of casualties and feeling the effects from a 
shortage of aircraft due to the Royal Aircraft Factory being unable to meet its demands, both 
Trenchard and Henderson believed that immediate solutions had to be found to mitigate both 
the aircraft and aircrew shortage that the RFC was experiencing. One of the quickest ways of 
replacing both lost aircraft and crews was to request reinforcements from the RNAS.1004 Lord 
Curzon, President of the Air Board, was himself an ardent supporter of the RFC to the point 
that his influence became almost detrimental to the army’s air service in his meetings with A. 
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J. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty.1005 Curzon had hand carried Haig’s letter to the 
War Committee, reminding them of the Trenchard’s shortage of fighter aircraft and demanded 
that the navy provide aircraft to the RFC. Though the Admiralty was still trying to convince 
the War Office that a ‘strategic’ bombing offensive against German industry was viable, both 
Curzon and General Henderson did their best to oppose the scheme, arguing that Trenchard 
needed every available aircraft to support Haig’s Somme offensive.1006 
The Army Council responded by requesting assistance from the Admiralty. Realizing 
that the RFC was in fact reaching a critical stage in its air campaign over the Somme and that 
the RNAS did have fighter aircraft available, the Admiralty complied and within ten days of 
the request formed a new squadron from the RNAS Dunkirk command.1007 One flight from 
each of the RNAS three wings was detached from their parent unit to form the new fighter 
squadron of 18 aircraft. The new unit, Number 8 (Naval) Squadron, was equipped with some 
of the best aircraft in the British inventory: six agile Nieuport 17’s, six Sopwith 1 and 1/2 
Strutter’s and six of the latest fighter aircraft, the Sopwith Pup; a fast, highly maneuverable 
and easy to fly single-seat aircraft which would become one of the best fighter aircraft of the 
war.1008 Naval 8, as the unit became known as, was attached to 5th Brigade, RFC and located at 
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Vert Galand airfield on 26 October.1009 Though there were still signs of inter-service rivalry 
between the navy and army pilots, the addition of 18 battle-proven aircraft added much to the 
RFC’s offensive capability. The unit flew its first patrol on 3 November and shot down 
twenty-four German aircraft for the loss of two pilots before the end of the year.1010 Though 
they would have little impact on the air campaign over the Somme, five other similarly 
equipped RNAS squadrons would be attached to the RFC over the next five months and 
would make a significant contribution to the RFC’s subsequent air campaigns in the spring 
and summer of 1917.1011 
Though it had become evident by late September to Trenchard and the RFC that 
British air superiority over the Somme was being challenged more strenuously than ever 
before by the Germans, it was hard to convince German soldiers in the forward and support 
trenches of this. The 211th Reserve Regiment was located east of Pozieres and from a previous 
tour in the trenches on the Somme they 
had become almost fatalistically resigned to enemy air dominance . . . even 
when later on our own planes take to the air to free us from our disagreeable 
tormentors, the British reconnaissance planes do not allow themselves to be 
disturbed, but strong enemy defensive formations pounce on our airmen who 
cannot dare to become seriously embroiled with such superior forces. This we 
had to endure all summer; from early to late enemy planes continuously 
overhead, watching every movement; work on the trenches as well as all 
arrivals and departures. Disgusting! Nerve-shattering!1012  
 
Though many German soldiers fighting on the Somme might have thought that their air 
service was deficient in its duties and responsibilities to provide them direct support, it was 
becoming ever clearer to both Haig and Trenchard that the balance of power had shifted in the 
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air war over the Somme. With the GAAS’s introduction of the Albatros fighter aircraft the 
RFC was in jeopardy of losing its control of the sky.1013  
Using a revolutionary new aircraft design, the German Albatros fighter’s fuselage was 
built of semi-monocoque construction using plywood bent into place around longerons. The 
Albatros was thus both ‘sleekly tapered and streamlined’ like a shark’s body.1014 It was 
quickly evident to the first British pilots that encountered it in late September that it was the 
most powerful fighter on the Western Front. Equipped with either a 150-hp Benz or 160-hp 
Mercedes engine, it had a maximum speed of 109 mph. With such a strong engine the aircraft 
was able to carry two 7.92mm LMG 08/15 Spandau machine-guns which were synchronized 
to fire through the two bladed propeller. Though impressive in just about all critical areas as 
compared to its British counterparts, the Albatros was still outnumbered by the DH 2 and FE 
2b and it could not turn nearly as sharply as either of the primary RFC fighters.1015  
Though the effectiveness of the Albatros D I had already been demonstrated by 
Boelcke’s Jasta on 17 September, it was not just the several new types of fighter aircraft the 
Germans had introduced over the Somme that had caused Trenchard’s concern. What he 
feared even more was the possibility that the GAAS might receive a change in leadership, 
someone who recognized that a defensive strategy was not working and who might use the 
introduction of the newer, more advanced fighter aircraft to alter the tactics the German air 
service was using so that they could challenge British air superiority. In his letter through Haig 
to the War Office Trenchard wrote: “Supposing the enemy, under the influence of some 
drastic reformer or some energetic leader, were now to change his policy and follow the 
example of the English and French, and were to cease using his aeroplanes as a weapon of 
                                                            
1013 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, 197. See also John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the 
Air, 153;Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918, 60. 
1014 Kenneth Munson, Fighters 1914-1919, 116-117. 
1015 Ibid., 98-99. 
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defence and to start a vigorous offensive and attack as many places as far behind our lines as 
he could.”1016 Trenchard’s fears were to become a reality and much sooner than he had 
expected. 
The German High Command realized that the introduction of new aircraft was only 
one part of the solution to correct the imbalance of air power over the Somme. Having realized 
that a critical characteristic of the Somme battle was “the extraordinary increase in the 
importance of the air force to the battle on the ground. . . Control of the air over the battlefield 
had now become imperative for success,”1017 von Hindenburg selected General Ernest von 
Hoeppner, at the time commanding a reserve division, to take command of the GAAS and 
tasked him with “securing unity and method in the construction, concentration and use of all 
aerial means of waging war.”1018 Simply put, von Hoeppner was directed to restructure the 
GAAS so that it would not only challenge the RFC’s air superiority over the Somme, but 
would in fact wrest it away from the British along that sector of the Western Front.1019 The 
‘drastic reformer’ and ‘energetic leader’ that Trenchard had both feared and anticipated had 
been found and though the new German air service commander’s task seemed herculean he 
would achieve results much quicker than either the German High Command or Trenchard 
anticipated.   
Worse still for Trenchard and the RFC was the fact that the GAAS now possessed a 
core of highly trained and experienced squadron commanders like Oswald Boelcke whose 
Jastas were built around well-trained, experienced pilots. Most of these men like von 
Richthofen, Rudolf von Berthold, and Hans Muller to name a few, had many months of 
                                                            
1016 Sir HughTrenchard, ‘Future Policy in the Air’, 22 September, 1916, AIR 1/71/15/9/125, NA. 
1017 Deutschland, Reichskriegministerium, Der Weltkriege 1914 bis 1918, Band XI: Die Kriegfuhrung 
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1018 Ibid. See also Ernest von Hoeppner’s Germany’s War in the Air, 80-81, and John R. Cuneo, Winged 
Mars, Vol. II: The Air Weapon, 1914-1918, 278.  
1019 John R. Cuneo, Winged Mars, Vol. II: The Air Weapon, 1914-1918, 280.  
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operational experience as bomber or reconnaissance pilots before they were accepted to be 
trained as fighter pilots. Additionally by September, 1916, the Jastas were being equipped 
with the best fighter aircraft available at that time and opposing them were British aircrew that 
for the most part flew outdated aircraft and more importantly whose average training and 
experience level was vastly lower than their German counterparts. It is not difficult to grasp 
that because of the introduction of the Albatros, Fokker and Halberstadt fighters combined 
with the high levels of training and experience within the GAAS that by the fourth month of 
Britain’s offensive on the ground, the battle for air superiority over the Somme was beginning 
to go in favor of the Germans.1020 The final two factors: selection and training of aircrew must 
now be examined to understand their impact on the RFC’s efforts to gain air superiority over 
the Somme and more importantly their role in enabling the RFC to attain what would prove to 
be a Pyrrhic victory at the conclusion of the air campaign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1020Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918, 56 and 60. See also John R. Cuneo, 
Winged Mars, Vol. II: The Air Weapon, 1914-1918, 265-267.  
 
249 
 
 
Chapter Six 
SELECTION AND TRAINING OF RFC AIRCREW 
 
 
 
 
 
“The NCO Pilot”, Flight Sergeant W. G. Bennett, RFC   (IWM Art 2397) 
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From its humble beginnings as the Air Battalion in 1911, to its evolution into the RFC the 
following year, the thrill of piloting an aircraft attracted men from all walks of life within 
Britain and her Empire. Most of the prospective applicants had been fascinated by the lure of 
flight as youth and in the decade since the Wright Brothers first flight had followed the 
exploits of Bleriot, Grahame-White, Cody, and other daring aviation pioneers. They consumed 
the numerous articles published by the renowned aviation journals at the time, The Aeroplane 
and Flight, and what they found provided even greater impetus to pursue what, was 
considered both a mysterious and dangerous pastime. ‘Something deep within myself 
demanded adventure, an exploration into new and more exciting fields” one prospective 
candidate from South Africa stated.1021  
 The purpose of the Air Battalion “was to create a body of expert airmen, organized in 
such a way as to facilitate the formation of units ready to take the field with troops and 
capable of expansion by reserve formations” in the event of war.1022 The first applicants were 
selected from volunteers from any branch within the British Army and the Royal Navy. Most 
but not all of these men came from Britain’s upper and middle class for the sole reason that 
they could afford to pay for their initial flight training at a civilian flying school. Graduating 
from a flying course and receiving a Royal Aero Club certificate would almost guarantee a 
prospective military pilot’s acceptance into the Air Battalion.1023It was not until war was 
declared that the civilian flying schools were closed or taken over by the War Office and the 
pre-war policy of making pilots pay for their initial flight training was abandoned. This 
decision paved the way for some few civilians and soldiers from the lower classes to apply to 
become pilots. 
                                                            
1021 K. Van der Spuy, Chasing the Wind. (Capetown: Books of Africa, 1966), 25. 
1022 Air Historical Branch, Air Publication 125: A Short History of the Royal Air Force (London: 
HMSO, 1935), 9. 
1023 The majority of civilian flying schools charged a set rate of 75 pounds which the army and navy 
refunded upon earning the Royal Aero Club certificate and acceptance into the RFC.  
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From April, 1912 through April, 1916 the initial requirements for consideration to be trained 
as a pilot were: 
1. Interview of prospective candidate by an RFC officer. 
2. Possession of a Royal Aero Club certificate (RAeC).  
3. Previous experience in aeronautics. 
4. Good map-reader and field sketcher. 
5. Good record as a soldier or sailor (at least two years service). 
6. Aptitude for mechanics. 
7. Pass medical examination which included a vision test. 
8. Minimum age of 17; maximum age of 40 years of age.1024 
During the first year of the war, there were only three modifications to the selection process. 
The first occurred in 1915 when the decision was made to no longer require a RAeC as a pre-
requisite prior to entry. The RAeC still had to be earned before a pilot was fully certified, 
however.1025 The second major change allowed civilians with or without aviation experience 
to apply directly to the RFC as well as enlisted men to join from the ranks.1026 The third 
modification involved the minimum age limit. This was raised from seventeen years of age to 
eighteen.1027 
Much has been made by historians about the questions that were asked potential 
candidates during their initial interview. The first question should not have caught any of the 
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1026 Ibid, 35-36 and 75. 
1027 Cecil Lewis, Sagittarius Rising, 9. 
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aspiring candidates by surprise: ‘Why do you want to join the Flying Corps?’ But it was the 
follow-up question that has received the most focus having to do with whether or not the 
applicant had any experience with horses. Lieutenant William Fry, an infantry officer from the 
Rifle Brigade who had spent the first year of the war in Flanders as an enlisted soldier, was not 
eager to return to the trenches and thought the RFC might provide better opportunities.  
I was shown in to Colonel Warner, Personnel Staff Officer to the RFC, who 
asked me why I had volunteered. I gave him some sort of reason and then he 
asked if I could ride a horse and sail a boat. I said I could, although I had only 
been on a horse a few times and never been in a boat with sails.1028  
 
‘Can you ride a horse?’ does not seem to be a question that could measure whether or not the 
candidate had any aptitude for flying at first glance. But looking at it from the service’s 
prospective and the role of military aircraft in 1914, it does seem to be a logical one.1029 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1028 William Fry, Air of Battle. (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited., 1974), 35-36. 
1029 Douglas H. Robinson, M. D., The Dangerous Sky: A History of Aviation Medicine, (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 1973), 83. 
William M. Fry, photographed in 1917 as a captain  
in the RFC. (RAFM)  
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It was believed that a positive experience with horses provided “a good ‘seat’, a 
natural equilibrium, and a sensitive pair of hands, [which] would have been among the 
qualities the RFC was looking for. Even more important perhaps, would be “the self-
confidence necessary to control an animate object, and the ready acceptance of physical 
challenge.”1030 It must be noted that many young men during this period of the twentieth 
century had no experience with driving an automobile or even a motorcycle. Many, regardless 
of class, would however, have had contact with horses as a means of transportation and thus 
the assumption could logically be made that if one did not have experience with horses or had 
had a bad experience with them than they might have trouble handling the controls of an 
aircraft. Many young adult British males within the upper and middle class spent countless 
hours around horses on a daily and weekly basis. It is not too strong to suggest that for many 
of these men horses were a critical element of their social as well as cultural lives in the early 
twentieth century.  Not only did they ride them for pleasure but they also raced them, played 
polo and steeplechase on them, and conducted hunts from them. Those that entered the army 
with great experience with horses often gravitated towards the cavalry regiments. Thus it was 
believed that anyone who had the good ‘hands’ of a horseman would more than likely be able 
to make the transition towards piloting an airplane with little difficulty.1031 
Second, the primary role of aircraft in 1914 was to conduct short and long range 
reconnaissance for the army, a role traditionally conducted by the cavalry. The argument was 
still being debated as to whether or not aircraft would eventually replace the cavalry. Most of 
the experts at the time did not believe so but the assumption could have been made that 
‘seeing the writing on the wall’ cavalry officers would transfer to the RFC and capitalize on 
the technology and make their service still valuable.  
                                                            
1030 Ralph Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in France: From Mons to the Somme, 21. See also Denis 
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 An American cowboy from Sterling, Colorado, Frederick Libby had enlisted in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in 1915 and after serving in a motor transport unit in 
France for several months decided to apply to the RFC on a whim. Receiving permission from 
his chain of command he was sent to RFC headquarters where he was interviewed by a 
Colonel Bennett. 
Libby, we are glad to see you. This won’t take long, it is only routine. Do you 
know anything about aeroplanes? Absolutely nothing, I answered. What 
makes you think you can fly? I don’t know, I have never been near a plane. 
Can you ride a horse? Now, what a horse had to do with flying I didn’t know, 
as horses don’t fly, but here I was on safe ground, so I assured the colonel I 
was an expert with horses. This pleased him more than I expected, as he was 
the owner of several polo ponies, and we had a nice discussion about horses in 
general.1032   
 
Both Fry and Libby were accepted into the RFC. After serving in an infantry unit on the 
Western Front from 1914-1916 and gaining permission from his commanding officer to apply 
for transfer to the RFC, Norman Macmillan met with a senior RFC officer for his obligatory 
interview. 
“Why do you want to transfer to the Royal Flying Corps?” 
“Because I want to fly.” 
“Can you ride?”  
“I have ridden.” 
“Have you sailed a boat?” 
“Yes.” 
“Do you know anything about internal-combustion engines?” 
“I know the Otto cycle and two-stroke principles.” 
“Have you driven motor cars or motor cycles?” 
“Yes.” 
“Do you know anything about flying?” 
“I have read Flight, Aeronautics, The Aero and The Aeroplane since Bleriot 
flew the Channel. And I know something of Lanchester’s books.” 
The interviewing officer smiled. He knew the most aspirant pilots knew very 
little about flying. What they did know was only sufficient to whet their 
appetites. . . . “You’ll do,” he said.1033 
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Macmillan was probably one of the most qualified candidates applying from outside the ranks 
of the RFC. Not many men had the breadth and depth of experience that he had and he was 
eagerly accepted for flying training.1034 
 A direct lead-in from the second question on the candidate’s familiarity and 
experience with horses led to the third question which usually focused on sports and athletic 
achievements. In the spring of 1915, Cecil Lewis left his school, Oundle, a year early at the 
age of seventeen to volunteer to be a pilot in the RFC. Lord Hugh Cecil, an RFC captain 
conducted his interview. 
“So you were at Oundle?’  
“Yes, sir.” 
“Were you in the Sixth?” 
“Yes, sir-Upper Sixth. Er─a year under the average, sir.” 
“I see. How old are you?” 
“Almost eighteen, sir (Liar! You were seventeen last month.) 
“Play any games?” 
“Yes, sir. I got my School Colours at Fives, and I captained the House on the 
river. I should have got my House Colours for Rugger this year if I’d stayed; 
but─.” 
“Five, you say? You should have a good eye, then.” 
“Yes, I suppose so, sir.” (Does Fives need a good eye? Well, he seems to 
think so. I’m getting on all right.) 
“You’re very tall.” 
“Six foot three, sir.” 
“I don’t think you could get into a machine.” 
“Why, sir? (Oh, Lord! He’s going to turn me down. He mustn’t turn me 
down!)   
“Well, they’re not built for young giants like you, you know.” 
“Couldn’t I try, sir?” 
A slow smile, a pause, then: “Yes, I suppose so. I’ll write a note to the O.C. at 
Hounslow. And if it’s all right, come and see me again.” 
“Oh, thank you so much, sir. I’m awfully keen, sir to─.” 
“I’m glad.” He wrote rapidly. “Here take this with you and show it to the O.C. 
Hounslow.” 
“Thank you, sir. Good morning, sir.”1035 
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Even though Lewis did not meet the age requirement, he was accepted into the RFC, based 
largely on his athletic achievements at school and his youthful eagerness. He would be one of 
many applicants who would be accepted into the flying service for these same reasons. Having 
been a member of a team and even better, having been a leader on a sports team, were 
considered more important by the RFC interviewer than whether or not the applicant had any 
‘Previous experience in aeronautics’ or ‘Aptitude for mechanics.’ 
 Gwilym H. Lewis (no relation to Cecil Lewis) was just seventeen years old when the 
war began. Though born in Birmingham, England in 1897, Lewis came from a strong Welsh 
background. Coming from a family within the upper middle class, Lewis left Marlborough 
College and enrolled in the London University Officer Training Corps before being 
commissioned in the Northamptonshire Regiment in September, 1915.1036 Within weeks he 
grew bored of the constant drilling and marching and requested a transfer to the RFC. His 
regimental commander was furious but allowed his transfer to go forward. During his 
interview he was informed that though he was very qualified (some college but more 
importantly he had had earned his ‘House Colours’ in rugby in his first year of school, which 
at that time was extremely rare and hard to do); there were no pilot vacancies. His 
interviewing officer, Major Warner advised him to earn his RAeC and that would guarantee 
him a seat in the next draft of pilot candidates.1037 
 With his father paying the fee for his flying lessons at Hendon and flying a total of 
four hours with no dual-instruction, Lewis earned his certificate and was then assigned to 
Farnborough in January, 1916 for basic flying instruction.1038 A month later he was assigned 
to Upavon and the CFS where he trained on the BE 2a, BE 2c and the FB 5 ‘Gunbus’. Earning 
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his ‘wings’ on 23 April, 1916, Lewis was then assigned to the RFC’s third DH 2 equipped 
squadron, Number 32.1039 The unit flew to France on 29 May and arrived just in time to play 
an important role in attaining air superiority over the Somme just weeks before the ground 
offensive was to begin.1040 
 
 
 
With the initial emphasis placed on earning the RAeC certificate in the years before 
the war, the Royal Aero Club had established a set of standards that all licensed flying schools 
had to provide their trainees in order for them to be awarded the flying certificate. Not only 
did the school have to provide flying instruction and training but theoretical and technical 
ground instruction as well.1041 The fact that the Royal Aero Club was the only aviation 
organization in Britain sanctioned to license a British pilot, both military as well as civilian, 
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ensured that the standards were established and adhered to in each of the schools conducting 
flying training.1042 
 To earn his RAeC the student pilot had to conduct three separate flights around a five 
kilometer closed circuit course with each flight terminating with the engine of the aircraft 
being switched off at or before landing. The aircraft also had to come to a stop within 150 
meters of a point previously identified by the student pilot. An official from the Royal Aero 
Club had to observe all three flights and approve they had been completed to standard.1043 
Prior to these three flights flying training consisted of several hours riding directly behind the 
instructor so that when ordered, the pupil could lightly place his hands over the instructors and 
get a ‘feel’ for the aircraft controls. This was followed by conducting five ‘figure eights’ just 
wide enough to ensure the candidate had to bank the aircraft. When the instructor believed that 
his student had the ‘feel’ of the aircraft the two exchanged seats.1044 “The instructor sat in a 
slightly raised passenger seat immediately behind [the student] from which position he could 
barely reach forward to the stick with his right arm in order to help the student with the 
elevators and the ailerons; butt he had no control at all over the rudder or over the operation of 
the temperamental engine, except for what effect he could get by shouting into the student’s 
ear.”1045 
                                                            
1042 The Royal Aero Club was granted authority to license all pilots in the United Kingdom effective 1 
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 The flying course had three phases: ‘dual straights,’ ‘solo straights,’ and finally 
‘circuits.’  The dual straights were conducted with the instructor and focused on taking off, 
flying to the end of the airfield and then landing and then repeating that sequence several 
times. This was then done by the student pilot ‘solo’ and passing this phase the instructor 
directed the student to fly circuits around the airfield. Prior to his first solo Frank Courtney’s 
instructor’s parting instructions were concise: “Shove off and break your blasted neck.”1046  
When the instructor believed his pupil was ready to solo he sent him aloft and hoped 
the student pilot applied what he had learned and did not damage the aircraft or kill himself in 
the process. Pemberton-Billing was able to solo in a day; Joubert de la Ferte soloed in one 
hour and fifty minutes; Brancker required thirteen hours over four weeks and Trenchard went 
solo after sixty-four minutes spread over thirteen days.1047  
Barring any serious mishaps the student pilot completed the three circuit flights each 
of five kilometers and attaining passing marks from the Royal Aero Club observer would earn 
his RAeC certificate. From there the next step was gaining acceptance into a course at the 
Central Flying School.   
The RAeC certificate was first introduced in 1910 but its value began to be debated by 
the RFC leadership once the CFS graduated several courses of pilots in 1912 and 1913. Many 
RFC and RNAS instructors, especially those who had returned from a tour of duty in France 
and Flanders, argued that the training it took to earn the RAeC was of little practical value. 
They would have preferred that their students had had no previous flying experience before 
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attending the CFS.1048 With the almost monthly advances in flying technology and training, 
the requirement to own a civilian flying ‘license’ prior to entering a military flying school 
seemed irrelevant. Since it took nearly an hour to administer the final flying exam and when 
one was in progress all other flying training had to be suspended, the army finally said enough 
was enough. In October, 1915, Lieutenant Colonel W. G. H. Salmond, the commander of 5th 
Training Wing requested that the War Office take action to reduce “the lamentable waste of 
time’ the air tests caused by stopping all other flying training. He recommended that 
considerable time could be saved if the test was condensed from five figure-eight’s to just two. 
Surprisingly, perhaps because they had little choice in the matter, the Royal Aero Club 
approved the recommendation.1049 
After conducting a detailed analysis of the coursework being taught by the CFS and 
concluding that the military’s requirements were more demanding than that presented by the 
Royal Aero Club, the Club agreed to issue the certificate to a pilot who could produce 
evidence that he had graduated from a course given by the CFS.1050 
Two of the other requirements for pilot selection were ‘previous experience in 
aeronautics’ and ‘aptitude of mechanics.’1051 Though these two criteria allowed for much 
leeway in application, they did provide a small group of enlisted men the opportunity to 
become qualified as pilots. Men who had enlisted in the Air Battalion or RFC who had been 
motor vehicle mechanics, built or rode motor-cycles, worked with engines, or had any 
experience working with aircraft prior to entry into the military, were sought after and 
                                                            
1048 Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman Macmillan, 38. By not requiring the RAeC certificate instructors 
would be able to teach and enforce the critical skills of flying and would not have to deal with bad 
habits or poor techniques that the student pilot may have gotten from the civilian flying course that he 
attended to earn the required RAeC certificate. 
1049 HQ II Brigade to War Office, Letter dated 30 October, 1915, AIR 1/138/15/40/283, NA. 
1050 C.G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS, and RAF, 
40-41. 
1051 Air Historical Branch, Air Publication 125: A Short History of the Royal Air Force (London: 
HMSO, 1935), 9 
261 
nominated for training as pilots. It was not uncommon in the first years of the war for an 
officer student pilot to have a non-commissioned officer (NCO) pilot as his instructor.  During 
ground training at the RAF at Farnborough in the spring of 1916, Second Lieutenant William 
Fry recalled a class on the air-cooled RAF engine. The instructor was a “young sergeant pilot 
wearing wings and the ribbon of the Military Medal.  He was named McCudden .  .  . He 
became famous as one of the most brilliant and successful of RFC Scout pilots, shooting down 
over fifty German aircraft . . . and winning the Victoria Cross and every other decoration it 
was possible at that time to win.”1052 Second Lieutenant Cecil Lewis’s flight instructor was a 
Sergeant Yates who authorized him to go solo after one and a half hours dual instruction. 
Lewis considered Yates an excellent instructor.1053 Not only did he survive his solo he went on 
to advanced training on the Avro 504, the BE 2c and the FE 2b before being sent to France in 
March, 1916. Assigned to Number 3 Squadron he flew the Morane Parasol monoplane 
throughout the air campaign over the Somme.1054 
Though the selection process at the start of the war could be considered haphazard to 
some degree compared to the standards of later twentieth century wars, the British eventually 
established a Medical Research Committee, led by Major Martin Flack, Royal Army Medical 
Corps (RAMC).1055 With headquarters in London, Flack’s primary duty was to advise the 
senior leaders of the RFC and RNAS on ‘aeromedical matters.’ He established six 
examination stations in England whose purpose was to conduct medical evaluations on all 
prospective applicants for both air services.1056 With heavy emphasis on cardiovascular 
performance in response to vigorous exercise, Flack also introduced the ‘Flack bag,’ a device 
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that supposedly could evaluate the ceiling to which a candidate could ascend to without 
oxygen.  
Breathing in and out of a five litre bag, the subject gradually reduced the 
partial pressure of oxygen in the container while the exhaled carbon dioxide 
was absorbed by a canister of sodium hydroxide. Thus, within twenty or thirty 
minutes, the man would be breathing air with an oxygen partial pressure 
equivalent to that at high altitude. The length of time that the man was able to 
keep this up was noted; then a sample of the air in the bag was taken and 
immediately examined, and the percentage of oxygen in the bag was 
determined by careful analysis; and in this way it was very simple to 
determine to what altitude this man would be able to attain.1057   
 
The results of the initial Flack ‘rebreather’ tests found that “sixty-one percent of the men 
found fit for flying were able to tolerate an oxygen percentage equivalent to that found at 
20,000 feet or above; twenty-five per cent were not able to tolerate more than the equivalent of 
15,000 feet; and fourteen percent could not surpass more than 8,000 foot equivalent.”1058 
During the air campaign over the Somme, the operational ceiling for RFC fighters was 9,000 
feet for the FE 2b; 14,500 feet for the DH 2; and 15,000 feet for the Nieuport 11C.1059 When it 
was realized that the Flack tests simulated an ascent at a greater rate than that of which the 
aircraft then being used by the RFC were capable of achieving, it bore no relationship to a 
pilot’s ability to tolerate anoxia at higher altitudes during the conduct of air operations. It was 
only towards the last two years of the war that British medical officers realized that all aircrew 
required supplementary oxygen above 12,000 feet and without supplementary oxygen above 
15,000 feet aircrew performance would become noticeable impaired and subsequently place 
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the crew at great risk.1060 Between 1914 and the air campaign on the Somme the false results 
gained from the Flack test reinforced the medical examiner’s belief that healthy, young pilots 
and aircrew could fly at the ceiling of any RFC aircraft then in use without oxygen.1061   
 By the fall of 1916, the RFC had revised its medical examination for aspiring pilots 
along the lines of the French Air Service medical exams. A team of sixteen doctors led by Dr. 
Flack and Major Ernest G. R. Lithgow examined nearly two hundred applicants per day.1062 
Starting with the heart it was then believed that “a pulse rate of 60 was thought good and one 
over 100 was bad.”1063 Next the lungs were tested followed by the spinning test in which the 
applicant was spun ten times in a chair over a twenty second period. After the chair was 
stopped the candidate’s eyes were checked to see if the eyes became stabilized within a thirty 
second period. A fifteen minute interview was then conducted to identify the “slow-witted, the 
timid, the unstable, and the unreliable.”1064 In his Examination of Aviation Candidates, Dr. 
Flack wrote that “There is a type of facial expression one gets well acquainted with carrying 
out this sort of interview. It consists of a furtive look as if always expecting something 
unpleasant to happen, in marked contrast with the straight, decided expression of the crack 
fighter pilot.”1065 
The vision test was an integral part of the medical examination. Excellent vision was 
deemed a pre-requisite for flight training and since the primary mission of the RFC was 
acknowledged to be reconnaissance it was only logical that a pilot have superior vision to 
conduct detailed reconnaissance operations. The vision test tripped up a number of prospective 
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candidates.  Brancker failed his first eye test. “He is so short-sighted that he will be a danger 
to himself and everyone else if he is allowed to fly.”1066 Had he not received a waiver from the 
War Office due to his position on the General Staff, this gifted leader would never have been 
accepted for flight training. Several days after the declaration of war, Frank T. Courtney, 
having already earned his RAeC certificate was ordered by the War Office to report to RFC 
headquarters. He was to be interviewed by none other than the new commanding officer at 
Farnborough, Major Hugh Trenchard.  
“Do you have to wear those glasses? [Trenchard] roared.  
“Yes, sir, “I said, “I’m a little shortsighted, but . . .” I was about to explain 
that my glasses had never bothered me in flying, but I didn’t get that far. 
“Don’t try and tell me,” he boomed, “that you can fly with those things on.  
Get out.”1067 
 
The interview had lasted a total of twenty seconds. Courtney then met with the medical officer 
and hoped to bluff his way through the exam but the doctor was convinced that anyone with 
less than 20/20 vision could not be a pilot.1068 Returning to his previous position at the 
Grahame-White aircraft factory, several months passed before Courtney returned to 
Farnborough to work on a broken Morane aircraft fitting. A sergeant had observed his work 
and took him aside and asked if he had thought about joining the RFC. He told the NCO about 
his glasses and his interview with Trenchard. The NCO informed him that Trenchard had gone 
to France to take command of First Wing and if he enlisted as a mechanic he would be an 
NCO in short order.1069 Courtney then interviewed with the Squadron Sergeant Major and 
Trenchard’s replacement, Major Ashmore. Three days later he was a 2d Class Air Mechanic in 
the RFC.1070 A few short weeks later and primarily due to the shortage of pilots, Courtney was 
interviewed again, tested on his capabilities with the Maurice Farman ‘Longhorn’ and made 
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an instructor pilot. After several more weeks of successfully training new pilots he was 
notified he could “wear wings and given flight pay, the only 2d class Air Mechanic in the 
Royal Flying Corps” [who was a qualified pilot].1071 
 What type of man makes an excellent pilot? What qualities and skills was the RFC 
looking for in a pilot? Thirdly, did age play a role in determining the best pilots? Brancker 
provides a succinct answer to each of these questions.  
The popular impression is that a special temperament is required for success 
in the air; it is rather assumed that an artistic temperament, a vivid 
imagination, carelessness and reckless daring are great assets in the 
psychology of a would-be pilot. . . I always found that the most useful pilot in 
war was the man who would have made the best officer in the old regular 
Army─that good old type which has won us the British 
Empire─unimaginative but absolutely reliable─courageous and honourable to 
a fault, rather stolid, devoted to the hardy sports of the hunting field and the 
jungle and caring nothing for the artistic side of life─this type could usually 
be trained into a useful pilot at almost any age within reason. But most 
unexpected people turned into good pilots. Age was always a debatable point. 
Young men naturally learnt more quickly and easily than those bordering on 
thirty, but they did not last as long under active service conditions. The 
demands of war forced us to train numbers of boys of eighteen, or even 
seventeen, to fly, and then send them straight off to the front, but I always 
said that the ideal fighting age was more like twenty-five. There is no doubt in 
my mind that for peace conditions the younger a man starts to fly the better. . . 
During the War, it paid us well to teach a certain proportion of older men, 
because they were invaluable as Squadron and Wing Commanders.1072 
 
On the subject of age, Henderson was fifty-one and Brancker was thirty-six when they earned 
their RAeC certificates but both qualified as pilots before the war and neither one of them 
would fly in combat. An excellent example of a successful fighter pilot who was considered 
‘too old to be a Scout pilot’ was Edward Mannock who transferred from the Royal Engineers 
in 1916 and was accepted for flight training at the age of twenty-eight. Instructed by the newly 
promoted ‘Lieutenant’ James McCudden, Mannock completed his courses with honors and 
arrived in France on 1 April, 1917. Flying the Nieuport 17 and later the SE 5 (Scouting 
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Experimental) and SE 5a, he rose to become one of the most successful squadron commanders 
the RFC ever produced.  He was thirty years old when he was shot down and killed by ground 
fire in July, 1918.1073 
 As the war progressed, however, the trend of selecting younger men to be pilots 
became the norm. Within a few months after the Battle of the Somme ended, there were very 
few British pilots over the age of thirty flying combat operations. Of 100 RFC aircrew 
identified as killed in action, died of wounds or killed in a flying accident in the fall of 1917, 
60% were twenty-two years old or younger.1074When the air war really began to intensify in 
the late summer and fall of 1915, it was quite evident to most RFC commanders that this new 
type of three-dimensional warfare would require the physical abilities and quick-witted brain-
power that only young men possessed. A man between 18 and 25 with quick reflexes, an alert 
mind, and the ability to manhandle a temperamental aircraft at high altitudes, against an 
enemy whose aircraft at that time was both better armed and faster was what was required. But 
not all believed that that was the case. C. G. Grey, the editor of The Aeroplane, disagreed. His 
argument tied the question of age directly to the class that the pilot came from.  
There is an idiotic theory that a man is too old at 30 if he wants to fly and that 
a howling little bounder of 20 is going to make a better officer aviator than a 
thoroughly sound sportsman of 32. The youngster may certainly fly more 
recklessly till his nerve breaks just as a mongrel dog will go yapping into a 
fight till he gets a damned good hiding but he will never make an officer and 
will never fly after a bad smash in the way the better class of man will do. 
Blood tells in a man as much as it does in a horse or a dog. Many a good 
chaser has come out of the shafts where it has found it way by bad luck and 
many a better officer aviator can be found in the ranks than among the brats of 
the well-to-do shopkeepers and business-like merchants such as are now 
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entitled to swagger round in uniform and draw salutes from their social, 
mental, and moral betters.1075 
 
Another issue that would have long-term effects on the evolution of the RFC had to do 
with the rank of pilots. When the RFC was formed in 1912, the War Office established the 
Military Wing’s force structure at seven squadrons with each squadron containing thirteen 
aircraft.1076 With two pilots per machine and a reserve of equal strength that meant the 
Military Wing required 364 trained pilots as well as other administrative officers and 
approximately 180 enlisted men per squadron.1077 The initial plan called for 182 of these pilots 
to be commissioned officers and the remaining 182 to be NCOs.1078 Therefore, Brancker 
developed a policy to enlist and train a large number of NCO pilots. In his first draft he 
recruited six trained pilots to enter the RFC as sergeants.1079 The War Office initially 
supported the idea of a half officer, half NCO system but before it could establish a program 
to achieve this, the Royal Navy literally ‘torpedoed’ the entire argument. 
Almost immediately afterwards I heard that the Admiralty were giving all 
pilots Commissions! Expostulations and remonstrances were in vain; this 
ridiculous policy was adhered to and, perforce, the War Office had to follow 
suit, since if we had not everyone would naturally have gone to the Royal 
Naval Air Service in order to obtain a Commission. This system lasted till the 
end of the war; I was always opposed to it; but nothing could be done until 
real executive control over the two Services was established.1080  
 
Brancker’s plan was however, partially adopted. A small number of NCO’s were 
trained as pilots to allow the officers they flew with to conduct observation and 
reconnaissance, skills that at the time were considered more important than flying an 
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aircraft. 1081 Twenty NCOs and enlisted men were enrolled in flying courses at the 
CFS in 1913. Fourteen passed and earned the rank of 2d Class Pilots.1082 One of the 
flying instructors, Captain E. L. Gerrard, fully supported Brancker’s scheme and was 
eager to prove the NCO pilot program a success. One of his pupils, ‘a burly sergeant 
of the Guards,’ was having great difficulty with flying the dual control Maurice 
Farman aircraft. Gerrard briefed the NCO that if he failed to solo on his next flight he 
would be excused from the course and returned to his unit. “All right, climb in and go 
and break your blooming neck” Gerrard instructed. The NCO passed his solo flight 
and completed the course with passing marks and earned his ‘wings’ in the 
process.1083     
The experiment had mixed results primarily because of the bias towards 
enlisted men and their abilities as pilots that were inherent throughout the senior ranks 
of the British military just prior to and during the First World War. “The opinion has 
often been expressed that men chosen from the non-commissioned ranks of the army 
or the lower ratings of the navy do not make good pilots.”1084 To support this 
argument, military officials at the War Office and the Admiralty noted that as a result 
of slow promotions before the war, NCOs and Petty Officers were usually married 
men and of an age that greatly exceeded the much younger applicants the RFC and 
RNAS were looking for to be pilots. By having wives and families and being more 
mature, they would tend to think first and avoid taking risks. Therefore, the 
conclusion was made that for these reasons enlisted men would not make good 
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pilots.1085 Additionally, the authorities argued that since these NCOs and Petty 
Officers were experienced and well-trained their commanders would be reluctant to 
let them transfer. It was feared the men the army and navy would release for flight 
training were probably undesirables who they were trying to get rid of.1086 Even the 
Official History recorded that the question of the rank of pilots had more to do with 
class than anything else.1087  
The War Office as well as the British Army’s bias against the incorporation of 
large numbers of NCO pilots within its ranks was definitely one reason why the RFC 
was faced with a shortage of pilots during the first phase of the Battle of the Somme. 
Relying primarily on educated men from the upper and middle classes, the RFC faced 
intense competition with every other branch of the army who required men of the 
same caliber to serve as junior officers within their regiments. This was evident in the 
wake of the first few weeks of the ground campaign on the Somme after the army 
suffered massive casualties, most especially at the junior officer level. The RFC was 
to face its first of several manpower crises when its supply of pilots grew dangerously 
short of meeting the requirements dictated to man the squadrons in support of the air 
campaign.1088  
 Though the Admiralty may have crushed Brancker’s plan to train NCOs to be 
pilots, the door was never completely closed on the concept. Enlisted men within the 
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ranks of the RFC, who had served in operational or training squadrons as fitters, 
riggers, armorers, and in other roles, were able to apply to become observers and after 
so many hours of operational experience with a squadron they were often encouraged 
to apply for pilot training. Thus the RFC had more than a few NCO pilots, such as 
James T. B. McCudden, Herbert Bellerby, George Eddington, Archibald Whitehouse, 
and Cuthbert Baldwin. Like McCudden and Whitehouse, a fair amount of NCO pilots 
were commissioned and a select few went on to command flights and squadrons 
before the war ended.  
 Once the war began and well into 1915, the RFC received many of its 
prospective pilots from transfers from other army units. As the RFC expanded 
throughout the first and second year of the war it became obvious that this source of 
recruitment would not enable the RFC to fully man the increasing number of 
squadrons that were then being created. Because of the manpower, aircraft, and engine 
shortfalls the RFC was experiencing as it nearly doubled in size from the Battle of 
Loos to the start of the Somme offensive, Trenchard predicted that “the battle of the 
air will be won or lost at home.”1089 
 Taping into all available manpower sources, the RFC began recruiting 
prospective aircrew from outside the United Kingdom. While efforts had been 
underway to begin flying schools in France and Egypt, there were also flying schools 
being established in Canada, Australia, and South Africa as well.1090 At the start of the 
Somme offensive there were nearly eighty Canadian airmen in the RFC in France and 
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half of them were assigned to the headquarters, army, and corps wings that would 
participate in the air offensive. Approximately 10 percent of RFC aircrew at the front 
were Canadians and this number would remain constant throughout the air battle as 
more Canadian reinforcements arrived to keep pace with the RFC expansion program. 
Nearly all of the Canadian airmen had transferred from the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (CEF).1091  A typical example was Trooper W.G. Barker. Enlisting in the 1st 
Canadian Mounted Rifles in Winnipeg in December, 1914, and after completing a 
machine gun course in England, he deployed to France with his unit in September, 
1915. Giving up their horses, the men became infantrymen. Barker spent several tours 
in the trenches before applying for a transfer to the RFC. Passing his interview and 
with a good recommendation from his commanding officer, he was sent to Number 9 
Squadron in March, 1916 as an observer under training. While on probation, Barker 
completed nine patrols during March and was then officially transferred from the CEF 
to RFC and accepted as an observer. In April, he was commissioned and transferred to 
Number 4 Squadron. In July, he was transferred to Number 15 Squadron where he 
participated in the entire air campaign over the Somme. By the time the campaign 
ended, Barker had won the Military Cross and was recommended for pilot training.1092   
 Though commanders in the field might not be happy about losing good men 
from their units to the RFC neither the BEF nor CEF prevented transfer requests until 
they began experiencing heavy casualties during the Battle of the Somme. In October, 
1916, two weeks after suffering its first major losses at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, 
the Canadian Training Division in England was directed “to place a freeze on all 
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transfers to the flying services until the reinforcement needs of the CEF had been 
met.”1093  
 The infusion of pilots from nations within the British Empire played an 
important part in alleviating the manpower problem the RFC faced during the air 
campaign over the Somme and later as well. A quick survey of the nationalities of the 
pilots within one RFC squadron which supported the Fourth Army in 1916 is worth 
review. Number 24 Squadron had 145 pilots serve within its ranks during the war. 
From that total, twenty were Canadians, five were Australians, four were South 
Africans, two were from New Zealand (and eight were Americans).1094 Nearly all 
RFC squadrons had similar compositions amongst its aircrew. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that without these men from the Dominions, the RFC would 
have had great difficulty overcoming the manpower crisis it faced in 1916.1095 
From its beginnings the RFC was focused on the manpower issue and though 
the air service had not expected the war to begin in August, 1914, it was in the process 
of building a force of nearly 200 pilots and aircraft with another 100 trained pilots and 
an additional 100 aircraft in reserve when the war began. Four squadrons, all of which 
were under strength in officers, men, and equipment were deployed to France within 
weeks of the outbreak of war. As the operational units deployed all that remained in 
England was the CFS whose purpose was to replace the casualties and build new 
squadrons. 
                                                            
1093 War Office to CEF HQ, 18 October, 1916, 8-1-121, PAC, RG 9 III, vol. 35. 
1094 Denis Winter, The First of the Few, 20. 
1095 Ibid. See also G. E. Gibbs, Personal Memoir, AIR 1/2388,  NA. Gibbs was a fighter pilot in Number 
29 Squadron who achieved 14 victories during the war. He believed that by the last year of the war 
nearly 70% of his squadron’s pilots were from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. It 
was his contention that the RFC could not have maintained its operational effectiveness without these 
large numbers of aircrew personnel from Britain’s Dominions. 
273 
 
  
 
 As early as 1912, Henderson and Sykes had planned for an annual ‘wastage’ rate of at 
least 100% in both pilots and aircraft.1096 Little did they expect that by following a 
continuous offensive strategy during the air campaign over the Somme the RFC 
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would experience losses that exceeded 100 percent in several of its squadrons in just a 
matter of weeks. 
     One of Britain’s first military aviation theorists, Colonel John E. Capper, an expert and 
advocate for airships and balloons and later commander of the Balloon School, argued as early 
as 1910 that aircraft pilots should be trained on subjects such as navigation, meteorology, 
photography as well as military skills.1097Many of his recommendations were reflected in the 
courseware for Britain’s first military pilots.  
     The first military aviation course began in April, 1912 and was conducted in temporary 
buildings and hangars while the required buildings for the CFS were being built. The course as 
designed required twenty-five aircraft but in fact only had seven─two French and five British 
models. The first class consisted of officers from the army and navy who either understood the 
potential of aircraft in the next war or were seeking adventure from doing something new and 
dangerous.1098 
     The course consisted of two phases. Phase I focused on reconnaissance from captive 
balloons, free balloons, and airships and lasted for four weeks from 10 April to 10 May. Phase 
II emphasized actual ground and flight training and last nearly three months, from 20 May 
through 15 August.1099 Student pilots actually assembled and disassembled aircraft as well as 
engines so that they understood how the mechanics of flight was tied to the theory. 
     Much of the theoretical work which encompassed the theory of flight, aircraft design, 
engines, navigation, as well as map reading, instruments and photography took place in Phase 
I.1100 During each week the student pilots attended five lectures on theoretical work and before 
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the student pilot could graduate they had to pass nine examinations. Phase II focused primarily 
on the actual hands-on aspects of flying.1101  
            The first course to be held at the CFS permanent site at Farnborough began on 17 
August, 1912 and was completed on 5 December.1102 The thirty-six officers that began to 
course were divided into four flights with army and navy officers distributed evenly 
throughout each flight.1103  Those officers who had entered the school without a RAeC 
certificate were provided elementary flying instruction until they were proficient enough to 
earn their certificate.1104 The practical exams included flying, map reading, compass, engines, 
and signaling. The theoretical exams were on the theory of flight, internal combustion engines, 
aerial reconnaissance, and the formation of troops.1105  Thirty-two of the thirty-six candidates 
graduated from the first CFS course with one officer being expelled for having no aptitude for 
flying, a second officer resigned, while two failed the course itself.1106 
Student pilots initially began their flight training on the Maurice Farman dual control 
aircraft and after demonstrating their proficiency to their instructor they then moved on to fly 
solo in the same aircraft.1107 After completing several short cross-country flights they were 
then given dual control instruction on either an Avro or BE 2 and then flew solo on this 
aircraft. The final test was a long cross-country flight at which nearing the airfield on the 
homeward leg the pilot had to attain a height of 3,000 feet, turn off the engine and glide to a 
landing.1108 This was to test how well a pilot reacted in an emergency situation. 
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    The length of the course was reduced from seventeen weeks to thirteen in 1913 to allow 
for maintenance on the few available aircraft the CFS possessed.1109 Four courses were 
conducted that year and though it was originally intended that the training would include 
flights in free balloons and dirigibles, since none were available, this part of the training was 
eliminated from the curriculum.1110 Even before the war began the CFS did not have the 
number of aircraft or instructors to meet the demand of student-pilots for both the Military 
Wing and the Naval Wing. The school was forced to send a number of pilots who had already 
earned their RAeC certificate to operational squadrons to receive their military flying 
training.1111  
 When the war began, there was an immediate need for more pilots and both 
Henderson and Brancker realized that the CFS would not be able to provide the numbers 
required. To provide for the increase, the War Office assumed control of the civilian airfield 
and its facilities at Brooklands and set up a second military aviation school at Netheravon.1112 
In the fall of 1914 pilots were recalled from France to fill instructor positions and later the 
RFC formed Reserve Aeroplane Squadrons (RAS) at Farnborough and Netheravon. 1113The 
RNAS followed the example established by the army and took control of the civilian schools 
at Hendon and Eastbourne. In January, 1915 the system was reorganized again as more RAS 
were formed. The purpose of these new squadrons was to serve as elementary flying schools 
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which included basic flying training the associated theoretical and technical ground instruction 
as well.1114  
     Once a student-pilot completed his elementary course at a RAS, he was either sent to 
the CFS or to a Service squadron which was in the final stages of preparing to deploy to 
France or Flanders. Once there it was expected that the student-pilot would spend up to eight 
weeks flying just one type of aircraft, rather than a wide variety of machines which had been 
the norm in the past. Because it was serving the role of an advanced flying school, the number 
of pilots in a Service Squadron might be as high as fifty percent above its required strength.1115 
Eventually the surplus would be taken away to form a new squadron and the parent unit would 
then deploy. This system of training would last long after the end of the air campaign over the 
Somme.1116 
      This system of using ‘Service’ squadrons for teaching advanced flying training placed 
a large burden on the units whose primary mission was to prepare for combat operations. If 
there was a conflict between practicing tactical training and conducting advanced pilot 
training for new pilots, the advanced training took precedence.1117 This was a major reason 
why many RFC pilots lacked the tactical flying skills required when they arrived in France. 
The problem would grow even worse as technological advancements in aircraft, engines, and 
even weapons systems placed an enormous burden on partially trained pilots who had to 
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assimilate not only the technological changes that were taking place but also the constantly 
evolving doctrine of aerial combat as well.1118 
       By 1915, most of the instructors responsible for training new pilots had some 
experience flying over the Western Front but few of them could be regarded as experts. Both 
before and during the air campaign over the Somme, the majority of instructor pilots in Britain 
were considered to be in a ‘resting’ status since they were not in operational squadrons 
overseas. Though several instructors at the CFS, such as Captain’s Gerrard and Fulton, had 
several years of flying experience each, neither had any background or training experience 
teaching men with either little or no experience how to fly. “They did things instinctively 
without being able to explain how they were done, and the young pilot really had to teach 
himself all that was to be known beyond simple turns and landings.”1119 The fact that more 
pilots were killed in training accidents than were killed by the enemy is evidence that serving 
as a flying instructor at the CFS was more stressful than serving with an operational squadron 
in France. Nearly 8,000 pilots were killed in the UK learning or teaching others how to fly 
against 6,166 pilots, who were killed in action or died of wounds sustained in combat between 
August, 1914 and November, 1918.1120 It is no wonder that flying instructors often termed 
their student pilots as ‘Huns.’1121   
 With his return from France in December, 1915, Brancker supported the idea of 
centralizing the flying training units in England by combining the two separate training 
brigades (II and V), to form one organization. On 9 March, 1916 this was done and the 
                                                            
 
 
1119 Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman Macmillan, 37-38. 
1120 Denis Winter, First of the Few, 36. 
1121Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Tumult in the Clouds: The British Experience of the War in the Air, 
1914-1918, 84.  
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Training Brigade was established with the highly respected Brigadier General Jack M. 
Salmond selected to command the new formation.1122 At the same time a Home Defence Wing 
was also created. 
 Having examined French flying training programs while commanding 3rd Wing in 
France, Brancker realized that Britain’s principal ally was using much more advanced flying 
instruction than the CFS was. After studying French methods on aerial fighting conducted at 
their school at Cazaux, Brancker directed that a suitable place be found within Britain to 
establish an aerial gunnery school and after much effort Loch Doon in Ayrshire was selected 
but before it became operational, temporary aerial gunnery schools were established at Hythe 
and Turnberry.1123 
 The school at Hythe was established in September, 1915 (the second month of the 
‘Fokker Scrouge’) and by the end of that same year the RFC’s School for Instruction was 
organized at Reading to relieve the congestion when the number of pilot candidates exceeded 
the accommodations available at the CFS and its satellite airfields.1124 
 A week prior to the start of the air campaign on the Somme, the senior leadership of 
the RFC (Trenchard and Brancker, with much input from the Wing and Squadron 
commanders) established revised minimum standards that pilots must achieve before earning 
                                                            
1122 Salmond commanded No. 3 Squadron when the war began through the spring of 1915. His 
reputation became almost legendary after an incident during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, 
1915. An aircraft was being loaded with bombs for an upcoming mission when one of the bombs was 
dropped and exploded, destroying the aircraft and killing eleven men and seriously wounding another 
four. Salmond forbade any one from his squadron to go near the wreckage as it was found that not all of 
the bombs had detonated. During the night, Salmond single-handedly removed the remaining bombs 
and buried them away from the airfield. During the Battle of Loos, Salmond commanded Second Wing. 
Promoted to Brigadier General in late 1915, he took command of II Brigade when the RFC reorganized 
in January, 1916. Salmond’s brother, Geoffrey would also serve a significant role within the RFC 
during the First World War, most especially in the Middle East. See Anne Baker, From Biplane to 
Spitfire: The Life of Air Chief Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, (London: Pen & Sword Books, 2003). 
1123 The RFC experienced countless difficulties in the development of the aerial gunnery school at Loch 
Doon and in 1918 the project was finally abandoned because of excessive costs and poor climate. 
1124 Air Historical Branch. A Short History of the Royal Air Force, 11. 
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their wings and being sent to a squadron overseas. There were six criteria, all of which had to 
receive a passing mark to graduate from the CFS. 
A. Qualification Tests in Flying required as of March 23, 1916: 
1. The pilots must have spent at least fifteen hours in the air solo. 
2. He must have flown a service aeroplane satisfactorily. 
3. He must have carried out a cross-country flight of at least 60 miles successfully. 
During this flight he must land at two outside landing places under the supervision 
of an officer of the Royal Flying Corps.  
 
4. He will climb to 6,000 feet and remain at that height for at least fifteen minutes 
after which he will land with his engine stopped, the aeroplane first touching the 
ground within a circular mark of fifty yards diameter. 
 
5. He will make two landings in the dark assisted by flares. [The CFS and 
Administrative Wing commanders had the authority to dispense with this test if 
the weather conditions caused an unwarranted delay]. 
 
6. He will attain a standard of eight words a minutes signalling on the buzzer [Morse 
code]. 
 
 Further Training: 
Newly qualified flying officers who may remain with squadrons at home are 
to be given every opportunity of gaining air experience. They should be made 
to fly in bad weather on all possible occasions; and they should practice 
landing over a tape of ten feet from the ground; bomb-dropping over the 
camera obscura, fighting in the air, night flying in formation. Wireless work 
and photography should be practiced where feasible.1125 
 
The directive added that each advanced training squadron had to kept up to strength with 
twenty student pilots in each, even if that meant pushing pilots from the preliminary training 
squadrons to the advanced training squadrons before they were fully prepared. Additionally, it 
was no longer a requirement for a student pilot to possess a RAeC to enter the CFS but the 
certificate had to be earned before graduating from the advanced training squadron. Finally, 
                                                            
1125War Office Directive to G.O.C 6th Brigade, Commander, CFS, and O.C. Administration Wing, 23 
March, 1916, AIR 1/387/15/231/28, NA; subsequently formalized at the CFS as Qualification Tests in 
Flying, 1-2. AIR 1/131/15/40/218,  NA. See also WITA, Vol. III, 295-298; and Air Historical Branch, 
The Royal Air Force in the Great War, 154. 
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the commanders were notified that they “should not hesitate to recommend the removal of any 
pupil who shows either lack of keenness or ability, always bearing in mind that a pupil who is 
above average in keenness and audacity will almost always make a very good pilot if given 
time.”1126 
Burke as commandant of the CFS strongly recommended that the standard be 50 
hours instead of the 15 that was proposed. Brancker argued that this was not feasible. “I am 
absolutely with you in principle, but I fear that at the moment we cannot make graduation 
more difficult then laid down in the draft which I sent you. Already the output [of pilots] is not 
equal to the demand, and thanks to too rapid expansion during the past six months we are very 
nearly bankrupt at the moment. The standard has been allowed to drop too low, hence my 
memorandum, but the time has not come yet to raise it to a really satisfactory basis.”1127 
Lieutenant Colonel Hugh C. T. Dowding, commander of the Administrative Wing, argued that 
the requirement to land within a circular mark of fifty yards was “desirable but 90% of RFC 
pilots could not do this now at the first attempt. 50 yards circumference is 8 yards radius.” He 
also recommended that aerial photography, wireless and formation flying be added to the 
curriculum. Dowding’s recommendation’s of adding the additional three tasks to the training 
curriculum were approved and included in the War Office directive.1128 
 Shortly after the RFC leadership formalized the revised graduation requirements for 
pilots, three additional qualification certificates were introduced, all of which were in addition 
to the RAeC. 
Certificate A consisted of a written examination on the theory of flight, RFC 
organization, and artillery co-operation procedures.  
 
                                                            
1126 Qualification Tests in Flying, 3, AIR 1/131/15/40/218,  NA. 
1127 Brigadier General W. S. Brancker to Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Burke, 21 March, 1916, War Office 
87/7094, NA. 
1128 Ibid. 
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Certificate B consisted of tests of practical skills involving aircraft engines, 
rigging, Morse code, machine guns and the like. 
 
Certificate C involved flying tests conducted in accordance with instructions 
issued locally by Wing Commanders.1129  
 
Certificates A and B had to be earned in sequence but the flying test could be done at any 
time. Once a prospective pilot had earned all three certificates, the student was awarded his 
Graduation Certificate of the RFC by the CFS. The War Office was then informed of the 
candidate’s qualification and shortly thereafter the new pilot would be ‘gazetted’ (his 
achievement being published in the London Gazette) as a Flying Officer. Once he was 
gazetted he was entitled to wear his ‘wings.’1130 In June, 1916 Certificates A and B were 
combined into a single Certificate A which had to be earned before starting flying training. 
 Months after these changes in flying training were put into effect, several senior 
leaders within the RFC claimed that new pilots were still being sent to France without having 
attained the necessary competencies and skills that would enable them to accomplish their 
missions and stay alive in the process. P. R. C. Groves, a close friend and ally of Frederick 
Syke’s, was highly critical of Trenchard’s leadership during the war and what Groves believed 
was a refusal to enforce the training standards established by his own headquarters in France. 
I discovered, from personal visits to all the principal training centres in Great 
Britain, that pupils were being sent out wholesale to France before they had 
acquired even the minimum standard of proficiency necessary for active 
service. Pilots were being dispatched overseas while the standard of their 
aerial gunnery was such that they had only the most remote chance of hitting 
another machine in the air, and when their flying experience was so limited 
that they could neither manoeuvre nor keep formation. Many, indeed, left for 
                                                            
1129 C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 
40. See also AIR 1/1273/204/9/148,  NA.  
1130 Ibid. Both the War Office and the RFC routinely reminded training units that the wearing of ‘wings’ 
was conditional until the orders were published which then made it official. As C.G. Jefford notes that 
the “illicit practice” of wearing flying badges was encouraged within the training squadrons to give 
some credibility to newly qualified pilots who were selected to become flying instructors before being 
‘gazetted.’ C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and Other Non-Pilot Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS, 
and RAF, 40. 
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the front without ever having flown the type of service machine which they 
would be called upon to take over the lines.1131 
 
Another officer who was critical of Trenchard and what he believed were major shortcomings 
with the pilot training program was L. E. O. Charlton. Having started the war as a flight 
commander in Number 3 Squadron under Major J. M. Salmond, Charlton commanded 
Number 8 Squadron during the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May, 1915. When Brancker became 
Director of the Air Organization in March, 1916 he made Charlton his G. S. O. 1 responsible 
for all General Staff duties. Brancker credits Charlton for making several recommendations 
that led to major changes within both the pilot and observer training programs. 
Another new feature we introduced about this time [December, 1915-January, 
1916] was a course of ground training for pupils before they ever went near 
an aerodrome. . . This was Charlton’s idea and it certainly proved useful. 
Reading was our first ground training school, but we afterwards took over 
several of the Colleges at Oxford, a military camp at Denham, and various 
buildings elsewhere as our numbers increased. At these schools everyone 
joining the Flying Corps underwent a period of intensive training in rigging, 
engines, signalling, artillery observation, musketry, and discipline, and had to 
                                                            
1131 P. R. C. Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen. (London: Faber and Faber, Limited, 1934), 124-125. 
Groves  blamed Trenchard and RFC Headquarters in France for the failure to enforce  the standards. 
“all [of my] protests to this course [of action] were met with the reply that the policy was dictated by 
military necessity.” Groves argued that “There was in fact no such necessity.” After inspecting the RFC 
training centers in Britain, Groves was sent to Egypt where he was given command of the “finishing 
Wing of the training organization in Egypt, which comprised four squadrons devoted respectively to 
Aerobatics, Aerial Gunnery, Bombing, and Artillery Co-operation. “This enabled me personally to 
ensure that no pupil instructed in Egypt should be passed out for active service until he had achieved the 
requisite standard of efficiency.” In March, 1918, Groves returned to Britain where he became the 
Director of Flying Operations at the Air Ministry. Conducting an investigation on the issue of pilot 
reinforcements being sent to France, he found that 51% of pilots were still being sent to the Western 
Front without having attained the minimum standards that had been established by the RFC. Groves 
was a career Army officer who had given little thought to the use of aircraft and aerial warfare prior to 
the First World War. A close friend of Frederick Sykes, it was because of Sykes’ influence that Groves 
was able to enter the RFC in 1914. Being both a friend and ally to Sykes proved to be Groves undoing 
for when Sykes resigned as Chief of the Air Staff in 1918, Groves was left without a sponsor and his 
days in the RAF were numbered. Though he became a firm believer in strategic bombing towards the 
end of the war and during the inter-war period, Groves was an outspoken critic of Trenchard and his use 
of the ‘incessant offensive policy’ throughout the war.  As a supporter of Sykes, one must wonder 
whether or not Groves criticism of Trenchard’s aerial strategy was based on professional differences or 
was it in fact because Trenchard was Sykes arch-nemesis in all things pertaining to the use of air power 
during the war. In his book , War From the Air published in 1935, Groves was damning of Trenchard’s 
attrition based offensive strategy and argued that it did more to hurt British aircrew morale than it ever 
did to achieve air superiority during the Battle of the Somme and after.  
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pass a definite standard before being allowed to join a flying station to learn 
to fly.1132 
 
Charlton replaced Brancker as the Director of Air Organization (DAO) in January, 1917 when 
Brancker was appointed Deputy Director-General of Military Aeronautics (DDGMA). On one 
occasion, Charlton had threatened to resign from the Directorship over the policy of 
reinforcing squadrons in France with newly-trained pilots. He later wrote: 
At that time there were many hundreds of youths at various training stations 
throughout the country learning to fly and learning, also, the art of fighting in 
the air and the other necessary accomplishments that went with flying. They 
were being fattened for the front. Flying Corps headquarters in France was 
constantly demanding supplies of these youths in fives, tens, and twenties, 
according as the need arose, and sometimes there were enough ready and to 
spare. But at other times there was a scarcity, and the alternative of a 
confession, on the part of those responsible for home training, of failure to 
keep pace with the demand was to send over the half-trained and hope for the 
best. The proceeding was almost mechanical and quite as inhuman. The great 
thing was on no account to fail to supply the goods. . . . to detail any who 
could only just fly and knew nothing beyond seemed to [Charlton] to be little 
short of murder. So [Brancker] put his foot down, as he had a perfect right to 
do, and made it a rule that none should go to France who could not satisfy 
him, or one of his principal assistants, that they were certified in every way 
possible.1133  
 
Charlton’s decision was unpopular and as expected met with much resistance. He received 
three young pilots in his office who had received orders to leave for France the following day. 
None of the three had completed their training so he cancelled their orders and sent them back 
to their flying school. Within thirty minutes he was notified that his decision had been 
overturned by the War Office. It was then that he offered his resignation but was told that 
since he was only a staff officer he was “as such bound to carry out orders, even though he 
disagreed on grounds of conscious.”1134  
                                                            
1132 Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman Macmillan, 121-122.  
1133 L. E. O. Charlton, Charlton: An Autobiography, (London: Penguin Books, Limited, 1938), 238-240.  
1134 Ibid., 238-239.  Charlton returned to France in October, 1917 to take command of V Brigade, RFC. 
He commanded that unit until the end of the war in November, 1918. 
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 Though far from perfect, pilot training improved during 1916. This was due to several 
reasons. The fact that there were more aircraft available, there were more airfields, and more 
instructors who were more experienced, combined with a more rigorous and realistic training 
program that now included ground training schools, aerial fighting schools as well as aerial 
gunnery schools. Brancker once more gave the lion’s share of credit to Charlton for his efforts 
in improving the pilot training program within the RFC. “Colonel Charlton deserves undying 
honour for the initiative, imagination and energy that he displayed in their creation.”1135 
  The training of pilots would be a constant thorn in Trenchard’s side until one 
outspoken squadron commander took matters into his own hands. Major Robert Smith-Barry 
was a flight commander in Number 60 Squadron when his squadron commander was shot 
down and killed on the third day of the Somme offensive. Assuming command of the 
squadron, Smith Barry had spent most of 1915 as a flying instructor at Gosport, and was 
considered one of the best flying instructors in the RFC.1136 In the month before the Somme 
campaign began, Number 60 Squadron received several replacement pilots who were only 
partially trained. Smith Barry refused to allow them to be assigned to deep penetration patrols 
behind the German lines until they had proven their proficiency with their aircraft and could 
fly in formation. He confronted Trenchard over the issue of untrained pilots. “They’ve only 
seven hours flying, sir, and it’s bloody murder [to send them across the lines untrained]” 
Smith-Barry is reputed to have shouted at the RFC commander.1137 Convinced that the flying 
courses being conducted by the CFS were not nearly sufficient enough to prepare pilots for the 
                                                            
1135 Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman Macmillan, 138. 
1136Smith-Barry had been a pilot in Number 5 Squadron when war was declared. He was badly injured 
in an aircraft crash in France in mid-August 1914 and spent the rest of 1914 and the winter of 1915 
recovering from injuries. Persuading doctors to pass him fit for flying he was assigned to Gosport as an 
instructor. Instructing during the day, he flew anti-Zeppelin patrols at night. In April, 1916 he was 
successful in transferring to Number 60 Squadron which was then in training prior to deployment to 
France.  
1137 F. D. Tredrey, Pioneer Pilot: The Great Smith Barry Who Taught the World How To Fly. (London: 
Peter Davies Limited, 1976), 52-53. 
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rigor of air combat that they would experience in France or elsewhere, Smith Barry set about 
making recommendations that would have a major impact on how British pilots were trained 
during the last two years of the war. He was convinced “that only a completely new approach 
to flying training would produce the kind of pilots that scout squadrons needed to master the 
German opponents, and whenever he met Trenchard or members of his staff he told them 
so.”1138 
 The increase in RFC casualties in the fall of 1916 can be linked directly to the 
insufficient training received by pilots at that time but the casualty rate grew proportionately 
even higher when the GAAS introduced three new fighter aircraft in September, all of which 
outclassed the majority of British fighters then operating over the Western Front.1139 
Along with pilots, the RFC understood before the war began that it was going to 
require trained observers if it was to accomplish the air service’s primary mission of aerial 
reconnaissance. The need for trained observers within the RFC can be traced to 1913 when the 
first commander of the Military Wing, Major Frederick H. Sykes, proposed the publication of 
four documents that would become the RFC’s first doctrine. Two of them, the Training 
Manual and War Manual, addressed the duties and responsibilities of both the pilot and 
observer. The problem with Sykes’ doctrine was that it did not identify who the observer 
should be. Was the observer a second pilot? Or was he a specialist, specifically trained in the 
art and science of observation and reconnaissance? 
In June, 1913, the War Manual was revised and published as the RFC’s Training 
Manual, Part II (Military Wing). The major revision that specifically applied to observers read 
that  
                                                            
1138 F. D. Tredrey, Pioneer Pilot: The Great Smith Barry Who Taught the World How To Fly, 52-53. 
1139 RFC casualties (killed in action, wounded in action, and prisoner of war) increased from 82 in 
August, 1916  to 137 in September. The new aircraft which entered service for the GAAS were the 
Fokker D I and DII, the Albatros DII, and the Halberstadt DII; all were biplanes armed with two 
synchronized machine guns.  
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Pilots will always be provided from the personnel of the Royal Flying Corps; 
officers for duty as observers will be provided by the Royal Flying Corps, or 
temporarily from the General Staff and other units, as occasion demands.1140 
 
The doctrine implied that pilots would still be responsible for conducting duties as observers 
because there were no plans to establish a trained force of professional observers. During the 
1912 Army Maneuvers, Trenchard, Sykes and Brancker found themselves serving as airborne 
observers and the during the 1913 Army Maneuvers, most of the officers assigned to be 
observers were inexperienced pilots or students from the British Staff College on temporary 
loan to the RFC for the exercise.1141 Captain G. S. Shephard had flown as both a pilot and 
observer during the 1913 maneuvers and argued that pilots made poor observers for two 
reasons. First, they disliked riding as passengers and second, they spent most of their time 
focusing on what the pilot was doing instead of performing observation duties. Shephard 
recommended that observers should be experienced officers from outside the RFC. He added 
that if they had some mechanical knowledge that would also be of value in case the aircraft 
experienced mechanical failure away from the airfield. It would also be helpful if the observer 
had flown several times with the same pilot to ensure familiarity and develop teamwork. 
Finally, he recommended that the observer should be equipped with a compass “as the 
observer is ultimately held responsible for finding the way.”1142  
 As war clouds loomed over Europe the War Office directed that the RFC train a small 
cadre of officers to serve as observers. The first course began on 13 July, 1914 at Netheravon 
and was made up of ten infantry officers. A second course was scheduled to begin the second 
                                                            
1140 C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 
4. See also RFC Training Manual, Part II (Military Wing), June, 1913, AIR 1/785/204/558, NA. 
1141Sir Sefton Brancker, ed. Norman Macmillan, 42. See also C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators 
and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 4.  
1142 C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 
5. See also Memoirs of George Shephard, ed. Shane Leslie, (London: Privately published, 1924). See 
also Marvin L. Skelton’s article on Shephard’s comments on the training of observers in The Cross and 
Cockade Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Spring, 1977). 
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week of August but was cancelled when the War Office suspended further observer training 
on 31 July just four days before Britain declared war on Germany.1143 
 During the first year of the war the ‘observer’ in most RFC aircraft was actually 
another pilot. The first observer to be killed in action, Lieutenant C. G. G. Bayly, was a pilot 
riding in the second seat of an Avro from Number 5 Squadron which was conducting a 
reconnaissance mission on 22 August, 1914.1144 As additional pilots arrived in France, several 
of them served as observers. Shortly after taking command of First Wing, Trenchard notified 
his replacement back in Farnborough that he was against the idea of using pilots as observers. 
In my opinion it is absolutely unnecessary for the squadrons out here to have 
more pilots. 15 pilots per squadron is ample and we should get 9 observers 
who are not pilots to go with them, as it is manifestly a waste of time to train a 
man as a pilot and then when he comes out here not to allow him to fly a 
machine, and only use him as an observer. . . 1145 
 
Trenchard had a valid point. If the aircraft was shot down, then the RFC lost two trained pilots 
instead of one. Realizing the RFC was critically short of observers, the War Office devised 
several creative schemes in the hopes of solving the problem. One such scheme involved the 
recruitment of six cadets from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. They were gazetted as 
subalterns and sent to France, arriving there in mid-November. By December a total of 
twenty-three officers had arrived in France who were assigned to be observers, most had little 
if any experience with aircraft.1146  
For most of the first year of the war the RFC obtained the majority of its observers 
from volunteers from the army. These men were attached to the RFC and obtained their 
training at the squadrons they were assigned to. Most of this training was conducted ‘on the 
job’ by flying over German-controlled territory on actual observation missions.  
                                                            
1143 C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 
5. 
1144 Ibid., 7. 
1145 Ibid. See also Trenchard to Ashmore, 4 December, 1914, Air 1/1283/204/11/13, NA. 
1146 Ibid. 
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Headquarters, RFC began its own recruiting campaign in late 1914 by allowing wing 
commanders to coordinate directly with the Royal Artillery to attach two artillery officers to 
each of their squadrons for a period of three weeks. The goal was to coordinate and promote 
the advantages of aerial observation and the direction of artillery fire. It was also intended to 
develop an understanding between the two branches on what they could do for one another but 
more importantly develop a long-term relationship between the RFC and the artillery. It was 
hoped that artillery officers would also see the numerous advantages the RFC could provide 
their branch and this might cause them to transfer to the flying corps.1147  
Fearing that some of their quality artillery officers might be ‘borrowed’ permanently, 
HQ, Second Army wrote to Henderson, then commanding the RFC. To assuage their fears, the 
RFC chief of staff, Sykes, informed the artillery community within Second Army that there 
were to be two classes of observer. The first were those who were fully trained and who were 
“attached permanently” to the RFC. The second group of observers would consist of those 
officers who were temporarily attached to the RFC, whether they were trained or not. The 
officers on loan from the artillery were classified in the second category. Sykes did add that 
once the artillerymen were trained it was hoped that they would agree to transfer to the RFC 
whereupon their attachment would become permanent otherwise it was not cost effective to 
train an observer only to have him return to his original unit after his training was 
complete.1148   
One such volunteer was Second Lieutenant Sholto Douglas. Commissioned into the 
Royal Horse Artillery in August, 1914, Douglas had spent less than two months with his 
battery in France when his request for transfer to the RFC was approved by his commanding 
                                                            
1147 C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other non-pilot aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, 
10. See also  
HQ, RFC Routine Orders for 27 December 1914, 5 and 6 January, 1915. AIR 1/829/204/5/219, NA.  
1148 Ibid, 11. See also HQ, RFC Letter G/155/1, 4 January, 1915,. AIR 1/2148/209/3/199, NA. 
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officer. He was to report to Number 2 Squadron for a three week trial period. If he did well his 
transfer would become permanent. Douglas’s intent was to become a pilot and believed that 
by first serving as an observer he would become that much more proficient at flying an aircraft 
when the time came. Douglas survived his probationary period and his transfer became 
permanent in late January, 1915.1149 
 
 
Not all prospective observers came directly from army units; some such as A. J. Insall 
were already in the RFC. Insall was attending the University of Paris when the war began. He 
immediately returned home and enlisted in the University and Public Schools Brigade of the 
Royal Fusiliers in August, 1914 but then transferred to the RFC for flight training. He was 
taught by an NCO pilot and to his own surprise soloed after just fifty minutes. He was 
                                                            
1149 Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat, 57. 
Sholto Douglas (pictured as a squadron commander in 1918) (RAFM) 
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awarded his RAeC after meeting each of the stated requirements shortly thereafter.1150 Sent to 
Netheravon he joined the nucleus of Number 11 Squadron which was being formed with the 
intent of being the first fighter unit in the RFC. Insall was injured while making practice 
landings in a Maurice Farman when the landing gear hit a deep rut and the aircraft flipped 
over on top of him. After a ten-day grounding he found that he was unable to land the aircraft 
without getting physically ill.1151 Over a three day period he made seven attempts to land his 
aircraft but had to relinquish control to the instructor-pilot. The only solution was to give up 
his dreams of becoming a pilot and with War Office approval he became an observer.1152 It is 
not known how many pilot-candidates either failed flight training or voluntarily dropped from 
the CFS to become observers but surely Insall was not alone in taking this path to becoming 
an observer. 
To ensure that observers were proficient in their duties, RFC HQs approved a formal 
training course of three weeks and directed the 2d and 3rd Wing to conduct the training. All of 
the prospective observers came from the Royal Artillery. Many of the observer candidates 
were found to be of low caliber and out of twenty-four men, the training cadre recommended 
that only ten be retained and assigned to squadrons as observers. Not pleased with the initial 
results, Sykes recommended to Henderson that there should be three categories of observers 
instead of two. The first category called for a select group of eight well trained men per 
squadron who would be permanently attached to the RFC. The second category would entail 
an additional two men per squadron who were in training and would serve as an initial reserve. 
The third category would consist of fully trained men who would return to their parent unit but 
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would be attached back to the RFC to carry out a specific task or mission to support their own 
unit commander’s operations. They would also form a second reserve.1153   
Sykes recommendation was approved by BEF HQs and the RFC conducted a second 
observer’s course in April, 1915 for an additional sixteen artillery officers. Though the RFC 
preferred officers to serve as observers, a number of NCOs were also approved for training. 
Most of these men had served in front line units in the trenches. Because of their ‘aptitude and 
enthusiasm’ the RFC expanded the use of NCOs to serve as observers.1154 Many of these 
NCOs, such as James McCudden, and the Americans, Arthur Whitehouse and E. M. Roberts, 
became qualified observers and after surviving a tour of operations over the Western Front 
were sent back to England for pilot training and eventually were commissioned. 
In August, 1915, RFC HQs formalized the qualifications for an officer to be certified 
as a trained observer, identifying five critical areas they were required to be proficient in. 
Although it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as regards the 
qualifications of observers, it is considered that the same general standard of 
proficiency should be maintained throughout the RFC. Normally an officer 
should not be recommended for grading as a qualified observer unless: 
 
a. He knows the Lewis Gun thoroughly. 
 
b. Can use the RFC camera successfully. 
 
c. Can send and receive by wireless at the rate of 6 words a minute with 98% 
accuracy. 
 
d. Knows the method of co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery 
thoroughly. 
 
e. Has carried out two reconnaissances or has ranged batteries successfully on 
two occasions.1155 
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A month prior to the new guidance being issued, the RFC approved a distinctive single-
wing badge attached to an oversized “O” to be awarded to flying personnel who had qualified 
as observers. Though a small step aimed at improving the status of observers in the eyes of the 
rest of the RFC, most especially pilots; the awarding of the observers wing was meant to 
recognize the important role the observer served in two-seater aircraft.1156 With the arrival of 
the Vickers FB5 pusher fighter to France in the summer and fall of 1915, the observer’s role 
became even more critical since it was the observer who by operating the aircraft’s machine 
gun controlled the aircraft’s offensive as well as defensive firepower. 
Since the cancellation of the second observer course and the start of the war there had 
been no ‘official’ courses conducted back in England. Each RFC squadron was expected to 
train its own observers and until the summer of 1915 that meant standards varied. Second 
Lieutenant C. F. A. Portal having transferred from the Royal Engineers to the RFC as an 
observer was assigned to Number 3 Squadron in July, 1915.1157 Already proficient in using 
Morse code and map reading (on the ground), he was directed by his flight commander to 
familiarize himself with the Lewis machine gun as they would be flying in two days time over 
enemy lines. Receiving a cursory introduction to the ‘Artillery Code’ being used by the 
squadron, Portal was considered ‘proficient’ enough to conduct his first mission. His pilot, 
Captain T. O. B. Hubbard, though an experienced pilot, who had spent the previous three 
                                                                                                                                                                           
observer qualification. Prior to this directive, wing commanders were developing their own standards. 
In 2d Wing, Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Burke had published similar but different standards to the 
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years as an instructor at the CFS, had just arrived in France and had no operational experience 
himself.1158  
Having never been in an aircraft before, Portal’s first encounter with anti-aircraft fire 
was an enlightening experience. The pair got lost twice but managed to find their way back to 
their own airfield. 
At the time, it did not appear strange that a reconnaissance should be 
performed by a pilot who had only once before flown the type of aeroplane 
used (and wrecked it) and never been over the objective or any other part of 
the enemy’s lines, accompanied by an observer who had never been in the air 
at all.1159 
 
After several more reconnaissance missions, Portal received a thirty minute briefing on the 
theory and methodology of directing artillery from the air. Along with his pilot he then was 
sent out on two artillery co-operation missions. Upon landing, he was notified that he was now 
a fully trained aerial observer. Portal’s experience would prove to be the norm for most 
observers and not the anomaly prior to the Battle of the Somme.1160As Royal Air Force 
historian C. G. Jefford has identified “A new observer was simply thrown in at the deep end. 
Whether he succeeded on learning to swim in his strange new environment, and how strongly, 
depended almost entirely upon his enthusiasm, aptitude and resourcefulness, reinforced by any 
advice that might be offered by his sympathetic colleagues.”1161 
 E. M. Roberts, an American from Minnesota, had joined the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force and served with a transport unit behind the lines.1162 He requested a transfer to the RFC 
hoping he would have a more direct impact in the fight against the Germans. His transfer was 
approved and he too was assigned to Number 3 Squadron. Like Douglas, he spent a 
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probationary three weeks learning the skills of his trade. Unlike Douglas however, Roberts 
spent the first week in the trenches with an infantry unit. Upon returning to his squadron he 
was taken aloft on his first reconnaissance mission and he too also got quite a shock when 
several anti-aircraft shells exploded near his aircraft. Upon landing he was then sent to an 
artillery battery for a week where he learned in great detail how the battery operated. 
Returning to his squadron he spent the third week learning what was required of an aerial 
observer. Though less dangerous than the first two weeks, Roberts found that he had to work 
“fourteen hours each day” in order to comprehend and remember everything that was taught 
him about wireless telegraphy, Morse code, the Lewis gun, as well as the conduct of artillery 
direction from the air.1163 Roberts was quick to realize that his time spent with both the 
infantry and artillery was instrumental to gaining a perspective on what those on the ground 
experienced and how the RFC could best support them.1164 The attachment of observers to 
artillery batteries would become a common practice as the war progressed. It was most 
beneficial in the development of a professional working relationship between the squadrons 
and the batteries involved. 
As RFC squadrons concentrated on training their observers during the summer of 
1915, the RFC’s doctrinal manual was revised a second time. During the middle of June 
copies were distributed amongst the squadrons in France for comment. Chapter three 
addressed the needs and requirements for trained observers. 
Observation from aeroplanes can be carried out by the pilot single-handed, 
but as undivided attention is necessary for observing, it is usually 
advantageous to carry a passenger who is free to devote his whole attention to 
this task. 
 
The observer requires air experience and special training. He should have 
good eyesight, and possess sufficient military knowledge to enable him to 
recognize units of all arms in their various formations, and to be able to 
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discern the most probable places in which to search for them. He should be 
able to read Morse code.1165 
 
This revision to the doctrine was significant because the RFC now officially recognized that it 
required trained personnel and not just a second pilot or a grounds crewman to perform the 
duties of an observer. The revised doctrine also stated that “as the attention of the observer is 
necessarily absorbed by his work in watching the ground, it is the special duty of the pilot to 
keep a lookout in the air for hostile aircraft.”1166 By the time of the Somme battle the role of 
pilot and observer would virtually be reversed as the air war greatly intensified and the 
observer, armed with one or two Lewis guns would be responsible for searching the sky for 
enemy aircraft while the pilot focused on the terrain below them. 
 In March, 1916 a select group of five observers were sent to Brooklands for training 
and the results were so favorable that the War Office asked all prospective observers 
volunteering for duty in France to attend the Brooklands course prior to deployment.1167 HQ, 
RFC did not accept the offer, believing that once these observers were trained they would be 
kept in England as instructors or the observers would be allowed to enter pilot training without 
ever serving in an operational squadron. In reality, Trenchard had two good reasons for 
ensuring that RFC HQ’s had the final say over observer training. First, he wanted his squadron 
commanders to train and certify their own observers, and second, Trenchard believed the 
training taking place back in England was not meeting the needs of the operational units in 
France. On at least one occasion in the weeks leading up to the Somme offensive, Trenchard 
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had sent a letter to Brancker complaining about the inadequate wireless telegraphy training his 
observers were receiving.1168  
 Though RFC HQs had elected not to have their observers participate in the training 
being conducted at Brooklands, men selected for observer training from units in England 
attended the course in ever increasing numbers starting in the spring of 1916.1169 Men who 
were experienced observers such as Second Lieutenant C. Court Treatt who was serving as an 
Assistant Adjutant with Number 1 Reserve Squadron at Farnborough, and observing what he 
identified as inadequacies with the training, submitted his own recommendations for a 
comprehensive training program for observers.  
a. It was impractical to train pilots and observers within the same unit.  
 
b. An observer training school needed to be adjacent to a large training centre 
for troops of all arms, to facilitate the co-ordination of realistic co-operation 
exercises. 
 
c. It was essential that observers be provided with a substantial amount of 
practical flying experience. 
 
d. There was a need for a special school, similar to those at Reading and 
Oxford, to provide an introductory aviation course designed to meet the 
specific requirements of observers.1170 
 
Three weeks later the War Office notified Treatt that his proposal had been read but that it was 
determined to not be feasible for implementation at that time. In fact the RFC would not act 
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upon Treatt’s proposal until January, 1918 when a prepatory course was established especially 
for observers.1171  
 As the Battle of the Somme began in July, the training process began to coalesce for 
observers in England. After graduating from initial training at Oxford or Reading, observers 
were assigned to a semi-operational squadron which was nearing completion of its tour at an 
advanced flying training school. They then were attached to Brooklands or Hythe to attend a 
three week course and once this was completed a few were sent to France to replace casualties 
while the majority returned to their original squadrons until the squadron completed its 
training and was sent overseas.  
 When the RFC’s air campaign began over the Somme in April, 1916, Trenchard’s 
staff was confident that there were sufficient numbers of officers identified that were waiting 
for vacancies to become observers. But neither Trenchard nor his subordinate commanders 
had expected that the RFCs aircrew casualties would continue to increase to alarming numbers 
as the battle for air superiority intensified. Demand for trained observers quickly outstripped 
the number available back in England. Realizing the manpower shortage was getting worse, 
the War Office directed HQ, VI Brigade that it had to increase the number of NCOs and 
enlisted men as gunners to fill “up to 50% of the establishment” of two-seater fighters 
squadrons.1172  
In May both RFC HQs and the War Office agreed that since the majority of men 
applying to be air gunners were enlisted men or NCOs then serving in units in France, that 
upon transfer to the RFC and prior to going to Hythe to attend a gunnery course, they should 
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be sent to Reading to attend a ground course where they would be fully inculcated into the 
flying service.1173 
Just prior to the start of the ground offensive and several months into the battle, two 
policy decisions were enacted that would have severe repercussions on the RFCs ever 
increasing manpower shortages. These two decisions influenced Trenchard and Brancker to 
increase the number of NCOs that could serve as observers and gunners as there weren’t 
enough officers available within the squadrons to fill the vacancies caused by the increased 
number of casualties that had occurred in France between April and June. The first decision 
took place in June when Haig notified the War Office on 15 June that to properly support the 
still expanding army, the RFC would need to be doubled in size from twenty-seven to fifty-six 
squadrons.1174 This request was approved with little debate. The second decision occurred in 
September when the total number of observers in each squadron was increased from twelve to 
eighteen with the stipulation that “not more than twelve will be officers, the remainder to be 
Serjeants.”1175  
With the number of volunteers from the army requesting transfer to the RFC failing to 
keep pace with the demand for observers and gunners, the War Office in October made the 
decision to select potential candidates from amongst soldiers that were being recruited from 
army units into the RFC in England.1176 At the same time it was realized that gunners would 
be required for all types of aircraft then in service and not just those designated as fighters. It 
is critical to note that these men were recruited specifically to fill the need for aerial gunners 
and not as trained observers. It would not be until February, 1917 that the RFC began to 
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recruit and train men to be specifically aircraft machine gunners and it was at that time the 
designation of “gunner observer” was replaced with that of “aerial gunner.”1177  
After his transfer from the CEF was approved and having passed his initial interview 
with a senior RFC officer, American Frederick Libby was hoping he would receive several 
weeks leave before reporting to a squadron. But because of the recent start of the Somme 
offensive, Libby was directed to report to his new squadron within twenty-four hours where he 
would serve as an observer. Arriving at his new unit at 0730, on 15 July, 1916, Libby was 
escorted by the squadron sergeant major to meet the commanding officer who was in 
conversation with two of his pilots near the aircraft hangars. 
“Welcome to Twenty-third Squadron, Libby.” This before the sergeant could 
open his mouth. “Libby we need observers. This is Lieutenant Price and 
Lieutenant Hicks, both of whom are in need of a good observer. What do you 
know about a machine gun?” Up to now no one has ever mentioned machine 
guns, so, when I assure the major I know nothing, he shows no shock, but 
immediately tells the sergeant major to take me to the gunnery sergeant for a 
half hour instruction and shooting on the gun range, then to bring me back and 
Lieutenant Price would take me up for twenty minutes practice shooting at a 
gallon petrol can on the field.1178 
  
After his training session with the Lewis gun and his first flight in an aircraft (FE 2b), which 
included air-to-ground target practice with the Lewis gun against empty fuel cans, Libby was 
given passing marks by Lieutenant Price and several observers on the ground. He was then 
notified that he would go on his first operational flight at 1500. Borrowing flying coat, helmet, 
goggles and gloves, the neophyte observer met the pilot he would be flying with, Lieutenant 
Hicks. Libby notified Hicks that he wasn’t sure if he could tell the difference between friendly 
and enemy aircraft. 
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This Libby, you will learn, but be on the safe side, have a roving eye, don’t let 
any ship get in a position to shoot us down. If he is friendly, he will show his 
colors. Unless he does, let him have it. And tomorrow, if you will go to the 
adjutant’s office, he will show you silhouettes of all ships, both the enemy and 
ours. I suggest you study three of our enemy ships, the Fokker, Roland and 
Albatros. These are the most deadly the Germans have at present. They are 
faster and have much more maneuverability than our ships, unless it is our 
Nieuport. And of these we don’t have many. As for our FE 2b, the enemy 
have a wholesome respect for it. A good observer can shoot from any angle 
and has a wonderful range of vision with the front gun. The rear gun is to 
keep Fritz off your tail when returning home across the lines.1179   
 
Libby and Hicks were part of a flight of five FE 2b’s tasked with conducting a three-hour 
reconnaissance east of Arras. Within moments of crossing the front lines into German-
controlled territory, Libby’s FE 2b was attacked by a German fighter. Reacting almost 
instinctively, the American fired his Lewis gun and emptied the entire drum of forty-seven 
rounds at the German fighter. He didn’t realize until after they had safely returned and landed 
back at their airfield that he had shot down the German aircraft in flames. 
From seven-thirty this morning I have left my motor lorries [his previous unit] 
. . .  have made the trip to Twenty-third Squadron, have been up twice and in 
contact once with the elusive Hun and have nothing but luck.1180 
 
 
Three weeks later, Libby was commissioned and along with his pilot, the recently 
promoted Captain Price, was transferred to Number 11 Squadron which was also using the 
FE 2b. In four days the pair shot down four German aircraft and by the end of the Battle of 
the Somme, Libby was credited with having shot down ten enemy aircraft in just over three 
months. He was then sent back to England to undergo pilot training.1181  
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 Another American, Arthur Whitehouse, was born in England but raised in the 
United States and upon Britain’s declaration of war he sailed back to Britain where he 
joined the British Army. After serving some months with the Northamptonshire Yeomanry 
in France as a machine gunner, Whitehouse transferred to the RFC in the hopes of being 
sent back to England to be trained as a fighter pilot. He was shocked when he realized that 
instead of pilot training he was sent to an operational squadron where he would serve as an 
aerial gunner.1182 Much of his training was conducted in the air against the GAAS but when 
he was not flying reconnaissance or escort patrols with one of several pilots he did undergo 
some intense periods of training on the ground. 
We were given more instruction in the Vickers gun as well as in the air-type 
Lewis. At times we were shown the various aerial cameras and how to use 
them. Map-reading and some primary instruction in Morse code were also 
given . . . All these periods of instruction were used to grade us. After the tests 
the results were considered, and when we had put in our fifty hours over the 
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line we could claim our observer’s wing. . .  above all we were first class 
machine gunners. We were blindfolded and placed behind Lewis guns and 
timed to see how fast we could take them apart and assemble them again. This 
was to teach us to clear stoppages and replace parts without ever taking our 
eyes off enemy planes. . . We sat and stared at wall maps of the front until we 
could recite from memory the position of every German aerodrome, kite 
balloon, and antiaircraft battery on our front. . . We were told how much 
ground a German regiment took up while marching along a road, we learned 
how to trace new battery positions by the marks made by their wheels through 
the grass and the general designs of their earthworks. We were given the latest 
ground-strip signals used by the infantry to denote their positions during an 
attack or a retreat.  . . we were learning to be observers and to become 
efficient in the ancient art of killing.1183   
 
 While the air campaign over the Somme was taking place approximately twenty 
observers a month were being trained in England at the Wireless School at Brooklands and 
with more emphasis being placed on the aviation aspect of the training the course was 
renamed the Wireless and Observers School in October, 1916.1184  The curriculum was revised 
extensively in August with the students broken down into two groups. The first group, Group 
A, consisted of men who had less than six hours of flying time. The second group, Group B, 
contained men who had more than six hours of flying experience.1185  
After completing a theoretical indoctrination at one of the Schools of Instruction the 
observers in training spent three weeks studying topics such as the Clock code, directing 
artillery from the air, using Morse code, conducting aerial photography, as well as intense 
training with the Lewis gun, as well as many more practical subjects.1186 The course 
culminated with several flying exercises and examinations. The observers were then sent to a 
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gunnery course at Hythe. Each observer had to be tested on four subjects before he could be 
sent to an operational squadron. The four exams covered “co-operation with artillery; the use 
and care of wireless equipment; photography and the care of the RFC camera; and the use and 
care of machine guns.”1187 Once the observers arrived in France they had to be certified at the 
brigade or wing level. The end result was that for the RFC, during the later phases of the 
Battle of the Somme, observers were better trained than their predecessors were in the first 
two years of the war.  
The RFC also trained observers to operate from captive kite balloons. Balloons had 
several advantages over aircraft in that they could remain aloft all day and night if required. 
Furthermore, balloon observers did not have to concern themselves with the duties of an aerial 
gunner and protecting the aircraft. More importantly, whereas an aircraft observer had to use 
Morse code to communicate with the a ground station or artillery battery, the balloon-observer 
used a telephone set that was linked by cable to a ground exchange and thus could talk directly 
to the battery commander, another balloon observer and if necessary to the Corp commander 
that he supported.1188 Another major difference between the two was that a balloon observer 
was equipped with a parachute while aircrews were not.1189 
Selection criteria to be a balloon observer was the same as for an aircraft observer but 
the training requirements, though in some ways similar, were also different in that there was 
much more focus on the operation of the balloon as well as observing from it.1190 Ground 
training began with the history of ballooning in peace-time and war, map-reading, use of 
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Morse code and the telephone, as well as observation and directing artillery fire.1191 The 
second phase consisted of hands-on training with the balloon itself, first the German designed 
Drachen type (a huge sausage shaped hydrogen filled balloon with a single air-filled rudder on 
the underside at the rear of the balloon) and later the French designed Caquot type (shorter 
than the Drachen with two tail fins and a third fin attached to the rear bottom of the 
balloon).1192 Initial ascents were done with several other observer-candidates and an instructor 
until the instructor believed the trainee was ready to ‘solo.’ Most of the training was 
conducted during daylight hours but to become a fully qualified balloon observer or 
‘balloonatic’ the trainee had to conduct at least one ascent at night. Once the night ascent was 
completed satisfactorily the observer could apply for his Aeronaut’s Certificate from the 
Royal Aero Club.1193 The RFC established two Advanced Balloon Schools (ABS), with one at 
Larkhill and the other at Lydd.1194 During the Somme offensive the RFC had a total of twenty-
two kite balloon sections in operation to provide support of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army.1195  
Though the training of pilots and observers was being improved in England, as well as 
France, it was that same training program that would be a nagging problem for Trenchard and 
his subordinate commanders throughout the air offensive and many months afterwards with 
consequences that none of the British military leaders, most especially Trenchard, predicted. 
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Linked directly to Trenchard’s strategy of  maintaining a continuous and incessant air 
offensive at all costs, the RFC commander had no one to blame but himself that his airmen 
were sent to the Somme unprepared for the changing combat conditions they were to face in 
the last eight weeks of the air campaign. Trenchard had hoped that his casualties would 
decrease when the RFC gained domination in the air over the Somme but with the resurgence 
of the GAAS in mid-September, it was the lack of training tied to a faulty strategy that lead to 
unintended consequences for the RFC after the Somme campaign was over.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
German Drachen Observation Balloon, Western Front. 
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Chapter Seven  
A BRITISH HAWK FALLING: THE END OF  
THE AIR CAMPAIGN, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
De Havilland DH 2’s of Number 32 Squadron, Vert Galand 
airfield, Summer, 1916. (IWM Q11897) 
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As the RFC and Aviation Militaire wrested aerial superiority away from the GAAS in 
the spring of 1916 and maintained it throughout the summer, Colonel Hermann von Lieth-
Thomsen was forced to transfer a number of combat formations from Verdun to strengthen the 
beleaguered squadrons on the Somme front. This transfer included two Kampfgeschwadern, 
two Feldflieger Abteilungen, one Kampfstaffel and one Artillerie Flieger Abteilung.1196 Just as 
Trenchard was demanding more and better fighter aircraft from his government for the RFC, 
the German High Command directed a series of changes which included a major 
reorganization of the GAAS itself. On 10 August, 1916, Lieth-Thomsen ordered the formation 
of the first Jagdstaffeln (Fighter Flight) and the next day recalled Boelcke with orders to 
organize and take command of Jagdstaffel 2 on the Somme front.1197 Each of the new 
Jagdstaffeln were to be manned with experienced pilots from the Feldflieger Abteilungen and 
Kampfgeschwadern as well as the KEKs, many of whom who would be recruited personally 
by the squadron commanders. The Jagdstaffeln’s purpose was purely offensive; they were to 
attack enemy aircraft, most especially, the British two-seaters that were conducting artillery 
observation and direction as well as kite balloons.1198 By doing so they would allow their own 
army co-operation aircraft the time required to complete their missions.  
More and larger changes followed. With Hindenburg’s promotion to Chief of the 
General Staff (CGS) on 29 August and with Ludendorff serving as his quartermaster general, 
there had been even greater emphasis placed on the role of the aircraft for future operations. 
Only three days after taking command of the German Army, Hindenburg submitted a revised 
plan to the War Ministry which entailed the total mobilization of German industry towards 
                                                            
1196 Alex Revell, Pictorial History of the German Army Air Service, 1914-1918, 35. 
1197 Alex Imrie, German Fighter Units: 1914-May 1917, 21. See also John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great 
War in the Air, 152-153. 
1198 Alex Revell, Pictorial History of the German Army Air Service, 1914-1918, 41. 
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weapons production.1199 The new CGS identified and prioritized five war industries that he 
believed would greatly assist the army in overcoming the Allies numerical superiority in 
manpower. Artillery and artillery ammunition were the first two critical areas that had to 
increase production, followed by machine guns, trench mortars and aircraft.1200  
Hindenburg, acting on the recommendations of Lieth-Thomsen and his assistant 
Major Wilhelm Siegert, directed that the GAAS begin to shift more fighter squadrons from 
Verdun to the Somme in early September in an attempt to end the RFC’s air superiority in that 
sector.1201 As the newly created Jagdstaffeln relocated to their new airfields they began 
receiving the first new Albatros and Fokker fighters as well. With the return of Oswald 
Boelcke to take command of Jagdstaffel 2 (Jasta 2), it was less than two weeks before the new 
aircraft were tested in combat. Six Albatros fighters led by Boelcke encountered several 
flights of RFC aircraft on 17 September and shot down six British planes without loss.1202 It 
was a portent of things to come. 
With the transfer of units and the influx of new fighter aircraft the Germans had 885 
aircraft on the Western Front by mid-October, nearly half of them were dedicated to provide 
support to the German First and Second Armies on the Somme.1203 Though still numerically 
outnumbered in overall numbers of aircraft by the British and French, the increase in better 
                                                            
1199 John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air, 159-165. 
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1201 Ernest von Hoeppner,  Germany’s War in the Air, 72-73. See also John R. Cuneo, Winged Mars, 
Vol. II, The Air Weapon, 1914-1916, 258-60. 
1202 WITA, Vol. II, 281. 
1203 John R. Cuneo, Winged Mars, Vol. II, The Air Weapon, 1914-1916, 260.  
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designed and better armed fighter planes was proof positive that allied air superiority was 
about to be seriously challenged for the first time since the Battle of the Somme had begun.1204  
The second major change entailed the total reorganization of the Fliegertruppe and 
this occurred on 8 October, 1916, when OHL issued a decree signed by Kaiser Wilhelm: 
The increasing importance of the air war requires that all air-fighting and defense 
forces in the army, in the field and in the hinterland, be united in one agency. To this 
end I command: The centralized improvement, preparation, and employment of this 
means of warfare will be assigned to a “Commanding General of the Air Forces,” who 
will be directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. The “Chief of Field 
Aviation,” with the dissolution of that post, becomes “Chief of Staff to the 
Commanding General of the Air Forces.”1205 
The Kaiser’s edict absorbed all flying units that had been under the command of the 
Feldflugchef as well as units that were closely related to army aviation.1206 
General Ernst von Hoeppner, a cavalry officer who had served as Chief of the General 
Staff for both the 2d and 3rd Army’s, and at the time of the decree was serving as the 
commander of the 75th Infantry Division, was selected to be the Kommandierenden General 
der Luftstreitkrafte (Commanding General of the Air Forces), or Kogenluft.1207 Having served 
as the Chief of Field Aviation, Leith-Thomsen became Hoeppner’s Chief of Staff and Major 
Siegert was promoted from acting Feldflugchef to become the Inspekteur der Fliegertruppen 
(Inspector General of the Air Service).1208 Hoeppner was thus given a unified command that 
was in many ways organized similar to the RFC and similar to the command relationship 
between the RFC and the RNAS, the German Naval Air Service remained separate and apart 
from Hoeppner’s command. Additionally, as part of the reorganization, the GAAS also 
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received a new title: Luftstreitkrafte (Air Force).1209 Hoeppner, Lieth-Thomsen and Siegert 
would form a triumvirate that would mold and build the Luftstreitkrafte into one of the most 
effective air forces of the First World War. 
Realizing he must move quickly if the Germans were to have any chance of ending 
British air superiority, Hoeppner began clarifying missions and roles of for each type of flying 
unit. The Flieger Abteilungen were assigned the role of conducting long range reconnaissance 
for Army Headquarters.1210 As newer and faster armed biplanes became available such as the 
Albatros C III and the Halberstadt D II, these units received them as well as improved cameras 
that could photograph larger areas of the battlefield in a single exposure. The Flieger 
Abteilungen (A) units were tasked with providing support to ground units while the Kagohl 
units focused on both tactical and strategic bombing.1211 With the initial success of the 
Kagohls that were conducting daylight bombing of London and other British cities, 
Ludendorff directing that Hoeppner expand the number of bomber squadrons within the 
force.1212 The Jastas primary purpose was to engage the RFC and Aviation Militaire in air 
combat as well as provide escort and protection to the reconnaissance and bombing aircraft 
and to this end Hoeppner began increasing the number of Jagdstaffeln with the intent of 
having a total of thirty-six by spring, 1917.1213 
It was soon evident to the OHL that within the first two weeks of taking command 
von Hoeppner and his command team were making great strides in the restructuring of the 
Luftstreitkrafte. By mid-October there were 38 squadrons with 333 aircraft supporting the 
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German First Army alone, of which 45 were fighters. These aircraft were primarily engaged 
with the RFC while the German Second Army had 207 aircraft supporting it, of which 44 
were fighters, most of which were engaged against both the Aviation Militaire.1214 In total, out 
of 885 German aircraft on the Western Front, 540 (61%) of them were located on the 
Somme.1215 Opposing these air units, the RFC’s 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades had 383 aircraft, of 
which only 73 were fighters consisting of primarily DH 2’s, FE 2b’s, and Nieuport 11’s.1216 
Though the RFC might have had 45 more aircraft than the GAAS squadrons supporting the 
German First Army, quantity was no longer the key factor. The RFC did not have a fighter 
plane that could effectively compete with the Albatros DI fighter, either in performance or 
firepower1217  
When it was realized that Four Jagdstaffeln were assigned to the Somme sector in 
September but only one was sent to Verdun, Trenchard was convinced that the Germans first 
priority for air support was to the Somme sector and that reinforcing the Verdun sector with 
air units was a distant second.1218 By concentrating his available fighter units on the Somme 
von Hoeppner was intent on challenging the RFC for control of the sky. 
The organization of single-seater planes into pursuit squadrons made it 
possible to concentrate them at decisive points on the battlefield and made it 
possible to exercise personal influence on their training and employment. The 
number of pursuit planes and their technical performance together with the 
leadership and valor of their pilots, were, from now on, to assume the first 
role in aerial combat and the struggle for air supremacy.1219 
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This massing of fighter aircraft opposite the British Fourth Army, allowed the Germans to 
achieve temporary air superiority when supporting local counter-attacks on the ground. With 
the introduction of the Jagdstaffeln and the Albatros D I and D II fighters and well as the 
Fokker D I and the Halberstadt fighters, the Luftstreitkrafte began the process of wresting air 
superiority away from the RFC before the battle concluded.1220 
It was largely through the vision and planning of Hoeppner, Lieth-Thomsen and 
Siegert as well as the airmen who executed their plans led by the likes of squadron leaders 
such as Boelcke and Immelmann that made the Luftstreitkrafte such an effective force. 
Historian John Morrow, Jr. rightfully credits this team of air power experts for the 
development and expansion of the Fliegertruppe into the Luftstreitkrafte.1221 Early historical 
accounts on the GAAS give most of the credit to von Hoeppner and overlook the work of 
Lieth-Thomsen and Siegert.1222 One can make the assumption that this was largely because 
von Hoeppner was one of the first to write a history of his nation’s air service immediately 
after the war.1223 That these German leaders were able to transform Germany’s air service into 
a much more capable combat force while fighting the RFC during its air campaign over the 
Somme is a testament to not only their leadership but also to their ability to influence the 
German High Command in shaping the future development of German air power for the 
remainder of the war.1224 
With a more advanced pilot training program than either the British or the French air 
services and combined with the introduction of faster and better armed aircraft, von Hoeppner 
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directed the Jastas to concentrate their efforts against the British over the Somme.1225 If 
September had witnessed the beginnings of a shift in the balance of power between the RFC 
and the Luftstreitkrafte, October provided even more evidence that the RFC’s air superiority 
was in jeopardy and the steady increase in aircrew casualties began to take a toll on RFC 
morale.1226 For Trenchard, morale was the critical component of his aerial strategy. As far 
back as late-1914 when he had taken command of the First Wing, he had realized the 
importance of maintaining aircrew morale while conducting a continuous offensive-based 
strategy.1227 
 Having seen his principles tested and proven correct by the Aviation Militaire at 
Verdun, Trenchard was thus convinced that only by employing an offensive strategy in the air 
could the RFC provide the proper support to the BEF and its operations on the ground. With 
the Germans content with assuming a defensive posture in the air as well as on the ground, 
Trenchard was determined to take the war to the enemy and the deeper his forces could attack 
behind enemy lines the better. As one noted historian identified, Trenchard’s air strategy 
“[was the] classic exposition of the doctrine of the offensive.”1228 
 As has been noted, Trenchard, like so many of his peers in the British Army in the 
years before the First World War, was a firm believer in ‘the cult of the offensive.’ The 
writing’s of Ardent du Picq, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, de Grandmaison and General Sir Ian 
Hamilton all dealt with the criticality of the moral force in war, especially during offensive 
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operations.1229 It was deemed one of the most important, if not most critical factors to attaining 
victory. Hamilton wrote that “War is essentially the triumph, not of a chassepot over a needle-
gun, not a line of men entrenched behind wire entanglements and fire swept zones over men 
exposing themselves in the open, but of one will over a weaker will . . . the best defence to a 
country is the army formed, trained and inspired by the idea of attack.”1230 The side with the 
stronger will and better morale would win out in the end. All agreed that with the advent of 
modern weaponry on the twentieth century battlefield victory would come at great cost. 
Casualties were expected to be heavy. The German theorist Wilhelm Balck wrote that “Great 
victories are, as a rule, accompanied by great losses.”1231 British theorist Colonel F. N. Maude 
agreed when he wrote “The chances of victory turn entirely on the spirit of self-sacrifice of 
those who have to be offered up to gain opportunity for the remainder . . . in other words the 
true strength of an Army lies essentially in the power of each, or any of its constituent 
fractions to stand up to punishment, even to the verge of annihilation if necessary.”1232 Every 
soldier in the British Army had been trained and indoctrinated that not only were they to fight 
for their country when directed to do so but if necessary they would die for it as well. Haig, 
along with the majority of his subordinate commanders (to include Trenchard), understood 
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that the concept of sacrifice was a critical factor embedded within any offensive-based 
strategy.1233 
In his ‘Future Policy in the Air’ memorandum, Trenchard concluded that “the sound 
policy then which should guide all warfare in the air would seem to be this: to exploit the 
moral[e] effect of the aeroplane on the enemy, but not to let him exploit it on ourselves. Now 
this can only be done by attacking and by continuing to attack.”1234 
In a memorandum written after the Battle of the Somme for army, corps and 
divisional commanders, Trenchard identified why in his mind the only logical strategy to use 
in the air was an offensive one.  
Fighting on the ground from the strategical point of view may be offensive or 
defensive, or a combination of the two, but in the air the offensive is the only 
policy which can give success. The aeroplane is essentially an offensive and 
not a defensive weapon. Owing to the unlimited space in the air and the free 
manoeuvring possible in all three dimensions, the accidents of wind and cloud 
and to the difficulty of one machine seeing another, no number of aeroplanes 
acting on the defensive will prevent a hostile pilot of initiative and 
determination from reaching his objective.1235 
 
The memo proceeds to explain that by using fighter aircraft to conduct offensive patrols 
against the enemy air service while corps squadron aircraft conduct “bomb raids by night and 
day”, the RFC was able to provide the best possible support to ground units as was evidenced 
by the its conduct during the Somme campaign.1236 Furthermore, by using an offensive policy, 
the RFC was able to attain and maintain aerial superiority over the enemy. In projecting to the 
future, as he had the previous September, Trenchard wrote that “Hard fighting is inevitable 
and heavy casualties are bound to occur, but it is confidently anticipated that the same policy 
will produce the same results as soon as a spell of settled fine weather enables the offensive to 
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be pursued over a period sufficient to subject the enemy to a continuous strain.”1237 Trenchard 
was willing to adhere to a strategy of attrition, just as the ground commanders on both sides 
were, in the belief that the side that demonstrated the stronger morale, would win. 
On the subject of casualties suffered by the RFC during the conduct of its “relentless 
and incessant offensive” air strategy, the Official Historian of the Royal Air Force contends 
that British aircrew understood that heavy casualties were not only expected as a result of 
taking the fight to the enemy but they were also accepted as well. 
Every pilot along the [Western] front knew that the Flying Corps could 
maintain an offensive only at the expense of heavy casualties. That these 
casualties would exceed those inflicted on the enemy was accepted. Suppose 
the Royal Flying Corps, admitting the enemy’s temporary superiority, had 
fallen back on the defensive; what would have been the result? This defensive 
policy had been tried by the German air service at Verdun and again during 
the Somme battles and had proved disastrous. The morale of the enemy 
airmen had been sapped and their service discredited in the eyes of the 
German army. Furthermore, defensive flying had offered no sort of defence 
either to the airmen or to the ground formations below them. . . An air service 
which confines its flying to its own territory may save aeroplanes forced 
down damaged, but the armies suffer. Their positions are open to 
reconnaissance and attack by the enemy airmen. The morale of the troops is 
adversely affected by the attention of the hostile aeroplanes. The artillery of 
the army whose air service is flying defensively is inadequately registered, the 
opposing defences are not photographed, and there may be no close 
reconnaissance. But an inferior air service which maintains the initiative of 
the offensive may force the enemy to fight over his own territory, and no 
matter how strenuously the enemy fights he cannot prevent some part of the 
reconnaissance, photography, and other work being accomplished.1238 
 
 
This statement was written years after the war and it seems intent on adjudicating Trenchard’s 
decision and insistence at following an offensive strategy even though it meant his squadrons 
would suffer significant losses in the process. It must be remembered that Trenchard’s 
foremost aim was to provide air support to the BEF, wherever and whenever they requested it. 
The RFC commander was also very cognizant of the fact that while the air service lost several 
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hundred airmen every few months; the army was suffering thousands of casualties each week 
during the Somme offensive. Though addressing the RFC’s role and the high casualties it 
suffered in support of the BEF during the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917, the Official 
Historian may have just as well been addressing the true purpose of the RFC during the Battle 
of the Somme. “That cooperation might be assured only by aggressive tactics, and the cost, 
though it must be high, was not to be counted. Pilots and observers went into the battle 
sustained by the knowledge that they were helping the men on the ground.”1239 
 How much did the lack of adequate flying training contribute to the RFC’s casualty 
list? Several weeks before the Somme offensive ended, the issue was raised at a meeting of the 
Air Board in London. Reviewing the number of RFC training casualties which had occurred in 
September it was found that 31 officers and other ranks had been killed and 33 had been 
injured in flight schools overseas, while 12 had been killed and 15 injured in England. Colonel 
Salmond, commander of the Training Brigade, added that another 14 had been killed in the 
first two weeks of October but they were a small proportion of the 1,800 aircrew undergoing 
training.1240 When the topic was raised about whether or not the Admiralty could ‘loan’ 
several more RNAS squadrons to the RFC, the Navy delegate, Rear Admiral Tudor, asked 
Trenchard “whether, if the Navy provided more squadrons, the Royal Flying Corps would be 
enabled to give its pilots longer training. It was his impression, he said, that the casualties 
among military [Army] pilots were partly due to the shortness of their training.”1241 Trenchard 
responded by stating that though the RFC had suffered 100 percent casualties in 18 weeks, it 
took only one casualty for every hundred times an aircraft crossed the German lines, compared 
to one in three for the infantry when it crossed the lines. He therefore concluded that the 
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number of aircrew losses was not linked to the “inexperience of pilots except, perhaps on 
long-distance work.”1242 Henderson agreed with Trenchard by stating that the “shortness of 
training was a consequence of the number of casualties and not the casualties of the shortness 
of training.” 1243Thus both Trenchard and Henderson believed that the high casualty rate was 
due to the conduct of continuous offensive operations on the German side of the line against a 
rejuvenated enemy air service and was not the result of too few flying hours in training as 
Rear Admiral Tudor believed.  
It is difficult to understand Trenchard’s and Henderson’s perspective. Tudor’s query 
was both clear and logical. Issues concerning the RFC aircrew training programs, most 
especially pilot training, had been on-going throughout 1916. It was brought to the public’s 
notice on 22 March by Member of Parliament Noel Pemberton-Billing in a speech in the 
House of Commons in which he proclaimed “that quite a number of our gallant officers have 
been murdered rather than killed.” 1244 Pemberton-Billing had served in the RNAS and seen 
action in the air over the Western Front in the first year of the war and knew something of the 
plight of the RFC airmen when he argued that the RFC was suffering unsustainable casualties 
by flying in antiquated aircraft that had little to no chance against the Fokker Eindecker and its 
synchronized machine gun(s). Along this same argument he questioned the viability of the 
training the RFC pilots received and whether or not it was adequately preparing them for the 
rigors of air combat. He was on record for stating that at the CFS flight schools “hardly a day 
goes by but two or three pilots are killed in this country.”1245 Trenchard’s headquarters had 
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received numerous complaints from subordinate commanders, most especially in the latter 
stages of the air campaign, that the pilots they were receiving from the CFS were only 
partially trained and did not have the requisite skills for combat flying. Brigadier General J. F. 
A. Higgins, commander of III Brigade, reported that the pilots he received in his fighter 
squadrons from England were just sufficiently trained to conduct take-offs and landings 
without damaging their aircraft.1246 He had little confidence in their ability to conduct any of 
the missions his squadrons had to conduct over the line and warned Trenchard that they posed 
a great risk to themselves and even a greater risk to the men they were to fly with. Higgins 
recommended that the RFC emulate the Aviation Militaire and establish a flying school for 
frontline combat training and use dual-control trainers as well.1247  
In November, Major Robert Smith-Barry, then a flight commander in Number 60 
Squadron, sent Trenchard a paper suggesting the use of dual-control trainers and the 
establishment of a flying school for instructors. It is to Trenchard’s credit that he listened to 
his subordinate commanders and acted on their recommendations. Four weeks later Smith-
Barry was sent back to England to implement his recommendations and revamp the RFC’s 
pilot training program.1248  
Even the RAF Official Historian seemed to disagree with Henderson and Trenchard’s 
statements about the correlation of training time to casualties. Though addressing the high 
number of casualties the RFC experienced at the beginning of its air campaign over Arras, H. 
A. Jones could just as well have been describing the high losses suffered by the RFC in the 
last four weeks of the Somme offensive: 
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On the five days from the 4th to the 8th of April [1917], seventy-five British 
aeroplanes fell in action with a loss in flying personnel of 105 (nineteen 
killed, thirteen wounded, and seventy-three missing). In addition there was an 
abnormally high number of flying accidents in which, in the same brief 
period, fifty-six aeroplanes were wrecked and struck off the strength of the 
squadrons. These heavy losses by accidents were due in part to insufficiency 
of training which had been speeded up to the danger point (author’s italics) 
and in part also to the strain imposed on pilots who had to meet in the air an 
enemy equipped, with few exceptions, with superior fighting machines.1249 
 
This was evidence that by achieving air superiority before and during the air campaign over 
the Somme, and pursuing relentless offensive operations, the exceedingly high number of 
RFC aircrew casualties caused long-term unintended consequences on the organization as a 
whole that were only magnified in the air campaigns that followed the Somme.  
 According to Eric Ash, Trenchard’s concept of morale was based on two tenets. First, 
it was his intent to maintain ‘positive morale’ with RFC aircraft supporting the ground forces 
and being seen by army units in the conduct of their assigned missions such as observing and 
directing artillery fire, flying contact patrols, and engaging and defeating any enemy aircraft 
that were bold enough to venture over the British lines. He believed that by accomplishing 
their missions, the RFC enjoyed ‘positive morale’ and in turn caused the enemy to have 
‘negative morale’ from the results of the actions taken by the RFC against the Germans.1250 
There was some truth to this concept. Numerous captured enemy documents and prisoners of 
war informed RFC intelligence that when only British aircraft were seen above the German 
trenches, German morale suffered.1251 Second, with the arrival of the DH 2 and the FE 2b 
fighter aircraft in the spring of 1916, the RFC was able to defeat the ‘Fokker Scrouge’ and 
begin the period of RFC dominance in the sky above the Somme. ‘Positive morale’ was 
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achieved within RFC units when they realized they had gained aerial superiority over their 
counterparts and this spread to British  units on the ground who enjoyed the results of this 
superiority by rarely being interfered with by German aircraft. This ‘positive morale’ 
however, had to be earned on a daily basis throughout the summer and fall. Much of the 
success the RFC attained though could be attributed to the fact that the GAAS was poorly 
organized, outnumbered and not equipped to deal with the RFC’s air offensive for the first 
five months of the air campaign.1252 By maintaining constant aerial superiority, the RFC 
experienced a steady increase in aircrew casualties with each passing week of the ground 
offensive. Once the GAAS began the reorganization of its force structure and received more 
advanced aircraft than the British and French possessed, the ‘positive morale’ that the RFC 
had experienced began to wane.1253 
 To ensure morale remained positive within his squadrons throughout the air 
campaign, Trenchard established a personnel policy of ‘No empty chairs at breakfast.’ Within 
hours of RFC headquarters having been informed that a squadron had suffered casualties, 
replacement aircrew were enroute to that squadron. Regardless of what Henderson and 
Trenchard told their political leadership and the Royal Navy, this often meant sending pilots 
who were only partially trained to front-line squadrons before they were ready to fly combat 
operations. Though it was understood that the surviving pilots and observers aircrew would 
mourn their lost friends and comrades, Trenchard could not allow the increasing number of 
casualties to impact the overall mission. Thus replacement aircrews had to fill the seats in the 
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mess as quickly as possible and more importantly, the cockpits of aircraft, to ensure that 
offensive operations could be maintained.1254  
 Trenchard’s vision of maintaining a constant air offensive regardless of losses is 
supported by a pilot from Number 43 Squadron, Lord Balfour of Inchrye who flew a Sopwith 
1 and 1/2 Strutter during the Battle of the Somme. “Most of our casualties were fairly new 
pilots. They couldn’t keep in formation. . . . They were very trying, very hard times. Trenchard 
came round the Squadron and we thought he was going to tell us how sorry he was for our 
casualties and what fine chaps we were. Not a bit of it. He said: “You’ve never finished your 
job, get on and do more than you are doing” and very nearly told us all off. He did it in a very 
charming way and it was far better for morale than trying to condone the casualties and 
console you.”1255  
 A critical sub-component of morale for Trenchard was the welfare of his aircrew. 
Aside from the increasing number of pilots and observers who were killed, wounded or went 
missing and became prisoners of war with each passing week of the air campaign, there were 
other factors that contributed heavily to the well being of each airman taking part in the 
offensive. On the positive side RFC aircrew “were never under fire for more than six hours a 
day. When we returned to our aerodromes the war was over. We had a bed, a bath and a mess 
with good food and peace until the next patrol. Though we always lived in the stretch or sag of 
nerves, we were never under bodily fatigue, never filthy, never verminous or exposed to the 
long, disgusting drudgery of trench warfare.”1256 Though it was true that the life of a fighter, 
bomber, or reconnaissance pilot was not nearly as arduous as that of his infantry counterparts, 
as identified in the above passage by RFC pilot Cecil Lewis, aircrew experienced a physical 
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strain that the infantryman and artilleryman on the ground did not: the strain that was imposed 
by flying continuous combat sorties six to eight hours a day for weeks at time. During the 
fight for control of the sky over the Somme it became the squadron commander’s 
responsibility to identify when each of his pilots and observers needed a ‘rest’ from 
operations. It would not be until late 1917 that the RFC assigned a medical officer to each 
RFC Brigade for the purpose of determining the physical and mental well-being of aircrew.1257 
 Until then the squadron commander maintained a close watch on his men. As the 
following quote attests, squadron commanders soon became experts at identifying when a 
pilot or observer needed a break from combat: “Shaking hands unable to pick up cups of tea. 
Twitching eyelids. Men constantly glancing at the clock or unable to keep still. A double 
Dubonnet before a patrol. Lapses of memory and blurred vision. Meals returned 
untouched.”1258 All were indications that the individual was probably experiencing what 
would be termed ‘battle fatigue’ in the Second World War. Other indicators included the 
inability to sleep or incessant nightmares of being shot down in flames.1259 The pilot’s cockpit 
in nearly all RFC aircraft flown during the Somme offensive was located either directly in 
front of or behind the engine or fuel tank. A single bullet or spark from a ricochet could turn 
the highly flammable dope-covered fabric, which encased the wings and the fuselage, into a 
torch within seconds. Since RFC airmen were not issued parachutes they had basically two 
choices: go down with their burning aircraft and be burnt to ashes or fling themselves from the 
burning machine to a certain death.1260 It was the possibility of a death by flames that many 
airmen struggled with, each in their own way. The fear of such a death and the nightmares it 
caused can be found in the diaries maintained by many pilots and observers throughout the 
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war. Some pilots, like James McCudden and Major Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock, carried a 
revolver or pistol with them, not to be used against the Germans if forced down behind enemy 
lines, but to be used on themselves if their aircraft ever caught fire.1261 
 Flying at altitudes well above 10,000 feet, which by the Battle of the Somme was the 
norm and not the exception, without oxygen and experiencing the intense cold at those 
altitudes, often 30 to 40 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, not only impacted the airman’s mental 
capacities but also severely impacted the physical as well.1262 Oxygen deficiency caused 
severe headaches, increased the blood pressure, and caused eye and ear problems but while in 
the air the most dangerous effect was that it dulled the pilot’s thinking as well as his 
reactions.1263 Again, it would not be until late 1917 that RFC medical officers identified the 
many dangers of flying at altitude and began experiments testing the use of oxygen on 
aircrew.1264 
The cockpits of all RFC aircraft were open to the elements and unheated so the danger 
of suffering severe frostbite was a possibility with every flight. Pilots wore several layers of 
flying clothing in an attempt to ward off the intense cold. Long leather coats were worn over 
uniform and coveralls along with thigh length fleece-lined boots. Several sets of gloves 
protected the hands while fur-lined leather helmets and scarves protected head and neck. The 
face was covered in whale-oil or a leather face-mask but aircrew complained that the face-
mask limited visibility and the eyes, covered by goggles, were always the aircrew’s first 
defense against enemy aircraft. After the Somme the RFC would develop electrically heated 
flying suits for bomber crews and an RNAS pilot would develop a one-piece overall that gave 
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greater protection against cold than all other flying clothing developed by either air service. 
By late 1917 it was adopted by many aircrew in both air services.1265  
Fear of death, the intense cold, the lack of oxygen, as well as flying six to eight hours 
a day against an enemy who was often equipped with faster and better armed aircraft 
combined to cause what would be identified as ‘flying fatigue’ or ‘war neurosis.’ Captain 
Dudley Corbett, Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), was responsible for RFC aircrew 
patients at the 24th General Hospital in Etaples, France. He was one of the first medical 
officers to identify ‘flying fatigue’ and his initial findings are worth covering in detail. 
A man first notices that he is beginning to feel generally tired, and that he has 
lost some of his original keenness. His sleep does not refresh him. He gets 
occasional headaches. Later he does not get off to sleep quite so well as he 
did, or he may get off fairly soon, and yet wake up early in the morning. He 
may lose his appetite . . . his sleep may be troubled with dreams of flying and 
fighting, and nightmares of all kinds. He may notice that he is getting 
irritable, and that he cannot stand the society of his friends ‘en masse,’ but 
prefers to go off by himself and read. He probably feels quite fit and keen in 
the air, but has to force himself to go up. After landing, he may be shaky and 
feel utterly exhausted . . . To keep himself going, he may rely on alcohol, and 
although this tendency is rare, but he nearly always smokes too  much, for 
which no one can blame him. He may cease to take trouble about his flying 
and fighting tactics. Tired pilots have confessed to me that they have got into 
a frame of mind, when, if they meet any enemy machine, they feel that they 
must either turn tail or go for it recklessly; they cannot trouble to think about 
maneuvering. I am not sure that many good pilots have not met their end from 
sheer carelessness. They become too tired to think.1266  
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Corbett’s recommended course of action to alleviate the condition was to prescribe ‘regular 
rest days’ for pilots and observers as well as the establishment of rest stations at least ten miles 
from the airfields they operated from. Aircrew believed to be suffering from ‘flying fatigue,’ 
minor illnesses or the emotional effects suffered from crashing an aircraft were to be sent to 
the rest stations for several days before returning to their squadrons.1267 
 RFC Headquarters did establish what by army standards was considered a generous 
leave policy for aircrew flying in France and Flanders. “Each man received fourteen days 
leave in England every three months, and could expect to be reassigned home after five or six 
months in fighter, long-range reconnaissance, and bomber squadrons, and after seven to nine 
months in artillery observation squadrons.”1268 It was believed that a trained fighter pilot could 
fly between 150 and 300 hours before he needed a rest and artillery observation pilots 350 to 
450 hours before they also needed to be rotated back to the UK.1269 
 Trenchard delegated the decision of when aircrew required leave down to his 
squadron commanders but he also worked closely with his wing commanders and Brancker on 
rotating experienced leaders back to England where they could get a rest and at the same time 
use their operational experience to train new aircrew. An analysis of Trenchard’s daily 
correspondence to Brancker during the Battle of the Somme finds that a key point of 
discussion in many of the letters and dispatches focused on which pilots in France needed to 
be sent home for a rest and who in England should be sent out to France as replacements to 
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ensure that there was no let-up in conducting the air campaign.1270 Several brief examples 
provide evidence of Trenchard’s management of his aircrew. “I am sending you Darwin who 
has done splendidly but is undoubtedly tired and weary. Only today he went on a long 
bombing raid of 4 ½ hours, and he has been on most of the long bombing raids. I wonder if 
you could put him into a fighting squadron with some fast scouts . . .”1271  
A week after the battle ended Trenchard was already planning for the air campaign to 
support the British spring offensive in 1917. “I am arranging to send Patrick, Henderson, and 
later on other good scout pilots home now. I hope you will see they are really put into 
Squadrons of the new and powerful types of machines like the De Havilland 4, the De 
Havilland 5 and the S. E. 5 . . . It is essential that we have all the star turns next year in order 
to retain the supremacy. Of this I am certain you will agree, and if you will really see that 
these pilots are put into proper squadrons it will give them two or three months at home and 
bring them out with renewed vigour on new types of machines.”1272 Though Trenchard’s 
primary focus at all times during the air campaign was to ensure that the RFC maintained air 
superiority over and behind the German lines, it was this same objective which led to the high 
number of casualties that the RFC suffered which subsequently forced him to nearly micro-
manage many of the assignments of the replacements that Brancker sent to France. It was the 
high casualty rate that brought further ire on Trenchard from both political as well as military 
leaders. 
 One of the harshest critics of Trenchard’s offensive strategy was Brigadier General P. 
R. C. Groves, a staunch ally of Frederick Sykes, who would serve as Director of Flying 
Operations in 1918 under Sykes after Sykes became Chief of Air Staff. Groves was serving on 
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the RFC staff in Egypt during the air campaign over the Somme but would later argue that 
Trenchard used a “‘schoolboy policy to which the RFC was sacrificed”1273 and because of the 
heavy casualties it suffered the only morale that was adversely affected by conducting 
continuous offensive operations was that of the RFC aircrew.1274 ‘For psychological and 
technical reasons the air arm was far too delicately tempered a weapon for battering ram 
tactics [from 1915 through 1917]. Yet to such it was committed in an unremitting offensive. . . 
This unremitting ‘aggressive policy at all costs’, which it was easy enough to order, 
culminated . . . in the balance being tipped not against the German Air Force but against our 
own.”1275 To further support his argument, Groves used articles from officially sanctioned war 
correspondents as well as entries from the RAF’s Official History to support his contention 
that Trenchard had used the wrong strategy and by doing so had very nearly destroyed the 
RFC.1276 But again, Groves was critical of the strategy only after the war was over. 
One of the most recognizable correspondents that Groves used to support his 
argument was Philip Gibbs, who by 1915 had become one of only five official war 
correspondents attached to the BEF. By the Battle of the Somme, Gibbs had earned an 
excellent reputation from both political and military leaders as well as the soldier in the 
ranks.1277 One of the passages that Gibbs wrote that Groves used to buttress his case stated that  
General Trenchard, their supreme chief, believed in an aggressive policy, at 
all costs, and was a Napoleon in the war in the skies, intolerant of timidity, 
not squeamish of heavy losses if the balance was tipped against the enemy. 
Some young flying men complained to me, bitterly, that they were expected 
to fly or die over the German lines, whatever the weather, or whatever the 
risks. Many of them repeated escapes from anti-aircraft shells and hostile 
craft, lost their nerve, shirked another journey, found themselves crying in 
their tents, and were sent back home for a spell, by squadron commanders, 
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with quick observation for the breaking point; or made a few more flights, and 
fell to earth like broken birds.1278  
 
In writing about the strategies used by both the RFC and GAAS over the Somme, Gibbs added 
that “There were times when our flying-men gained an absolute supremacy . . . as a rule, and 
by order, the German pilots flew with more caution, not wasting their strength in unequal 
contests. It was a sound policy, and enabled them to come back again in force and hold the 
field for a time by powerful concentrations. But in the battles of the Somme our airmen, at a 
heavy cost of life, kept the enemy down a while and blinded his eyes.”1279 Gibbs’ observation 
of what was taking place above the Somme in the summer of 1916 was accurate and it is easy 
to see why Groves would use the writing of one of Britain’s few sanctioned war 
correspondents to support his argument.  
 Probably the most damning of all statements of Trenchard’s offensive strategy 
however came from an officer in Number 1 Squadron. “Trenchard follows the good military 
principle of repeating any tactics that have not been actually disastrous-and often those that 
have-again and again, regardless of the fact that the enemy will probably think out some very 
good reply, until they really are so disastrous that they have to be abandoned.”1280 This 
squadron operated north of the Somme in the Ypres sector and was only indirectly involved in 
the battle. Its crucible experience occurred the following year. In one week in May, 1917 the 
squadron lost nine aircraft, four of which were shot down attacking German observation 
balloons in a single morning. From 15 February through 1 July, 1917 the squadron lost 36 
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aircraft due to enemy action. In sum the squadron suffered 200% casualties during that four 
month period.1281 
 Trenchard was no fool. He understood more than most that his strategy of a “relentless 
and incessant” offensive was costly in both lives and aircraft. Regardless of the intrigue and 
inquiry concerning the validity of the strategy that was taking place within the War Office and 
Parliament, he stayed firmly focused on his stated objective which was to maintain air 
superiority over the Somme during the ground offensive.1282 He firmly believed that by 
following this strategy it would keep the Luftstreitkrafte on the defensive and allow the BEF 
to conduct its operations without interference from the enemy air service. Unlike air power 
strategists of the inter-war and Second World War periods, Trenchard never argued that air 
power would be decisive in its own right. He was a realist who understood the strengths and 
shortcomings of the technology then available and advocated that the RFC could provide 
critical support to the ground forces in assisting them in the accomplishment of their tasks.1283 
By using aircraft to conduct both tactical and strategic reconnaissance, observe and direct 
artillery fire, contact patrols with the infantry, bombing of command and control facilities, 
logistics centers as well as air combat to prevent the enemy air service from doing the same to 
friendly forces, Trenchard believed that air power could provide the army on the modern 
battlefield valuable support to assist it in achieving its objectives.1284 It was these same tenets 
that would eventually evolve into the concepts of air superiority, offensive and defensive 
operations in the air as well as interdiction and close air support that nearly every air force 
involved in the Second World War would use to conduct their own air campaign.  These same 
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tenets would be used in Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the first Gulf War and are still 
in use by modern air forces today.1285 
 The beginnings of the last phase of the Somme offensive witnessed several attacks by 
the Fourth Army which were conducted on 7, 12, and 18 October, but none were 
successful.1286 What was worse, a pattern was discernable in the results. Prior to and during 
each attack, bad weather had hampered the RFC from observing for the artillery which 
prevented the bombardment from being as effective as it could have been.1287 Steady rain 
began to turn the ground into a morass, making it extremely difficult for the infantry, and even 
more so for the artillery, to advance.1288 It was during the first week of October that British 
forward units noticed a change in what was taking place in the skies over the Somme 
battlefield. With an increasing regularity low-flying German aircraft were crossing the British 
lines and strafing front-line units and then returning to their own lines unopposed by RFC 
fighter squadrons. “Our aircraft were not as bold or efficient as usual” a Canadian battalion 
commander recorded.1289   
Haig and Rawlinson still demanded and expected positive results from the infantry. 
Further attacks against the Transloy Line occurred on 23, 28, and 29 October but none of them 
were successful.1290 The Fourth Army had fought its way into a valley by the end of 
September and since that time had been trying to fight its way out. Though thick fog and low 
clouds obscured the battlefield, flights of German aircraft flew at tree-top level over Fourth 
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Army units and were not molested by RFC aircraft. Trenchard tried to alleviate some of the 
pressure on his squadrons by bombing German airfields and key logistic centers in the 
German rear area. The results were almost predictable. “A bombing raid of the 3rd Brigade 
consisting of 16 bombing machines and an escort of 14 was attacked on its way to Vraucourt 
by at least 30 Germans, chiefly fast scouts. The enemy attacked from the front, and our scouts 
dived and got to close quarters with them. As the fight progressed the escort got gradually 
below the bombing machines. Meanwhile the enemy was reinforced and the bombers were 
attacked from both sides. Numerous individual fights ensued.”1291 The RFC lost three BE 2cs, 
and two DH 2s shot down and two other DH 2s were damaged but landed safely behind the 
British lines. Aircrew casualties were two killed, five wounded, and seven missing in action, 
later confirmed to be prisoners of war.1292  
Haig realized that the worsening weather and the onset of winter would end the 
campaign before the year was over. He thus committed his army to another series of attacks to 
gain the high ground that the Transloy Line was situated on.  
The prospects for future operations were now extremely bleak. Incessant rain had 
turned the battlefield into a quagmire. Only with the greatest difficulty could 
ammunition for the guns and food and water for the troops reach the front. The mud 
confined all traffic supplying the Fourth Army to a single road from Longueval to 
Flers.1293 
During the last two weeks of October, the Luftstreitkrafte made determined efforts to prevent 
British reconnaissance and artillery observation from accomplishing their missions deep 
behind the German lines. The RFC daily communiqué for 20 October reported more than 80 
air combats taking place.1294 British casualties were three pilots killed, five wounded, and 
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another three missing in action.1295 With the increase of German air activity, Trenchard made 
the decision to transfer three corps and two fighter squadrons operating in the Ypres sector in 
Flanders south to the Fourth Army sector on the Somme.1296 The fighter squadrons, Numbers 
29 and 32 were equipped with the DH 2. Additionally, two new squadrons, Number 41 
equipped with FE 8’se and Number 46 with Nieuport two-seaters arrived from England on 13 
and 26 October, respectively.1297 The FE 8 was very similar to the DH 2 in both design and 
armament but was already obsolete as compared to the Albatros and Halberstadt fighters.1298 
Lieutenant Gwilym Lewis, a fighter pilot with Number 32 Squadron, noted the increased 
aggressiveness in the German pilots.   
It so happens that just at present we are living in busy times. The Huns are making the 
best effort to take over the air supremacy they have made since July, and a lively time 
they are giving we poor wretched DH pilots who are responsible for keeping them 
back. . . . [T]he good days of July and August, when two or three DHs used to push 
half-a-dozen Huns onto the chimney tops of Bapaume, are no more.1299 
From 22 through 31 October, the RFC was only able to fly five of the ten days due to extreme 
bad weather but still lost 18 aircraft in that span with twenty-four aircrew killed, six wounded 
and six more taken prisoner.1300 The British fighter squadrons, now for the most part flying 
obsolescent aircraft, were finding it more and more difficult to protect the corps aircraft from 
being attacked by the superior German fighters. The BE 2 series two-seater squadrons were 
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suffering nearly 40% casualties and all total nearly 90% of all RFC casualties for the month of 
October were inflicted by the German Jastas which were led by men of Boelcke’s caliber.1301   
 Lewis’s reflective comment above confirms that the fact that he, as well most of the 
aircrew in the RFC, had come to realize that the Luftstreitkrafte was increasing its efforts to 
regain some measure of air superiority over the Somme before winter set in. Of more concern 
to the British airmen was the realization that their patrols were engaging larger numbers of 
German aircraft over the British lines, which had been almost unheard of before late 
September. Witnessing first-hand the increased aerial activity and predicting (albeit several 
weeks after the fact) that the Germans were about to increase their efforts to regain mastery of 
the air over the Somme, the Military Correspondent of The Times reported during the second 
week of November that: 
One of the chief evidences of the new activity has been the great aerial battle, 
wherein some 70 aeroplanes were engaged, which the official communiqué 
has alreadt mentioned. It took place between 9 and 10 o’clock on the morning 
of November 9 well over the German lines in the direction of Vaux-
Vraucourt, north-east of Bapaume, whither certain of our aeroplanes were 
bound on a bombing expedition. With them were fighting machines and 
scouts, making in all a fleet of 30. Near the villa of Mory, just before reaching 
Vaux-Vraucourt, they sighted an enemy squadron somewhat outnumbering 
themselves, the actual strength being something from 36 to 40 aeroplanes. We 
[the British] attacked at once. Some of our machines were flying at a higher 
level than the enemy, and they plunged headlong to join in the general 
engagement, which was fought at an average height of not much above 5,000 
feet. Of the melee which followed it is impossible to get any coherent account, 
for no man in it had time or thought for anything except the enemy machines 
with which  he was engaged; but for 20 minutes there raged among the clouds 
such a battle as the world has never seen: an inextricable tangle of single 
combats, of darting, swirling machines, the air filled with the roar of 70 
propellers and the chatter of guns. Four of our machines were lost. . . in the 
ships that came home, one brought a dead observer and two others, with 
                                                            
1301 Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, 292-300. See also Trevor Henshaw, The Sky 
Their Battlefield, 119-123 and Alex Revell, British Single-Seater Fighter Squadrons on the Western 
Front in World War I, 43.   
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wounded pilots, had difficulty in beating up against the wind and landing in 
our lines.1302 
RFC aircrew claimed three German aircraft destroyed and three more badly damaged. British 
losses were even higher than reported by The Times correspondent. The RFC in fact lost three 
bombers and four fighters shot down during the air battle.1303 Of greater significance was the 
fact that this air engagement had involved such a large number of aircraft; all total more than 
seventy took part. It was in fact the largest air battle of the war yet seen.1304 It was a 
demonstration of what would become the norm in the skies over the Western Front in the last 
two years of the war.  
As the Luftstreitkrafte strove to wrest air superiority away from the RFC it suffered a 
terrible blow to its tactical leadership at the Jagdstaffeln level. On 28 October, two DH 2’s 
from Number 24 Squadron, piloted by Lieutenants Knight and McKay, were attacked by 
Boelcke and eleven other fighter aircraft from Jasta 2 over Pozieres. Knight was flying at 
8,000 feet and McKay was about 1,500 feet below him when the German fighters dove from a 
height of 10,000 feet onto the two British aircraft. Lieutenant Knight received most of the 
focus of the German pilots as at least eight of them began to pursue him. A melee ensued as 
Knight and McKay skillfully avoided the combined strength of twenty-four machine guns 
mounted on twelve Albatros D IIs that were being flown by some of Germany’s best fighter 
pilots. Two of the Albatros fighters dove upon Knight and without seeing one another until the 
last possible moment made just the slightest contact with one another. Boelcke’s wingman, 
                                                            
1302 ‘The Air War: Renewed Enemy Activity’, The Times, 13 November, 1916, 9. 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive. Accessed on 21 July, 2010. See also the official communiqué for 9 
November, 1916, contained in Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, 306-307. 
1303 RFC War Diary, September-December, 1916, AIR 1/1184/204/5/2595, NA. See also Trevor 
Henshaw,  The Sky Their Battlefield, 124-125. 
1304 Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, , ed. Christopher Cole, 304. 
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Leutnant Erwin Bohme recorded the split-second decisions that had to be made when aircraft 
operated in a life or death situation during a dog-fight. 
Boelcke and I just got one Englishman between us when another opponent, 
chased by friend Richthofen, cut across us. Quick as lightening, Boelcke and I 
both dodged him, but for a moment our wings prevented us from seeing 
anything of one another─and that was the cause of it. How am I to describe 
my sensations from the moment when Boelcke suddenly loomed up a few 
meters away on my right! He put his machine down and I pulled mine up.1305 
 
Von Richthofen was sickened by what he saw take place immediately after his 
squadron commander’s collision with Leutnant Bohme’s aircraft. 
Boelcke drew away from his victim and descended in large curves. I had not 
the feeling that he was falling, but when I saw him descending below me I 
noticed that part of his planes had broken off. I could not see what was 
happening afterwards, but in the clouds he lost an entire plane. Now his 
machine was no longer controllable. It fell accompanied all the time by 
Boelcke’s faithful friend [Bohme].1306 
 
 
In the chaos of the fight, Bohme’s landing gear had made contact with Boelcke’s top wing. 
After the collision occurred the remaining German aircraft broke off their attacks against the 
two RFC pilots who then turned westwards to return to their airfield unmolested. It would be 
several days before Knight and McKay would learn that the Albatros fighter with the damaged 
wing had actually crashed only minutes after the collision had taken place, its pilot killed. 
They also learned that at the controls of the Albatros had been the renowned Jasta commander 
Oswald Boelcke.  
In less than eight weeks on the Somme, Boelcke had shot down twenty British 
aircraft, bringing his victory total to forty just two days before he was killed.1307 As an 
                                                            
1305 Johannes Werner, Knight of Germany, 229. 
1306Manfred Von Richthofen, The Red Air Fighter, (London: Greenhill Books Lionel Leventhal 
Limited, 1990), 96-97. 
1307Christopher Campbell, Aces and Aircraft of World War I, (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc.,1981), 
44-46. See also Air Historical Branch, The Royal Air Force in the Great War, 131. 
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innovator and teacher of fighter tactics, Boelcke had no peer within the Luftstreitkrafte. He led 
his Jasta with skill and courage, earning the respect of his own army and air service as well his 
opponents, the aircrews of the RFC.1308 In leading his squadron he played a significant role in 
challenging the RFC’s superiority over the Somme. During the battle, he had developed seven 
tenets for air combat which became known as the Dicta Boelcke, the standard reference for 
German pilots on air fighting and fighter tactics. It would be issued to a new generation of 
fighter pilots during the Second World War.1309 The pilot who had been involved in the mid-
air collision with the Jasta 2 squadron leader provided a fitting epitaph for what the loss of 
Boelcke meant to the Luftstreitkrafte. 
A harder blow could not have befallen us. . . Only very gradually do we 
realize what a gap our Boelcke leaves and how the soul of our entity had 
departed with him. In every respect he was our unique master. He exercised a 
forceful influence on all who came in contact with him, including his 
superiors, purely by virtue of his personality and the naturalness of his 
character. He could lead us anywhere he pleased. When he was with us, we 
never felt that anything could possibly go wrong, and so we succeeded in 
practically everything we did. In this last month and a half he has enabled us 
to put over sixty enemy machines out of action. The superiority of the English 
waned daily. Now we others must look to it that his triumphant spirit does not 
depart from the Staffel.1310 
 
If the Germans could derive any good news from Boelcke’s death it was the legacy that the 
squadron commander had left his pilots. He had been a mentor, coach and trainer and as an 
expert tactician he had taught his lessons to the men of Jasta 2 so well that in the coming year, 
many of his pupils would equal or surpass his number of aerial victories and just as many 
would rise to command flights and squadrons within the Luftstreitkrafte.1311 All would give 
Boelcke full credit for teaching them how to lead and command men in the air. In his honor, 
                                                            
1308 Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft 1914-1918, 64.   
1309Aaron Norman, The Great Air War, 108-109. See also Christopher Campbell, Aces and Aircraft of 
World War I, 45.  
1310 Johannes Werner, Knight of Germany, 232. 
1311 Alex Imrie, German Fighter Units: 1914-May, 1917,  39. 
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Jasta 2 was renamed Jasta Boelcke. Boelcke’s value to the overall German war effort was 
captured well by Captain Hans Ritter: 
Under the leadership of Boelcke the German Jagdstaffels accomplished the wonderful 
feat of gradually checking the activities of the enemy aircraft to such an extent, 
despite their numerical superiority, that our own reconnaissance machines were eased 
of their burdens and could work again; at the same time they had sufficient forces left 
to put a very perceptible check on the activities of the enemy artillery planes that 
hitherto worked practically unmolested. . . . The attacks of the Entente lost a 
considerable amount of thrust when their unconditional supremacy of the air was 
abolished.1312 
Though the RFC would honor the memory of their dead German nemesis, the battle for air 
superiority over the Somme remained in the balance. As October turned to November, and 
with Haig realizing he could expect little more from Rawlinson’s exhausted Fourth Army, the 
BEF commander, chose Lieutenant General Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army (formerly the 
Reserve Army) the task of capturing Beaumont Hamel before winter arrived.1313 
The accomplishments of the RFC during the remainder of the offensive were not as 
spectacular as those they had achieved in the spring and summer.1314 For sheer tenaciousness, 
its pilots and observers struggled through horrendous weather to support the Fourth Army 
flying dangerously low to register the guns, conduct reconnaissance and attack infantry and 
supply convoys with their machine-guns and bombs. There was no doubt that the British 
infantry suffered much worse from the weather and the conditions it caused, but during every 
hour of daylight, the soldiers knew that the RFC would be above them, providing whatever 
support was required. No matter the cost.1315 
                                                            
1312Johannes Werner’s Knight of Germany, 217. 
1313 Martin Gilbert, The Somme: Heroism and Horror in the First World War, 222-224. 
1314WITA, Vol. II, 314. 
1315Ibid., 314. 
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The final ground attack took place on 13 November when the Fifth Army captured 
Beaumont Hamel and the remainder of the Thiepval-Ginchy Road.1316 The Battle of the 
Somme officially came to a close on 18 November when Haig called a halt to offensive 
operations (see Map 3). Fighting continued for another twenty-four hours until ‘abominable’  
weather conditions brought the fighting to a halt.1317 The battlefield had become a quagmire 
from the continuous rains, which had begun falling from early October on.  
From Boelcke’s death to the end of the Battle of the Somme Jasta 2 was commanded 
by Leutnant Stefan Kirmaier and the squadron shot down twenty-five RFC aircraft in just 
three weeks. On 22 November, Kirmaier was shot down and killed by Captain John “Jock” 
Andrews and Second Lieutenant K. Crawford, both of Number 24 Squadron.1318 The Albatros 
D II fell behind the British lines, another sign that the Luftstreitkrafte was willing to take the 
offensive when it saw fit to do so and not remain strictly on the defensive as it had for the 
most part during the first five months of the air campaign.1319 
The next day, less than a week after the Somme offensive was officially declared over 
by Haig, an aerial combat took place between one of the RFC’s most accomplished pilots and 
a relatively unknown German aviator of the Luftstreitkrafte that would have major 
repercussions for the RFC, both in the near-term as well long-term future.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1316Michael Chappell, The Somme, 1916: Crucible of a British Army, 114. 
1317Ibid., 118-119. See also Chris McCarthy, The Somme: The Day-by-Day Account, (London: Arms & 
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Map 4: The Somme: The End of the Battle, November 1916. Arthur Conan 
Doyle, A History of the Great War, Vol. 3: The British Campaign in France 
and Flanders, 1916. (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), xiv. 
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Four DH 2’s of Andrews’ A Flight took off from Number 24 Squadron’s airfield at 
Bertangles, near Amiens, to conduct a patrol over the Fourth Army front. A midday rain had 
just stopped falling and C Flight had recently returned from its morning patrol after escorting 
two reconnaissance aircraft to German-held Bapaume. The British pilots reported seeing large 
formations of German fighters east of Bapaume as they returned towards the British lines.1320                   
Number 24’s squadron commander, Major Lanoe Hawker surmised that the Germans 
were lying in wait for the next flight of British reconnaissance aircraft. Despite the order 
forbidding squadron commanders from flying over the lines into enemy territory, Hawker 
made the decision to accompany A Flight as its fourth member. Led by Andrews, the flight 
also included Lieutenants John H. Crutch and Robert H. M. S. Saundby; all four were very 
experienced fighter pilots.1321 
At 1310 Crutch’s DH 2 developed engine trouble and he signaled Andrews that he 
was returning to base. A Flight crossed the lines at 11,000 feet at 1330. The remaining three 
pilots noticed an air battle in progress over Grandcourt between several British Nieuport 
fighters and a flight of German Albatros fighters. When Andrews turned his flight to assist the 
Nieuports the Germans spotted the DH 2’s and disengaged from the fight and headed east.1322  
Twenty minutes later Andrews spotted two German Roland two-seater observation 
aircraft flying below the British flight at 6,000 feet northeast of Bapaume. He gave the signal 
to attack. ”I attacked two Hostile Aircraft (HA) just North East of Bapaume and drove them 
East when I observed two strong patrols of HA Scouts above me.”1323 Realizing that the 
reconnaissance aircraft had been bait for a trap, Andrews estimated that an entire German 
squadron was diving on the three DH 2’s who were deep behind German lines. He quickly 
                                                            
1320Tyrrel M. Hawker, Hawker V. C., 230. 
1321Ibid. 
1322Royal Flying Corps, 1915-1916, ed. Christopher Cole, 323. 
1323Number 24 Squadron air combat report, 23 November, 1916, AIR 1/1221/204/5/2634, NA.  
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decided his only course of action was to turn westwards and lead his flight back to base as fast 
as possible.1324 
Andrews and Saundby made a wide right turn, but Hawker, either because he thought 
Andrews was turning back due to engine trouble or because he was intent on pursuing the 
retreating enemy aircraft 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1324Number 24 Squadron air combat report, 23 November, 1916, AIR 1/1221/204/5/2634, NA.    
Captain John ‘Jock’ Andrews, Number 24 
Squadron, November, 1916. (RAFM)
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that had been engaging the Nieuports, continued to fly east. Realizing that the German 
squadron was drawing ever nearer to Hawker, Andrews continued the circle instead of 
breaking for home, with Saundby still off his right wing, then went after Hawker, hoping to 
head off the German attack.1325 Andrews fired twenty-five rounds at one of the German 
aircraft when it was less than one hundred feet above and behind Hawker. The enemy fighter 
fell into a steep dive, but more importantly, Hawker turned his head and realized he had 
become a target for at least ten German Albatros D II’s. No one has been able to ascertain why 
Hawker continued to pursue the two retreating Roland aircraft. It may have been because he 
had lost situational awareness and became fixated on shooting down the German aircraft and 
was simply following his own dictum of “Attack Everything.”1326 
Andrews came under attack within seconds, several bullets tearing into his engine and 
gas tank of his DH 2. His engine stopped, but he managed to turn west, putting his plane into a 
steep dive in an attempt to glide back to British lines. Taking one last look behind him, he saw 
Hawker flying in circles with a lone German fighter at about 3,000 feet.1327 One of the 
Germans pursued Andrews, but Saundby got behind the unsuspecting enemy and emptied 
most of a 97-round drum from his Lewis gun into his wings. The Albatros fell into a spin. 
Saundby waved to his flight leader and then turned eastwards in search of other enemy 
aircraft. Two miles inside the German lines, Hawker was engaged in a deadly ballet with a 
lone D II piloted by Manfred von Richthofen who since his initiation against the RFC as a 
fighter pilot eight weeks before had earned ten aerial victories. As the two antagonists circled 
with each striving to get on the other’s tail, the German quickly realized that he was up against 
                                                            
1325Tyrrel M. Hawker, Hawker V. C., 232. 
1326 Ibid., 182. 
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a very experienced pilot.1328 Nevertheless, he thought if he was patient the Englishman would 
eventually run low on fuel and have to make a break for the British lines. Von Richthofen later 
recorded that the two antagonists “circled twenty times to the left, and then thirty times to the 
right. Each tried to get behind and above the other.”1329 Accounts vary but most aviation 
historians agree that the air battle lasted nearly thirty minutes with neither pilot gaining an 
advantage over his opponent.1330  
As the two fighters continued to circle they gradually descended from 5,000 feet to 
less than 300 feet. With the DH 2 running low on fuel, Hawker made the decision to make a 
dash for the British lines. Richthofen snapped his Albatros into a tight bank and went straight 
for the Englishman’s tail. Both men were flying less than 150 feet over the pockmarked 
battlefield. Hawker zigzagged first left then right hoping to present a more difficult target but 
at the same time he lost precious speed. A stream of machine-gun fire tore past his left wing, 
then past his right.1331 
With the DH 2 less than a quarter mile from the British trenches and after using up 
nearly 900 of his 1,000 rounds of ammunition; and also having had to clear two jammed guns 
in the process, von Richthofen drew to within sixty feet of the DH 2, squeezed the trigger and 
watched as his rounds struck the British aircraft’s engine and cockpit. The DH 2 straightened 
for a moment before nosing downward, crashing into a water-filled shell-hole less than one 
hundred yards from the British lines.1332 Major Lanoe Hawker, VC was dead, a single bullet 
had hit him in the back of the head. Richthofen later wrote that he took great pride in shooting 
down “the English Boelcke.” 
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My Englishman was a good sportsman, but by and by the thing became a little too hot 
for him. He had to decide whether he would land on German ground or whether he 
would fly back to the English lines. Of course, he tried the latter, after endeavoring in 
vain to escape me by loopings and such tricks. At that time my first bullets were 
flying around him, for so far neither of us had been able to do any shooting. When he 
had come down to about 300 feet he tried to escape by flying in a zigzag course, 
which makes it difficult for an observer on the ground to shoot. That was my most 
favorable moment. I followed him at an altitude of from 250 to 150 feet firing all the 
time. The Englishman could not help falling. But the jamming of my guns nearly 
robbed me of my success. My opponent fell shot through the head 150 feet behind our 
line.1333 
German infantry buried Hawker next to the wreckage of his DH 2 and sent the serial number 
of his aircraft along with its Lewis gun to von Richthofen as trophies. Hawker’s grave was lost 
during the following two years of near continuous fighting in the area around Bapaume. It was 
von Richthofen’s 11th victory but more importantly, the air combat between Hawker and the 
young German ace was a significant event in that the results confirmed that to both the British 
and the Germans that unless the RFC received a better fighter aircraft than the Albatros or the 
Halberstadt fighters, it would only be a matter of weeks before the RFC’s superiority in the air 
over the Somme came to an end. 
On the day that Hawker was killed but prior to being informed of the death of one of 
his premier squadron commander’s, Trenchard provided an assessment of his German 
counterpart to Brancker. As he had predicted, the new commander of the Luftstreitkrafte was 
allowing his squadrons to take offensive action as was evidenced by the number of air battles 
that were now taking place behind the British lines. 
You will be glad to hear that the new dictator the Germans have appointed has 
been bustling the German Flying Corps a good deal more, with the result we 
got two machines across the lines when you were out here, four, if not five, 
yesterday, and I believe one or two today, but I have not heard for certain. 
This dictator was the Chief of the Staff to the 2nd German Army all through 
the battle of the Somme and fighting opposite to us. Therefore he knows the 
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importance of aeroplanes and has seen the ineffectual work of his. So we may 
now expect a great improvement in the German Flying Corps.1334 
 
Within hours after the air combat between Hawker and von Richthofen, RFC Headquarters 
posted Hawker as ‘Missing’ and within days it was confirmed that Hawker had in fact been 
killed in action.1335 The circle was complete. In June, the Germans had lost their premier 
fighter pilot in Max Immelmann, only two weeks before the start of the Somme offensive. It 
was an event which signified that the RFC had in fact regained air superiority. Then in late 
October the renowned Jasta leader, Oswald Boelcke was killed. Now the death of Hawker 
was proof that the pendulum had swung back in favor of the Germans. Probably of greater 
significance, however, was the fact that the DH 2, which had eclipsed the Fokker Eindecker in 
the spring and summer, had now been surpassed by the Albatros and Halberstadt fighters.1336 
The day after Hawker had been shot down and killed Trenchard notified Brancker and 
the War Office of the squadron commander’s loss with a single sentence: “You will be sorry 
to hear that Hawker is lost.” He then summarized both the successes and losses of the RFC for 
the day. “Yesterday was another great day of aerial fighting and we crashed five Germans for 
certain on their side of the lines, and several others went down hit. We lost three machines; 
one was a Naval one─the first one.”1337  Trenchard and most of his commanders knew that no 
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matter how a good a fighter pilot Hawker was, flying an aircraft that was outmatched by at 
least three more advanced German models; in engine speed, maneuverability and fire-power, 
had meant his doom. For the RFC, air superiority, not only above the Somme, but the entire 
Western Front, was over unless they received better aircraft than those the Germans were 
equipped with. To make matters worse the heavy casualties of the last month of the air 
campaign was causing the RFC commander even greater concern that it had during the 
summer and fall. “The pilot question is making me very uneasy. If we are going on with this 
fighting all through the winter every fine day and lose on an average each fine day anything 
between 8 and 12 pilots either killed, wounded or missing we shall have to take drastic steps I 
think to get pilots from the Navy. There is no doubt they have some good pilots.”1338  
Brancker had met with Trenchard at his headquarters in France the week before 
Hawker’s death and upon his return to England provided Lord Curzon an assessment that fully 
supported the RFC commander’s concerns.1339 Brancker acknowledged the impact of the 
reorganization of the German air service and its achievements in staving off defeat in July and 
August during the air campaign over the Somme. He concluded with a dire warning that 
unless the RFC received more advanced aircraft in the coming months the Luftstreitkrafte 
would in all likelihood prevent the Allied air services from gaining aerial superiority prior to 
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the next Allied offensive that was already in the initial planning stages to occur in the spring 
of 1917.  
The situation as regards Fighting Aeroplanes is most disquieting . . . there is 
no doubt in my mind . . . that the Germans have certainly two and probably 
three new types of Fighting Aeroplanes which are superior in performance to 
the majority of ours and which are flying at over 100 miles an hour at 10,000 
feet. These German machines have appeared in considerable numbers and are 
not, therefore, the preliminary machines of experimental types, but standard 
and properly developed Fighting Aeroplanes. . . they completely outclass our 
F. E. 8’s, De Havilland Scouts, and F. E. 2’s. . . The creation of what is 
practically a Minister for Air in Germany is a very significant sign. The 
Germans have suffered severely at our hands from the air during the Somme 
offensive. Never before has aircraft been used so continuously and so 
effectively for independent offensive action, let alone so thoroughly in co-
operation with the artillery and infantry. Obviously Germany must have 
realized their inferiority in this respect and grasped the enormous importance 
of aerial supremacy on the battle field. To me, the creation of this Air 
Minister indicates that Germany intends to devote all possible energy to 
obtaining aerial supremacy on the Western Front, even at the expense of their 
other arms. Unless British Aviation can carry more weight in the eyes of 
Government than it does at present, we must be prepared to face a very ugly 
situation at the beginning of next spring.1340  
 
Two weeks later Trenchard confirmed Brancker’s observations with some detailed analysis of 
the new German aircraft, several of which were provided to the RFC when the German airmen 
were wounded and forced to land behind the British lines. In his opening statement Trenchard 
predicted that the RFC would be “in for a very bad time if we do not have a few fast machines 
out here, and I am afraid it will mean that I shall have to ask the Chief to ask for a lot of Naval 
Squadrons because they certainly seem to have faster machines than we have.”1341 Trenchard 
was referring to the Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutter and the smaller and more agile Sopwith Pup, 
the latter having been assigned to ‘Naval 8’ Squadron in October, 1916.1342  
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In its short time at the front it had attained much success against the Albatros, Fokker, and 
Halberstadt fighters that it had encountered.1343 
There is no doubt that the Albatross Scout is faster than all of our F. E. 2b’s, 
F. E. 8’s, De Havillands and B. E. 12’s and it also maintains its speed fairly 
well at height. Also there is no doubt that it has two guns firing ahead it can 
bring more powerful fire to bear, and in the event of a jam it can use a second 
gun. . . German prisoners lately captured state that they are bringing out a 
single-seater Albatross Scout with a 230 hp. Mercedes in it which will be 
faster than anything on the front. The prisoners also stated that the present 
Albatross is faster than the Nieuport at a height, but it does not climb as well. 
I think this is correct. The only squadrons I have at present which are good 
enough for fighting are one squadron of single-seater Nieuports, one squadron 
of F.E. 2d’s [and] by converting No. 1 Squadron into single-seater Nieuports, 
I get three fighting squadrons. By converting No. 19 into SPADS I get 4, the 
Naval Squadron of 8 Sopwiths makes 5, you are going to send me out another 
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squadron of 8 Sopwiths which makes six fighting squadrons. I think I shall 
have to try and get 3 or 4 Squadrons of better machines from the Navy which 
I will talk to you about when I come home. This will make nine fighting 
squadrons and we must have 20.1344  
 
Had the Luftstreitkrafte pressed its advantage it could very well have defeated the combined 
efforts of the RFC and the Aviation Militaire. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans were 
content to remain on the defensive. Though they established some semblance of superiority in 
the air when and where they chose, the Luftstreitkrafte never achieved the dominance that the 
RFC had attained from April through September. This was probably in part because of the 
realization by von Hoeppner that the Germans could never match the numerical superiority of 
the British and French air services that would have enabled them to overwhelm the Allies in 
the air.1345  
The Battle of the Somme officially ended on 18 November, 1916. The fighting had 
lasted for 140 days and the casualties for the three major combatants were horrific.1346 As best 
as can be determined the British/Dominion forces suffered a total of 432,000 men killed, 
wounded or missing or about 3,600 for every day of the battle.1347 The British Fourth and Fifth 
Army “had advanced exactly six miles and were still four miles short of Bapaume, which the 
cavalry had hoped to take in the opening attack.”1348  The French suffered 204,253 total 
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1346 Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, (New York: W. W. Norton  & Company, Inc., 
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Jackson, 1996), 252. 
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casualties and the Germans between 460,000 and 600,000.1349 At the cost of more than 1.3 
million men, an area twenty-five miles long and seven miles deep had changed hands.1350 For 
a number of reasons, including unseasonable weather, the offensive on the Somme had ended 
in stalemate as the Allies did not gain the objectives that they had set out to capture on either 
side of the Somme. Haig, however claimed the Battle of the Somme as a victory. In his 
dispatch of 23 December, 1916, titled “The Opening of the Wearing-Out Battle”, the BEF 
commander reiterated that the three objectives he had established for the offensive had been 
accomplished.1351 First, the BEF had relieved the pressure on Verdun. Second, the BEF had 
assisted the Italians and the Russians by preventing the “further transfer of German troops 
from the Western front” to the other theaters of operation, and thirdly, the “enemy’s strength 
had been considerably worn down.”1352 In the same dispatch Haig wrote: 
Anyone of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme battle. The 
attainment of all of them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of our 
                                                            
1349 Historians continue to debate the number of casualties suffered by the German armies during the 
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does Andrew A. Wiest. See A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme, (London: Severn House Publishers, 
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Company, 1963), 235-236. The actual numbers may never be known as the German records were 
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troops and for their sacrifices made by ourselves and our Allies. They have brought us 
a long step forward towards the final victory of the Allied cause.1353 
Recent historical research has challenged Haig’s contention that the Somme was a British 
victory. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have argued that Haig and his staff began planning for 
an offensive on the Somme before the Germans attacked the French at Verdun. Instead of 
attacking towards the French sector south of the Somme to assist his hard-pressed allies, Haig 
directed the Fourth Army to attack towards the north-east and away from the French which 
only then forced the Germans to transfer divisions away from Verdun.1354 Thus, according to 
Prior and Wilson, only indirectly did the British relieve pressure from the French forces 
fighting at Verdun. They further argue that Haig’s forces did not prevent the transfer of 
German units to reinforce the other theaters of war during the Battle of the Somme, stating the 
“Fifteen German divisions left for the east during the course of the battle and this number 
proved quite capable of overrunning Rumania when that country rashly entered the war on the 
Allied side.”1355  And finally, Haig’s claim that the German Army had suffered significant 
damage because of the ‘one continuous battle’ was also in error. The error was not so much in 
the number of casualties inflicted on the German armies facing the BEF but in the fact that 
Haig had originally planned for a breakthrough on the Somme and not for an attrition battle 
that would last many months.1356 Even the British Army’s Official Historian surmised that 
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“The Somme offensive had no strategic object except attrition.”1357 He went further to argue 
that “Even a complete breakthrough, unless carried very far, would not have led to an 
interruption of the main German communications . . .  and the Allies would have found 
themselves between two German Armies with intact communications.” 1358   
During the offensive Haig had approved four separate attacks during each of the three 
phases of the campaign whose aim was to cause a rupture of the German positions leading to a 
breakout which he believed would then result in victory for the Allies and possibly end the 
war, the first of which was the initial attack that began the battle.1359 It was not until late 
October, when it was obvious that the Somme campaign would have to be ended because of 
the increasingly poor weather that Haig began openly discussing his intent for a war-winning 
offensive in 1917.1360 Malcolm Brown supports both Prior and Wilson’s contentions and 
argues that Haig “saw the main purpose of the campaign as attritional rather than that of 
achieving an outright breakthrough.”1361  Like so many of his peers in the British, French and 
German armies, Haig was intent on winning the decisive battle that would end the war and he 
planned for the attack on the Somme to do just that. Noted historian John Terraine has argued 
rather convincingly that the Battle of the Somme “was a victory; and at the same time, of 
course it was a disaster. It was above all a human disaster, because in the in four and a half 
months of its duration the three largest Powers of Western Europe sustained losses amounting 
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to a million and a quarter men.”1362 Furthermore, he states that “within the terms of reference 
of the 1914-1918 War, the Battle of the Somme was an unquestionable Allied victory, mainly 
a British one, because it laid the essential foundation for the final defeat of the Germans in the 
field.”1363 The pressure that the BEF and the French armies applied on the Somme during the 
summer and fall of 1916 did prove to be a vital element in the weakening of the German 
Army. Though it would take another two years until final victory was achieved, the Battle of 
the Somme was the beginning of the end for the Kaiser’s Army. As the German senior 
military leadership later acknowledged “The Somme was the muddy grave of the German 
field army, and of the faith in the infallibility of German leadership.”1364 
The casualties suffered by the RFC during the air campaign over the Somme were 
significant, most especially because their replacements were only partially trained and thus the 
vast majority was unprepared for the rigors of air combat.  From 1 April to 30 June, 1916, 81 
aircrew were killed, wounded or missing. These casualties occurred during the RFC’s efforts 
to attain air superiority before the ground offensive began. During the Fourth Army’s 
offensive from 1 July to 18 November, the RFC suffered 499 aircrew killed in action, 
wounded, or captured. Another 268 aircrew were non-battle casualties primarily a result of 
flying accidents, severe illness, or exhaustion.1365 The RFC had lost more aircrew in the battle 
than it had on strength at the start of the offensive: 499 versus 426. In comparison the 
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Luftstreitkrafte suffered 359 aircrew losses.1366 The RFC also lost more aircraft than it had to 
start the battle with. On 1 July, the RFC had 410 serviceable aircraft. During the course of the 
campaign 190 aircraft were shot down, and another 592 were damaged and required extensive 
repairs or were removed from service due to obsolescence, bringing the total losses to 782 
aircraft.1367 Though its claims were much higher, the RFC destroyed 164 German aircraft and 
damaged and forced to the ground another 205 enemy machines.1368 If there was any good 
news for the RFC it was the fact that the air service continued to expand during the battle. On 
1 July there were 27 squadrons in France of which ten were equipped with fighters. By the end 
of the offensive the RFC had expanded to 38 squadrons with 550 operational aircraft. It is 
significant to note however, that only eight of these squadrons were equipped with single-
seater fighters.1369  
The British aircraft industry would be able to replace the large losses of RFC aircraft 
suffered over the Somme, most especially as the industrial base in Britain was re-organized 
under the Ministry of Munitions in 1917. The bigger issue though was the high number of 
aircrew casualties and the resultant impact on morale that would have far-reaching impact on 
the RFC in the air campaign that followed the Battle of the Somme. 
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“If by the Spring the Germans are able to do in the air one quarter of the 
work carried out by our air forces during the last months of the Somme 
battle, it is to be feared that the inevitable result will be a universal and 
irresistible demand for defence and protection; the abandonment of our 
offensive and consequently the loss of our superiority in the air.” 1370 
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Though Rawlinson’s Fourth Army failed to achieve the objectives Haig had directed 
them to during the Battle of the Somme, what of the RFC? Was the RFC successful in 
accomplishing its assigned missions to support Haig’s ground offensive? According to the 
Official Historian of the Royal Flying Corps, H. A. Jones, as well as historians Peter Hart, 
Hilary St. George Saunders and Ralph Barker, the RFC did win a major victory in the air 
above the Somme.1371 Based on Jones’ definition of ‘victory’ it is difficult to disagree with his 
findings.1372 The RFC did achieve air superiority in the spring and early summer of 1916 and 
then fought a daily battle to maintain it for nearly the entire five-month ground campaign.  
Did the RFC accomplish their assigned mission of providing the best possible support 
to Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Somme offensive as the Official Historian would lead 
one to believe? Haig, Rawlinson and Trenchard had agreed before the start of the battle that 
the RFC would be required to accomplish six key tasks. These six tasks were (1) Aerial 
reconnaissance, (2) Aerial photography, (3) Observation and directing artillery, (4) Bombing, 
(5) Contact patrols to support the infantry, and (6) Air combat against the German Army Air 
Service. 
Both tasks of aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography were accomplished with 
ever improving skill and with little interference from the GAAS, primarily because the RFC 
had won air superiority over the Somme several weeks before the battle began. 19,000 
photographs were taken by the RFC during the five-month campaign. From these negatives 
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420,000 prints were made and issued to army and subordinate headquarters for use in planning 
their future operations.1373 New and revised maps were also made from the photographs and 
were issued down to company and platoon level.  
By accomplishing both of these tasks on a daily basis, the RFC provided invaluable 
information and intelligence to Rawlinson and his subordinate commanders, both before and 
during the conduct of the battle. Prior to each attack the corps squadrons photographed the 
entire area to be attacked to assist in the rehearsals that were conducted down to battalion 
level. They reported on the condition of the wire obstacles, the enemy trenches and even on 
the probable strength of the enemy at critical strong points, such as the Quadrilateral, 
Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. There were at least two instances where the RFC 
identified newly dug trenches (the German Third Line between Pozieres and Bapaume on 14 
July and a new trench system built 300 yards forward of the Switch Line which III Corps was 
about to attack during the second phase of the battle) and reported them in time to allow 
infantry commanders to alter their attack plans. Had this not been done these two attacks 
would more than likely have met with disaster. 
The third task, deemed the most important by Rawlinson, was that of observing and 
directing artillery fire which provided the most direct support to Rawlinson’s Fourth Army 
during the battle (and by the last two months of the campaign, Gough’s Fifth Army also). The 
work of the pilots and observers of the RFC, in training and cooperating with the artillery, 
demonstrated advances and skills never before accomplished in combat. In October, General 
Gough had written: 
During all the three months of fighting, the Air Service had been increasingly active 
and efficient. Fighting was not confined to operations on the ground . . . Much went 
on in the air. Gradually and surely our Air Service established a moral and material 
superiority over the enemy though at the cost of many gallant young lives. But the 
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work done was invaluable-especially in the direction of “blanketing” the enemy’s 
observation of his artillery fire, while they assisted, guided, and directed ours most 
helpfully. No one of the complicated miscellany of services which comprise a modern 
army so commanded the respect and admiration of the infantry as did our air 
service.1374 
A number of German army and corps commanders reported that the success of the British 
infantry, especially the 14 July battle that captured the Bazentin Ridge and the 15 September 
battle that captured Flers, was largely due to the superiority of British air and artillery 
cooperation. The German Quartermaster General, Erich von Ludendorff, acknowledged that 
the British were supreme in the field, using their aircraft to coordinate effective artillery fire 
on German units. “On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by excellent 
aeroplane observation and fed with enormous supplies of ammunition, kept down our own fire 
and destroyed our artillery.1375 
In a letter to his commander-in-chief towards the end of the battle, Rawlinson quoted 
figures to quantify how the RFC had in fact provided great assistance to his ground forces: 
Between the 23rd of July and the 29th of October 1,721 shoots were observed from 
the air on to enemy batteries, bringing destruction or damage to 521 of them, and 
silencing 307 others, and that, in addition 281 observations were made of 
bombardments of enemy trench systems. These figures do not include many shoots 
based on aeroplane reports, nor shoots directed against troops in movement. The 
reports on attack days, on the relative positions of our own troops and of hostile 
troops, furnished by aeroplane observers during the operations, have been remarkably 
accurate.1376 
Rawlinson added that his experiences with the RFC during the Somme offensive brought 
home to him the enormous importance of aircraft and artillery cooperation and directed the 
necessity for even greater advancements in the future with the RFC. In the same letter, 
Rawlinson submitted a proposal that the RFC corps squadrons should be placed under the 
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direct control of the Corps Artillery commander. The First Army commander, General Sir H. 
S. Horne supported Rawlinson, stating that: 
The operations on the Somme had proved that tactical success is largely dependent on 
superiority in artillery and supremacy in the air . . . and until the direction and control 
of artillery fire from the air is placed in the hands of the artillery we shall not gain full 
advantage from our superiority in guns and ammunition.1377 
Haig allowed much debate and discussion through December, 1916 but he did not believe that 
Rawlinson’s or Horne’s proposals were justified. He was very pleased with the RFC’s 
performance during the Somme battle, especially so with its accomplishments in observing 
and directing artillery missions throughout the campaign. He saw no need to change a system 
that in his opinion had been extremely effective under combat conditions. Air to artillery 
command and control would remain an RFC responsibility.1378 Any shortcomings between the 
two services he believed could be overcome by the exchanging of experienced liaison officers.  
The techniques and procedures used by the RFC to observe and direct artillery in 
support of the Fourth Army were codified and made doctrine. Haig’s headquarters issued 
Cooperation of Aircraft with Artillery in late December 1916. The tenets and principles in the 
document remained in effect for the remainder of the war, only being revised to incorporate 
minor adjustments due to improved technology.1379 
The conduct of bombing missions also brought much more significant results than 
even the BEF or RFC had planned or hoped for. Bombing was much more concentrated than 
the raids conducted in 1915 and now including night missions. During the course of the battle, 
the RFC bombed 298 targets, dropped nearly 13,000 bombs in the first four days of the battle 
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alone and 292 tons overall, in support of the Fourth Army.1380 Targets of critical importance to 
the conduct of the battle for the Germans, such as the railway networks at Marcoing, Epehy, 
and Velu, were bombed repeatedly with significant results. The most notable was the 
ammunition train at Aubigny-au-Bac, which was blown up by aircraft from Number 7 
Squadron on 1 July. Another was the train station at St. Quentin where the German 22nd 
Reserve Division was prevented from entraining and moving to the Somme front as hastily 
needed reinforcements, when their train was destroyed along with most of the division’s arms 
and ammunition. The logistics centers of Cambrai and Bapaume were also continuously 
targeted and attacked. Supply centers at Grevillers, Irles, Le Transloy, Rancourt, St. Leger, 
and many others were also bombed repeatedly, as were both the First and Second Army 
headquarters. 
As spectacular as the results of some of these incidents were, the greatest value 
Trenchard’s bombing campaign provided Rawlinson’s army was its’ impact on the morale of 
the German soldier. Every day that the weather was fair, RFC squadrons, flying in formation, 
could be seen flying across the German lines to attack targets deep in the enemy rear area. The 
same aircraft were seen returning within hours; usually having accomplished their mission 
with minimal losses. It was only late in the campaign where bomber losses became severe, 
forcing Trenchard to provide escorts for them. However, there is ample evidence from 
German prisoners and captured documents that during the battle this in fact instilled a “spirit 
of defenseless” in many German infantrymen and caused much anger against the GAAS for 
allowing the bombing to occur. At the same time it was extremely rare for the German 
infantry to see their own aircraft providing them support anywhere near the front lines, let 
alone crossing into British territory.1381  
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The RFC flew contact patrols daily to support the infantry and though the system was 
not perfect, much was learned by both the infantry and the airmen, as the battle progressed. 
The techniques and procedures developed by the RFC and infantry units during the Somme 
battle would continue to evolve for the remainder of the war. Rawlinson and his subordinate 
commanders were extremely impressed by the accuracy of the reports they received from the 
contact patrols regarding the progress and location of attacking units and also on the actions 
and disposition of the enemy forces. The contact patrol pilots normally flew at heights ranging 
from 500 to 1,000 feet, often putting themselves at risk to not only enemy fire but also 
friendly artillery fire. It is almost unbelievable that during some of the most intense artillery 
barrages in history, that took place during the Somme offensive, only one RFC aircraft was 
shot down by friendly fire. The wind itself often caused more problems for the contact patrols 
than the enemy did. The prevailing winds in northern France were westerly and often-times 
British pilots had to turn into the wind while over enemy lines and remain almost stationary 
while their observers noted what they saw. Such a sitting target always drew a barrage of 
fire.1382 
Ludendorff gave further praise to the RFC and its system of contact patrols, stating 
that during the Somme campaign British aircraft had caused great havoc amongst the German 
infantry by flying very low and using their machine-guns on the troops crowded in the 
trenches. The wide- spread negative effect on troop morale was far more of an impact on his 
forces than the casualties that occurred from the low level attacks.1383 
The sixth and final task assigned to the RFC was engaging the GAAS in air combat 
and preventing its fighters from interfering with RFC Corps squadrons. Trenchard believed 
this task was of critical importance and was the one mission that would enable air superiority. 
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He also believed that the other five tasks could not be accomplished without achieving it. 
Since the RFC engaged an offensive strategy throughout the air campaign, seeking out enemy 
aircraft was termed ‘offensive patrolling.’ The offensive patrols were of two kinds. Those 
provided by the army squadrons- Number 22 (FE2bs) and Number 24 (DH 2s) of the IV 
Brigade, flying behind the German front lines but still within sight of the corps squadron 
aircraft; and two, the headquarters squadrons, Number 60 (Moranes), Number 27 (Martinsyde 
Scouts), and Number 70 (Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutter) which flew up to twenty miles behind 
the German front lines. IV Brigade was reinforced by five other squadrons from III Brigade to 
conduct both types of offensive patrolling during the duration of the Somme battle.1384 
Before the battle, and up until late August, 1916, it was rare for the RFC to encounter 
German aircraft that were seeking a fight. The work of the offensive patrols began to steadily 
increase once the Jagdstaffeln were formed and equipped with the new Albatros, Fokker, and 
Halberstadt fighters in September and October. The RFC strategy to seek combat, regardless 
of location or odds, was quite incomprehensible to the pilots of the Luftstreitkrafte. Lieutenant 
Baldemus, shot down and made prisoner just after the Battle of the Somme ended, commented 
to his RFC interrogator on the contrast between the British and German pilots: 
You seem to be magnetically attracted to any German aeroplane you see, and never 
weigh the situation. I saw one of your machines take on one Fokker, then two 
Fokkers, then three Fokkers, before being shot down at Lille. We do not look for 
fights unless it is our duty. With us a machine should return without a fight, unless it 
is specifically sent up to fight. To return without a fight and with our work done, is the 
task with us.1385 
British fighter pilots, led by men like Hawker and Rees, could not fathom this type of 
thinking. To them it boarded on the edge of cowardice.1386 The RFC embedded in its aircrew 
an aggressive and direct approach to air combat. Hawker’s orders issued the day before the 
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1386 L. W. B. Rees, Fighting in the Air: The Official Combat Technique Instructions for British Fighter 
Pilots, 1916-1945, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1978), 8-9. 
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start of the offensive was both simple and typical of that aggressive approach: “Attack 
everything.” It was this aggressive attitude that was stressed at all times by the leaders of the 
RFC and the enforcement of a continuous offensive strategy at all costs that brought about the 
results that would prove nearly catastrophic for the RFC in the air campaign that followed the 
Battle of the Somme. Add an ineffective training program which forced partially-trained 
aircrew, flying aircraft that were in many cases obsolete against a well trained, more 
technologically equipped enemy and it was a combination of these elements which earned the 
RFC a Pyrrhic victory in its air campaign over the Somme in the fall of1916. 
Having addressed how the RFC accomplished the six missions it was assigned by the 
BEF prior to and during the Somme offensive it is also appropriate to review briefly each of 
the five critical factors used throughout this study and the role they served in enabling the 
RFC to attain and maintain air superiority during the air campaign. More importantly though 
is how each of these factors led to the Pyrrhic victory over the Somme and consequently led to 
the RFC’s outright defeat by the Luftstreitkrafte in the ensuing air campaign over Arras in 
April, 1917. 
The first factor was strategy which was the most critical factor of the five 
analyzed, heavily impacting each of the other four factors as well as setting the 
conditions for the planning and execution of the air campaign itself. Trenchard has 
often been criticized for maintaining a continuous offensive strategy, even after he was 
aware that RFC lost the technological edge when the Germans introduced better 
fighter aircraft than those possessed by the RFC in September, 1916. His 
memorandum, “Future Policy in the Air,” published that same month only hardened 
his position of maintaining the offensive by reiterating his belief that the aircraft was 
an offensive weapon and not a defensive one, arguing that regardless of developments 
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in German aircraft performance or air policy, the RFC must attack and continue to 
attack. His strategy of ‘relentless and incessant’ offensive action had forced the 
Germans to take a defensive position in the air. Trenchard had notified his chain of 
command that if and when a visionary leader took command of the GAAS, or the 
enemy developed better and faster aircraft, the RFC would become even more 
aggressive, regardless of losses, to ensure the British Army received the support it 
requested from its air service.1387  
The RFC’s offensive strategy which advocated unrelenting offensive patrols, deep 
behind enemy lines in aircraft that no longer possessed the technological advantage they had 
held during the first two stages of the Somme offensive, especially after the introduction of the 
Jagdstaffeln, was a major reason for the large number of aircrew losses the RFC suffered in 
the last three months of the campaign. In September, the RFC suffered 134 aircrew casualties, 
the highest number of casualties suffered in one month during the eight month air 
campaign.1388 Although he understood the ramifications of not having more advanced aircraft 
as well as highly trained aircrew, Trenchard refused to consider altering his strategy or 
doctrine after the start of the air campaign. And yet, on three occasions in September alone, 
the RFC commander informed Haig and the War Office about the inadequate and outdated 
aircraft and poorly trained crews that he was receiving from England.1389  
In contrasting Trenchard’s incessant application of offensive operations to the 
theoretical, Liddell Hart’s axioms on strategy are found to be applicable.  
                                                            
1387 RFC HQ Memorandum, ‘Future Policy in the Air,’22 September, 1916, AIR 1/522/16/12/5, NA. 
1388 Trevor Henshaw, The SkyTheir Battlefield, 115. 
1389 Trenchard to Haig, 15 September, 1916, Autobiographical Notes, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/61, 
RAFM; RFC HQ Memorandum, ‘Future Policy in the Air,’22 September, 1916, AIR 1/522/16/12/5, 
NA; and Trenchard to Robertson, 30 September, 1916, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/8, RAFM. See 
also Maurice Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, 1914-1918, 178-183.  
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If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance 
of guarding himself─and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you 
take a line that threatens alternative objections, you distract his mind and 
forces. .  .  the absence of an alternative is contrary to the very nature of war. . 
. To be practical, any plan must take into account of the enemy’s power to 
frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan 
that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such 
adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along 
a line which offers alternative objectives . . . A plan, like a tree, must have 
branches─if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren 
pole.1390  
 
 
By constantly adhering to his offensive strategy and its ‘attack at all cost’ mantra, Trenchard 
only increased the number of casualties his force suffered during the last two months of the air 
campaign. Even when the Germans achieved the technological edge in fighter aircraft in mid-
September, Trenchard would not fathom relinquishing the initiative or ordering a pause in the 
continuation of his offensive strategy. He was well aware of the costs in men and aircraft in 
maintaining his directed strategy and chose to defend his decision to adhere to with his 
superiors regardless of the consequences and at the same time disregard the politicians and 
subordinate officers who questioned it. 
 There were several military and civilian leaders, both in England and France, who 
suggested that he reconsider his strategy as well as the doctrine being used during the Battle of 
the Somme if simply to allow the RFC some respite to rest and train aircrew and allow more 
time for the delivery of advanced aircraft.1391 As for the political and military leadership who 
were running the war from London, though they may have disagreed with Haig and 
Trenchard’s myopic focus on continuing offensive operations at an increasingly high cost in 
human life, they were not willing to direct a change in the strategy on the ground or in the air. 
                                                            
1390 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 330-331. 
1391 The most influential political leaders who opposed Trenchard’s strategy included Arthur Balfour 
and Lord Curzon. Within military channels senior RFC leaders such as Frederick Sykes, P. R. C. 
Groves and L. E. O. Charlton as well as RFC fighter pilot Harold Balfour, future Under-Secretary of 
State for Air during the Second World War, were also strongly opposed to the advocacy of a “relentless 
and incessant’ offensive policy. 
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Just like Haig and many of the other British generals in command on the Western Front, 
Trenchard was a full supporter of conducting a war of attrition and he, along with most of the 
British and French commanders believed they would win the war using an attrition based 
strategy.1392  
By adhering to his strategy, Trenchard is rightfully deserving of two criticisms. The 
first concerns his willingness to accept an extremely high casualty rate that repeatedly 
exceeded the RFC’s ability to provide trained replacements for those casualties. Regardless of 
what Trenchard and Henderson told the military and political leadership on the subject, the 
high rate of casualties suffered during the air campaign was a direct cause for RFC aircrew 
being rushed to the front only partially trained which only exacerbated the problem that much 
more. Second, in relations to the Principles of War, by focusing predominantly on the offense, 
Trenchard totally ignored the principle of mass or concentration of his available forces, which 
the Luftstreitkrafte very effectively demonstrated on several occasions in the last six weeks of 
the battle. With the birth of the Luftstreitkrafte and its almost immediate impact on restoring 
the balance of power to the Germans in the skies over the Somme, which Trenchard had 
foreseen, a wiser leader would have been adaptable enough to change his strategy and 
conserve his limited resources of both aircrew and aircraft. By doing so he would have 
allowed his pilots the valuable time they need to complete their training and at the same time 
provided the industrial base the additional time it required to produce the more advanced 
aircraft that Trenchard incessantly demanded. By rigidly focusing on the maintenance of 
offensive operations “The RFC had discovered the inherent paradox of offensive power. 
Attacks on enemy targets, either strategic or tactical, will undoubtedly force him to divert 
                                                            
1392Michael Howard. “Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive” in Makers of Modern Strategy: 
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
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more resources to air defence. But the more successful the policy in forcing the enemy on to 
the defensive, the more difficult and costly it becomes to inflict proportional damage on the 
original targets.”1393  Trenchard’s offensive strategy was thus not only inflexible it became 
dogmatic to the point that the British would adhere to it for the remainder of the war. 
Throughout the air campaign the RFC incorrectly believed it was shooting down more 
German aircraft than it actually was primarily because aircrew reports were accepted by RFC 
intelligence officers as fact. Since the majority of air combats took place far behind the 
German lines there were often few witnesses that could corroborate pilot and observer claims 
of German aircraft shot down or destroyed. Many German aircraft reported as nearing the 
ground out of control or having been shot down in fact were able to land undamaged.1394 The 
events of 17 September however, in which the RFC lost ten aircraft along with their crews in 
an afternoon, alerted Trenchard and his squadron leaders that these heavy casualties, 
compounded by the new German fighter, had tipped the balance of losses in the 
Luftstreitkrafte’s favor.1395 
 Arthur Gould Lee, a fighter pilot with Number 46 Squadron in 1917-1918, summed 
up very candidly the strengths and weakness of Trenchard’s strategy for the Somme campaign 
and the remainder of the war. 
General Trenchard was right to sustain an offensive spirit. Where he erred was in 
identifying this with an offensive strategy which was, in effect, a territorial offensive. 
To him, as to his staff, and most of his senior commanders, for a British aeroplane to 
be one mile across the trenches was offensive; for it to be ten miles over was more 
offensive. Influenced perhaps by naval doctrines-“seek out and destroy the enemy” 
and “our frontiers are the enemy coasts”-he applied them to the air, not appreciating 
that they were largely irrelevant in a three dimensional sphere. In the air fighting of 
World War I, despite the siege-like situation on the ground, it was not a fighter 
aeroplane’s position in relation to a line of defences that measured the offensive spirit 
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but the aggressive will of its occupants to attack the enemy wherever he was 
encountered, at whatever odds.1396 
Trenchard weathered the criticism both at home and in France on his adherence to the 
offensive strategy and remained in command of the RFC in France until January, 1918. He 
was convinced that only by maintaining a continuous air offensive would the Allies and most 
especially the British, be able to control the skies over the battlefield. Nearly two years after 
the Somme offensive had ended, Trenchard was ‘directed’ to take command of the 
Independent Air Force and tasked to carry out the strategic bombing of German cities. His 
comments on receiving this assignment tell much about his inflexibility as well as his 
dogmatic style of thinking. “I have stood firm for 3 ½ years now, first against one lot and then 
against another, and I have guided the development of the Air Service in battle and in this 
bombing, and I have not diverted right or left from my principles, so I shall try to carry out to 
the end if they will only allow me to do so. . .1397  
In all fairness to Trenchard however, it must be remembered that prior to the start of 
the war he had very little training to prepare him for the great challenges of commanding the 
army’s newest branch, one that grew exponentially as the war proceeded unabated. Everything 
from strategy and tactics to training, doctrine, logistics and command and staff procedures, 
had to be learned by experiencing it firsthand and much of what was learned came the hard 
way: by trial and error in combat on a scale never experienced before and in a medium in 
which everyone was a neophyte.1398 
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The offensive took a severe toll of RFC squadrons during the campaign. Number 70 
Squadron, which flew long-range reconnaissance and offensive patrols in one of the best 
aircraft the British had at the time, the Sopwith 1 and 1/2 Strutter, suffered casualties between 
August and October that set a record within the RFC. After nine weeks in action, only nine of 
the original thirty-six pilots and observers had survived combat operations. Twenty-seven 
aircrew, plus twenty replacements, were killed in action, wounded, missing, or prisoners of 
war. The youngest casualty had been seventeen, the oldest just twenty-two.1399 
Trenchard was not overly concerned about the casualty rate at the beginning of the 
campaign when he reported that the RFC was conducting three missions daily against two 
percent losses. Most of the British leadership including Haig, Henderson, Trenchard, and 
Brancker presumed that the casualties would not continue at that level. Yet the RFC lost 20 
percent of its force in the first week of July alone. The losses did drop over time but they 
remained sufficiently high─111 aircrew for the month of July, to cause concern about the 
availability of trained replacements. At the end of the battle Trenchard admitted that the RFC 
squadrons in France had suffered 100 percent casualties from 15 June to 1 November, his 
aircrew suffered only one casualty for every hundred flights over the enemy lines, compared 
to one in three for the infantry when it left the trenches during an attack.1400 If nothing else, 
these statistics would have helped as part of a recruiting campaign for the RFC. The Official 
Historian was much more accurate when he summed up the RFC’s high casualty rate during 
the battle: “The offensive which was relentlessly pursued in the air by the British air service 
was about four times more costly than the defensive policy adopted by the Germans.”1401  
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The Luftstreitkrafte on the other hand, by using a flexible defense, maintained a 
distinct advantage over the British in the war of attrition that was taking place in the air during 
1916. By fighting almost always above their own territory, the Germans seldom engaged in air 
combat unless under their terms. If a German aircraft was damaged or the pilot wounded, and 
he could land his plane, both pilot and machine could be repaired and put back into the fight. 
If a British pilot or crew found themselves in the same circumstances the best they could hope 
for was to spend the rest of the war in a prisoner of war camp. This cumulative saving of 
personnel would prove even more significant when in 1918 the Germans began to issue 
parachutes to their aircrew; something the RFC leadership refused to do except to their 
balloon observers. The Germans were thus able to maintain their investment in experienced, 
highly trained airmen, while the British, continually weakened by ever increasing levels of 
attrition, were not.1402  
The second factor, the organization of the RFC itself, had unforeseen consequences on 
the outcome of the air campaign. Undergoing several structural changes in the first year of the 
war alone, the RFC established Wings to enable decentralization for the sole purpose of 
ensuring it could provide the best possible tactical support to the infantry units of the BEF. At 
the same time the organization maintained its autonomy as an air service with its own chain of 
command. This reorganization did in fact prove to be critical to the future development of the 
RFC in that it provided the required organizational framework necessary for the even greater 
expansion which took place on a nearly continuous basis over the course of the following 
three years.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
Somme battle was at the rate of 300 per cent although it was nearer 400 per cent for the period 
subsequent to the arrival of the new German fighters in September.”  
1402Malcolm Cooper, “The Development of Air Policy and Doctrine on the Western Front 1914-1918,” 
Aerospace Historian (Spring, March 1981): 45-46. 
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By the time the air campaign began in early April, 1916, the evolutionary changes in 
its organizational structure enabled the RFC to be adaptable to the changing nature of air 
warfare and in turn assisted the organization to accomplish its primary objective of attaining 
air superiority over the Somme prior to the ground offensive.  The one decision involving the 
organizational structure that did have a potential negative impact on the RFC’s performance 
during and after the Somme air campaign was the decision to enlarge every squadron from 
fourteen to eighteen aircraft. This decision was made just prior to the beginning of the air 
campaign and though not completed until well into the battle, the fact that the RFC was 
suffering a shortage of aircrew was only exacerbated by this decision. Add to the fact that the 
high casualty rate resulted in a high demand for replacements which then reduced the amount 
of time pilots and observers spent in training squadrons, it can be argued that by increasing the 
amount of aircraft and aircrew in every squadron during the battle, Trenchard should have 
considered delaying this change in organizational structure until after the air campaign or 
better still after the changes in aircrew training he had directed had a chance to produce better 
trained airmen and the more advanced fighter aircraft such as the SE 5, Bristol F2b Fighter 
and the Sopwith Camel were ready for operational service in France.     
The third factor, leadership, also played a critical role in the RFC achieving air 
superiority before and during the battle as well as the events which took place following the 
Somme air campaign. The three key leaders: Henderson, Trenchard and Brancker enforced the 
strategy of ‘continuous and relentless offensive’ operations at all costs which though it gained 
them air superiority over the Somme from May through September, 1916, it was these same 
leaders who refused to amend or alter the offensive strategy which led to near-disaster in the 
air campaign that followed the Somme in the spring of 1917. 
374 
In his dispatches to the War Office after the Somme battle had concluded, Haig 
provided evidence that he was more than pleased with the performance of the RFC (and its 
leadership) in supporting his ground units. He also reminded the military and civilian 
leadership who were directing the Allied war effort of the criticality of maintaining ‘mastery 
of the air’ for all future operations. 
The admirable work of the Royal Flying Corps has been a very satisfactory 
feature of the battle. Under the conditions of modern war the duties of the Air 
Service are many and varied. They include the regulation and control of 
artillery fire by indicating targets and observing and reporting the results of 
rounds; the taking of photographs of enemy trenches, strong points, battery 
positions, and of the effect of the bombardments; and the observation of the 
movements of the enemy behind his own lines. 
 
The greatest skill and daring has been shown in the performance of all these 
duties, as well as in bombing expeditions. . . Not only has the work of the 
Royal Flying Corps to be carried out in all weathers and under constant fire 
from the ground, but fighting in the air has now become a normal procedure, 
in order to maintain the mastery over the enemy’s Air Service. In these fights 
the greatest skill and determination have been shown, and great success has 
attended the efforts of the Royal Flying Corps.1403 
 
Haig may not have been an advocate for air power when the war began but by the end of the 
Battle of the Somme he had become a firm believer that effective air support was required to 
allow the ground forces to pursue their objectives unimpeded from the enemy’s air service. 
Primarily because Trenchard did his utmost to ensure the RFC provided the maximum support 
to the army at all times, Haig supported Trenchard during his entire time as commander of the 
BEF. When Trenchard left command of the RFC in early January, 1918 to become Chief of 
the Air Staff, Haig had nothing but praise for his trusted air advisor. “I recall with gratitude the 
magnificent work done during the fighting of 1916 and 1917 by Major-General Sir Hugh H. 
M. Trenchard, at that time commanding the Royal Flying Corps. The influence exerted by this 
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able and distinguished officer upon the moral[e] and the development of the British Air 
Service and in the creation of its splendid traditions can scarcely be exaggerated.”1404 
To Trenchard’s credit, he took command of the air service when it faced a crisis with 
the advent of the ‘Fokker Scrouge’ in the fall of 1915 and established the conditions for the 
RFC to not only end that period of German dominance in the air by the spring of 1916 but 
enabled his own force to gain air superiority over the Somme in less than eight weeks leading 
up to the start of the British ground offensive.  Trenchard may not have been one of the truly 
gifted captains in military history but he provided a strong and unwavering vision when the 
RFC needed it most. No other individual in the RFC offered the leadership and drive that he 
brought to it. As one RAF historian later wrote of Trenchard’s performance during the Somme 
offensive “By taking the fight to the enemy even when losses seemed prohibitive, Trenchard 
stuck to his principles, relying on the tenacity and resilience of his aircrews. They never failed 
him.”1405 
In sum, all three leaders: Henderson, Trenchard, and Brancker, served critical roles in 
planning leading and resourcing the RFC in its air campaign over the Somme. Under their 
leadership the RFC achieved air superiority over the Somme before and during the majority of 
the battle. But it was these same three leaders who were also directly responsible for the 
severe losses suffered by British aircrew because they failed to modify or adjust their thinking 
in terms of the strategy they directed the RFC to adhere to, most especially when the 
Luftstreitkrafte began to achieve dominance in the skies over the Somme in the autumn of 
1916. It was this failure in critical thinking by the senior leadership of the RFC would also led 
to the near catastrophic results of the RFC’s subsequent air campaign over Arras in April-
May, 1917. 
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The fourth and fifth elements, selection and training, are tied directly to each other 
and are also inextricably linked to the other three factors. Arguably one of the shortcomings in 
the selection of aircrew that the RFC leadership can be faulted for and which would have 
alleviated part of its manpower shortage  before and during the Somme air campaign was the 
fact that it did not rely more on NCO pilots like the French and German air services did.1406 In 
February, 1916 there were approximately thirty NCO pilots serving in squadrons in Britain, 
most of who were still in flight training status.1407 At the same time there were only three NCO 
pilots serving in operational squadrons in France and despite the massive expansion that the 
RFC experienced during the Battle of the Somme and into 1918, there were never more than 
three percent NCO pilots in operational squadrons in France.1408 Throughout the air campaign 
the RFC continued to select a few NCOs to become pilots and maintained this practice for the 
remainder of the war. The selection of NCOs to serve as pilots was not however considered a 
solution to overcome the shortages the RFC experienced both during and after the Somme 
campaign.  
There was at least one long-term benefit of using NCOs as pilots, most especially for 
the post-war Royal Air Force (RAF). In 1924 while serving as Chief of Air Staff, Trenchard 
convinced the government to create auxiliary squadrons made up of reserve pilots and ground 
crews. This was the beginning of what would become the Auxiliary Air Force designed to 
serve as a reserve for the RAF. 1409 Many of these part-time pilots were NCOs and it was this 
reserve force which became the RAF Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) in 1936 and would provide 
huge dividends for the RAF in the first year of the Second World War. In the summer and fall 
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of 1940 when the RAF prevented the Luftwaffe from gaining air supremacy during the Battle 
of Britain, it was largely due to the efforts of a small professional force of approximately 
2,400 pilots and aircrew, many of whom had served with auxiliary squadrons before the war. 
Of this number, more than 800 were NCO pilots who constituted one third of the pilots then 
serving in RAF Fighter Command.1410 It is fair to say that had the RFC/RAF leadership made 
the decision to stop using NCOs to serve as pilots in the First World War as well as the inter-
war period, the RAF may very well have lost the Battle of Britain due to a shortage of trained 
and capable pilots.1411  
Even before the air campaign began over the Somme it had become evident to 
Trenchard’s subordinate squadron, and brigade commanders that newly arriving pilots from 
England were insufficiently trained. The primary reasons for this were attributed to a shortage 
of qualified instructors and the bad weather in England which prevented flying on many days. 
To address the deficiencies in training, Trenchard transferred Brigadier General J. M. Salmond 
back to England to take command of the V Brigade and in effect serve as the senior aircrew 
trainer in the RFC.1412  
By May, 1916 the RFC had realized the criticality of training pilots in air fighting 
techniques as well as night flying. The establishment of the School of Aerial Gunnery at 
Hythe was the first of many that would train future RFC fighter pilots in the art of air combat. 
By the end of the Somme campaign, Salmond established even more rigorous training 
requirements with solo hours increasing from fifteen to twenty for qualification and as many 
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as twenty-eight depending on the type of aircraft the pilot was to fly in combat.1413 Salmond 
also reorganized the instruction provided both aircraft and balloon observers as well. In 
September, 1916, the Wireless School at Brooklands was placed under control of the Training 
Brigade and reorganized into the Wireless and Observers School and in December, Salmond 
directed the formation of a Kite Balloon Training Wing as well. 
To overcome the impact of poor weather on flying within the confines of the United 
Kingdom, Henderson, Brancker and Salmond were able to organize and establish pilot 
training in Egypt, Canada, and once the United States entered the war in April, 1917, in Texas 
also. During the Battle of the Somme the RFC established three reserve squadrons in Egypt 
with the majority of pilot candidates being accepted from army units in Egypt, Salonika, 
Mesopotamia, and India. By July, 1917, when the War Office approved the doubling in size of 
the RFC, an additional Training Wing consisting of five squadrons was established. Once 
Salmond received the required number of training aircraft he believed was required to support 
the additional training squadrons, he was confident that by January, 1918 the RFC could 
produce 180 fully trained pilots each month thanks in large part to the training and good 
weather in Egypt. 
Additional flying schools in Canada funded by the British on the condition that the 
Dominion government sanction and support an aircraft factory, were established north and 
east of Toronto in 1917 at Camp Borden and Deseronto respectively. By the end of the year 
there were five squadrons training at Camp Borden and an additional five training at 
Deseronto. By mid-September 1917, the RFC established a headquarters at Fort Worth, Texas 
and moved five American Air Service squadrons that had been training in Canada to one of 
three airfields in established in Texas. A School of Aerial Gunnery, developed on the same 
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organizational lines as that at Hythe, was also established at Borden Camp and one of the 
airfields in Texas as well. By 1918, Canada alone was sending on average 200 trained pilots a 
month to England.1414 
Between the leadership and vision provided by Salmond and the technical and tactical 
expertise provided by Robert Smith-Barry who Trenchard sent back to England in December, 
1916 to reorganize and restructure flying training, the RFC spent considerable time and 
resources improving its aircrew training programs during, but most especially after, the air 
campaign over the Somme. It was a slow but steady process and unfortunately for the RFC the 
benefits of the revised training programs would not have a major impact on the force as a 
whole until well after the disastrous air campaign at Arras in 1917. 
Although the RFC suffered high losses because it rigidly adhered to an offensive 
strategy throughout the Somme campaign, when the battle ended, the RFC still controlled the 
skies above the Somme.1415 One could argue that this was because the Luftstreitkrafte chose 
when and where to contest Britain’s domination and was biding its time until the good 
weather returned in the spring of 1917 and the next ground offensive took place.1416 Though 
Rawlinson’s Fourth Army did not achieve all of its objectives, the RFC accomplished all of 
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in World War I, 45. 
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the missions and tasks set by the BEF and Fourth Army commanders. In doing so, Trenchard 
and his airmen earned the respect and admiration of the BEF’s leaders.1417  
 Further evidence that the British air campaign over the Somme was a Pyrrhic victory 
is provided by the RFC’s experience in the air campaign that immediately followed the Battle 
of the Somme. From the end of the Haig’s offensive and all through the winter of 1916-17, 
poor weather caused a steady reduction in air activity for both sides, but casualties for the RFC 
increased with each passing month. From 1 December, 1916 to 30 March, 1917 the RFC 
suffered 371 aircrew killed, wounded or prisoners of war.1418  That was more than the 
combined casualties for the first five months of the air campaign over the Somme when the 
RFC wrested air superiority away from the GAAS.1419 Beginning in January, 1917 there was a 
notable increase in air combats taking place behind the British lines as opposed to behind the 
German lines. The Luftstreitkrafte was demonstrating that it was willing to use offensive 
tactics when and where it chose.1420 
During this same period it was becoming more and more obvious to Trenchard as well 
as Haig (promoted to Field Marshal in January) that the Luftstreitkrafte was threatening once 
again to achieve air superiority and if this occurred it would have a major impact on the BEF’s 
spring offensive in the Arras sector. In mid-January Trenchard was informed by Brancker that 
two squadrons of the new and advanced Bristol Fighter could not be delivered to France as 
planned because of labor issues at the factories in England, Trenchard became incensed.  
You are asking me to fight a battle this year with the same machines as I 
fought it last year. We shall be hopelessly outclassed, and something must be 
done. I am not panicking, but the Hun is getting more aggressive. I warned 
you fairly as far back as last September, and the Chief [Haig] also warned you 
in November. And I warned the Air Board personally on 12th December. All I 
can say is that there will be an outcry from all the pilots out here if we do not 
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have at least these few squadrons of fast machines, and what I have asked for 
is absolutely necessary.1421 
 
Trenchard notified Haig’s Chief of Staff, General L. E. Kiggell, of his concerns in writing and 
subsequently Haig informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General William 
Robertson, on the severity of the issue over the continual postponement of the twenty new 
squadrons that the War Office had approved be formed and sent to France by spring, 1917, 
most of which were to be equipped with faster, better armed and more maneuverable fighter 
aircraft then in development.  
It appears to me necessary to bring to the notice of the War Cabinet the state 
of the Air Service in France. On the 15th of January I informed the War 
Cabinet, at the conference in London, that this service would probably not be 
fully ready for an offensive by the 1st April. To-day the situation appears to be 
worse than I hoped. . . . I was informed officially by the War Office on the 
15th November, 1916, that the establishment of 56 squadrons was approved in 
principle, and I was furnished with a forecast of the estimated rate of supply. . 
. . [Based on what was promised and what is expected to arrive in France by 7 
March]. . . . The result may be summarized as under: 
 
(i) There will be no reserve of Corps Squadrons, and five squadrons which 
should have been new type [aircraft] will be old type [aircraft]. 
 
(ii) There will be a shortage of from four to seven fighting squadrons below 
what is promised and of seven to ten below what I asked for, and in addition 
two squadrons which should have been new type will not have been converted 
from old type. 
 
The position as regards fighting squadrons in particular is most serious. Our 
fighting machines will almost certainly be inferior in number and quite 
certainly in performance to those of the enemy. In view, therefore of the 
marked increase in number and efficiency of the German aeroplanes it 
appears that we cannot except [sic] to gain supremacy in the air in April, and 
it is even possible that it may pass to the enemy. 
 
The seriousness of this situation cannot be overrated, and its possible effect on 
the results of our operations will no doubt be fully realised by the War 
Cabinet. 1422 
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Trenchard would have been happy had he received half of those ‘expected’ 
squadrons before the spring offensive. On 1 January he commanded thirty-nine 
squadrons on the Western Front, but only twelve were categorized as “suitable for 
escort work, offensive patrols and general air combat.”1423 Even more concerning to 
Trenchard and his commanders was the fact that only five of these squadrons, 
equipped with Nieuport 17s and Sopwith Pups, were capable of engaging the Albatros 
and Fokker bi-plane equipped Jastas on equal terms.1424The War Office was only able 
to send to France six new squadrons before the start of the Arras air campaign and 
these arrived incrementally between 17 January and 27 March. Additionally the 
Admiralty had finally agreed to transfer three RNAS fighter squadrons to the RFC so 
desperate had Trenchard become for aircraft and pilots. Of the six RFC squadrons, 
four were two-seater all purpose aircraft; one was to be used solely for night bombing 
operations; and one was equipped with single-seater fighters. Two of the two-seater 
all purpose aircraft squadrons were equipped with brand new models, the first was the 
RE 8 which eventually would replace all of the obsolete BE2c aircraft in France over 
the next year and the second was the Bristol F2b Fighter.1425 Although both aircraft 
would later prove to be able to hold their own against the best German fighters and 
did quite well in combat in the hands of a well trained crew, the two new machines 
initially performed poorly during the Battle of Arras, primarily because of the lack of 
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familiarity of the machine by its crews.1426  Of the seventy-seven RE 8’s that entered 
the battle, fifteen were shot down and of the eighteen Bristol Fighters that took part in 
the battle nine were shot down with six shot down during the Bristol Fighter’s 
initiation into the air war on 5 April in a single air combat with Von Richthofen’s 
Jasta 2.1427 
With the weather improving in March the level of air combat between the 
RFC and the Luftstreitkrafte increased in ferocity and intenseness, harbingers of what 
was to come with the air campaign during the Battle of Arras. The Official Historian 
recorded that the RFC was forced to deal with “an onslaught that surpassed all 
previous experience.”1428 Because of the pressure the German Jastas were putting on 
the RFC’s I Brigade, on 19 March, Trenchard was forced to commit the squadrons of 
III and V Brigades to assist I Brigade whose mission was to support the BEF’s First 
Army, slated as the main effort for the spring offensive. The Jastas effectiveness is 
evidenced by the number of casualties they inflicted on the British squadrons in less 
than four weeks. For the month of March the RFC had 120 aircraft shot down, with 59 
of those crashing behind the British lines.1429  The Luftstreitkrafte lost just seven 
aircraft.1430 On the eve of the Battle of Arras it was evident to both the British and 
German air commanders that the new Albatros DIII fighter was the dominant aircraft 
in the skies above France and Flanders.1431 As an example, on 9 March von 
Richthofen’s Albatros DIII equipped Jasta 2 engaged 8 FE 8 pusher fighters from 
                                                            
1426 Hilary St. George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power, 1911-1939, 135. See also 
WITA, Vol. III, 351-352. 
1427 Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, 151. See also Norman Franks, Russell Guest and Frank 
Bailey, Bloody April . . . Black September, 17.  
1428WITA, Vol. III, 321.  
1429Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, 212. See also WITA, Vol. III, 322; and Richard P. 
Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 70. 
1430Alex Imrie, German Fighter Units: 1914-May, 1917, 42. 
1431Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 69. 
384 
Number 40 Squadron. The FE 8 had arrived in France in August, 1916 and was 
obsolete by the time it saw its first combat.1432 Four of the British aircraft were shot 
down and the remaining five were all damaged and forced to land behind the British 
lines. In one air engagement one RFC squadron had lost nearly fifty percent of its 
effective strength.1433 
On 26 March, 1917, ten days before the start of the air campaign, Trenchard provided 
his intent to his subordinate commanders:  
The aim of our offensive will therefore be to force the enemy to fight well 
behind, and not on, the lines.  This aim will only be successfully achieved if 
offensive patrols are pushed well out to the limits of Army reconnaissance 
areas, and the G.O.C. looks to Brigadiers to carry out this policy and not give 
way to requests for close protection of corps machines except in special cases 
when such machines are proceeding on work at an abnormal distance over the 
lines. The aerial ascendency which was gained by our pilots and observers on 
the SOMME last year was a direct result of the policy outlined above, and 
with the considerable addition to our strength provided by the new type 
fighting squadrons now available the G.O.C. feels confident that a similar 
ascendency will be gained this year.1434 
 
Trenchard directed that his army squadrons force the German Jastas “away from the 
immediate battle area so as to ensure the greatest measure of freedom to the corps 
aeroplanes.”1435 Additionally all enemy observation balloons, rail centers and airfields were to 
be attacked.  To enable artillery-observation and reconnaissance aircraft the ability to operate 
without interference from enemy fighters, Trenchard’s staff designed a twenty mile wide 
quadrilateral shaped intercept zone that extended fifteen miles behind the German lines. At 
specific times there were as many as fifty single-seater fighters patrolling this area and twenty-
five two-seater fighters providing protection to the artillery and reconnaissance aircraft.1436 
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Primarily because of the heavy casualties sustained from December to March, 
Trenchard did not begin the RFC’s air campaign to support the BEF’s attack at Arras until five 
days before the start of the ground offensive.1437 The RFC held the advantage in total aircraft 
over the Luftstreitkrafte, 754 to 264 on the Western Front as well as in the numbers of single-
seater fighters or fighter-reconnaissance aircraft available, 385 to 114, but numbers only tell 
part of the story.1438 The real advantage went to the Germans with the more technologically 
advanced aircraft and the better trained and more experienced aircrew. 
The tactics used by the RFC described by Trenchard above had worked very well 
during the air campaign over the Somme but at Arras they met with abject failure. On the 
Somme the RFC had the more technologically superior aircraft until the last eight weeks of the 
offensive but over Arras the Luftstreitkrafte held that advantage. The grim results did not 
surprise Trenchard as he had fairly predicted and informed his chain of command, both 
military and political, what might happen to the RFC if it was not equipped with enough 
combat capable aircraft to oppose the advancements made by the  Luftstreitkrafte. In the first 
five days of the air campaign which began on 4 April, the RFC had 75 aircraft shot down with 
a loss of 105 aircrew. Sixty percent of those losses were from the corps squadrons conducting 
aerial photography or artillery observation and direction missions.1439 On 6 April alone twenty 
British aircraft were shot down with 23 aircrew killed and another 14 taken prisoner.1440 Even 
more worrisome to Trenchard and his commanders was the fact that a further 56 aircraft were 
lost to flying accidents. The resulting strain on aircrew nerves and morale can be imagined.1441 
It can only be guessed at as to how many of those accidents were caused by untrained or 
exhausted pilots. Thus in the first week alone the RFC had lost 131 aircraft. Trenchard’s aide, 
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Maurice Baring correctly foresaw what the RFC was to experience in the coming weeks at 
Arras when he recorded in his diary on 7 April that “Fighting in the air on a battle scale had 
begun. We had not got the necessary number of fighter machines. Du Peuty gave us enough 
Nieuports to supply a whole squadron. It was evident that we should not get through the battle 
and do the work of the Armies without severe loss.”1442 
After the heavy losses suffered by his squadrons in March and the first five days of his 
air campaign over Arras, Trenchard should have reconsidered the purpose of his ‘incessant 
and continuous offensive.’ As Alex Revell has identified an “offensive policy is unsuited to a 
technically inferior side.”1443It would have been wise and prudent for the RFC commander to 
scale back his offensive strategy and surge his fighters when and where they were needed 
instead of sending them deeper and deeper behind enemy lines to seek a fight. But that was 
not how Trenchard operated, most especially when Haig’s ground forces were attacking and 
required constant air support. Another reason Trenchard did not alter his strategy was because 
he believed the RFC was inflicting severe losses on the Luftstreitkrafte. On 6 April he notified 
Haig that his squadrons were ‘getting on top of the Huns.’1444 In reality the German air service 
had only lost six aircraft in the first week over Arras.1445   
For the RFC April became the deadliest month of the war. The Official Historian 
recorded that “In no other month throughout the war was the Royal Flying Corps so hard 
pressed, nor were the casualties suffered so heavy.”1446 All total the RFC lost 245 aircraft shot 
down by the Luftstreitkrafte or German ground forces during that thirty day period out of 821 
operational aircraft at the start of the battle. The Luftstreitkrafte lost just 66, a British to 
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German loss ratio of four to one.1447The human cost was staggering as well: 435 British 
aircrew had become casualties in six weeks of air combat with 211 killed in action or died of 
wounds; another 108 had become prisoners of war, as well as 116 being wounded out of a 
starting strength of 854 men with 754 aircrew actually assigned to squadrons on 1 April.1448 
Compared to the RFC’s casualty totals for the five month Somme offensive of 499, the air 
campaign over Arras had been nearly catastrophic. It was because of this extremely high cost 
in aircrew lives that the month of April, 1917 became known as ‘Bloody April’ to the aircrew 
who survived it.1449  
The air campaign over Arras continued on until the ground battle was called to a halt 
on 17 May. In a span of eight days the RFC lost two of its most famous and respected fighter 
pilots. On 29 April, Major H. D. Harvey-Kelly, squadron commander of Number 19 Squadron 
and renowned for being the first British pilot to land in France after war was declared, was 
shot down after engaging von Richthofen’s Jasta 2.1450 A week later, Captain Albert Ball with 
44 victories to his credit, was killed after an aerial combat with Lothar von Richthofen.  Ball 
had forced the German to crash land with a disabled engine but then flew into low clouds. His 
aircraft was observed by two German officers on the ground to exit the clouds inverted less 
than two hundred feet above the ground and crash.1451 Trenchard’s aide, Maurice Baring 
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observed that Ball’s death “cast a gloom through the entire Flying Corps.”1452 Trenchard 
himself wrote that Ball was “one of the most daring, skillful and successful pilots the Flying 
Corps has ever had.”1453 Ball was just twenty years of age when he was killed.1454 
German losses from 31 March to 11 May totaled 68 with thirty-three killed, sixteen 
missing and nineteen wounded.1455 Critical to note is that because of losses and delays in 
providing replacement aircraft to the eight Jastas primarily engaged with the RFC squadrons 
in the Arras sector during the month of April, there were on average only seven operational 
fighters available on a daily basis per Jasta as compared to a British fighter squadron that had 
between 14 and 18 aircraft1456 This meant that the Luftstreitkrafte was only able to put 56 
fighter aircraft in the air against the RFC at any given time during the first four weeks of the 
air campaign. It was these few aircraft that inflicted such heavy casualties on a force that 
outnumbered it by at least three to one throughout the battle.1457 
In sum, the near catastrophic losses the RFC suffered during ‘Bloody April’ 1917 can 
be traced directly back to the air service’s eight month long air campaign over the Somme in 
1916 and the Pyrrhic victory against the Luftstreitkrafte that was the result of it. Each of the 
five factors analyzed throughout this paper: strategy, organization, leadership, selection and 
training of aircrew, influenced the results of the first air campaign conducted by the RFC 
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during the Battle of the Somme and just as critically set the conditions for the disaster that 
befell the RFC during the Battle of Arras which followed. Trenchard’s insistence of adhering 
to a continuous offensive strategy in both air campaigns, in which he demanded results 
regardless of the cost in aircrew’s lives, as well as an organization that was under constant 
expansion and a selection process that focused too much on class and rank instead of ability 
and experience, combined with a training system that was not allowed to adequately prepare  
aircrew for combat operations resulted in the high casualty rate that the RFC incurred during 
the air campaigns over the Somme and Arras.  
While the ground campaign failed to accomplish most of its stated objectives, the 
Somme air campaign was a victory for the RFC, albeit a Pyrrhic one. The cost in terms of 
aircrew casualties served only to be a forerunner of what was to occur on even a more costly 
scale in the air campaign that followed in April, 1917 during the Battle of Arras.  
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APPENDIX B 
FUTURE POLICY IN THE AIR (SEPTEMBER 1916) 
Since the beginning of the recent operations the fighting in the air has taken place over 
the enemy’s line, and visits of hostile aeroplanes over our lines have been rare. It is hoped that 
this state of things may continue, but as one can never be certain of anything in war, it is 
perhaps an opportune moment to consider what policy should be adopted were this state of 
affairs to change, and were the enemy to become more enterprising and more aggressive. 
It is sometimes argued that our aeroplanes should be able to prevent hostile aeroplanes 
from crossing the line, and this idea leads to a demand for defensive measures and a defensive 
policy. Now is the time to consider whether such a policy would be possible, desirable, and 
successful. 
It is the deliberate opinion of all those most competent to judge that this is not the 
case, and that an aeroplane is an offensive weapon and not a defensive weapon. Owing to the 
unlimited space in the air, the difficulty one machine has in seeing another, the accidents of 
wind and cloud, it is impossible for aeroplanes, however skilful and vigilant their pilots, 
however powerful their engines, however mobile their machines, and however numerous their 
formations, to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing the line if they have the initiative and 
determination to do so. 
The aeroplane is not a defence against the aeroplane; but it is the opinion of those 
most competent to judge that the aeroplane, as a weapon of attack, cannot be too highly 
estimated. 
A signal instance of this fact is offered to us by the operations which took place in the 
air at Verdun. When the operations at Verdun began, the French had few machines on the 
spot. A rapid concentration was made, and a vigorous offensive policy was adopted. The result 
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was that superiority in the air was obtained immediately, and the machines detailed for 
artillery co-operation and photography were enabled to carry out their work unmolested, but 
as new units were put into the line which had less experience of working with aeroplanes, a 
demand arose in some quarters for machines of protection, and these demands were for a time 
complied with. The result was that the enemy took the offensive, and the French machines 
were unable to prevent the hostile raids which the enemy, no longer being attacked, was now 
able to make. The mistake was at once realized and promptly rectified. A policy of general 
offensive was once more resumed, and the enemy at once ceased to make hostile raids, all his 
time being taken up in fighting the machines which were now attacking him. Superiority in the 
air was once more regained. 
On the British front, during the operations which began with the battle of the Somme, 
we know that, although the enemy had concentrated the greater part of his available forces in 
the air on this front, the work actually accomplished by their aeroplanes stands, as compared 
with the work done by us, in the proportion of 4 to 100. From the accounts of prisoners we 
gather that the enemy’s aeroplanes have received orders not to cross the lines over the French 
or British front unless the day is cloudy and a surprise attack can be made, presumably in 
order to avoid unnecessary casualties. On the other hand, British aviation has been guided by a 
policy of relentless and incessant offensive. Our machines have continually attacked the 
enemy on his side of the line, bombed his aerodromes, besides carrying out attacks on places 
of importance far behind the lines. It would seem probable that this has had the effect so far on 
the enemy of compelling him to keep back or to detail portions of his forces in the air for 
defensive purposes. 
When Lille station was attacked from the air for the first time no hostile aeroplanes 
were encountered. The second time this place was attacked our machines encountered a 
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squadron of Fokkers which were there for defensive purposes. This is only one instance 
among many.  
The question which arises is this: Supposing the enemy, under the influence of some 
drastic reformer or some energetic leader, were now to change his policy and follow the 
example of the English and French, and were to cease using his aeroplanes as a weapon of 
defence and to start a vigorous offensive and attacks as many places as far behind the our lines 
as he could, what would be the sound policy to follow in such a case? Should we abandon our 
offensive, bring back our squadrons behind the line to defend places like Boulogne, St. Omer, 
Amiens, and Abbeville, and protect our artillery and photographic machines with defensive 
escorts, or should we continue our offensive more vigorously than before? Up to now the 
work done by the Germans compared with that done by our aeroplanes stands, as we have 
seen, in the proportion of 4 to 100; but let us suppose that the enemy initiated a partial 
offensive in the air, and that his work increased, compared with ours, to a proportion of 30 or 
50 to 100, it is then quite certain that a demand for protective measures would arise for 
protective squadrons and machines for defensive patrols. 
One of the causes of such demands is the moral effect produced by a hostile 
aeroplane, which is out of all proportion to the damage which it can inflict. 
The mere presence of a hostile machine in the air inspires those on the ground with 
exaggerated forebodings with regard to what the machine is capable of doing. For instance, at 
one time on one part of the front, whenever a hostile machine, or what was thought to be a 
hostile machine, was reported, whistles were blown and men hid in the trenches. In such cases 
the machines were at far too great a height to observe the presence of men on the ground at all, 
and even if the presence of men observed it would not lead to a catastrophe. Again, a machine 
which was reported in one place would certainly, since it was flying rapidly, be shortly 
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afterwards observed in another part of the lines and reported again, but the result of these 
reports was often that for every time the machine was sighted a separate machine was 
reported, leading at the end of the day to a magnified and exaggerated total. 
The sound policy then which should guide all warfare in the air would seem to be this: 
to exploit this moral effect of the aeroplane on the enemy, but not let him exploit it on 
ourselves. Now this can only be done by attacking and continuing to attack. 
It has been our experience in the past that at a time when the Germans were doing 
only half the work done by our machines that their mere presence over our lines produced an 
insistent and continuous demand for protective and defensive measures. 
If the Germans were once more to increase the degree of their activity even up to what 
constitutes half the degree of our activity, it is certain that such demands would be made 
again. 
On the other hand, it is equally certain that, were such measures to be adopted, they 
would prove ineffectual. As long as a battle is being fought, any machine at the front line has 
five times the value that the same machine would have far behind the lines. 
If the enemy were aware of the presence of a defensive force in one particular spot he 
would leave that spot alone and attack another, and we should not have enough machines to 
protect all the places which could possibly be attacked behind our lines, and at the same time 
continue the indispensable work on the front.  
But supposing we had enough machines both for offensive and defensive purposes. 
Supposing we had an unlimited number of machines for defensive purposes, it would still be 
impossible to prevent hostile machines from crossing the line if they were determined to do 
so, simply because the sky is too large to defend. At sea a number of destroyers will have 
difficulty in preventing a hostile destroyer, and still more a hostile submarine, from breaking 
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the blockade. But in the air the difficulty of defence is still greater, because the area of 
possible escape is practically unlimited, and because the aeroplane is fighting in three 
dimensions. 
The sound policy would seem to be that if the enemy changes his tactics and pursues a 
more vigorous offensive, to increase our offensive, to go farther afield, and to force the enemy 
to do what he would gladly have us do now. If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a purely 
defensive policy, or a partially offensive policy, we should be doing what the French have 
learnt by experience to be a failure, and what the rank and file of the enemy, by their own 
accounts, point to as being one of the main causes of their recent reverses. 
Moreover, in adopting such a policy it appears probable that the Germans are guided 
by necessity rather than by choice, owing to the many fronts on which they now have to fight, 
and owing also to the quality and the quantity of machines they have to face on the Western 
Front alone. Nevertheless, one cannot repeat too often that in war nothing is certain, and that 
the Germans may, either owing to the pressure of public opinion, or the construction of new 
types of machines, or the rise of a new leader, change their policy at any moment for a more 
aggressive one. 
 
Advanced Headquarters 
Royal Flying Corps 
22 September 19161458 
 
                                                            
1458 AIR 1/522/16/12/5,  NA. 
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APPENDIX C 
HAIG’S LETTER TO THE WAR OFFICE (30 SEPTEMBER 1916) 
 I have the honour to request that the immediate attention of the Army Council may be 
given to the urgent necessity for a very early increase in the numbers and efficiency of the 
fighting aeroplanes at my disposal. Throughout the last three months the Royal Flying Corps 
in France has maintained such a measure of superiority over the enemy in the air that it has 
been enabled to render services of incalculable value. The result is that the enemy has made 
extraordinary efforts to increase the number, and develop the speed and power, of his fighting 
machines. He has unfortunately succeeded in doing so and it is necessary to realize clearly, 
and at once, that we shall undoubtedly lose our superiority in the air if I am not provided at an 
early date with improved means of retaining it. Within the last few days the enemy has 
brought into action on the Somme front a considerable number of fighting aeroplanes which 
are faster, handier, and capable of attaining a greater height than any at my disposal with the 
exception of one squadron of single-seater Nieuports, one of F.E. Rolls Royce, and one of 
Sopwiths,-the last mentioned being inferior to the enemy’s new machines in some respects 
though superior in others. All other fighting machines at my disposal are decidedly inferior. 
The result of the advent of the enemy’s improved machines has been a marked increase in the 
casualties suffered by the Royal Flying Corps, and though I do not anticipate losing our 
present predominance in the air for the next three or four months, the situation after that 
threatens to be very serious unless adequate steps to deal with it are taken at once. I have 
directed the G.O.C. Royal Flying Corps in France to put forward a statement of our estimated 
requirements. 
 In a personal letter to Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
written the same day, Sir Douglas Haig pointed out that the increase in RFC losses in the last 
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two weeks of September meant that “we were now doing less distant fighting with the result 
that an increasing number of German machines now come up to the lines, and a few cross 
them, whereas practically no German machines crossed the line in the first two months of the 
battle. It is the fighting far behind the enemy’s lines that tells most.”1459 
 
 
                                                            
1459 WITA, Vol.  2, 296-297. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ROYAL FLYING CORPS STATISTICS FOR THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME  
1 JULY–17 NOVEMBER 1916 
Aircraft 
Serviceable on1 July:   410 (219 were artillery spotting aircraft) 
Serviceable on 17 November  550 (299 were artillery spotting aircraft) 
Destroyed (combat or in accidents) 782 
Missing    190 
Completely rebuilt at Depot  173 
Returned to England   178 
Flown to England   57 
Flown from England   867 
Flown from Paris   139 
Average rate of replacement in squadrons (per month) 10 
Engines repaired at Pont de l’Arche 537 
Pilots 
Available on 1 July   426 
Available on 17 July   585 
Killed, wounded, or missing  308 
Non battle casualties   268 
Observers 
Killed, wounded, or missing.  191 
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RFC Aircrew Losses on the Western Front during the Air Campaign over the Somme, 
April to November, 19161460 
 
MONTH KIA WIA POW Total 
Casualties  
April 6 10 8 24 
May 11 5 7 23 
June 11 16 7 34 
July  40 38 26 104 
August 33 25 24 82 
September 63 34 40 137 
October 50 27 27 104 
November 36 27 15 78 
TOTAL 250 162 154 586 
 
Squadrons 
1 July     27 
17 November    35 
Balloons 
1 July     14 
17 November    35 
Wireless 
Ground stations    542 
Operators on 1 July   689 
Operators on 17 November  883 
Operator casualties   27 
Aircraft fitted with   306 
 
                                                            
1460 RFC Personnel Casualty Reports, AIR 1/844/204/5/369 through AIR 1/845/204/5/376, NA. It has 
been determined that 499 of the 586 casualties occurred over the Somme. The other 87 casualties 
occurred in the skies over Flanders, particularly the Ypres sector. The table above does not take into 
account the 268 non-battle casualties identified in Chapter Eight. 
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Bombing 
Raids with definite targets  298 
Number of bombs dropped  17,600 
Weight of bombs dropped  292 tons 
Photography 
Photographs taken   19,000 
Prints of photographs made  420,000 
Artillery Co-operation 
Targets registered with air observation 8,612 
Hostile aircraft 
Destroyed    164 
Driven down damaged   205 
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APPENDIX E 
“Too Many Casualties” 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sholto Douglas, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside 
 “The Battle of Arras in 1917 and the heavy casualties that it cost the Royal 
Flying Corps provided me with the most anxious period that I was to know during the 
whole of my life in the Air Force. During the two years that I spent as Commander-in-
Chief of Fighter Command in the Second World War, I was called upon to wage an 
offensive fighter campaign against the Luftwaffe that reminded me only too vividly of 
what had happened to us in the early spring of 1917. Our casualties had been much 
worse in the first war, but in 1941-42 I could not expect the young fighter pilots under 
my command to know much about that. 
 But the severity of our losses early in 1917 was not entirely due to the 
superiority of the German fighters. The continued demand for an increase in the 
numerical strength of the Royal Flying Corps was still leading to new pilots being sent 
to the front with far from enough training, or even with sufficient hours of bare 
experience in the air, and it was in addition to the need for replacements for the 
squadrons already in the thick of the fighting. Because of what I found then, as one of 
the squadron commanders who had to accept these raw replacements, I came to feel 
very strongly about what I considered was a short-sighted policy, and I have been 
given no reason to change that view. 
 I am quite aware that Boom Trenchard was admitting as early as the beginning 
of 1916 that the pilots coming out to the front were insufficiently trained, and also that 
his complaint did lead to a great improvement in the system of training at home. But 
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his insistence that there should be at the same time a rapid formation of more and 
more squadrons for service at the front went a long way towards undermining that 
system; and that magnificent eagerness of Trenchard’s to use the air for offence 
against the enemy led him, quite unintentionally, to make greater demands on the new 
pilots than were justified. 
 In the spring of 1917 the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps outnumbered 
those of the German Air Force by about two to one; but numbers alone did not spell 
superiority. I have always felt that we would have been much better off if we had 
greater experience; and quite a few of us who served on the Western Front and who 
were later to become senior commanders in the Royal Air Force felt the same way 
about Trenchard’s policy of driving hard and almost regardless of cost.”1461 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1461 Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat: A Personal Story of the First War in the Air, (London: Collins, 
1963), 179-180. 
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